No, they really absolutely never did and never had to do so. At a crude level the Allies did not enter mainland Europe until the fall of 1943, where the Soviet Union spent that time being the only Ally with troops on European soil at all.
Last I checked Tunisia was not in Europe but in Africa.
This is a self-serving myth meeting psychological needs of German and democratic soldiers of the time with precious little relevance to the reality of Operation Citadel-Kutuzov-Rumiantsev. The Nazis would have kept the battle going only insofar as they were willing to set up even worse problems than otherwise, as their major successes in the south had no impact whatsoever on the Soviet victory against the northern pincer and opening of their own offensive against Orel. Three divisions were proposed to be withdrawn, only one was, the other two remained involved in the fighting up to the Dnepr River.
No, the invasion bogged down a good number of Allied troops as it was poorly-led and worse-conceived, meeting primarily the need to avoid following up Tunisia with another few months of a Soviets-only war in continental Europe, and then it was downhill from the failure of Montgomery and Clark to fight a single campaign and the pattern of a US war in Italy and a UK war in Italy. The invasion tied down no significant number of German troops, nor did it show anything beyond that the Allies were able to make judicious use of firepower as a means to paper over the inability of either Alexander or Clark to fight a war.
Not at all, this would have happened regardless as Tito was the only Yugoslav leader interested in actually fighting the Germans. More aid to Tito would have meant more Germans sent against him with or without Italy, and Tito was as a Communist hardly the kind of ally the democracies would really want to emphasize.
True, and this really does testify to the ability of the democracies to engage in successful deception warfare, shown by the German inability to comprehend Overlord was the real landing three weeks into the fighting.
All of them would be skirmishes by the standard of the Axis-Soviet War where the "small" battles like Krivoi Rog, Brody, Debrecen, and others were with forces that size.
I was actually being generous to the democracies in rating their contributions at 5%, in terms of defeating the Wehrmacht their ground contribution is really for both around 2.5%, the USA still above the UK in that at least US generals could turn overwhelming advantages into actual victories in contrast to the immense difficulties the British had in say, Crete and North Africa where competent handling of either would have produced much simpler wars for the democracies.
Also nonsense, the bulk of the German army was always a 1918 force with horse-drawn artillery and logistics, the ultra-modern core was always a miniscule amount of Nazi forces. This never changed at any point during the Nazis' period of strength, a Nazi force with somewhat better motorization would have turned Barbarossa into a full victory.
Given the Soviets were able to win the Battle of Moscow with infantrymen against airplanes and panzers, I really doubt the one caused the other or had any impact on Soviet lethality. The Soviets were able to use a quarter-million men to curbstomp the Nazis and gain 100 miles when overwhelming numerical and firepower advantages took the British deep into Egypt against numerically inferior and logistically shrimpy forces commanded by Rommel.
Bollocks, the Soviet role in the naval war is non-existent, the Soviet Navy played no role in Allied naval policy.
Again, I don't think this quite works out this way. The Soviets, after all, had partitioned Poland and engaged in cheap, easy annexations of the three Baltic states and run into a buzzsaw in Finland *before* Barbarossa, where the British and the USA were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to actually avoid fighting, including preferring leaflets over German cities when the Germans were slaughtering Polish civilians and detonating synagogues left and right. In the war as it turned out the combination of decisive democratic victory on sea and in the air and Soviet ground power was more than sufficient to obliterate German military power. Without any of that triumvirate, a Soviet-Nazi war would be a horrific bloodbath, as would an Anglo-American/Nazi War.
Leaving aside the whole starving 3 million Bengalis willfully and purposefully and British decisions to deliberately target civilians in Germany at the expense of saving their own shipping when they had the technology to do so but Bomber Harris's hard-on for area bombing would not permit it.
Eh, no. The Soviets really did need the trucks and radios and railroads. They were the key element in the difference between the 1943 and 1941 Red Armies, and the Soviet economy's primary focus was on tools of war. There the Soviets accomplished an economic miracle but without Allied lend-lease in the form of food, trucks, and railroads I highly doubt the USSR would have wound up with more than a stalemate that would have meant clearing their borders of the Nazis who would also be bled white in the fighting that would have been the case. The 1941 invasion took a lot of the USSR's best land for this and deprived it equally of a lot of food, while one of the real Soviet saving graces here is that the Nazis were much worse at economics than the none-too-brilliant Stalinist system was.