Improvised supply for a 1941 German mediterranean strategy

We just had a thread on what should Hitler do if no Barbarossa. Focusing on one of the options, Lets say in January 1941 after Italian reverses in North Africa and East Africa and Greece Hitler decides to delay the Russian Campaign until 1942 and use 1941 to completely eliminate the British position / threat in the eastern med by taking the port of Alexandria and also closing the Suez canal (no further advance would be considered).

It has been the consensus on this forum that the Axis couldn't supply the forces via Libyan ports and by the poor coastal road over long distances in strength that would let them take Egypt. Often quoted is the book "Supplying War" by Creveld which talks of these limitations in detail.

However considering the considerable force kept supply by air sucessfully at Demanysk (6 divisions) and a much larger force unsucessfully at Stalingrad, it seems reasonable that the Germans if they committed the bulk of their air transport, that they could increase their supply capability over OTL, delivering fuel and other supplies close to the front.

At the same time the Germans could implement a crash program of constructing more siebel ferries and MFPs. These useful craft could carry tank, trucks and 88s across the med and unload them right on the beach close to the front. These were constructed in sections and could be shipped anywhere (I wonder if they could be contract built without weaponry (added later) in neutral shipyards in Spain, Sweeden, Turkey and the Soviet Union).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siebel_ferry

With the Soviet Union still neutral, the Germans would have more time to secure the Balkans, round up POWs, secure arms stockpiles, etc. and the Communist Partisans would not be engaged in Yougoslavia and Greece allowing the Germans to secure the supply routes through these places better than OTL.

Plus the bulk of the Luftwaffe would be available for Malta suppression / air cover over convoys, also improving supply vs. OTL.

With all these increases combined it seems like the Germans would be able to add to their existing forces, a small Panzer Division (15th and 21st Panzer sized), a few more motorized 88 mm batteries, a motorized combat engineer regiment, some motorized artillery batteries and keep these supplied. (More than that seems unrealistic). Italians forces would be the same as OTL.

Would these extra forces, considering German tactical superiority, allow the Germans to take Tobruk, advance across Egypt and take Alexandria in 1941?????
 

drakle

Banned
Air supply was used for encircled armies not for regular supply. It will waste aircraft that could be used attacking britan.
 

Deleted member 1487

The best bet would have been a combined naval-air campaign to cut off British shipping around the Home Isles. The Mediterranean was a waste of effort IMHO because the Germans couldn't project their strength there even with Italian help. Germany was not a naval power and Italy too weak of one to really make progress in the area. However the North Sea and Atlantic were vulnerable to German naval/air forces thanks to bases in France, Norway, and the Lowlands. Focus on a long blockade/siege from July 1940 on and Britain would be in a very tough spot by July 1941.
As I've said before, bombing and mining the major port areas of Merseyside, Clydeside, and the Bristol Channel would collapse the British war effort; even just a sustained bombing and mining campaign of the Mersey would cripple the British, while Uboats would make things that much harder in the Atlantic. If run from July 1940 Britain would be doomed in the long run IMHO.
 
The best bet would have been a combined naval-air campaign to cut off British shipping around the Home Isles. The Mediterranean was a waste of effort IMHO because the Germans couldn't project their strength there even with Italian help. Germany was not a naval power and Italy too weak of one to really make progress in the area. However the North Sea and Atlantic were vulnerable to German naval/air forces thanks to bases in France, Norway, and the Lowlands. Focus on a long blockade/siege from July 1940 on and Britain would be in a very tough spot by July 1941.
As I've said before, bombing and mining the major port areas of Merseyside, Clydeside, and the Bristol Channel would collapse the British war effort; even just a sustained bombing and mining campaign of the Mersey would cripple the British, while Uboats would make things that much harder in the Atlantic. If run from July 1940 Britain would be doomed in the long run IMHO.

A combined air/sea campaign against British shipping seems like a good idea if the Germans can decide that is what they want to do in July 40, plan on sticking it out through early 42, and start adjusting thier production accordingly.

The strategy here is that if the British are tied down around the British Isles they can't pick on Italy so much in 40-41.

The Germans OTL just seemed to stagger from June 40 through June of 41 with sort of an ad hoc general strategy and wasted a bunch of time (and aircraft in the BofB).
 
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