Improve the Singapore Strategy

[Cryhavoc101]

Five Years. Example is Pearl Harbor. 0-class II 1933-1937. Class II to Class I 1942-1943.

See previous comment.

Geography. See previous map? If one cannot forward defend north of Luzon, then the ONLY other naval geography that works is the Andaman Islands.

Again - perfect foresight would be required and had that existed they would not have needed the base anyway

See map. See Thailand? Worry.

Never happen. EVEN under those conditions, the RN staff, judged their means to hand was inadequate in a straight fleet square-off. as in British battleships (their metric) were inferior to Japanese battleships and that the Japanese could bring an 11 to 7 (actually with the "R"s 11 to 5 based on speed gauge) surplus in offense/defense into region compared to what the RN could safely risk out of Europe. That is why from Backhouse forward, the British kept asking the Americans for "help".

The Japanese were no more able to concentrate their entire Battleship fleet in such a fashion than the UK and the USA was at that stage of the war

As for Thailand - not an issue until the Germans cross the Meuse and end France as a major power - the Thais are not jumping in with the Japanese, with Thailand effectively surrounded as they were by France and the UK and only jumped to the Japanese camp at the 11th hour (effectively the 12th hour as they resisted the initial Japanese invasion in Dec 41)

And the British have 'only' fought coalition warfare in major wars for 200 odd years ever since the Europeans ganged up on them in the 1700s (if not before) - of course they asked the USA for help.

Its how 'sensible' nations fight wars - WW2 was no different

 

[McPherson]

But you're ignoring that by Dec 41 the RN has been at war for a long time fighting two European powers who are both closer to the most important part of the empire for the majority of RN and its paymasters. The stuff in the far east was the spare stuff that a hard pressed power could send to what it considered a third rated theatre? Many of the ships are WWI era for example the R class that were not really suitable for any real fighting by then, but they existed and so were used at least to try and make a fleet in being in east.

The British sent what they thought were their regional and situational experts and actually gave them the adequate tools to do the job. (Percival and Phillips). The Americans knew these two idiots were clowns. Did not help that the Americans (Thomas Hart specifically to Phillips face told him to go to hell and Phillips took Force Z with him and did.) knew they had their own clowns, too. (Hart's opinion of MacArthur, Brett, Brereton and Kimmel and their clown clubs.). Seeing the freight train coming and having enough sense to jump off the tracks is kind of difficult when one is a racist colonialist imperialist interloper bigot and believes one's own culturally biased assessment of the locomotive engineer oncoming as being a cartoonish buffoon.

Proper planning is to always assume the other fellow is as good or better than you are and is on the ball.

More modern example...

The other guy is always good. Dangerously so. Human beings constantly surprise each other that way. And I have no idea why that keeps happening after 2 million years of it.

 

[McPherson]

Torpedoes, sure. The IJN outclassed everyone. In everything else there were pros and cons to each, and it balanced out.

Actually no. The Japanese torpedoes were no better than anyone elses. They missed more often than American ones did. What the IJN fish DID was go bang instead of go clang. Took Americans 2 years to fix that goddamned exploder. Then it was American fish that were deadly.

I didn't say night air ops. I said night carrier strike (Taranto, Bismarck, Matapan). The IJN had nothing, the US had nothing until Independence and Enterprise started experimenting in 1943. The RN was well-practiced. Somerville was all ready to go against Nagumo until he got the update that the IJN had more carriers present than he'd previously thought, and he decided that the gamble wasn't worth the prize. That was a judgement call that others have disagreed with. Best case scenario would have ended with the IJNs five best carriers and their most useful four capital ships gone, and the world's greatest comedy happening in Ernie King's office when he found out. Worse case scenario would have cost the RN two fleet carriers and combat strength equivalent to about twice the 1945 USN at a time when it could least afford to lose anything, and opened up the Indian Ocean to the IJN. Far more intelligent and knowledgeable individuals than either of us reckon he was right to play the percentages.

Japanese did it while ships were moving, not when the ships were in port. Might also consult "Those Marvelous Tin Fish" pp35-45 and read about the "Barge War". ATL treatment is based on RTL Solomon Islands campaign. Somerville's fliers botched recon. Braindead Takagi put night fliers over Fletcher's flattops during Coral Sea. They did not attack due to strike coordinator confusions and a navigation error that led the IJNAS pilots to believe they were over their own decks. Odd thing is that the AAA and the CAP should have clued them in.

Somerville never had a chance when even the IJN clown club was THAT good.

What British submarine force? It had been sent to the Med where it was busy terrorising the Germans and Italians. You'll forgive me for not putting too much weight on the opinion of the IJN when it came to submarine warfare, given their ASW track record.

The one that turned in its miserable performance during ABDA.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Actually no. The Japanese torpedoes were no better than anyone elses. They missed more often than American ones did. What the IJN fish DID was go bang instead of go clang. Took Americans 2 years to fix that goddamned exploder. Then it was American fish that were deadly.

Japanese did it while ships were moving, not when the ships were in port. Might also consult "Those Marvelous Tin Fish" pp35-45 and read about the "Barge War". ATL treatment is based on RTL Solomon Islands campaign. Somerville's fliers botched recon. Braindead Takagi put night fliers over Fletcher's flattops during Coral Sea. They did not attack due to strike coordinator confusions and a navigation error that led the IJNAS pilots to believe they were over their own decks. Odd thing is that the AAA and the CAP should have clued them in.

Somerville never had a chance when even the IJN clown club was THAT good.

The one that turned in its miserable performance during ABDA.

IIRC both Bismarck and Vittorio Veneto were moving quite quickly and most definitely not in port.

 

[Captain Seafort]

Actually no. The Japanese torpedoes were no better than anyone elses. They missed more often than American ones did.

Faster, further, stealthier, and reliable. Given their vastly greater range it's hardly surprising if they missed more.

What the IJN fish DID was go bang instead of go clang.

Last I checked it took the USN the best part of a year just to go clang. I wouldn't be surprised if there were things wrong with the Mk 14 and its relatives that were never discovered because they cancelled each other out.

Somerville never had a chance when even the IJN clown club was THAT good.

Somerville knew exactly where the KB was. They didn't have a clue where he was, or even that he was nearby. He chose not to strike because it would signal his proximity and he couldn't guarantee taking out the lot in a single night.

IIRC both Bismarck and Vittorio Veneto were moving quite quickly and most definitely not in port.

Ditto Pola, which was hit even later in the day than Bismarck later was.

 

[naraic]

The one that turned in its miserable performance during ABDA.

Maybe it's just ignorance on my part but I believe the British commitment to ABDA was a pair of submarines.

I don't think it's possible for a pair of subarmines to have a miserable performance due to the nature of submarine combat at the time.

 

[jsb]

Slips in length vs total slips. Capital ship slips were approximately equal.

I don't understand GB had far more slips than Japan, just look at how many ships RN had on slips on 1 Jan 39? (5 v 2 BBs & 4 v 3 CVs before we look at the cruiser classes laid down by RN)

AAA.

Directors matter. Radar matters. The IJN did not have radar, but they had "decent" all angle AAA optical and they had a good fighter line. Not until the British got a line of their own, would they be able to handle the air part of the air-sea battle. And they never figured their AAA defense out against low angle approach too well. The IJN had. Example is Santa Cruz.

Any evidence that RN AA fire was worse than IJN at any point in the war, look at how many attacks from large land based forces they had to fight in Med?

The British sent what they thought were their regional and situational experts and actually gave them the adequate tools to do the job. (Percival and Phillips).

Not sure that the forces could really be described as close to adequate? Was much of the actions taken not a result of knowing they were not adequate to the threat ie thinking they have to sortie at sea as the land/air forces are known to be inadequate?

 

[McPherson]

I don't understand GB had far more slips than Japan, just look at how many ships RN had on slips on 1 Jan 39? (5 v 2 BBs & 4 v 3 CVs before we look at the cruiser classes laid down by RN)

6 vs 6.

Any evidence that RN AA fire was worse than IJN at any point in the war, look at how many attacks from large land based forces they had to fight in Med?

Force Z was based on Med Experience and estimates. It was WIPED OUT.

Not sure that the forces could really be described as close to adequate? Was much of the actions taken not a result of knowing they were not adequate to the threat ie thinking they have to sortie at sea as the land/air forces are known to be inadequate?

Enough troops and aircraft for MATADOR or to handle the Special Attack Force. Once Yamashita got the airfields in the Kra, it was game over. Hence Percival and Phillips who knew that was the lynchpin of Japanese planning, misused their adequate forces to prevent it from happening and lost.

They underestimated the Japanese.

 

[Captain Seafort]

Any evidence that RN AA fire was worse than IJN at any point in the war, look at how many attacks from large land based forces they had to fight in Med?

Some of Force Z's AAA ammunition was disintegrating in the weapons because it couldn't handle the heat and humidity. The problem was identified and fixed in subsequent production, but that didn't help Force Z.

Not sure that the forces could really be described as close to adequate? Was much of the actions taken not a result of knowing they were not adequate to the threat ie thinking they have to sortie at sea as the land/air forces are known to be inadequate?

Given that "the job" in question was to deter the Japanese from attacking in the first place the tools were manifestly inadequate.

 

[McPherson]

Maybe it's just ignorance on my part but I believe the British commitment to ABDA was a pair of submarines.

I don't think it's possible for a pair of subarmines to have a miserable performance due to the nature of submarine combat at the time.

Four. Two were pulled out almost immediately. The other two accomplished ZERO.

 

[jsb]

6 vs 6.

Er how do you get 6 v 6 ?

I make it 2 Yamatos v 5 KVGs and 4 I class v Shōkaku class & Hiryū in terms of capital ships on slips1 Jan 1939?

Force Z was based on Med Experience and estimates. It was WIPED OUT.

From Med experience it was supposed to have a CV for air cover, but that did not happen and something had to be improvised badly anyway leading to disaster.

 

[McPherson]

Faster, further, stealthier, and reliable. Given their vastly greater range it's hardly surprising if they missed more.

Beyond 200 seconds nose wander carries a torpedo off solution, so make that 7000 + meters = miss.

Last I checked it took the USN the best part of a year just to go clang. I wouldn't be surprised if there were things wrong with the Mk 14 and its relatives that were never discovered because they cancelled each other out.

You would be wrong. The fish HIT when set shallow (Shōhō for example. Kaga is another.) They just did not explode. That was the Mark 6 exploder.

Somerville knew exactly where the KB was. They didn't have a clue where he was, or even that he was nearby. He chose not to strike because it would signal his proximity and he couldn't guarantee taking out the lot in a single night.

No he didn't. Or that Canadian PBY would not have been shot down while Somerville was off refueling and out of position.

Ditto Pola, which was hit even later in the day than Bismarck later was.

No air cover. Try that in the slot or even earlier at Java Sea.

 

[McPherson]

Er how do you get 6 v 6 ?

I make it 2 Yamatos v 5 KVGs and 4 I class v Shōkaku class & Hiryū in terms of capital ships on slips1 Jan 1939?

Slipways for capital ships. Not hulls... slipways. 2 Shōkakus, 2 Yamatos, and a slue of shadow carrier conversions (5 of them)

 

[Captain Seafort]

Slipways for capital ships. Not hulls... slipways. 2 Shōkakus, 2 Yamatos, and a slue of shadow carrier conversions (5 of them)

5 (KGV) + 4 (Illustrious) = 9. All on the slips as of 1 Jan 39.

 

[jsb]

Slipways for capital ships. Not hulls... slipways. 2 Shōkakus, 2 Yamatos, and a slue of shadow carrier conversions (5 of them)

SO How do you get 6 for the RN/GB using the same standards? How do you get 6 v 6.....?

KVG 5 & I class 4 before you even get to Unicorn, Implacables and the slips used for thinking about Lions.......forgetting the other huge RN/GB building programs at the same time like Fiji class etc?

 

[Captain Seafort]

Beyond 200 seconds nose wander carries a torpedo off solution, so make that 7000 + meters = miss.

So, exactly what I said.

You would be wrong. The fish HIT when set shallow (Shōhō for example. Kaga is another.) They just did not explode. That was the Mark 6 exploder.

I know nothing went bang. I'm simply surprised to hear of the USN figuring out they were running shallow so quickly.

No he didn't. Or that Canadian PBY would not have been shot down while Somerville was off refueling and out of position.

Who said anything about when he found out? End result: Somerville knew where his opponent was and was therefore free to engage or not at his discretion.

No air cover. Try that in the slot or even earlier at Java Sea.

In the dark, when everyone else has gone home for the night? There would be no difference. Remember that we're talking about night strike, not just night air ops.

 

[McPherson]

So, exactly what I said.

Not exactly. You wrote the IJN Type 93s were fearsome because they were stealthy and long ranged. They were actually quite noisy and were often dodged because of it. They also contrary to popular belief vented gas and left a bubble trail as clear as a wet heater.

I know nothing went bang. I'm simply surprised to hear of the USN figuring out they were running shallow so quickly.

1939. Nobody told the fighting fleet until they found it out the hard way. Even the Atomic Playboy was flummoxed when Goat Island finally told HIM.

Who said anything about when he found out? End result: Somerville knew where his opponent was and was therefore free to engage or not at his discretion.

Again he did not. His scout Albacore reported a position error of 40 nautical miles south of where Yamagucci actually was. As ASV only had an effective search conic against a carrier sized target of 25,000 meters at the search altitude in use (3000 meters) in that WEATHER in that ocean at that time (night time thermal degrades, Indian Ocean), if Somerville had launched on that botched contact report, his Albacores would have missed.

In the dark, when everyone else has gone home for the night? There would be no difference. Remember that we're talking about night strike, not just night air ops.

Black Cats. PBYs. They did not care. They struck everybody as several US destroyers found out, the hard way in THE SLOT.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

The Japanese were quite capable of night air operations (Solomons Islands). They just were not good at the air battle against a peer opponent. The FAA never was a peer opponent. The Americans took three years to become such a peer opponent (Philippine Sea.). That is how bad the disparity was in 1941 between the IJN and the allies in their operational capacities.

The U S Navy did pretty well at Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.

 

[McPherson]

The U S Navy did pretty well at Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.

I used to think so before "Shattered Sword" and "The First Team". My admiration for Fletcher grew immensely. He had a flawed weapon and he still somehow found a way to win.

 

[Rickshaw]

Zero vs. Spitfire? Darwin air battles 1942.

The Zero is a Navy fighter. The Spitfire was an RAF/RAAF fighter. There were virtually no Zeros at Darwin, except in the initial raid, mounted from Imperial Japanese Carriers. The other fighters in later battles were Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa, used by the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force. A completely different aircraft, even if nearly as maneuverable. There were no Spitfires at Darwin when the IJN attacked. Their first deployment there was on 2 Febrary 1943.