Importance of the Zimmermann Note

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whitecrow, it was not, nor could the British have sent such a telegram through German communications.

When asked to deny the telegram Zimmerman stated that he could not because it was true.


He admited not only once but twice and at a time some of the press was specultating it was a British plant. It was hard for them to believe that the Germans did something THAT stupid. It is idiotic on the face of it. Why would Mexico be willing to commit suicide for the greater glory of the German Empire? If it ever got out that Germany was behind it the US would become really pissed at Germany which is of course what happened OTL.
 
Zimmerman was asked to deny the authenticity of the telegram by an American journalist he knew to be on Germany's payroll and even that didn't ring a bell with him as to what the correct answer was.
 
Zimmerman was asked to deny the authenticity of the telegram by an American journalist he knew to be on Germany's payroll and even that didn't ring a bell with him as to what the correct answer was.

Yes, he has to be one of the biggest idiots picked for Foreign Minister in World history.
 
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Was this the view in the US? My understanding was that in 1917 the president felt that without loans the war would petter out, even with the Uboat campaign, netting him his 'peace without victory'. Wilson's agonizing had less to do with being 'in at the kill' than avoiding letting the Entente win, because they had proven themselves undeserving of total victory, and more about neutral rights and the defense of American rights and lives specifically.


He may very well have hoped for such an outcome but that's not the same as expecting it.

Remember he's not privy to the inner workings of the British Exchequer, so though he knows that Britain will be in economic difficulty without the loans, at this pooint he doesn't know how serious.

I agree, though, that it was only one consideration. Between USW and the ZT, it required real determination not to go to war - and that determination was weakening.
 
God Help Me-

Blame Harry Turtledove for how his reworking of WWI in TL-191 fascinated me enough to read John Keegan and others about the denouement of European liberalism in the totally avoidable brutal crucible of stupidity and agony of World War I.

As to the Zimmermann Telegram, it proved to be the worst brain-fart in a series of German foreign-policy screw-ups, except possibly violating Belgium's neutrality.
However, let's look at why they did so beyond assuming the stupidflu (even more virulent than the "Spanish"/Ft. Riley flu) took out Germany's leadership.

On paper, the US in 1917 wasn't much of a military threat. The US had a decent fleet, but no army worthy of playing on the killing fields of the Somme in numbers, guns or savvy and wouldn't for a year after declaring war in 1917 IOTL between American refusal to learn from the British and French and just training and gearing them up from scratch.

So from the German perspective, the US Navy wasn't going to make the blockade any worse and the US Army was laughably small- 100K all told with obsolete equipment and hadn't exactly covered themselves in glory since the Spanish-American War. They'd get butchered to a man in a slow couple of weeks in Northern France.
Seeing Black Jack Pershing blunder about after Pancho Villa probably convinced a few in the OKH that the Mexicans, if they invaded in force, could tie the US in knots for years. The Mexicans had zero chance of actually defeating the US before getting curb-stomped, but the Germans didn't care. The Mexicans' job was to keep the US from being much of a military factor in the European killing fields.

The Germans'd already spiked the Russians' guns by sending Lenin to raise havoc on the Russian home front who ended up collapsing the Provisional Government and suing for peace with Brest-Litovsk which was a spectacular success. All kinds of unintended consequences to that, but it undoubtedly worked.

Why NOT see what the Mexicans could do IF the US was "just about" to join the fray anyway?

IMO, based on what I've heard American public opinion was decidedly mixed about entering the war. Staying neutral proved quite popular and profitable.
Some folks were understandably upset losing loved ones on Allied ships during USW but they were warned of the risks.
Unless deliberately poked, FWIK the US wasn't joining the fray, especially with the ghastly casualties as the war ground on.

The problem was, as many have said, the US was already doing quite well economically keeping the Allies in the fight with loans and food and goodies as it was. They didn't need to send a single doughboy to defeat Germany in WWI if they actively sided with the Allies. The Mexicans invading wouldn't have changed that picture at all.

So long post shorter, the Germans picked the wrong tool, strategy, and roused the US to action and sealed their doom, based on some very mistaken assumptions.
One, that the Mexicans were so proud of their nation that they wanted to redress all grievances with the US post-haste, no matter the consequences.
Two-that America's resources would have little impact on the war, neutral or Allied.
Three- That America couldn't mobilize quickly enough to be a formidable military power.
 

yourworstnightmare

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I remember to have read somewhere that when the German Cabinet discussed the revival of the USW the issue of US probably joining the war came up, and I think it was Ludendorf who dismissed it as not relevant since the US had an army smaller than Portugal's. I might remember it wrong though, but someone definitely said the US was less dangerous than Portugal.
 
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I remember to have read somewhere that when the German Cabinet discussed the revival of the USW the issue of US probably joining the war came up, and I think it was Ludendorf who dismissed it as not relevant since the US had an army smaller than Portugal's.


Which was perfectly accurate - in 1917.

This is the key to everything. Most people on both sides (or neutral) expected 1917 to be the final year of war. The Germans hoped that the u-boats would win it for them in 1917. Most others expected them to lose in 1917. But nobody was really looking beyond that year. Hence German insouciance about war with the US. They assumed the war would be over - one way or the other - before American intervention could make any difference.

Wilson was under the same misapprehension. If the war had only months to run, any US force sent to Europe would be tiny, and American casualties negligible. Some American sailors would get drowned, but (given USW) probably not many more than if the US had stayed neutral. In such a short war, even the financial outlay would probably be modest. He seemed to have gone to war at exactly the right moment.

Of course, once in the war, his optimistic calculations were quickly dashed. Britain's financial difficulties required a far bigger monetary commitment, while the collapse of Russia and the weakness of France meant a far bigger military one. And the rest is history.
 

BlondieBC

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When though? An delay or not?


Assuming the British don't do something to offend Wilson and that Russia does not sign the peace treaty, a few months. Wilson asked for the armed merchant ship bill but lost in the Senate. The harder question is not does Wilson ask for war, but does the Senate approve it? Also, does the Senate appropriate as large a funds as OTL? Approve a draft?

Best Guess: War declaration 3 months later than OTL, and 1,000,000 troops in France is 5 months later than OTL due to less funding in congress and a greater than 3 month delay in beginning the draft.
 
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