Importance of the Zimmermann Note

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Deleted member 1487

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zimmermann_Telegram

The Zimmermann Telegram (or Zimmermann Note) was a 1917 diplomatic proposal from the German Empire to Mexico to make war against the United States[1]. The proposal was caught by the British before it could get to Mexico. The revelation angered the Americans and led in part to a U.S. declaration of war in April.[2]...

The portrayal of its contents in the American press on March 1 caused public outrage that contributed to the U.S.'s declaration of war against Germany and its allies on April 6.

The Note included offers to Japan and Mexico about attacking the US in an alliance with Germany if war was declared.

How much did the Telegram really contribute to Wilson's declaration of war in April 1917? As it was the final trigger was the sinking of an American ship without warning headed for Le Havre. The declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in January resulted in the breaking off of relations with Germany, before the note came to Wilson's attention, and resulted in the policy of armed merchant ships, but also economic disruption along the US East Coast, as merchant ships refused to sail into a war zone, setting off a bitter debate about the rights of neutrals in war that started the slide of the US into war.

However biographers of Wilson suggest that Wilson stopped trying to avert war and actively began psychologically preparing the US for war once the Telegram was revealed to him, even before receiving Zimmermann's confirmation of the note's authenticity. Apparently he gave up on Germany being a 'civilized' nation and now viewed them as a 'mad dog' that the US would have to confront eventually. Still he held back until there had been an 'overt' act of war by Germany, at is the sinking without warning of an American ship in March that led to deaths of American sailors. Its been said that he was still holding out hope for Germany to come to their senses and call of the (unrestricted) Uboat war.

But what if the Zimmermann Telegram is either not sent or sent via Uboat so that it is not intercepted? Will the lack of the diplomatic crisis that resulted keep the US out of the war longer or at all?
It seems that the Note created fear in two areas untouched by the war and were neutral in the outlook: the South, which would have been affected by the Mexicans, and the Pacific Coast, which would have been threatened by the Japanese. This turned American public opinion against Germany, which, even with the Uboat threat, likely made war possible in April.
So what say you all? Did the Note really lead to war in April or was it the Uboats?
 
I don't see why it can't be both - neither alone being enough, but the combination being too much.
 
The note was sent three different ways and picked up by the British all three so it will be spotted and the US aware of it in short order.

As for Wilson having an unfriendly attitude once he learned that Germany was using the cable he made available to them illegally to seek allies in a war against the US, why the surprise?
 

Deleted member 1487

The note was sent three different ways and picked up by the British all three so it will be spotted and the US aware of it in short order.

As for Wilson having an unfriendly attitude once he learned that Germany was using the cable he made available to them illegally to seek allies in a war against the US, why the surprise?

All either broadcast or transmitted, which the Germans understood would open them up to interception. The original plan was ONLY to send it via Uboat courier.

And yes, it was obviously a major affront to Wilson personally...so what it critical in causing him to go to war?
 
Other than the insult involved, when he was literally violating international law to keep contacts with Germany, a fact the British revealed that they knew all about when they mentioned the telegram to him?

Doing something stupid and offensive, at the very moment when they did not want the US to be especially provoked, was an extremely foolish thing for Germany to do, but they did it.
 
I believe the Telegram mattered less than Wilson's realization that TR was right when he said that idealism did not provide much of a basis for US power politics to influence Europe without participation in World War I, and the German decision to resume Unrestricted Submarine Warfare foreknowing this meant a war with the USA had far more influence in this regard on Wilson. The Telegram's primary influence was to strongly undercut the anti-war movement and pro-Central Powers blocs who found it much more difficult to work against the war or for Central Powers interests when Germany was willfully being stupid on a diplomatic level.
 
All either broadcast or transmitted, which the Germans understood would open them up to interception.

One of the routes through which it was sent was via the US Embassy in Berlin which the US Gvernment had made available to Germany with the proviso that nothing hostile to US interests would be sent via that route.
Which probably added insult to injury.

The British were aware of it before it arrived on the desk of the German Ambassador in Mexico, but it was that version that was presented to the US authorities as the British did not want to reveal their interception and decoding capabilities (an agent had to physically get a hold of it).
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I believed the war accelerated the date that Wilson would ask for War, baring a dramatic reversal of fortune by the Entente. Wilson was naive, but if the Entente was appearing to be losing fast, he would not ask for war. No sooner than a month later than OTL, but no later than the end of 1917 would be when he asks. I based this on the assumption that unrestricted submarine warfare would eventually lead to another "Lusitania type" massacre. After all, in WW2, the USA sank transports loaded with USA POW on a Japanese maru. Also, each week the British would be pushing stories in the American papers of the latest outrage.

The other faction pushing Wilson into war would be the banks, in particular JP Morgan. While the USA was not making unsecured loans as policy, JP Morgan had allowed the UK to overdraft 400 million and this was growing at 15 million per day. JP Morgan had prevented the crash of 1908?? and was the leading bank in the United States. While Wilson and congress, could JP Morgan to go down, it is very possible it would go down. While this would not be as sever as the Great Depression or our current economic trouble, it would like cause a national recession, it would at least devastate the large parts of the New York financial industry, and the USA was on the gold standard, so there is no federal reserve printing gold and there is no FDR type FDIC.

It would also depend on how the British acted. A bad British diplomatic blunder such as Germany coming to the table with a reasonable peace offer such as status quo antebellum on colonies and western borders with a "free" Poland with access through the autonomous region of Lithuania could stop it.

I think Wilson gets his war declaration, after some debate, because TR strongly supported it, but there are no guarantee. Wilson armed cruiser bill was voted down, and he decided to do it anyway under newly discovered "Presidental Authority", there by burning bridges with the Congress.
 
Actually the Germans during WWI were strangely persistent in not showing a concern for leaks, even when they had sound reason to be aware of serious risks.

For instance, the fellow who lost his baggage in the Middle East and then made such a noise that the British code breakers were able to sense that something important was in the baggage, a book of codes which was found to the delight of the British.



Germany making a reasonable peace offer would have been a veritable wonder to see...
 
The British army reached a stage where they refused to use radio for significant orders etc due to the British capabilty of interception and decoding.
The french developed a system whereby they could listen in electronically to the field telephones in use in the german trenches (not hard wired, just picked up the electronic transmissions passing down the cables).
The Swedes also provided a diplomatic cable for use by the Germans out of Stockholm (again subject to interception).
 

whitecrow

Banned
Doing something stupid and offensive, at the very moment when they did not want the US to be especially provoked, was an extremely foolish thing for Germany to do, but they did it.
It has been theorized that the Zimmermann Telegram was a false-flag operation by the British.
 

Deleted member 1487

It has been theorized that the Zimmermann Telegram was a false-flag operation by the British.

It wasn't. Zimmermann himself stated soon after it was real and didn't see what Wilson was so upset about, because he was just following the pre-war diplomatic protocol of secret treaties. Zimmermann was quickly fired.
 
whitecrow, it was not, nor could the British have sent such a telegram through German communications.

When asked to deny the telegram Zimmerman stated that he could not because it was true.
 
If the note had not been intercepted, and if Mexico act upon the suggestion, then I think we would have gone to war anyways (though with mexico or Japan AND Germany) because Americans love to defend their home front. But i think the Note and the U-Boat war fare together pushed the US towards war, however, if it was just the Note, then I don't think we would have been so quick to act unless Mexico or Japan actually acted on it. In other words, the unrestricted war fare or the U-Boats started pulling the trigger back, and the Note I think might have just fired the gun. (sorry bad analogy)
 
I believe the Telegram mattered less than Wilson's realization that TR was right when he said that idealism did not provide much of a basis for US power politics to influence Europe without participation in World War I, and the German decision to resume Unrestricted Submarine Warfare foreknowing this meant a war with the USA had far more influence in this regard on Wilson. The Telegram's primary influence was to strongly undercut the anti-war movement and pro-Central Powers blocs who found it much more difficult to work against the war or for Central Powers interests when Germany was willfully being stupid on a diplomatic level.


If there's one thing Wilson never believed it is that TR was right on any subject. The feeling was mutual.

I'd say the exact reverse is true. Wilson firmly believed in the importance of an idealistic peace - and that he himself (of course) was the only man who could deliver one. This meant that it was in America's/Humanity's vital interest that he be at the Peace Conference - which he wouldn't be if he remained neutral to the end.

By 1917 it looked to outside observers (only a few top men in the British Treasury knew better) as if the war might not have long to run. Conventional wisdom was that Germany had barely made it through 1916, and 1917, with a bigger and better trained British Army, and a better armed Russian one, was likely to see her collapse. Accordingly, if Wilson wanted to be "in at the kill" he needed to make his mind up pretty soon. Without the ZT, he might have agonised a bit longer, but would probably have come to the same decision.

This, however, is contingent on Germany still sinking American ships - not just Allied ones with Americans on board. US opinion had, however grudgingly, become inured to the latter, and support for war on that ground would almost certainly not have been forthcoming.
 
The likelihood of a war between the US and Japan was extremely low.

Just one of their bits of diplomatic ineptness was the German refusal to notice that the terms of any proposal sent to Japan invariably found itself in London in very short order, almost as if Japan was passing it on.
 

Deleted member 1487

By 1917 it looked to outside observers (only a few top men in the British Treasury knew better) as if the war might not have long to run. Conventional wisdom was that Germany had barely made it through 1916, and 1917, with a bigger and better trained British Army, and a better armed Russian one, was likely to see her collapse. Accordingly, if Wilson wanted to be "in at the kill" he needed to make his mind up pretty soon. Without the ZT, he might have agonised a bit longer, but would probably have come to the same decision.

Was this the view in the US? My understanding was that in 1917 the president felt that without loans the war would petter out, even with the Uboat campaign, netting him his 'peace without victory'. Wilson's agonizing had less to do with being 'in at the kill' than avoiding letting the Entente win, because they had proven themselves undeserving of total victory, and more about neutral rights and the defense of American rights and lives specifically.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
German submarines were sinking American ships. War would have been declared without the Telegram. Wilson and his government could not tolerate more submarine warfare.
 
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