Interesting, I will have to look at the Kiplinger piece in detail. Research I had done earlier seemed to show Dewey's proposed build-up was not the direction Congressional Republicans were favoring, and that they favored maximal reliance on the strategic air force rather than ground forces:
Taft did score a partial victory around the same time in the spring of 1948. The Truman Administration had proposed the Universal Military Training (UMT) program to provide a vast number of reserves for the armed forces. It was meant primarily to demonstrate American resolve to defend its overseas commitments. The Administration also insisted it needed to continue Selective Service for five more years to maintain adequate occupation forces and ready reserves until the benefits of UMT could be realized. Both measures were unpopular. Taft vigorously opposed UMT. He was assisted by liberal isolationist Senators William Langer and Glenn Taylor, who staged a filibuster against the measure. Vandenberg did not push for UMT and his silence gave Taft room to maneuver and rally the Republicans. On the Selective Service, Taft did vote for a two-year draft, which passed instead of the five-year version. This put the Administration in the awkward position of having to request a draft again in the spring of 1950, during the midterm election campaign.(Eden,Ch. 7)
Taft’s penchant for developing substitutes for Administration policies helped him in this case. He successfully campaigned to fund a far larger Air Force build-up than Truman wanted. The bill to procure sufficient aircraft for seventy air groups, fifteen more than the Administration wanted, was passed before the defeat of UMT and helped guarantee that result. The enlarged Air Force meshed well with Taft’s philosophy, because these forces were more suitable to deter an attack on the continental United States than for political intervention abroad. The emphasis on airpower also appealed to Taft because it left America maximum freedom of action, because aircraft, unlike ground troops, could have a military impact abroad even while based on American territory. After passing seventy air group air force appropriation, the collective opinion of Congress was that they had just demonstrated resolve by increasing American nuclear delivery capacity and had spent enough on defense for the year. (Eden, Ch.7)
This victory, spearheaded by Taft and the isolationists, had real impact on American strategy. The Administration succeeded in expanding overseas commitments, while Congressional Republicans denied funding for sufficient conventional forces to support these commitments and increased US atomic striking power. (Eden, Ch.7) The synthesis of these two factors was an alliance structure bolstered by nuclear threat, thus presaging the Eisenhower Administration’s policy of Massive Retaliation.