Imperial Japanese not in Axis in WWII

Hmm, I'll have to read up more on this, but I'm going with A&P's version for now which makes more sense and is an acknowledged authoritative.

See http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm for a description of the development of Japanese warplans before WWII. Note that it does not contradict in fact any of your sources, only the unwarranted assumption that just because Nagano personally opposed war with the U.S. (as did Yamamoto!), that represents the view of the Japanese high command, or had any chance of being put into practice no matter what Yamamoto does.

Fact is, Japan had already decided at the highest levels that it must use force to break the ABCD embargo, and that it could not afford to strike at the DEI without first neutralizing the British and American holdings in the area.

Had they not done so, they could have, ya' know, fought a limited war, actually bring their home advantages to bear and actually make an armistice possible? People tend to forget that the USN of 1941-42 wasn't the top-grade stuff that came later in '43 or '44, and that the Combined Fleet Striking Force had the best coordinated aerial strike force at the time.

Define limited war. There was no chance in hell that Japan would let the U.S. keep a base from which it could choke off the oil spigot from Indonesia at will, despite Nagano's wishful thinking. And it is wishful thinking. The U.S. would never have accepted Japan using military force against the U.S. led embargo, in direct defiance of the U.S. ultimatum, and it is likely to be more despite FDR rather than because of him. FDR was very much focused on Europe and wished to keep the peace in the Pacific to free up resources. He was roundly criticized for not being sufficiently hardline over the Panay incident, and also for transfering 1/3 of Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic for Neutrality Patrols, including 2 carriers and 3 battleships, due to the perception that it showed weakness.

As per the Japanese plans pushed by the General Staff and approved by Admiral Nagano, Japan would have opened with surprise attacks against the Philippines, which OTL was overshadowed by Pearl Harbor, but still was one of the greatest military disasters in U.S. history and would be viewed as such TTL, likely even as a Day of Infamy. They then would have proceeded with the same historical centrifugal offensive, only perhaps moving slightly faster due to having the Kidou Butai and its supporting shipping available from day one. On the other hand, without the defenses of PH in ruins, the U.S. has hundreds of modern aircraft that historically went to rebuilding Hawaiian defenses that could now go to Australia. The Wake relief operation would likely have gone ahead with a well defended base and battleline to fall back on and without the U.S. command having had its nerve shattered, meaning Wake remains in U.S. control. At which point Japan ends up in a notably weaker position than historically at the same time, and there's not even any reason to believe the U.S. would be noticibly less determined.
 
Adam, a shattering blow to the IJN morale was during the operation against Midway when, after losing four carriers but sinking the Yorktown(convincing themselves they had sunk two), they realized that the USN was turning east rather than charging for Japan's beloved all-out battle to pit US heavy cruisers against Japanese battleships.

The best minds of the IJN sat there with not the slightest clue of what to do and ultimately turned away and abandoned the campaign when Midway might still have fallen.
 
Adam, a shattering blow to the IJN morale was during the operation against Midway when, after losing four carriers but sinking the Yorktown(convincing themselves they had sunk two), they realized that the USN was turning east rather than charging for Japan's beloved all-out battle to pit US heavy cruisers against Japanese battleships.

Well, Yamamoto basically threw a tantrum at the war games preceding Midway when the OPFOR, shockingly, won. He got the games skewed in IJN favor but even after a few more games and still more fuming, they still couldn't get the perfect victory (two IJN carriers sunk for the lost of three American). Need to consult my book again, but that was just about how it went. Shabby way to conduct a war, and indicative of the Japanese doctrinal mindset at the time.

Grimm Reaper said:
The best minds of the IJN sat there with not the slightest clue of what to do and ultimately turned away and abandoned the campaign when Midway might still have fallen.

They have would gotten slaughtered on the beaches had Tanaka's men tried landing there, and make no mistake, they need those troops on the ground to consider Midway "fallen". That was how poor Japanese amphib doctrine was at the time, exacerbated by the interservice hostility (the Army didn't even want to grab Midway, for they recognized just how insane the logistical trail was). And then, with no ground troops to take the ground, the IJN can only watch, sputter, perhaps bombard the place a bit and then pull a fast one out before their supplies run out and more American airpower from Hawaii get to them.
 
I don't remember any such event at the wargames, rather the Japanese umpire(Ugaki?) intervening when the IJN lost two carriers, reducing the loss to one, then magically resurrecting the other for future operations.

Actually they probably could have taken Midway as the USN was no longer in a position to stop them, with one carrier sunk and the other two having lost so many aircraft. They wargamed this at Annapolis and the conclusion was that the IJN would have taken Midway. As for holding it for long, well...
 
See http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm for a description of the development of Japanese warplans before WWII. Note that it does not contradict in fact any of your sources, only the unwarranted assumption that just because Nagano personally opposed war with the U.S. (as did Yamamoto!), that represents the view of the Japanese high command, or had any chance of being put into practice no matter what Yamamoto does.

Yamamoto did? The way he shoehorned the Pearl Harbor plan doesn't very much sound like he opposed the war.

Hmm... thanks for the link.

xchen09 said:
Define limited war.

A limited war focusing in areas that would not stretch my logistical capabilities, but rather force the enemy to come over and strain himself, and maximize my own naval advantages. I mean, the United States came to sense in using their flattops only after PH gutted the Pacific Fleet, and even then they didn't employ them very well as shown at Midway. Beforehand, they were still stuck in the Battleship Mentality. Whereas the IJN had actually been paying attention to Taranto. Even without a PH event, it is not unreasonable to assume that the IJN would have the clear upper hand in naval airpower, and that they'll be able to smash any American fleet coming into or near the Philippines.

Shattered Sword pg.129:

... Had the Americans been able to observe this spectacle, they might well have been envious of the prowess of their foes. At this point in the war, the US Navy still struggled to mount a coordinated attack from a single flight deck, as the events of this day would demonstrate.

Also make it politically hard for the opposition's government to rile up the population to the near-fanatical levels of hatred that came after PH. Make sure the US declares war first, then strike at the Philippines. It's 4000 miles away from Hawaii, after all, whereas say Formosa is much, much closer. Then grind them logistically, piece by piece, get the United States to divert as much war material to the Philippines as possible and make them bleed there for no appreciable gain. Turn the whole area into a resource singularity (for the US). Avoid decisive engagements unless the perfect opportunity presents itself, but DO NOT, I repeat, DO NOT seek out such engagements as an end goal. Keep on blaring over the airwaves as American troops are dying in Luzon and Bataan with propaganda like "Why are your sons dying for nothing?", "Roosevelt lied when he said no American son will die in a foreign war; they are dying for European Colonies now." or "We never wanted this war, you declared war on us first!". A bit too dramatic, but close.

Then at some point in early 1943, pull out of China (back into Manchuria that is), bolster the Southeast Asian holdings with Kwantung Army divisions and arrange for limited peace talks with Washington. If it doesn't work, well, dig a really deep grave.

I'm not advocating that this plan might actually be workable or even be carried out (IJA would tell me to fuck off for pulling out China, for one), but it has a better chance of seeing Japan coming to terms with the United States in a diplomatic solution rather than "enragng the entirety of America at PH and then you're so totally dead nuked".

Of course, that doesn't count another Pacific War erupting a few years down the road with an even stronger American Navy, or the above grave-digging happening.
 
Last edited:
I don't remember any such event at the wargames, rather the Japanese umpire(Ugaki?) intervening when the IJN lost two carriers, reducing the loss to one, then magically resurrecting the other for future operations.

Well indeed. Here we go, the actual events in detail:

Shattered Sword, pg62:

If Nagumo was guilty of being withdrawn, it shortly became clear that Yamamoto and his staff were engaged in being actively disingenious. The character of the games was established early on when an officer in charge of playing the Red forces (representing the American Navy) submitted a course of action that closely resembled the tactics that would be used by the Americans in the actual battle. Having shown up sooner than anticipated, while the invasion of Midway was in process, Red proceeded to attack Nagumo's flank. The Japanese carriers were heavily hit, and the invasion was placed in great difficulties. At this juncture, the table judge demurred, asserting that such American tactics were impossible, and reversed the damage to three Japanese carriers. Despite the emotional supplications of the Red player, his plea was overturned and his tactics were recast along lines more in keeping with Yamamoto's vision as to when and where the foe should show himself.

In a second incident, the Japanese side was playing through the ramifications of the attack by American land-based aircraft against Nagumo's force. The table judge for the event, Lt. Commander Okumiya Matasake, rolled dice to determine that nine hits had been scored, resulting in both Akagi and Kaga being sunk. Ugaki then personally intervened to revise the number of hits downward to three, leaving Kaga the sole victim of the American attack. Later in the exercise, Kaga was allowed to reappear as a participant in the follow-up operations against Fiji and New Cadelonia. Both of these events reinforced the opinion of many of the assembled officers that the operation was fundamentally flawed. However, it was clear that the commander in chief was not prepared to listen to reason on these matters.

Considering that Ugaki was Yamamoto's lac-I mean cohort, AND that Yamamoto was the one who wanted this plan to proceed...

Grimm Reaper said:
Actually they probably could have taken Midway as the USN was no longer in a position to stop them, with one carrier sunk and the other two having lost so many aircraft. They wargamed this at Annapolis and the conclusion was that the IJN would have taken Midway. As for holding it for long, well...

Like I said, taking it is quite debatable. For one, the American defenders were dug-in deep with criss-cross firing lines. Two, they had tanks that survived the Japanese bombardment of the island hiding near the beaches. Three, the Japanese had no way of coordinating naval gunfire support for ground elements, even with their SNLF dudes. Four, when was the last time the Japanese had tried amphib landings under heavy resistance? And you definitely need boots on the ground to consider actually consider Midway taken...

But even if it was (somehow) taken, yup, it was certainly to be a Japanese resource sinkhole. And to think they were considering on Hawaii after that...:rolleyes:
 
Yamamoto did? The way he shoehorned the Pearl Harbor plan doesn't very much sound like he opposed the war.

He shoehorned it into the existing plans for action, should Japan choose to go to war, a plan that already assumed going to war with the U.S., and indeed to do so with a surprise attack same as Japan did in the Russo-Japanese War. It doesn't mean he favored going to war with the U.S. any more than Nagano developing and approving the plan including a surprise attack on the Philippines meant Nagano favored war with the U.S., or whichever American officer that developed War Plan Red favored the U.S. going to war with Britain. A good commander should always be prepared to present strategies for maximising the odds of success of his government's policies, even if he personally opposes those policies. Whether he was correct in his estimation that the Pearl Raid improved Japan's chances over the existing plan is another question, but as detailed in my previous post, it most likely did. Whether it would do so over an entirely hypothetical plan made by armchair generals with 60 years of hindsight is yet another question, one that I feel is not particularly relevant.

A limited war focusing in areas that would not stretch my logistical capabilities, but rather force the enemy to come over and strain himself, and maximize their naval advantages....-snip-

Indeed, so entirely unlike any plan Japan had, or was likely to develop given their constraints at the time. It may seem silly to us that Japan at the time would prefer death over the loss of face in backing down from an American ultimatum or pulling back in China, but it's still true. It may seem that opening with a surprise attack against the U.S. was counterproductive, but Japanese doctrine was very much based around them. Maybe with hindsight, aiming the war entirely at weakening American will rather than military concerns is rational, but it is very much irrational given what the Japanese knew at the time.

As to specifics, first U.S. carrier doctrine was not at all tied to the battleline by 1941. The fast carrier task force doctrine had been developed since the 20s and always assumed independent operation. Second, the U.S. didn't train for multi-deck operations because their theory suggested widely separated task forces improved chances of survival. They changed their minds later, but it had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Next, letting the U.S. choose the timing of entering the war can badly skew Japan's chances of coming out ahead in the proposed grinding campaign of attrition given the massive program of reinforcement, fortification, and simply improving readiness under way in December 41. And finally, said grinding campaign of attrition can only lead to defeat for Japan, even with the best imaginable exchange rate. Japan could never win in a war of attrition, not when even a 2-1 exchange would see the Japanese military, particularly its air corps, gutted beyond recovery simply inflicting the losses suffered by the U.S. in the first few days of the war to the surprise attacks while doing almost no damage in return. The U.S. may indeed run out of will before finishing the war, but it'll be running out of will after destroying the Japanese offensive, and beginning the starvation and bombardment of Japan itself...a year ahead of OTL. In other words, the worst of all possible worlds for Japan, its Empire still lost, but the military clique not finished and the post war economic miracle stillborn, with Imperial Japan living on as an isolated pariah state that the U.S. can starve to death at any time.
 
Last edited:
Whether he was correct in his estimation that the Pearl Raid improved Japan's chances over the existing plan is another question, but as detailed in my previous post, it most likely did. Whether it would do so over an entirely hypothetical plan made by armchair generals with 60 years of hindsight is yet another question, one that I feel is not particularly relevant.

Guess I'll concede on that now...

xchen08 said:
Indeed, so entirely unlike any plan Japan had, or was likely to develop given their constraints at the time. It may seem silly to us that Japan at the time would prefer death over the loss of face in backing down from an American ultimatum or pulling back in China, but it's still true. It may seem that opening with a surprise attack against the U.S. was counterproductive, but Japanese doctrine was very much based around them. Maybe with hindsight, aiming the war entirely at weakening American will rather than military concerns is rational, but it is very much irrational given what the Japanese knew at the time.

Not surprising at all, given what I've typed out in quotes. Generally, their problems ran deeply straight back to the Naval War College's inception.

xchen08 said:
In other words, the worst of all possible worlds for Japan, its Empire still lost, but the military clique not finished and the post war economic miracle stillborn, with Imperial Japan living on as an isolated pariah state that the U.S. can starve to death at any time.

I heard someone once said that a North Japan would be evn worse than our North Korea. In this case, with the necessities of the Cold War propelling revanchist Japanese militarism to the forefront... well, that's kinda scary thought. Too bad its all hindsight though, and just as irrelevant.
 
Okay, what about this idea from some old thread:

Perhaps with a Dutch version of Vichy, where the legitimate successor Dutch government still runs most of country and the govt in exile is only tiny and marginalised in 1940-41. Such a govt could allow Japanese forces into the EI to defend them, and this would give the Japanese the oil they needed to defy the embargo. Perhaps the Pacific war would be started by the USA, but if given a few years to exploit Indochina and the East Indies Japan would be in a good condition to face the US.
 

Cook

Banned
Okay, what about this idea from some old thread:

The Dutch East Indies in the hands of a Vichy style Dutch government would have been seen as an immediate threat within the Australian and British spheres and would have been invaded well before Japan became involved in the war.

Australian defence doctrine at the time considered the naval facilities of Singapore critical, anything between them and Australia would have to be occupied by friendly forces.
 

Cook

Banned
The Anglos never attacked Vichy Indochina.

Because French Indo-China isn’t sitting astride Britain’s principal defence line in the Far East (and Australia’s in the Near North) and doesn’t have a large number of oil wells.

And Vichy controlled Indo-China is about the only Vichy territory the British didn’t invade, probably because the other Vichy territories were of more immediate importance. Consider the invasion of Syria etc.
 
Top