Imperial Japanese not in Axis in WWII

Here's another Changing the Times scenario! This time from Christopher Nuttall I believe.

I've bolded the important bits.

“I’ve got a cunning plan…”

The Japanese went to war in 1941 for a number of reasons. The prime one was an economic blockade by the United States and Britain, which was slowly strangling Japan’s economy. The other reasons included a desperate need to win their empire before one of the European combatants actually won the war, the need to cut American supplies off from the Chinese, a correct assumption about the fragility of the European Empires and a strong belief that, despite all they’d achieved, they were still looked down upon by the white powers.

Having talked themselves into confronting their ‘tormentors’, the Japanese conceived a plan that was strategically brilliant – provided that you accepted one assumption. That was the assumption that, if it lost all its immediately available striking power and needed to spend time and money rebuilding that power, the US would accept a compromise peace that would leave the Japanese with their ill-gotten gains. Unluckily for the Japanese, their ‘cunning plan’ hit a slight snag – they failed to destroy the US’s carriers and their support ships. That gave the US the ability to feel that it could still fight in the darkest days and gave them the strength to build up and crush Japan. At some other point, we can discuss if America would have given up if the carriers had been sunk and Japan’s rampage was unopposed for longer.

There was, however, another possibility. Many of the resources that Japan needs, in the short term, are available in the Dutch East Indies. Of all the powers in the pacific, the Dutch are arguably in the worst position, taking them would have been child’s play for Japan and the concept that a Dutch fleet comprised of destroyers and supports could have stopped Japan’s main strike force is laughable.

There is, however, a slight snag. Both Britain and the US would be likely to be unhappy with the Indies changing ownership. Britain can be discounted in 1940, fighting for survival at home; they’re not going to start a war in the Far East. The US, on the other hand, is very powerful and is opposed to any colonial transfer. In order for Japan to use the Indies, they need a shed of legality. I can think of two ways to do this.

One – Let’s have Hitler offered a deal by the Japanese in January 1940. The Japanese will provide technical support and assistance for the growing German fleet, mainly the Graf Zeppelin carrier. In exchange, Hitler will force the Dutch to surrender the East Indies to him and then ‘sell’ them to the Japanese. The British would be unhappy about this little stunt, but, as the Japanese would have local superiority and no commitment from FDR, they would probably accept the situation.

Two – Let’s have the Japanese approach the Dutch government in exile. The Dutch have two choices. They can agree to sell the Japanese goods at minimal prices, regardless of what the Americans or British may say, or the Japanese will either seize the islands and gamble on the Americans doing nothing, or the Japanese will support nationalists who will then invite the Japanese in. Either way, the Dutch Empire is doomed.

The beauty of this scheme is that if America goes to war over it, they will not be fighting to avenge a sneak attack, but for the defence of colonisation. The heart of America will not be in this war and the Japanese would have a good chance of surviving the war without massive damage.

So, assuming no other major changes in the timeline, at the end of 1940, we would have a Japan occupying (de facto if not de jure) both the Dutch East Indies and Indochina. In both cases, we also have a sullen, but seriously concerned Britain and an unhappy (and in some quarters paranoid) US. The US would probably dispatch what army and air force units it could scrape up to the Philippines and begin a massive build-up of that colony’s defences and native forces. As the US grows in power, the US stations small fleet units and fighter planes in the bases there.

What has changed, as 1941 rolls on, is no real embargo. The US is unwilling to start a war, with their supplies the Japanese, while still pinched; don’t see a war as a necessity. The Japanese, instead of preparing to hit the US in late 1941, continue attacks on Cheing’s forces in china and concentrating forces to attack the USSR if it looks like the USSR will be defeated. However, the Germans do not manage to force the USSR to surrender and Japan, still feeling the sting of Nomonhan, does not stab them in the back.

1942 sees a very different world. The US is not in the war, but is actively supplying both the British and the Russians, as well as the Chinese. The British have finally managed to produce a strategic victory in the Middle East, defeating Rommel and forcing the Germans and Italians back into Libya. The extra British naval forces cut off Rommel’s supply line and force him back into Tunisia. As the British chase him into French territory, Hitler sends some reinforcements, but not enough to turn the tide. The British effectively occupy the French North African colonies.

Meanwhile, in the pacific, the Americans have built a massive force in the Philippines. They have trained thousands of native troops, as well as shipping in hundreds of fighter planes and bombers. Those forces are in a perfect location to interfere with Japanese transports from the East Indies to Japan, making the Japanese very paranoid. The Chinese have been getting better as well, as have the British Indian forces. The Japanese launch a massive offensive against the Chinese Nationalists, which, despite tough resistance, is a limited success. Cheing is bottled up in Western China. With the defeat of the nationalists, many Chinese warlords agree to support Japan in exchange for favours.

The Soviets push the British into invading France or Italy. The British are reluctant to invade Italy and flatly refuse to invade France. The British are recovering from the war in North Africa and are rebuilding their forces. The Americans are supplying as much material as they can, but the British don’t have the sheer numbers of troops, or the experienced leaders, to take on the Germans. They do increase the bombing program, but the only other offensive action they do is an invasion of Sardinia. The British have to fight with one eye cast over their back. They don’t trust Japan – although with Lead Lease the British are stronger in the Far East – and they have nationalist problems in India.

FDR is one frustrated politician. He’s pushed the American congress into approving large amounts of supplies for Britain, Russia and China. It is becoming clear, however, that China is incapable of using the American supplies and that Russia is untrustworthy. The Germans have exposed the Russian massacre of Polish officers to the world. FDR also has the problem of paying for lend lease. The British will not be able to pay the debt they’ve had to take on, so they’ll have to default and if they do, the American economy will take a nosedive.

World War Two stalemates. The Germans and the Russians have fought bitterly, but the Russians are scraping the barrel, while the Germans have persistent supply shortages. The British have captured Africa, but they cannot take the war directly to the Germans. After demanding a second front, Stalin decides to make a separate peace, which gives the Germans western Russia in exchange for peace in early 1944.

The Germans and the British are stuck. The British are far more powerful in 1944 than they were in 1940. America has provided several new carriers and dozens of advanced aircraft. The British have been able to tap Indian, African and Algerian manpower (the British have promised not to allow the French back if the Algerians help defeat Germany) to make dozens of new divisions. The British have also designed a tank which is reasonably comparable with the best German tanks and America has mass produced it for both their army and the British one.

The British are in fact divided. FDR has slowly loosened the purse strings to the point when the British are receiving goods that can rebuild the British economy. On the other hand, the soviets have taken over north Iran completely and are threatening the British from the east. Meanwhile, Japan sits in the rear and might still be threatening.

Under such circumstances, the British will probably seek peace. They’ll acknowledge German continental dominance in exchange for their empire being recognised and a private deal against Stalin if he attacks the British positions in Iran. World War Tow ends with a weak USSR, a weakened, but victorious Germany, an extremely powerful US and a strong Japan. China will probably end up being partitioned between Japan, Britain and Russia.

I leave the long-term effects of a powerful Asian nation on Indian independence and geopolitics to the reader.

So, is this scenario plausible at all? Japan continues its expansionist war in China, but doesn't actually get into a war with the Allies.
 
Hm. The British are probably going to be the first to the Atom Bomb in this world, and probably know that fact as well. (Without the US in the war, I can't imagine the Manhattan Project getting as much funding and such as in OTL, and certainly not having Tube Alloys folded into it.), followed by the Germans. If the Japanese can still buy Uranium from Germany they might beat the Russians, even. They may be tempted to hold out, with the prospect of a decisive victory in reach...
 
I think before we consider the implications, we should first determine if this scenario is plausible or not. Could Japan really have continued being expansionist in Asia without running out of oil and avoided war with the Allies?
 
I think before we consider the implications, we should first determine if this scenario is plausible or not. Could Japan really have continued being expansionist in Asia without running out of oil and avoided war with the Allies?
If that isn't completely ASB, it's extremely unlikely.
 
Here's another Changing the Times scenario! This time from Christopher Nuttall I believe.

I've bolded the important bits.



So, is this scenario plausible at all? Japan continues its expansionist war in China, but doesn't actually get into a war with the Allies.

Very interesting, and I believe it is both possible and plausible.
 

Cook

Banned
Scenario said:
One – Let’s have Hitler offered a deal by the Japanese in January 1940. The Japanese will provide technical support and assistance for the growing German fleet, mainly the Graf Zeppelin carrier. In exchange, Hitler will force the Dutch to surrender the East Indies to him and then ‘sell’ them to the Japanese. The British would be unhappy about this little stunt, but, as the Japanese would have local superiority and no commitment from FDR, they would probably accept the situation.

The Dutch Government in January 1940 was in the position of armed neutrality. They would not be willing to give up their empire for any meaningless guarantees offered by Hitler. And following the invasion of the Netherlands the Dutch Government went into exile in London and continued to govern the Dutch East Indies from there.
There British in January 1940 were in a position of some considerable strength, France had not fallen and combined they had the World’s largest Army and Navy. France and Britain would not be making concessions to Japan and Japan would never risk conflict with the combined European Great Powers.


Scenario said:
Two – Let’s have the Japanese approach the Dutch government in exile. The Dutch have two choices. They can agree to sell the Japanese goods at minimal prices, regardless of what the Americans or British may say, or the Japanese will either seize the islands and gamble on the Americans doing nothing, or the Japanese will support nationalists who will then invite the Japanese in. Either way, the Dutch Empire is doomed.


The Japanese DID approach the Dutch East Indies Government in Batavia making very close to those demands and making some very un-subtle hints along those lines. “How can we compromise when you won’t give us all our demands?” was the comment by one Japanese diplomat.
The result was joint planning by Britain, the Dutch and United States in mid 1941 onwards for mutual defence in the advent of Japanese attack, not concessions.

I can’t be bothered looking at the rest.
 
The Japanese DID approach the Dutch East Indies Government in Batavia making very close to those demands and making some very un-subtle hints along those lines. “How can we compromise when you won’t give us all our demands?” was the comment by one Japanese diplomat.

Cook

You have yourself nailed why the "Patient Japan Scenario" is at least borderline ASB. Anyone who understands the chaotic way in which the decision making process worked in the Japanese Empire would know this. The Empire was for all intents and purposes ruled by fanatical majors, lt. colonels, and colonels in the IJA, ready to assasinate any superior who failed to show a likewise sense of deeply ingrained fanaticism toward the expansion of Imperial power. In ALL directions. EVERY SINGLE GEOGRAPHICAL NEIGHBOR THE JAPANESE EMPIRE HAD WAS EVENTUALLY ATTACKED, AND IN CHINA AND RUSSIA IN OPERATIONS STARTED AT A LOCAL LEVEL. It's not like Tokyo had a whole heck of a lot of control over their own army. I could see and invasion of Indo-China, and eventually Siam, started by local forces that Tokyo would have to support. And from there?

The cultural barrier that existed between East and West at this time was simply too great. For too many years, the coming war was seen by the Japanese as completely inevitable. There just wasn't anyone in power who was asking the questions we in the West would take for granted, like "Can we win?" and "Why?".

Also, there was no way in God's green Earth that a rampantly Military government was going to allow an unlimited Allied buildup in Singapore, Malaya, Hawaii, and the Philippines to go through. It would allow the West to shut off Japan's oil spigot at will. And since that's exactly what Japan would do if the shoe were on the other foot, the warlords in Tokyo could not imagine it being otherwise for the West. Fighting island to bloody island is one thing, simply blowing Japan's 6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping out of the water is another. No warlord, no matter HOW scornful of the fighting ability of the West, could fail to observe Japan's inherent vulnerability as an Island Nation.
 

Cook

Banned
You have yourself nailed why the "Patient Japan Scenario" is at least borderline ASB... .

Was that meant to be a “Patient Japan Scenario”?
I didn’t bother reading after the sections I highlighted.
The Empire was for all intents and purposes ruled by fanatical majors, lt. colonels, and colonels in the IJA...
It's not like Tokyo had a whole heck of a lot of control over their own army…
I could see and invasion of Indo-China, and eventually Siam, started by local forces that Tokyo would have to support. And from there?


This is based on the incidents in China and Manchuria.

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a Japanese dream for most of the 30’s. The planning and logistics requirements of actions in South East Asia require the support of the Imperial Navy at the highest level. Occupying Indo-China is not something that could have been undertaken by a local commander in southern China on his own.

And as for the reasons I listed earlier Japan was not going to move earlier then they did.

 
The Empire was for all intents and purposes ruled by fanatical majors, lt. colonels, and colonels in the IJA, ready to assasinate any superior who failed to show a likewise sense of deeply ingrained fanaticism toward the expansion of Imperial power.


Indeed and, while that may not have been appreciated by Western nations, it was well known to China, Japan's biggest victim. Chiang once told Western diplomats attempting to broker talks between the KMT and the Japanese government that negotiating with generals and ministers in Tokyo was a waste of time because the colonels and majors of the Japanese army in China were the actual policy makers.

Looking at some of the other mistaken suppositions made in the Changing Times material and avoiding those which Cook already refuted:

  • The US is already on record regarding it's opposition to colonial transfers in the Western hemisphere. In the OTL that policy was also extended to the Far East when both Japan and Germany began pressuring Vichy to hand over Indochina to Japan. Switching out the DEI for Indochina isn't going to change US thinking or policy.
  • People all too often conflate US domestic opposition to joining the war in Europe with an unwillingness to fight in the Pacific. FDR was savaged for not taking a harder line after the Panay incident and the each step in the growing embargo on Japan was, if not actually applauded, accepted as necessary.
  • Japan can launch all the huge offensives in China it wants and, just as in the OTL, none of them will accomplish a damn thing. All they'll do is add to the amount of territory they already cannot control more than a rifle shot beyond the rail lines they patrol and villages they occasionally garrison. China is nothing but a giant tar baby and all the oil in the DEI isn't going to improve Japan's chances there.


Understanding how Japan thought, saw the world, and was "governed" during this period is incredibly hard for many of us in 2010. Attempts to fashion "Patient Japan" time lines always founder when the writer, like the well meaning author of this Changing Times material, suggests that Japan make decisions and choices that are "rational" instead of the "irrational" ones actually made. What they fail to comprehend was that the decisions Japan made were rational from Japan's point of view at that time.
 

Cook

Banned
Another detail overlooked.
These days you hear complaints about there being a powerful Israeli lobby in Washington, well in the 1930s and 1940s there was a very strong China lobby in Washington, these could not be ignored.
 

Cook

Banned
What they fail to comprehend was that the decisions Japan made were rational from Japan's point of view at that time.


It isn’t unreasonable to consider Japan at the time as suffering a degree of Bi-polar disorder; they are still functional but the logic and reasoning was breaking down and paranoia and delusions were increasing .
 
It isn’t unreasonable to consider Japan at the time as suffering a degree of Bi-polar disorder; they are still functional but the logic and reasoning was breaking down and paranoia and delusions were increasing .

You've read what I've quoted over there right - Yamamoto going over the top of his superiors just so he could launch Pearl Harbor? The way the IJN pressed for Midway even when it was out of their strategic reality to resupply? And these weren't even incidents in China and Manchuria, but WWII itself.
 

Cook

Banned
You've read what I've quoted over there right - Yamamoto going over the top of his superiors just so he could launch Pearl Harbor? The way the IJN pressed for Midway even when it was out of their strategic reality to resupply? And these weren't even incidents in China and Manchuria, but WWII itself.

Yamamoto was Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and had been given the task of formulating a plan to defeat the American Navy. Given his responsibility his insistence that his plan, including Pearl Harbour, be accepted or he be replaced is entirely valid and is not rebellion.
No-one in the Imperial Navy was going to unilaterally start a war.
 
Yamamoto was Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and had been given the task of formulating a plan to defeat the American Navy. Given his responsibility his insistence that his plan, including Pearl Harbour, be accepted or he be replaced is entirely valid and is not rebellion.
No-one in the Imperial Navy was going to unilaterally start a war.

Again, from Wikipedia:

He was against Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's planned attack on Pearl Harbor, but reluctantly gave his approval only after Yamamoto threatened to resign as commander of the Combined Fleet.[4]

From The Pacific: Pearl Harbor

In January of 1941, Yamamoto first began to commit to this strategy by planning out his attack and showing it to other Japanese officials. Yamamoto developed the following eight guidelines for the attack: (1) surprise was crucial, (2) American aircraft carriers there should be the primary targets, (3) U.S. aircraft there must be destroyed to prevent aerial opposition, (4) all Japanese aircraft carriers available should be used, (5) all types of bombing should be used in the attack, (6) a strong fighter element should be included in the attack for air cover for the fleet, (7) refueling at sea would be necessary, and (8) a daylight attack promised best results, especially in the sunrise hours. Many of Japan's Navy General Staff were in opposition to Yamamoto's plan, but they continued to prepare for the attack. All of the necessary training was given to troops, and all of the fighters and submarines were prepared.

Japan prepares to attack Pearl Harbor:

The Japanese Naval General Staff initially rejected Admiral Yamamoto's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor as being too great a gamble. They doubted that surprise could be achieved when the strike force would be at sea for two weeks before the attack. Japan had eleven aircraft carriers, and the admirals felt that Yamamoto's plan could put at risk their six best carriers. They also felt that diverting Japan's six most powerful aircraft carriers to Hawaii would leave the southern attacks on the Philippines and British Malaya dangerously unprotected. In the end, Yamamoto only overcame their opposition by threatening to resign.

Target: Pearl Harbor pg20

The personal approach worked well enough on subordinates, but the planners on the Navy General Staff remained unimpressed. They not only continued to oppose the Pearl Harbor plan but attempted to emasculate it in early October by reassigning Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu to operations in Southeast Asia, leaving Nagumo with only three carriers. Once again Kuroshima journeyed to Tokyo as Yamamoto's envoy and on October 18 demanded that all six carriers be assigned to the Pearl Harbor operation. Tomioka countered with the by then familiar objections to Yamamoto's plan. This time Kuroshima played his chief's trump card. Yamamoto, he said, would resign if he did not receive full support for his plan.

Nagano and his colleagues may have been sorely tempted to take Yamamoto up on his offer and be rid of the problem once and for all. But that move would have disastrous consequences. They knew that Yamamoto's personal charisma and undoubted brilliance made him, for all practical purposes, the Japanese Navy's one indispensable man. It would hardly do to have him leave under disputatious circumstances on the eve of war. The fleet and squadron commanders were accustomed to his methods, and coordinated operations depended upon Yamamoto at the helm. More over, the blow to morale at all levels might seriously endanger the navy's chances for success in the rapidly approaching conflict.

The general staff had no choice but to relent. Nagano claimed after the war that it was the threat to resign which compelled him to yield. Once Nagano decided to let Yamamoto have his way, opposition to the Pearl Harbor attack collapsed. The exact date of Nagano's decision is a matter of dispute among historians and participants in the deliberations. In late October or early November, Nagano bowed to Yamamoto's will and accepted the Combined Fleet commander's demands.

This is as Shattered Sword puts it, "an incredible state of affairs for any military organization." Basically, he was NOT ordered to destroy the American Navy, he MADE that order himself and ensured that it would be given the go-ahead by his superiors by throwing his own weight of personality at them. And it was a poorly thought out plan at that, an act of hubris that guaranteed Japan's eventual defeat.

From Shattered Sword pg24:

Yamamoto had insisted in 1941 that if Japan chose to capture the resources of the south through war, that war also had to include the United States. Furthermore, he believed that the US Navy had to be dealt a crippling blow at the outset so as to buy time for Japan to carry out its operations in the southern campaign areas without opposition. In this view he was opposed by several senior members of the Naval General Staff, including its head, Admiral Nagano Osami. Nagano was of the opinion that the United States would find it very difficult to go to war if Japan refrained from an outright attack. He reasoned (correctly) that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have a difficult time rallying sufficient support for a casus belli based only on Japanese attacks against British and Dutch colonial holdings, as American popular opinion was decidedly ambivalent about defending such interests.

Nagano had eventually lost the debate, even though his basic reasoning was sound. Yamamoto had won on the basis of both his personal reputation, and his willingness to use inelegant means to get his way. In the midst of the Pearl Harbor debate, he had let it be known that he and the entire staff of the Combined Fleet were prepared to resign if his views were not confirmed. Nagano, given the choice between acquiesing or confronting his wayward subordinate, had backed down. In doing so, he essentially let Yamamoto hijack the Navy's strategic planning process and place it under the purview of Combined Fleet. Yamamoto would later remark to his cohort Ugaki that, in his opinion, naval headquarters seemed to have "no definite ideas" as to how to carry out the war. Indeed, during a meeting in Tokyo on 5 December to brief the emperor, Yamamoto had gone so far as to tell the chief of the Naval General Staff, as well as the Navy minister, "not to interfere too much and thus set a bad precedent in the navy." This was, bluntly, a rather incredible state of affairs for any military organization.

So yes, Don Lardo and usertron2020 are essentially correct that the Japanese Empire, at this time, was ruled by fanatical majors, generals and admirals who got what they wanted. Unsurprising it is when the terrible consequences caught up to them as well.
 
Adam, Yamamoto insisted on the Pearl Raid after the decision to go to war with the U.S. was already made. The General Staff opposed him because they felt the plan was too risky, not because they weren't going to go to war with the U.S. anyway. Their existing plan that Yamamoto overrode called for simultaneous surprise attacks against Malaya and the Philippines before invading the DEI. Yamamoto merely forced the General Staff to accept a third assault simultaneous with the other 2, the one on Pearl Harbor due to his belief that war with the U.S. must be won quickly or not at all.

That's not to say there weren't fanatical admirals as well, but Yamamoto was not setting policy, only strategy. Had he not done so, Japan would still have gone to war with the U.S. with a surprise attack, likely inducing the same, or near the same level of rage, but leaving the U.S. far more military options in the first 2 years of the war.
 

NothingNow

Banned
I think before we consider the implications, we should first determine if this scenario is plausible or not. Could Japan really have continued being expansionist in Asia without running out of oil and avoided war with the Allies?

If The Brits hadn't treated them so poorly in WW1 and afterward in the Interwar period, including extending the Alliance in the Twenties, it could have easily Happened. Admittedly there would likely have been a Pacific war sooner or later, but it would have been just the US vs Japan.
 
Before Pearl Harbor Yamamoto had to be rushed back in to a command at sea to protect his life from some of those mid-level fanatical officers after he questioned some of their decisions and vision of the future.

As a result allowing him to retire in protest might have been a death sentence for Yamamoto, potentially catastrophic for Nagano and other officers involved given Yamamoto's popularity in the IJN.
 
Adam, Yamamoto insisted on the Pearl Raid after the decision to go to war with the U.S. was already made. The General Staff opposed him because they felt the plan was too risky, not because they weren't going to go to war with the U.S. anyway. Their existing plan that Yamamoto overrode called for simultaneous surprise attacks against Malaya and the Philippines before invading the DEI. Yamamoto merely forced the General Staff to accept a third assault simultaneous with the other 2, the one on Pearl Harbor due to his belief that war with the U.S. must be won quickly or not at all.

Hmm, I'll have to read up more on this, but I'm going with A&P's version for now which makes more sense and is an acknowledged authoritative.

xchen08 said:
That's not to say there weren't fanatical admirals as well, but Yamamoto was not setting policy, only strategy. Had he not done so, Japan would still have gone to war with the U.S. with a surprise attack, likely inducing the same, or near the same level of rage, but leaving the U.S. far more military options in the first 2 years of the war.

Had they not done so, they could have, ya' know, fought a limited war, actually bring their home advantages to bear and actually make an armistice possible? People tend to forget that the USN of 1941-42 wasn't the top-grade stuff that came later in '43 or '44, and that the Combined Fleet Striking Force had the best coordinated aerial strike force at the time.

But then again, the Japanese also had serious flaws in their strategic thinking and doctrine at this time; important one being, they literally believed in their enemies "following the plan". Tensions, thanks to deeply-rooted antagonism since the beginning of the century, were also running high in Japan after the final oil blockade; the Japanese population was so sick and tired of the war in China, but then got so riled up by the incident that they supported conflict with the West.

So yes, it is also quite unlikely they would have tried fighting a limited one, even with a Nagano plan, and instead blunder into a wider conflict with the US that'll see them crushed as per OTL.
 
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