Imperial German invasion of the USA

Which kind of answers the British strategic/diplomatic question of "Do we want a neutral/friendly US or a 'Who Know's What Those Wacky Huns Will Do Next?' German naval presence across our sea lanes to Canada?" I don't see the Admiralty, Parliament or British public sentiment at the time going for the latter.

It’s not even that. Let’s handwave away the logistical shocker of doing something like Operation Torch pre WW1, and assume a sustainable German combat presence on the Eastern seaboard.

Continental Europe’s dominant military and industrial power potentially adding the entire USA to their economy, or forcing them into some sort of client state status. Prussians in charge of Carnegie Steel, Standard Oil, etc etc. It’s full-on Existential Threat Time for both UK and France. They HAVE to make sure the US wins.

What I was getting at is that the British could not afford to allow this operation even to start. If the Foreign Ministry and the Admiralty in London so much as tut-tutted the Germans would have to call the whole thing off. In 1901 the Imperial German Navy had seven first-class battleships, a pair of armored cruisers and seven unprotected cruisers in commission, some of which were in for refit/repair or on foreign stations and some of which would have to be held in home waters. The British Coast Guard/Home Fleet contained nine battleships and the Channel Squadron/Fleet another four. Britain could have said "no" and made it stick.
 
Well, yes. I mean at the time the whole Monroe Doctrine rested on the Brits telling people not to be silly in South America.
But that’s all a bit dull, entertainment decrees that this madcap scheme is launched before London realises that yes the Kaiser has really lost his marbles. Now what?

Alternatively, consider this. Wilhelm really does want to do it (!!!) and Tirpitz and Schlieffen and their staffs are willing to go along(!!!!). How batshit a tantrum is there going to be in Berlin when London tells them to stop their crazy scheme, and what japes will ensue next? These are clearly not rational people, hence the ASBs are stocking up on popcorn.
 

DougM

Donor
Ok so I will give you that the German Army is better at that time then the US army. The question is how do you get it TO the US and then supply it? As for the German Navy vs the US Navy you have a similar problem. How does Germany keep thier Navy supplied off the cost of the US for any time? Forgetting about what they are protecting Germany with. Germany is not exactly popular in Europe and this idea has them pretty much sending the bulk of both the Navy and the Army a LONG way from home. Thereby putting the survival of Germany into the Hands of France England and Russia. Because we know that all of those traditional rivals of Germany would like nothing better then the Germans to take over the US.
So you have three issues here that you can’t just shrug off.
1). The ability to transport, land (invade) and then supply the Army from across the Atlantic. Because that was so easy for England and the US to do a decade later and with (other then subs) no Navy opposition (I think the US Navy just MIGHT resist an invasion, just saying)
2). How does a Navy that is notorious for not being set up for long distance operations (both in ship design and a lack of overseas bases or long distance support ships) going to project its Navy to the US coast and keep them there long enough to matter. All while also protecting the continuous flow of support across the Atlantic.
3). Germany can’t be everywhere at once. If the navy and and Army is over at the US what is keeping Germany safe?
 
Don’t forget that this is all in the age of coal and triple expansion, stokers shovelling coals and so on. The fast ocean liners were able to run the Atlantic at 20 knots but the battleships will have to chug sedately or run out of coal half-way.
Fuck knows how the destroyers would make it across, might be a bit of a top-heavy fleet.

Regarding the army, I think Germany would be pretty safe. At the time they could probably muster a couple of million men and no way can they move even a tenth of that over the Atlantic. The navy on the other hand will be stretched like a condom on a baguette.

New battle march of the German empire - Yakety Sax.
 
2rolwe.jpg

The only appropriate response to Kaiser Bill's idea...

In all seriousness, this seems like a fun way to lose the whole of the Kriegsmarine and the Reichswehr and leave der Vaterland open to Anglo-American attacks. This is why meritocratic leadership for militaries rather than picking the first aristo you see and making him General works rather well.
 
Keep in mind the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were still the era of limited war based in large part on the model of the wars of German Unification. German plans to invade the Eastern US were not geared toward conquering the United States. They were limited operations designed to get a German lodgment somewhere on the east coast of the US, probably on Long Island, digging in, and generally being hard to expel without considerable and costly effort. From their the US was supposed to choose the negotiate with the Germans and in exchange for the Germans packing up and leaving the US would hand over some of its recently won gains from the Spanish-American War.

Yes, still a pretty nutty idea but not given the strategic thinking of the time (remember these were some of the same brains who thought WWI would last six months tops) it's not hard to see where somebody could think up something like this.
 
There was actually a good semi plausible tl on this topic, though it was an invasion by the imperial navy post cp victory on some US Atlantic possessions. Ill try find it
 
Keep in mind the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were still the era of limited war based in large part on the model of the wars of German Unification. German plans to invade the Eastern US were not geared toward conquering the United States. They were limited operations designed to get a German lodgment somewhere on the east coast of the US, probably on Long Island, digging in, and generally being hard to expel without considerable and costly effort. From their the US was supposed to choose the negotiate with the Germans and in exchange for the Germans packing up and leaving the US would hand over some of its recently won gains from the Spanish-American War.

I'd say this. Still, enjoy your fortified beachhead...no more ammunition, fuel or medicine will be getting in, so the Americans can just keep the cage shut and wait.
 
Any German lodgement on the US east coast, especially the eastern half on Long Island is simply a self contained POW camp. The USA lines up artillery, produced in locations untouchable by the Germans, supplied from ammunition factories the Germans can't touch and pummels them. In short order the Germans run out of artillery shells for significant counter battery fire and the US moves the artillery forward to just beyond rifle/machine gun range. Simultaneously the USN cruises as close to the beaches as they can hitting areas out of range of the land based artillery.

BTW in the early 1900s the only way for the Germans to get any artillery larger than something like a mountain howitzer ashore is to seize a deep water port. Landing craft, as we understand them, simply don't exist anywhere at this time. You can get infantry and some light artillery ashore without a port (the USA did it in Cuba), but that's it.

Once again we see a military plan that expects the US to be so morally flabby that a good swift kick makes them cry to surrender. I'm not claiming any special superior moral strength for Americans, but counting on them to fold after a kick has not worked for anybody yet. The only time the USA has quit because they were unwilling to fight any more was Vietnam, and that was a case of a war of choice done badly.
 
Keep in mind the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were still the era of limited war based in large part on the model of the wars of German Unification. German plans to invade the Eastern US were not geared toward conquering the United States. They were limited operations designed to get a German lodgment somewhere on the east coast of the US, probably on Long Island, digging in, and generally being hard to expel without considerable and costly effort. From their the US was supposed to choose the negotiate with the Germans and in exchange for the Germans packing up and leaving the US would hand over some of its recently won gains from the Spanish-American War.

Yes, still a pretty nutty idea but not given the strategic thinking of the time (remember these were some of the same brains who thought WWI would last six months tops) it's not hard to see where somebody could think up something like this.

Another thing to consider is that the Germans can't even maintain naval superiority in terms of numbers - For ships commssioned by (the start of) 1900, you had 4 US predreads vs 5 German predreads. For ships commissioned by 1901, you had 7 US predreadnoughts vs the 6 German ones. For ships commissioned by 1902, you had 9 US predreads vs 9 German predreads. For ships commissioned by 1903, you had 10 US predreads and 13 German predreads. That covers the immediate scope of the timeline, so both sides are neck and neck in respect to absolute numbers of capital ships (The US had 2 additional ships under construction in the scope of the timeline - the Germans had 2 additional ones as well - later classes were laid down towards the end of our period and would be affected by war).

The US also has the advantage of fortified gun batteries on land and the possession of a variety of monitors as well. 6 monitors are in commission, of which 2 (one of which, Monterey, is the newest) are assigned to the Philippines. These vessels are older, but their munitions are fairly modern. Additionally, 4 more monitors are under construction (one on the Pacific coast), of which carry the most capable naval guns in the US armament. These would be ready by 1903, roughly, depending on if the war accelerates some under construction.

If we look further down at protected cruisers, the US maintains 13 protected cruisers, plus the 3 ABC cruisers and 2 bought from the British in 1899, for 18 total. 5 of those are unprotected cruisers / merchant vessel hunters. I'm also excluding Vesuvius as she is a... unique vessel. The Germans maintained 8 protected and 9 unprotected cruisers, for 19 total. There Germans also had 7 light cruisers that would be completed by 1902 (mentioned as none additional were completed by 1903 - so an advantage there. This excludes armed merchant vessels.

For armored cruisers, the US depended on two old armored cruisers, while the Germans would have 2 new ones complete by 1903. But, depending on time of completion, they might not be available.

Not to go any further down into smaller vessels (which the US would have more of available due to that simple range factor - even the larger predreads will, at best, struggle to make the 3,742 miles as the crow flies from Wilhelmshaven to New York), but just making the point - you had a peer opponent in the US. The best thing for the Germans would be to try and press against the edges of the new American colonial possessions in the Philippines and etc. To land in the US means to defeat a peer opponent at the end of your logistical train and at his front door, and to do it in such a fashion that they have no ability to strike back. And to do that, you have to render the US's navy completely ineffective and to eliminate the entirety of their naval production, which is spread along a coast hundreds of miles long on the East Coast, not to mention facilities on the West coast. That requires not one lodgement, but multiple lodgements in the same locations that the US has been most pointedly preparing for invasion for decades (New York, Hampton Roads, etc).

And let's not even get into the fleets being less effective at a longer range, or a complete dedication of the German fleet meaning that they would have to denude Germany or the colonies of vessels - or how the coastal defenses (both static and mobile, in terms of monitors/coastal battleships) will not be travelling far from US waters, meaning the force multipliers stack

It's why this argument turns very quickly into a joint Anglo-German invasion, as there is no practical way for the Germans to enact such an invasion except to hope for the US fleet to sink itself.
 
Assuming for the moment that the Germans can get ashore, I'd expect a precursor of the German frightfulness in Belgium (the real stuff, not the Entente propaganda stuff); hostage taking and shooting, towns burned, etc., and especially the assumption that every man, woman and child in their occupied areas are franc-tireurs. On the other hand there would be thousands of people sniping at the Germans and destroying infrastructure useful to them. For example, there were 3.5 million people* living in the crowded Five Boroughs and a considerable number of them would not take armed occupation lightly.

Facetious aside: We're talking 3.5 million New Yorkers. Any occupying force would die of rudeness as if it were typhus or influenza.;)
 
I'd say the war plans were just part of Germany's military doctrine; to quote Mr. Mundy: "Be efficient, be polite, have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

Basically the Germans put war plans into place in advance for every sort of scenario, against any potential or current enemy. Thing is, said plans aren't exactly foolproof, and in the case of the US warplans, it was more a case of "it's better than nothing". I suspect quite a few German generals would have had cold sweats at the thought of implementing their hare-brained scheme. Then again, Kaiser Wilhelm II was prone to overreaching himself.
 
Keep in mind the late 19th and early 20th Centuries were still the era of limited war based in large part on the model of the wars of German Unification. German plans to invade the Eastern US were not geared toward conquering the United States. They were limited operations designed to get a German lodgment somewhere on the east coast of the US, probably on Long Island, digging in, and generally being hard to expel without considerable and costly effort. From their the US was supposed to choose the negotiate with the Germans and in exchange for the Germans packing up and leaving the US would hand over some of its recently won gains from the Spanish-American War.

Yes, still a pretty nutty idea but not given the strategic thinking of the time (remember these were some of the same brains who thought WWI would last six months tops) it's not hard to see where somebody could think up something like this.
That’s a good point, but the countervailing example is that about thirty years earlier the French had invaded Germany and in short order had German armies roaming central France malletting french armies to splinters and capturing Paris. And still, after humiliating total national defeat, France was right back up in their grill again after a couple of decades itching for revenge and Alsace-Lorraine. So plenty of people would be going “umm, going into the enemy’s heartland with just barely enough force to really piss them off, maybe unlikely to get a good result?”.
 
A lot of war plans are done just to have something on the shelf in case something happens. Others are for more realistic scenarios, the US "color" plans had a combination of both types of plans. Whether or not they are done in case something wild happens, and I would bet somewhere in the Pentagon vaults there are some rough plans for an invasion from space, PROPER planning means you draw these things up based on a realistic determination of the resources you have - what the enemy has or may have can only be incompletely known, but you should have a pretty good idea of what you have ready, what can be mobilized and how long that takes etc. Drawing up plans, especially for major offensive action, where any sensible evaluation of resources shows no ability to make it work is lunacy. Drawing up some foolish bit of a plan to make the Kaiser happy is one thing, but I find it hard to believe the generals and admirals of the German military would have believed that this could work in reality.

FYI I have experience personally in some aspects of this sort of thing.
 
POD: The 1895 Venezuelan Crisis heats further, damaging relations between the US and Britain, due to handwavium. The actual invasion happens in 1904.

The key European alliances at the time are France-Russia and Germany-Austria/Hungary-Italy, and it's early enough in the German naval buildup for the Kaiser to dial back and mend fences with the British. The most immediately relevant rivalries are Germany v. France and, ITTL, UK v. US.

Due to assorted minor effects that somebody else who knows the time period better can sort out, the British view shifts that the United States is no longer a friendly neutral, but rather more of a true neutral wanna-be-hegemon. In the interests of establishing dominance in the Pacific, the British form closer ties to Japan and work to solve tensions with the Germans, alarming the French; this causes the French to reach out to the Americans. When the Germans look to give the United States a bloody nose to break American power before it can become overwhelming, the British are talked into lending support - the might of the Royal Navy, the staging point in Canada, and perhaps minor land forces (though only to defend Canada). The Japanese are invited along, as well, with the US Pacific possessions offered as a prize in exchange for opening a second naval front.

Due to actual ongoing tensions with an European power, Teddy doesn't allow the US Army to remain quite so unprepared, even if the army is small by European standards. The invasion, centered on New England and the Great Lakes, bogs down rapidly; the front is wide, the (newly formed) National Guard units are highly motivated, and much of the terrain is either highly defensible or difficult to traverse. H.M.S. Dreadnought has yet to launch and the German navy is still fairly weak, so the US Navy is able to function well in a purely defensive role, denying the British complete local dominance.

This has incredible potential to gradually devolve into a general Great War. The Russo-Japanese War may or may not be butterflied away, but the underlying tensions remain, and France is still quite leery of Germany; the French may decide that, with the Germans so committed overseas against their buddies and the British Navy tied up, this is their chance to strike. Multiple separate conflicts emerge: United States vs. Britain + Germany + Japan, Germany + Austria-Hungary + Italy vs. France + Russia, Russia vs. Japan.

There is an British Admiralty memo dated from 1814 that basically reads....."Do not go to war with the USA ever again" there is an equivalent letter in the White House

Britain relies on international trade - so its Merchant fleet would be at risk in such a situation and Canada and the West Indies are easy targets for an annoyed USA - there is very little to be gained from such an enterprise for the British Empire and very much to be lost. Similar for the USA.
 
I saw (many years ago) a "boys' books series" (same format as Tom Swift, Hardy Boys, etc) called IIRC the "Invasion of America" series. I only had a glance at a couple of volumes that had been picked up by a collector of the genre. They had titles like The Siege of Pittsburgh. The premise was an Imperial German invasion of the US, which had to be ridiculously successful for the Germans to get to such places, but that was necessary to provide the "local" connections to sell the books. I believe they appeared during the US engagement in WW I.
 
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There is an British Admiralty memo dated from 1814 that basically reads....."Do not go to war with the USA ever again" there is an equivalent letter in the White House

Britain relies on international trade - so its Merchant fleet would be at risk in such a situation and Canada and the West Indies are easy targets for an annoyed USA - there is very little to be gained from such an enterprise for the British Empire and very much to be lost. Similar for the USA.

Makes sense. I have a book on privateers from the War of 1812, they did quite well. Including one privateer (I do not recall the name, I'd have to re-read the book) that snatched a convoy out from under it's RN escort. Granted, in 1900 we aren't seeing privateers.
 
Makes sense. I have a book on privateers from the War of 1812, they did quite well. Including one privateer (I do not recall the name, I'd have to re-read the book) that snatched a convoy out from under it's RN escort. Granted, in 1900 we aren't seeing privateers.

Yes and the US Trade was devastated in return with the much larger RN fleet and British pool of Privateers simply adding US Merchant ships to the long list of nations they whose ships could be taken as prizes!

Is James DeWolf's ship the Privateer Yankee (Capt Oliver Wilson) you are thinking of?
 
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