Impact of Joe Johnston Remaining in Command

Impact of Joe Johnston Remaining in Command

  • Confederacy is better off

    Votes: 7 31.8%
  • Confederacy is worse off

    Votes: 3 13.6%
  • It makes no difference

    Votes: 12 54.5%

  • Total voters
    22

Anaxagoras

Banned
If Joe Johnston had remained in command of the Army of Tennessee in July of 1864, would the Confederacy have been better off, worse off, or would it have made no difference?
 
I'm voting for no difference. At this point, the Confederate chances of anyone defeating Sherman decisively enough to do any good are slim.

And I've been over arguments on what Joe may or may not have intended before and don't have anything new to add to them, so I'm going to give him a break.

Whatever can be said for Johnston preserving his army, if Sherman takes Atlanta (either earlier or not much later), that has the effects it did on the North that its fall did OTL, and the Confederacy certainly isn't in any shape for four more years.

This thread http://civilwartalk.com/threads/reomoving-johnston-at-atlanta.6428/ may be interesting - I was (don't post there any more) Elennsar if it matters.
 
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I voted worse off before I noticed you meant 1864, not 1862.:eek: His relievement in 1864 was a disaster based on who his replacement was, not because of what losing him took away from the Confederates. I can think of any number of generals who could have done better than Hood, but other than Nathan Bedford Forrest none that provide serious proof that they could have done better than Johnston, save Lee, who could not be spared from Virginia. And I also doubt seriously that even Lee could have handled the bag full of tomcats that was the senior officer corps of the AoT.

One name I would NOT put forward is James Longstreet. I would neither trust him in an army command nor especially in command of a department. Despite his brilliance under Lee and in corps command in general, he failed at Knoxville against the North's worst remaining general. Plus, if Lee had listened to Longstreet on the Second and Third Days of Gettysburg (regarding maneuvering around the Union Left), the South would most likely have lost the war in that battle.:(
 
One name I would NOT put forward is James Longstreet. I would neither trust him in an army command nor especially in command of a department. Despite his brilliance under Lee and in corps command in general, he failed at Knoxville against the North's worst remaining general. Plus, if Lee had listened to Longstreet on the Second and Third Days of Gettysburg (regarding maneuvering around the Union Left), the South would most likely have lost the war in that battle.:(

Not to mention that for some reason independent command saw a much less people-savvy Longstreet than dependent command - his quarrel with McLaws seems almost out of the blue given his Virginia record.

There might be something more behind it, but its not speaking well of Longstreet that this -and the issue between Jenkins and Law - erupted as it did.

Minor note, possibly relevant: The AoT, at least in the artillery, was not happy about getting ANV officers instead of its own promoted. I wonder if that sentiment would flavor how it reacted to a replacement for Johnston from outside the AoT (and if Hood was counted at this point as that).

More on the subject: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/was...on-in-the-atlanta-campaign.10260/#post-125204

I strongly recommend anyone who wants to look at that site read what trice has to say on various things. 'specially when he disagrees with me.
 
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One name I would NOT put forward is James Longstreet. I would neither trust him in an army command nor especially in command of a department. Despite his brilliance under Lee and in corps command in general, he failed at Knoxville against the North's worst remaining general. Plus, if Lee had listened to Longstreet on the Second and Third Days of Gettysburg (regarding maneuvering around the Union Left), the South would most likely have lost the war in that battle.:(

Please explain
 
I'm voting for no difference. At this point, the Confederate chances of anyone defeating Sherman decisively enough to do any good are slim.

And I've been over arguments on what Joe may or may not have intended before and don't have anything new to add to them, so I'm going to give him a break.

Whatever can be said for Johnston preserving his army, if Sherman takes Atlanta (either earlier or not much later), that has the effects it did on the North that its fall did OTL, and the Confederacy certainly isn't in any shape for four more years.


I haven't voted because I dont think any of the options really suit. Johnston retaining command would significantly change how the defense of Atlanta and any campaigns after it's fall would be conducted - and its fall is inevitable - so I cant agree with the "it makes no difference" option.

As for the Confederacy being "better" or "worse" off options, I'm split because I have no doubt whatsoever that if Johnston retained command the Army of Tennessee would emerge from the Atlanta Campaign in much better shape than it did under Hood and would prevent Sherman's March to the Sea and maybe even prolong the war an extra month or so, however the loss of Atlanta and all of Georgia above it means the loss of significant manufacturing centers and a major transportation hub connecting the east to the west and notably weakens the Confederacy's ability to provide for its Armies the supplies, ammunition and even manpower it needs to fight on.

And as far as successfully defending Atlanta long enough for Lincoln to win the election goes, I dont believe that just doing that would be enough for the War to end and the Confederacy achieve its independence, because I dont think McClellan was fool enough to end a war that his side was winning and was instead far more likely to have a short armistice where he offered humiliating terms to the Confederates that he knew they would reject so he could restart the war and claim the credit for winning it, immortalizing him as the President who restored the Union.

This thread http://civilwartalk.com/threads/reomoving-johnston-at-atlanta.6428/ may be interesting - I was (don't post there any more) Elennsar if it matters.
I knew you'd been on Civilwartalk but I didn't know you were Elennsar.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
And as far as successfully defending Atlanta long enough for Lincoln to win the election goes, I dont believe that just doing that would be enough for the War to end and the Confederacy achieve its independence, because I dont think McClellan was fool enough to end a war that his side was winning and was instead far more likely to have a short armistice where he offered humiliating terms to the Confederates that he knew they would reject so he could restart the war and claim the credit for winning it, immortalizing him as the President who restored the Union.

Albert Castel, in Decision in the West, makes the following three points about McClellan winning the election.

1) The people would have elected McClellan because they had become discouraged and determined that continuing the war was not worth the cost in lives and treasure.
2) McClellan would have owed his election to the Peace Democrats and would have had great difficulty resisting the political pressure to implement a cease-fire.
3) Many Republicans would have seen it as pointless to continue the war with McClellan as President, since the abolition of slavery would no longer be a Union war aim.

Putting the three together, a ceasefire is a near-certainty and it would have been political difficult, if not impossible, to resume hostilities once negotiations to restore the Union had failed (and they would have failed).
 
Not to mention that for some reason independent command saw a much less people-savvy Longstreet than dependent command - his quarrel with McLaws seems almost out of the blue given his Virginia record.

In fairness to Longstreet, people like McLaws were pretty diificult themselves.

Elfwine said:
More on the subject: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/was...on-in-the-atlanta-campaign.10260/#post-125204

I strongly recommend anyone who wants to look at that site read what trice has to say on various things. 'specially when he disagrees with me.

Meh. Anyone who disagrees with you on the American Civil War clearly doesn't know what they are talking about. Including me.:eek::(

And as far as successfully defending Atlanta long enough for Lincoln to win the election goes, I dont believe that just doing that would be enough for the War to end and the Confederacy achieve its independence, because I dont think McClellan was fool enough to end a war that his side was winning and was instead far more likely to have a short armistice where he offered humiliating terms to the Confederates that he knew they would reject so he could restart the war and claim the credit for winning it, immortalizing him as the President who restored the Union.

Incredibly agreed.:cool:

Albert Castel, in Decision in the West, makes the following three points about McClellan winning the election.

A) The people would have elected McClellan because they had become discouraged and determined that continuing the war was not worth the cost in lives and treasure.
B) McClellan would have owed his election to the Peace Democrats and would have had great difficulty resisting the political pressure to implement a cease-fire.
C) Many Republicans would have seen it as pointless to continue the war with McClellan as President, since the abolition of slavery would no longer be a Union war aim.

Putting the three together, a ceasefire is a near-certainty and it would have been political difficult, if not impossible, to resume hostilities once negotiations to restore the Union had failed (and they would have failed).

a) The people may well have also based their votes on the idea that Lincoln was "giving too much" to the freed slaves.

b) McClellan was a War Democrat, not a "Peace at any price" (or even Copperhead:eek:) Democrat. And once in office, as Leader of the Democratic Party and Commander-In-Chief, he is empowered to end the war on his own terms. Looking at the battlelines as of Inauguration Day 1865, he would have to virtually order a unilateral ceasefire to prevent a complete Confederate collapse, whatever non-OTL successful resistance the CSA might have made in this ATL.

The USA is not a parliamentary system, with the leadership facing things like votes of No Confidence and collapsing governments on any given friday. With our cyclical elections, the POTUS is immune to the demands of his "party supporters". As an example? There was a proposal that Lincoln once put before his cabinet. Only one vote was "nay". The nay vote was Lincoln's and the motion was defeated. In a parliamentary system, a prime minister who does that on a critical issue puts his career in jeopardy. There are no "Cabinet Revolts" or "Mass crossings of the aisle" in the USA. Separation of Powers, and all that.

If McClellan is the President of the USA during the CSA's surrender, he is politically invincible, and McClellan (as a War Democrat) is well aware of that.

The fact that he is no friend of the Colored Man is plenty to keep the Peace Democrats happy enough (no citizenship, no franchise), while the extinction of Slavery in the South (re-enslaving Blacks is a practical impossibility at this point) will keep the Whig Republicans and even a few Abolitionists quiet.

c) Abolition is no more the ultimate goal for Republicans than it is for the Democrats, save for the Radical Republicans. Except for Copperhead Democrats, the universal goal for all Unionists is restoration of the Union. Abolition (even under McClellan) with be the natural result of the fall of the Confederacy. Save only that under McClellan abolition will be a matter of osmosis and recognition of the facts on the ground, rather than official codification in the US Constitution.

Abraham Lincoln fully intended to press forward the war effort as much as humanly possible should he lose the election right up to Inauguration Day, for the express purpose of making an armistice between North and South all the more difficult for a new President. If Sherman is marching to Savannah, Sheridan has lain waste to the Shenandoah, Hood has been destroyed, and Grant is still pressing on Petersburg, it is hard to imagine President George B. McClellan making his Inauguration speech based on "PEACE NOW!" A man doesn't walk away from a strip poker table when his opponent has lost everything but her unmentionables.:D
 
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I knew you'd been on Civilwartalk but I didn't know you were Elennsar.

I trust you are/were the Nytram there.

If so, I must say that it is as much a pleasure to talk with you here as it was there, for all that we disagree very strongly on Joe Johnston.

usertron2020: True. But it seems to have only become beyond Longstreet's ability to handle when he got independent command.

Whether that was his head being in the cloud or what, I don't know. But when "being good at dealing with difficult people" is a must-have for anyone commanding the AoT (or any ACW army to a lesser extent), its definitely a point against him.

One could argue on his Gettysburg notions, but the rest is beyond repair.

And I stand by my comment on trice. Trice is/was much more of an expert on certain things than I am.
 
I trust you are/were the Nytram there.

If so, I must say that it is as much a pleasure to talk with you here as it was there, for all that we disagree very strongly on Joe Johnston.

Yes that was me, with the same username there as here. It was fun debating with you back there even though we didn't really agree on much, same here the times we've contributed to the same threads.
 
Yes that was me, with the same username there as here. It was fun debating with you back there even though we didn't really agree on much, same here the times we've contributed to the same threads.

You are too kind.

I hope you agree that posting those threads from the civilwartalk site helps here - I think what you and Trice had to say there is well worth reading when it comes to weighing alternate outcomes (although it would be better for the Confederacy were Joe not up against the wall with the choices being fight or forfeit).

As relates to this thread:
What you think Joe Johnston would do* when Atlanta falls (as it most likely will, given the various obstacles in Joe's way even if he commits wholeheartedly to fighting for it)?

Hood's Tennessee campaign is about as out of character for Joe as physical cowardice would be, but asssuming his army is even in the same shape as the OTL AoT that's still too significant a force to simply tell to return to their homes.


* Yes, Davis being Davis is likely to relieve him, but I'm wondering what you think Joe would make of the situation - not what Davis would want.
 
You are too kind.

I hope you agree that posting those threads from the civilwartalk site helps here - I think what you and Trice had to say there is well worth reading when it comes to weighing alternate outcomes (although it would be better for the Confederacy were Joe not up against the wall with the choices being fight or forfeit).

They certainly do have relevance to the issue at hand, but not have read those thread in a long time and not remembering what exactly I said there I couldn't comment on specifics.

As relates to this thread:
What you think Joe Johnston would do* when Atlanta falls (as it most likely will, given the various obstacles in Joe's way even if he commits wholeheartedly to fighting for it)?

Hood's Tennessee campaign is about as out of character for Joe as physical cowardice would be, but asssuming his army is even in the same shape as the OTL AoT that's still too significant a force to simply tell to return to their homes.


* Yes, Davis being Davis is likely to relieve him, but I'm wondering what you think Joe would make of the situation - not what Davis would want.
It has always been my belief that Johnston would continue to operate in front of Sherman's army and try to delay his advance or strike in a counter-offensives somewhere when the Federals overstretched themselves or made a mistake or fell for one of his feints - such as he attempted at Cassville and actually did at Bentonville - but the Federal superiority at the time was such that I would still expect him to be driven to the gates of Sevannah if not the city itself before turning North and heading into the Carolina's.

With Johnston retaining command, therefore, I expect the western and southern theaters to be contested for longer than they were with Hood and the Army of Tennessee up near Franklin and Nashville instead of in front of Sherman. Lee would probably still surrender before Johnston but Johnston's army may be significantly stronger than the 30,000 odd man army he built in North Carolina in OTL, meaning that either Grant will get the chance to march against and engage Johnston in the Carolina's - in tandem with Sherman chasing Johnston from the south - or Davis will hate Johnston even more for surrendering a larger undefeated army than he did in otl.
 
They certainly do have relevance to the issue at hand, but not have read those thread in a long time and not remembering what exactly I said there I couldn't comment on specifics.
Not a problem. Just thinking that you said some stuff worth reading the there, so I hope other people in this thread take advantage of the threads to learn more.

With Johnston retaining command, therefore, I expect the western and southern theaters to be contested for longer than they were with Hood and the Army of Tennessee up near Franklin and Nashville instead of in front of Sherman. Lee would probably still surrender before Johnston but Johnston's army may be significantly stronger than the 30,000 odd man army he built in North Carolina in OTL, meaning that either Grant will get the chance to march against and engage Johnston in the Carolina's - in tandem with Sherman chasing Johnston from the south - or Davis will hate Johnston even more for surrendering a larger undefeated army than he did in otl.

It would be interesting from a historical perspective to see what would happen if Johnston manages to deal Sherman a real defeat at some point. Not stop him outright - but something where Sherman has to pull back tactically would greatly impact his reputation. Irrelevant to his position in command, probably, but not to history.
 
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