Impact of a Successful Suez Crisis

In our time line the Suez crisis is seen as putting an end to Britain`s reign as a superpower (Though some see the 1947 loss of India as the end). Following the crisis Britain,and France, had received a major blow to their economies. And their ability to deploy forces overseas in order to decide an outcome favorable to them had ended. More and more the British were forced to follow the lead of the US in global affairs as their empire crumbled.
But did it have to be like this? What if instead of a humiliating defeat at the hands of Egyptian president Nasser the three powers managed to achieve all of their goals. Without any subsequent actions against them by the USA, USSR and US (that is a lot of acronyms) Today the Suez canal is still under British and French control. Most of the Sinai peninsula is under Israeli annxeation. And Egypt is even more a third world country.
 
No Defence White Paper in 1957 declaring manned aircraft obsolete, a more successful CENTO with a key role for Britain, no Winds of Change rapid decolonisation and greater engagement worldwide as a partner.

But most importantly TSR2 and CVA01 although I think it might be a bridge too far for the XJ13 to win Le Mans in 1966.

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This subject has been coming up a lot lately, and I feel like the answer I keep coming back to is that their political goals weren't realistic or reasonable, so it's not reasonable to expect them to have come to a sustainable solution that would be accepted by Egyptians.
 
This subject has been coming up a lot lately, and I feel like the answer I keep coming back to is that their political goals weren't realistic or reasonable, so it's not reasonable to expect them to have come to a sustainable solution that would be accepted by Egyptians.

It has, but I think I should credit for linking Suez with the Jaguar XJ13. First time ever, I do believe.

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For why I don't think it could have been successful, no matter what Eisenhower did, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ntion-in-the-suez-crisis.330680/#post-9792879

I am not, by the way, saying that *no* argument could be made against Ike's OTL policy. But that argument should be, not that the (very poorly thought out) Anglo-French actions would otherwise have succeeded. Rather, it is that for the sake of better US relations with western Europe, the US should have simply *let them fail* instead of acting in such a drastic manner. As Henry Kissinger put it in *Diplomacy*, "The British and French expedition had been ham-handedly conceived and amateurishly implemented; designed in frustration, and lacking a clear-cut political objective, it doomed itself to failure. The United States could never have supported so flawed an enterprise. Yet the gnawing question remains whether America's dissociation from its allies needed to be quite so brutal..." https://books.google.com/books?id=HhfceQZ3pmoC&pg=PT495
 
Suez is hugely important not just for longer lasting colonial empires but the whole influence of Nasser's "success" on Panarabism and Arab nationalism. Impact on Syria, Iraq and rise of Baathist regimes in general. Gadaafi was following the Neguib/Nasser template. Britain's small wars in South Arabia may not happen in late sixties and early seventies. Probably butterflies away the early seventies "Oil Shock" and 1967 and Yom Kippur wars. Probably no Macmillan premiership either as Eden doesn't resign and, in France, Fourth Republic lasts a bit longer.

EU unlikely to develop in same way either- Suez was a big driver. After Suez, the UK political/diplomatic class were forced to recognise that their alliance with the US did not cover all their geostrategic needs nor could they rely on uncritical US support and thus sought a counterbalance by trying to join the EEC. The French political/diplomatic class had already worked out that they couldn't be a world stage actor on their own prior to Suez but felt that a strong Anglo-French alliance could meet their needs. These hopes were dashed when the British backed down to American pressure. Schumann and Monnet had the theory worked out already but it was Britain demonstrating their unreliability as an ally that gave the needed fillip. And up to German reunification the EU was very strongly tailored to French needs. The French reluctance to let Britain in was partly to preserve that hegemony and partly, I suspect, as revenge for the British having ratted over Suez (seen as a betrayal by American puppets/Perfide Albion). When Britain is finally allowed in in 1973 (on unfavourable terms) it is because their economy is in quite a bad way and their politics are becoming unstable. The risk of a far-left or far-right regime taking power in the UK is not one the French and West Germans are willing to take. Continued British participation in NATO is essential to their own national security. All of that profoundly altered by less or no US pressure during Suez.

See my earlier comments in another discussion. I suspect that Kissinger's view, while it accurately reflects the situation after America put the boot in, does not mean that Suez would have been a failure (it was militarily succeeding up until the referee blew the whistle after all). Nasser gained huge credibility from "successfully" standing up to the Anglo French and Israeli forces. That wouldn't have been there once Suez was reoccupied and Nasser chased out of Cairo.
In the snake pit that is Middle Eastern politics, someone would have come forward to reach an accommodation and take power. Even cack-handed as the Anglo French and Israeli intervention was, they undoubtedly had some type of successor regime in mind. The fact that a new collaborationist leader was never publicly floated leads me to suspect that someone inside the Nasser regime had let it be known through back channels that they could come to an arrangement once the people had spontaneously selected them as the new leader.
 
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