Impact of a drought on Barbarossa/Typhoon?

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Deleted member 1487

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=380636
I did a thread recently about a different strategy during Barbarossa and the resulting logistics helping capture Moscow, which led me into reading about logistics for Barbarossa and I was struck how wet weather really impacted the campaign of 1941. And just browsing through Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzer East", a terrible book BTW in its arguments, but nevertheless with some interesting data about the Barbarossa campaign, and the author suggested that a drought in 1941 could have led to the fall of Moscow in 1941.

Its an intriguing idea because floods, wet roads, and mud especially by late Autumn really hurt Axis logistics. The USSR was periodically subject to drought or at least dry weather as in 1946-47 when that resulted in famine, so its not impossible.

So what if there was a drought in the USSR in 1941? How would it have impacted logistics if there wasn't the late floodings and mud, plus the early Rasputitsa in October-November 1941? I'm not suggesting an early start to the invasion, rather the impact of dry weather once the historical invasion began. For one thing it would really help Guderian in his drive into Ukraine in late August and into September, as his units suffered badly from flooding and mud during his push. For another Typhoon was pretty much immediately subjected to serious mud issues during the initial pocket battles and that seriously hampered truck logistics from early October on and bogged down the Axis offensive in all directions. A lack of significant mud until November would dramatically improve logistics and mobility for Axis units on the attack and dependent on truck borne supplies, while also helping rail conversion units get their job done sooner, as wet weather really impacted the rate of rail conversion.
 
Given the huge distances involved, and assuming Soviet forces do not suffer a collapse, aren't the Germans risking a whole lot more compared to OTL if, for instance, they actually encircle Moscow, get stuck in street fighting for a week or two, and then have Soviet reinforcements crashing into their flanks just as temperatures plummet?
 
Weren't the Germans somewhat reliant on plundering food off the locals to ease logisistics? A drought might actually slow them down if they need to get more food shipped in from Germany.
 

Deleted member 1487

Interesting idea. I'm curious whats so bad about the book in your opinion?
Totally unrealistic assumptions about the logistics of attacking Moscow in August and the ability to advance to Gorki thereafter. Really unaware of the rail situation in general.

Given the huge distances involved, and assuming Soviet forces do not suffer a collapse, aren't the Germans risking a whole lot more compared to OTL if, for instance, they actually encircle Moscow, get stuck in street fighting for a week or two, and then have Soviet reinforcements crashing into their flanks just as temperatures plummet?
No, because Moscow is pretty much going to fall to a straight shot to the city via the main highway that won't bog down as per OTL, while Guderian can get finished in Ukraine sooner with better weather and have better supply in his advance, which means cutting off Soviet forces that IOTL slipped out of the Bryansk pocket, plus then taking Tula (he was hamstrung badly by mud in October-November).
With Moscow taken with little in the way or in reserve in mid-October the Soviets would largely have a disaster on their hands; they'd be missing their central communication hub for land lines and rail traffic, plus have 1.5-2 million refugees from the city fleeing East. Moscow itself is pretty easy to hold against an attack from the East where the logistics are actually available for a major counterattack, while the situation around Kalinin would be quite hard to supply for the Soviets once Moscow is out of the picture in terms of rail communications. Likely the only avenue for winter attacks would be from the south and East, which aren't going to really so that much given that Guderian pretty much held after bending a bit, while from the East its pretty impossible to take Moscow, especially given that there are only a few rail lines in the Gorki area once Moscow is gone. Coordinating attacks will be very tough due to the communication breakdown from the loss of Moscow, while the loss of supplies, rolling stock, signalling equipment, personnel, and industry within Moscow (about 10% of total Soviet industry, though some was evacuated by October) would make anything like OTL counteroffensives pretty much impossible.

Given that there as a breakdown in morale in Moscow during the Vyzama battles having that wrapped up sooner due to no weather/mud issues (potentially launched even sooner without the problems caused by September rains/mud) would mean the Germans can attack before Soviet defenses get set up enough to stop them, while reinforcements can be moved around much quicker than IOTL and supply is less problematic due to distance without the breakdown in roads and trucks due to mud. Likely without Moscow Soviet offensives would be even less coordinated ITTL and take until at least January to start; they'd really lack air support too considering the Germans would hold the all weather fields in Moscow, so can handle the winter FAR better. German troops wouldn't be worn down in the November-December fighting, as Moscow would likely fall by the end of October at the latest if wet weather wasn't a factor and causing knock-on delays from June 22nd to December 5th.

Weren't the Germans somewhat reliant on plundering food off the locals to ease logisistics? A drought might actually slow them down if they need to get more food shipped in from Germany.
Not that much due to Soviet scorched early policies in 1941. In 1942 on sure but in 1941 the Soviets made sure to evacuate/burn anything they could. I'm sure there would be some missing supplies ITTL, but not much compared to OTL. IIRC food was actually one of the smaller requirements in terms of tonnage on trains BTW.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I can imagine water supplies might become a big issue.
IIRC they pretty much had to transport water IOTL because most of what was available was tainted by being stagnant or poisoned as part of scorched earth.
 
OTL, the Soviets almost messed up Moscow defense because they were committing forces to the Volkov to relieve Leningrad and to the Kharkov, Stalino area. It seemed late in the year for the Germans to try and take Moscow so it seemed a good idea to commit reserves to these other places. In hindsight a good idea for the Soviets because they managed to keep all of Moscow, Leningrad and at least temporarily Rostov.

Here it seems if the Germans were doing better than OTL. Perhaps the Soviets give up on the Volkhov and in the Donetz, putting the reserves committed to those places to Moscow since it should be obvious to the Soviets how important it is and its more at risk now in this TL.

I think your weather changes likely lead to the fall of Leningrad and the Germans hanging on to Rostov by secondary effects because the Soviets have to commit to Moscow.
 
Moscow itself is pretty easy to hold against an attack from the East where the logistics are actually available for a major counterattack,

Any attack would come down on the north and south sides of the resulting salient, snipping it off. Rail communication to the north were unaffected by the severing of the Moscow-Kalinin line OTL, as the Soviets simply routed around to north-south lines further east.

Furthermore, a German advance into Moscow would not result in it falling, but rather a protracted city battle. The Soviets were prepared for this. The idea of the Germans taking a city the size and importance of Moscow, with the corresponding garrison and . Not to mention that even without the wet weather, the logistical problems are ultimately insurmountable. Nothing about the weather solves the problems of inadequate supplies of fuel, POL, ammunition, rubber, tires, and so-on. The mud, in final analysis, made an impossible situation worse, not a bad situation impossible.

Although the winter is going to murder most of German rail transport regardless, undercutting their ability to hold out.

And this is leaving aside the fact that weather PoDs belong in the ASB forum, as they lie outside of human control.

which aren't going to really so that much given that Guderian pretty much held after bending a bit,
That's... a generous description of what happened. Guderian's force was routed from their initial positions, bleeding equipment, and almost completely wiped out. Not to mention that this withdrawal resulted in the southern face of the Rzhev bulge, which the Germans barely held onto as it was. ITTL, with the Germans even more overstretched trying to hold the entirety of Moscow, their going to get encircled and destroyed.

Not that much due to Soviet scorched early policies in 1941. In 1942 on sure but in 1941 the Soviets made sure to evacuate/burn anything they could. I'm sure there would be some missing supplies ITTL, but not much compared to OTL. IIRC food was actually one of the smaller requirements in terms of tonnage on trains BTW.
That is precisely because the Germans relied so much on plundering food from the country side. Without it, the demands for transport for food would have been so high that ammunition, spare parts, and fuel could not have been adequately supplied.
 
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