IJN Soryu's and USS Wasp's Durability and Usefulness

[ShySusan]

Yamato is believed equal to three Standards

That is nothing but pure IJN lunacy. Yamato would be crippled and rendered combat ineffective long before she could take out 3 opposing battleships that are all firing on her simultaneously. While they probably wouldn't penetrate her citadel, they don't have to. While Yamato is executing her first opponent, the other 2-4 American battleships that are not engaged will be having gunnery practice with Yamato as their target. The sheer weight of fire alone would effectively shatter Yamato before she could take out the second ship.

 

[HMS Warspite]

So the POD in this scenario would be TF1 actually getting off the US West Coast and heading out to contest the Midway operation in a conventional battle-line engagement, with the carriers acting in recon and in preliminary strikes, with Yamamoto getting wind of this beforehand. At this time, IIRC, TF1 consisted of:

• Colorado
• Maryland
• Tennessee
• New Mexico
• Mississippi
• Idaho
• Pennsylvania

While BatDiv1 probably could not take on all these ships at once, they could certainly give it a hard time. There are seven Standards; Yamato is believed equal to three Standards, while the Nagatos can take one each. We'd thus have the 'Decisive Battle' that the IJN wanted, off Midway with battleships.

In order to effect this in turn, though, PacFlt's oiler situation needs to be MUCH better - and that's not readily fixed..

Sidenote, the USN BB's at the time of Midway were not getting faster then the ones at Pearl Harbor ever were so at best 20 knots with a gale blowing from behind and a smooth sea, or in other words, not possible to either dictate terms, or run away from danger. These so called "Standards" were not yet upgraded with acceptable anti aircraft outfits yet, as they at best carried a mix of the older, manually handled 5"/25 in majority, a mix of singel 3"/50 and quad 1.1 " as medium and a few 20mm and .50 MG's at best. The total absence of a medium range AA was a serious problem when facing airthreats, as the 3 inch was too slow in RAF and the clumsy 1.1" quads were horrible things to opperate and prone to defects. The few 20mm's and MG's were of little use other than offering some form of last ditch defense, which normally would be enough, if the medium AA was capable enough.

So long before the USN battleline can get in the batlte, it will be very vulnerable to attacks form the air especially, with some other threats from either submarines and the IJN battle tested night attacks of fast torpedo armed groups of surfaceships, just as trained for in the prewar years. It can be expected none of the USN BB's survive these attacks, even before they can get a shot at one of the IJN BB's, who were the last part of this plan. (Note, yoru scenario tells Nagumo's forces are doing their Midway attack still, but are not countered by USN Carriers, but the battleline of old obsolete BB's. This gives the IJN an overwhelming superiority in naval airstrike capabilities and with their veteran aviators still dominating the cocpits.)

 

[marathag]

e clumsy 1.1" quads were horrible things to opperate and prone to defects.

Even with that, were far more effective than 20mm, on a ' rounds per aircraft shot down ' metric.
They had optical directors, unlike the individual 20mms.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

The Solomons would like to have a word with you.

Both the Solomons and the New Guinea campaigns were contested among islands and land based rather than carrier based air power predominated. Japanese doctrine relying on land based reconnaissance proved insufficient for deep water operations. In theory relying on land based reconnaissance left more carrier planes for offensive operation. Sound in theory, not so good in practice.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

Yamamoto was wrong about so much, that even though he was technically correct about the Americans refusal to negotiate after Kantai Kessen type results (Pearl Harbor), he still acted as if it was possible and still fought according to that doctrine.

So, what to make of the "Robert E. Lee of the Japanese Navy"?

Both Yamamota and Lee were fighting for parties that were militarily and industrially far inferior to their opponent. Both Imperial Japan and the Confederate States had to rely on a strategy of tiring out their opponents and hoping they would give up. Of course it did not work in either case but there really no other way to play the hands that were dealt them. Both Gettysburg and Midway were attempts to bring about victories that would lead to the desired political result from the opponent. Both came close to achieving the victories they intended. I personally think victory at neither Gettysburg or Midway would have had the desired political impact on the side but the makes sense.

 

[McPherson]

Both the Solomons and the New Guinea campaigns were contested among islands and land based rather than carrier based air power predominated. Japanese doctrine relying on land based reconnaissance proved insufficient for deep water operations. In theory relying on land based reconnaissance left more carrier planes for offensive operation. Sound in theory, not so good in practice.

The IJNAS relied on cruiser based float plane recon as well as flying boat recon and LRMPs in blue water. Everyone did. They were not unique. Early war, when their LRMP and cruiser float plane crews were good and American CAPs were lousy, the blue water formula worked well. Like everyone else, they discovered as soon as radar and fighters combined to provide early warning and air denial, it no longer functioned as the pre-war and early war practice seemed to suggest. They adapted and used fighter supported recon to conduct search and shadow operations. Their longer ranged fighter secured their recon advantage all the way to the end of the war. It is the one WWII lesson learned the USN has not apparently learned.

Both Yamamota and Lee were fighting for parties that were militarily and industrially far inferior to their opponent. Both Imperial Japan and the Confederate States had to rely on a strategy of tiring out their opponents and hoping they would give up. Of course it did not work in either case but there really no other way to play the hands that were dealt them. Both Gettysburg and Midway were attempts to bring about victories that would lead to the desired political result from the opponent. Both came close to achieving the victories they intended. I personally think victory at neither Gettysburg or Midway would have had the desired political impact on the side but the makes sense.

See underlined? Lincoln would have raised another army and FDR would raise another fleet. Both the despicable Confederates and the imperialist Japanese bit off more than they could ever chew. They would lose, even if it had to be bulldozerkrieg to do it.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

Lincoln would have raised another army and FDR would raise another fleet

Come on Lincoln did not have to raise another army after after Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville and he would not have to raise another army after Gettysburg. They would have fallen back to the Pipe Creek line, the VI Corps was largely untouched and there was the little inconvenience to the Confederacy called Vicksburg. As for FDR there were 7 Essex Class carriers under construction with 17 more on order, 7 Independence Class carriers under construction 2 more on the way' 6 Iowa class battleships being built and while I can go on the point should be clear.

Both the despicable Confederates and the imperialist Japanese bit off more than they could ever chew.

Yes there was no way either Lee or Yamamota could win a longer war and they needed a political solution on the other side. As Henry Kiesinger said "we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win." While not guerrilla war the principle applies whenever you have vastly disparate forces facing each other.

They would lose, even if it had to be bulldozerkrieg to do it

Yes but both battles were close things. If Vincent doesn't hold Little Round Top the Union line could have been turned. Same result if Picket had made it through the center of the Union line. As Midway in one of his few historical analysis statements after the war Ray Spruance observed that they had many war games at the Naval War College after the war and never were able to replicate the victory. One simple difference would have been if Best had not diverted his three plane group to Akagi there could have, probably would have, been a different outcome if two Japanese carriers had counterattacked in the afternoon. Neither lost battle would have changed the ultimate outcome of either war. While not a fan of MacArthur I always liked his quote "It was close; but that's the way it is in war. You win or lose, live or die — and the difference is just an eyelash."

 

[McPherson]

Come on Lincoln did not have to raise another army after after Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville and he would not have to raise another army after Gettysburg. They would have fallen back to the Pipe Creek line, the VI Corps was largely untouched and there was the little inconvenience to the Confederacy called Vicksburg. As for FDR there were 7 Essex Class carriers under construction with 17 more on order, 7 Independence Class carriers under construction 2 more on the way' 6 Iowa class battleships being built and while I can go on the point should be clear.

1. Actually Chancellorsville was so bad, he did have to raise another levy to replace the manpower losses. April 1863-June 1863?

New York Draft Riots - HISTORY​

2. Not due until 1943, and you will notice that these were increases in construction orders after Coral Sea, Midway and Drumbeat? Massive ones.

Yes there was no way either Lee or Yamamota could win a longer war and they needed a political solution on the other side. As Henry Kiesinger said "we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win." While not guerrilla war the principle applies whenever you have vastly disparate forces facing each other.

3. There has to be an exit path. A viable clear one. If the exit path is clearly unobtainable, then the entry path is unwise.

Yes but both battles were close things. If Vincent doesn't hold Little Round Top the Union line could have been turned. Same result if Picket had made it through the center of the Union line. As Midway in one of his few historical analysis statements after the war Ray Spruance observed that they had many war games at the Naval War College after the war and never were able to replicate the victory. One simple difference would have been if Best had not diverted his three plane group to Akagi there could have, probably would have, been a different outcome if two Japanese carriers had counterattacked in the afternoon. Neither lost battle would have changed the ultimate outcome of either war. While not a fan of MacArthur I always liked his quote "It was close; but that's the way it is in war. You win or lose, live or die — and the difference is just an eyelash."

4. Lee's army could never march fast enough to catch the Federals if they evacuated to their fallback positions. This is one of those things Confederate fanboys never understand. To roll up the Federal fishhook all the way to Sugarloaf was a 2 day job, under the best of circumstances. Meade had enough high ground, road net, and uncommitted infantry and CAVALRY to make it impossible.

5. Spruance meant that sometimes the Japanese got chased out of there with a couple of flattops surviving or sometimes the result for the IJN was far worse. Never that the IJN could win.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Even with that, were far more effective than 20mm, on a ' rounds per aircraft shot down ' metric.
They had optical directors, unlike the individual 20mms.

If it worked, that is true, Problem however was that the gun itself was OK, but the mounting was not, so the total effectiveness of system was far below expectations and due to be replaced as soon as possible by a more reliable sort of weapon, in this case the copied Swedish Bofors 40mm gun on a adapted variation of the Dutch designed Hazemeier twin mounting, later evolving into the Quad mounting. (USN officials had tested the Dutch system in 1940 in the Caribbean where several Dutch warships operated in the West Indies, sharing their technology with friendly nations, like the USA, who were still neutral at the time, as well as the British, who were allied with the Dutch already from may 1940 on. The US thankfully took notice of this weaponsystem and evolved into something they could use, as did the British with their own developments like the STAAG and comparable systems.)

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Sidenote, the USN BB's at the time of Midway were not getting faster then the ones at Pearl Harbor ever were so at best 20 knots with a gale blowing from behind and a smooth sea, or in other words, not possible to either dictate terms, or run away from danger. These so called "Standards" were not yet upgraded with acceptable anti aircraft outfits yet, as they at best carried a mix of the older, manually handled 5"/25 in majority, a mix of singel 3"/50 and quad 1.1 " as medium and a few 20mm and .50 MG's at best. The total absence of a medium range AA was a serious problem when facing airthreats, as the 3 inch was too slow in RAF and the clumsy 1.1" quads were horrible things to opperate and prone to defects. The few 20mm's and MG's were of little use other than offering some form of last ditch defense, which normally would be enough, if the medium AA was capable enough.

So long before the USN battleline can get in the batlte, it will be very vulnerable to attacks form the air especially, with some other threats from either submarines and the IJN battle tested night attacks of fast torpedo armed groups of surfaceships, just as trained for in the prewar years. It can be expected none of the USN BB's survive these attacks, even before they can get a shot at one of the IJN BB's, who were the last part of this plan. (Note, yoru scenario tells Nagumo's forces are doing their Midway attack still, but are not countered by USN Carriers, but the battleline of old obsolete BB's. This gives the IJN an overwhelming superiority in naval airstrike capabilities and with their veteran aviators still dominating the cocpits.)

I did not mean that the US was not bringing CVs. Nimitz is far too smart for that. What I meant was that the CVs would be present, but would be acting in their pre-war recon/first strike role to cover the BBs on the approach to Midway.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

If it worked, that is true, Problem however was that the gun itself was OK, but the mounting was not, so the total effectiveness of system was far below expectations and due to be replaced as soon as possible by a more reliable sort of weapon, in this case the copied Swedish Bofors 40mm gun on a adapted variation of the Dutch designed Hazemeier twin mounting, later evolving into the Quad mounting. (USN officials had tested the Dutch system in 1940 in the Caribbean where several Dutch warships operated in the West Indies, sharing their technology with friendly nations, like the USA, who were still neutral at the time, as well as the British, who were allied with the Dutch already from may 1940 on. The US thankfully took notice of this weaponsystem and evolved into something they could use, as did the British with their own developments like the STAAG and comparable systems.)

A question: when the Japanese captured the NEI, did they find any intact 40mm Bofors guns?

 

[Kantai Kessen]

@McPherson , @Bob in Pittsburgh : this is NOT a Civil War thread. Thanks for the interesting parallels but please remember this thread's purpose.

 

[HMS Warspite]

A question: when the Japanese captured the NEI, did they find any intact 40mm Bofors guns?

No, they did not recover modern 40mm twin bofors mountings on Dutch sunken warships in the East indies as the ones carried there were of older types on the wrecked DD's present in Soerabaya. On land the KNIL used the landarmy variant of the weapon which differed from the navalized ones in mountings. The IJN did produce a few licence build 40mm bofors though based on the captured KNIL weapons though, but only a few were produced.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

That is nothing but pure IJN lunacy. Yamato would be crippled and rendered combat ineffective long before she could take out 3 opposing battleships that are all firing on her simultaneously. While they probably wouldn't penetrate her citadel, they don't have to. While Yamato is executing her first opponent, the other 2-4 American battleships that are not engaged will be having gunnery practice with Yamato as their target. The sheer weight of fire alone would effectively shatter Yamato before she could take out the second ship.

I'm just saying what the IJN thought. Also, bear in mind the superior range of Yamato (45,960 yards) to Colorado and Maryland (35,000 yards), Tennessee and the New Mexicos (36,800 yards) and Pennsylvania (34,300 yards). She also has the speed to control the range as much as she wants. Add the 25-knot Nagatos that can shoot to 42,350 yards, and this is not looking like a rollover for the USN.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

No, they did not recover modern 40mm twin bofors mountings on Dutch sunken warships in the East indies as the ones carried there were of older types on the wrecked DD's present in Soerabaya. On land the KNIL used the landarmy variant of the weapon which differed from the navalized ones in mountings. The IJN did produce a few licence build 40mm bofors though based on the captured KNIL weapons though, but only a few were produced.

That's a pity. IJN AA was in a sorry state as it was.

 

[HMS Warspite]

I did not mean that the US was not bringing CVs. Nimitz is far too smart for that. What I meant was that the CVs would be present, but would be acting in their pre-war recon/first strike role to cover the BBs on the approach to Midway.

In that case, the IJN doctrine still was to strike with pre-emtive strikes against whatever they could strike to weaken the approach of the USN countering forces, so the result will not differ much in this case as the main purpose of the Kido Butai did not change. Only the losses in aircaft were expected to be somewhat larger , but still the overwhelming nummers of IJN airforces present would be in Japans advantage, as the USN carrierforces were in this case more bound to support the slow obsolete BB line, removuing a significant portion of its airpower to just protect this element.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

In that case, the IJN doctrine still was to strike with pre-emtive strikes against whatever they could strike to weaken the approach of the USN countering forces, so the result will not differ much in this case as the main purpose of the Kido Butai did not change. Only the losses in aircaft were expected to be somewhat larger , but still the overwhelming nummers of IJN airforces present would be in Japans advantage, as the USN carrierforces were in this case more bound to support the slow obsolete BB line, removuing a significant portion of its airpower to just protect this element.

Which, IMO, goes to show that Nimitz was right NOT to deploy TF1 to Midway.

 

[ShySusan]

I'm just saying what the IJN thought. Also, bear in mind the superior range of Yamato (45,960 yards) to Colorado and Maryland (35,000 yards), Tennessee and the New Mexicos (36,800 yards) and Pennsylvania (34,300 yards). She also has the speed to control the range as much as she wants. Add the 25-knot Nagatos that can shoot to 42,350 yards, and this is not looking like a rollover for the USN.

And those numbers are essentially meaningless. The longest range gun hit in history is around 26,000 yards according to Guinness. Well, technically they list it as 15 miles, but either way the range is the same. That has been achieved exactly twice. One hit by Scharnhorst when she hit Glorious at around 26,400 yards and one hit by Warspite when she hit Guilio Cesare at about 26,000 yards. So ranges in excess of 30,000 yards are pretty useless in a naval engagement. Well, unless you just want to waste ammo.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

And those numbers are essentially meaningless. The longest range gun hit in history is around 26,000 yards according to Guinness. Well, technically they list it as 15 miles, but either way the range is the same. That has been achieved exactly twice. One hit by Scharnhorst when she hit Glorious at around 26,400 yards and one hit by Warspite when she hit Guilio Cesare at about 26,000 yards. So ranges in excess of 30,000 yards are pretty useless in a naval engagement. Well, unless you just want to waste ammo.

Longer range allows the IJN shooting to find the range to start more quickly and their fire solution to be acquired more quickly. The Standards haven't had their upgrades yet so by the time they start firing ranging shots, BatDiv1 may have the range. Pre-war, the IJN had trained exactly for this kind of long-range gunnery duel, and this is 1942 so they should be pretty good at it.

If that doesn't work and nothing else does, Yamato and the Nagatos can run away and lead the Standards on a wild goose chase - straight into a carrier or a destroyer strike.

This probably breaks every rule in the IJN's book, but Yamamoto liked to gamble and do weird things.

 

[McPherson]

If it worked, that is true, Problem however was that the gun itself was OK, but the mounting was not, so the total effectiveness of system was far below expectations and due to be replaced as soon as possible by a more reliable sort of weapon, in this case the copied Swedish Bofors 40mm gun on a adapted variation of the Dutch designed Hazemeier twin mounting, later evolving into the Quad mounting. (USN officials had tested the Dutch system in 1940 in the Caribbean where several Dutch warships operated in the West Indies, sharing their technology with friendly nations, like the USA, who were still neutral at the time, as well as the British, who were allied with the Dutch already from may 1940 on. The US thankfully took notice of this weaponsystem and evolved into something they could use, as did the British with their own developments like the STAAG and comparable systems.)

1. The PROBLEM was the shell fusing. The sensitive nose fusing of the 28 mm shells tended to go off just at muzzle exit of the US 28mm/70 guns. The US quad mounting borrowed feed from the Swedish naval mounting but was more BRITISH than Dutch in its evolution.

A question: when the Japanese captured the NEI, did they find any intact 40mm Bofors guns?

2. They captured the Dutch naval mount.

@McPherson , @Bob in Pittsburgh : this is NOT a Civil War thread. Thanks for the interesting parallels but please remember this thread's purpose.

3. The civil war / Midway comparison aside is interesting in illustrating how fanbois never dig into the details of why their favorite "what if" is never possible, because of ignored and unpleasant "facts".

I'm just saying what the IJN thought. Also, bear in mind the superior range of Yamato (45,960 yards) to Colorado and Maryland (35,000 yards), Tennessee and the New Mexicos (36,800 yards) and Pennsylvania (34,300 yards). She also has the speed to control the range as much as she wants. Add the 25-knot Nagatos that can shoot to 42,350 yards, and this is not looking like a rollover for the USN.

4. Battleship gunnery duels are time measured in flight times of shells, cycling speeds, and NOT in ship's cruise or battle speeds. In a nine minute gun duel HIJMS Kirishima had a 5 knot speed edge on the USS Washington. The USS Washington KILLED her. Nine salvoes cycled, in nine minutes, shell flight times were between 7 and 11 seconds. Ranges about 7,000 to 10,000 meters.

5. Radar advantage and fly outs for US shells at the 15,000-25,000 meters ranges to be expected? That is 25 to 40 seconds flyout every MINUTE with about 8%PH to Japanese shell flyout of 25 to 40 seconds with 4-5%PH every minute and a half. The American shells are heavier and they (surprisingly, because the American fuses were TERRIBLE.) have better fusing. Japanese ships would be in serious trouble. That includes the Yamatos.

In that case, the IJN doctrine still was to strike with pre-emptive strikes against whatever they could strike to weaken the approach of the USN countering forces, so the result will not differ much in this case as the main purpose of the Kido Butai did not change. Only the losses in aircraft were expected to be somewhat larger , but still the overwhelming numbers of IJN air forces present would be in Japans advantage, as the USN carrier forces were in this case more bound to support the slow obsolete BB line, removing a significant portion of its airpower to just protect this element.

6. Not true. USNAS doctrine was de-deck the enemy aircraft carriers first. Then go for kills on any enemy surface ships. What happened at Midway? Nagumo's flattops were wrecked and then Kurita was dive bombed. Then the Combined Fleet ran for their lives.

As for the Japanese doctrine of attrite and decrease.

The IJN had made a requirement for their attrite and decrease purposes for a submarine with a ridiculous high surface speed of 23 knots at least. They constantly sacrificed essential submarine qualities like dive speed and underwater trim stability and even forward massed torpedo salvo and size to obtain that surface speed.

Any navy that does not understand that it is the effectors and not the platform characteristics, is doing it wrong. See my comments about battleship GUNNERY and why it is the shells and not the battleships that matter.

About gunfire...

And those numbers are essentially meaningless. The longest range gun hit in history is around 26,000 yards according to Guinness. Well, technically they list it as 15 miles, but either way the range is the same. That has been achieved exactly twice. One hit by Scharnhorst when she hit Glorious at around 26,400 yards and one hit by Warspite when she hit Guilio Cesare at about 26,000 yards. So ranges in excess of 30,000 yards are pretty useless in a naval engagement. Well, unless you just want to waste ammo.

7. That is about what the USN concluded. Also the British and French and even the Japanese. (See Yamato comment below.)

Longer range allows the IJN shooting to find the range to start more quickly and their fire solution to be acquired more quickly. The Standards haven't had their upgrades yet so by the time they start firing ranging shots, BatDiv1 may have the range. Pre-war, the IJN had trained exactly for this kind of long-range gunnery duel, and this is 1942 so they should be pretty good at it.

8. The HIJMS Yamato was missing at 29,000 meters at Samar. That is about 18 miles.

If that doesn't work and nothing else does, Yamato and the Nagatos can run away and lead the Standards on a wild goose chase - straight into a carrier or a destroyer strike.

This probably breaks every rule in the IJN's book, but Yamamoto liked to gamble and do weird things.

How? They are on fire, burning down.