IJN Soryu's and USS Wasp's Durability and Usefulness

[CV12Hornet]

Perhaps this is the answer? This ship doesn't get torpedoed in 1941 and is diverted to PACFLT after Pearl Harbor?

USS Salinas (AO-19) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Salinas was the same class as Tippecanoe and so I think she could help support Saratoga. We then have:

• Kaskaskia to get TF11 to the Coral Sea.
• Neches to get TF14 to the Coral Sea. (She can do 14 knots, and so is better for fleet ops than the 10.5 knot Salinas).
• Platte to support TF17 in the SoPac beforehand.
• Neosho, Tippecanoe, Salinas to support the 3 carrier TFs.

Let us say that, supported with Neches and Salinas, TF14 now packs 1 CV with about 70 planes, 1 CA, 1 CLAA and 4 DD (probably). So the US fleet in the Coral Sea has:

• 3 CV: Yorktown, Lexington, Saratoga - with about 200-210 planes
• 6 CA: Astoria, Portland, Chester, New Orleans, Minneapolis, San Francisco
• 1 CLAA: Atlanta
• 13 DDs as escort

That almost exactly matches the USN's Midway OOB. Interesting. However, if Leary is as bad as @McPherson says, I don't think this is guaranteed to go well with him in charge.

At this point you've piled on three points of divergence to try and get Saratoga to Coral Sea, which I think speaks to how unlikely it is. This on top of the point of divergence needed to get Soryu there.

Surely you see the problem.

 

[Sargon]

At this point you've piled on three points of divergence to try and get Saratoga to Coral Sea, which I think speaks to how unlikely it is. This on top of the point of divergence needed to get Soryu there.

Surely you see the problem.

It's hard to disagree. Getting this Saratoga part of the scenario to work is looking like an exercise in implausibility. Though why that is desired when it could just cancel out another Japanese carrier there anyway, seems a bit puzzling.

Admittedly, it IS interesting if somehow there was another Japanese carrier at Coral Sea facing off against the historical US force and any changes that could lead to. How workable that can be is another consideration though.


Sargon

 

[McPherson]

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/macarthur’s-navy-how-world-war-ii-general-led-amphibious-assault-against-japan-169468Could you give some examples of Leary's idiocy?

MacArthur’s Navy: How the World War II General Led the Amphibious Assault Against Japan

Step 1: egos. In November 1941, the U.S. Asiatic Fleet weighed anchor in Shanghai, China, for the last time. Alarmed by the growing hostility and aggressiveness of the Japanese, Admiral Thomas Hart ordered the outnumbered and outgunned American vessels moved to the relative safety of Manila Bay in the Philippines.

Comment: VADM Hart took care of business and tried to do his job.

Admiral Hart sought to coordinate Army Air Corps reconnaissance flights with his naval activity. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of American and Philippine forces, would have none of it. He refused to allow cooperation and coordination among the services. He believed that all forces—naval, air, and land—should operate under a single command: his command. Nothing short of that was acceptable.

Comment: LTGEN Brereton (Incompetent golfer at FEAAF. ) and GEN MacArthur (Ego-attack, "Those are my toys!") and Sutherland (Power-trip. "I am the boss!") were not doing theirs, so Hart tried to make things happen in lieu of their inaction.

With the beginning of hostilities, the army’s planes were destroyed on the ground and the naval base at Cavite was bombed out of action. Manila Bay became untenable for the navy. Orders from Washington, D.C., instructed Admiral Hart to move his ships to the temporary safety of Java. General MacArthur accused Hart of desertion.

Comment: Debatable. Hart had his orders, which he actually had a hand in crafting from his end. Whether Stark agreed with him or not, I do not know, but the USNGS did and Hart acted as he thought best. MacArthur's accusation was typical MacArthur.

MacArthur might have been able to persuade Admiral Hart to remain and fight alongside him if they had established a working relationship. The imperious general personified the inter-service rivalry then burgeoning between the army and the navy. There was no love lost between the two men. Leaving Manila Bay was an easy order for Admiral Hart to follow.

Comment: I prefer to suggest, that since MacArthur, Sutherland and Brereton threw the air power away, it was the only sensible naval move possible and Hart took it. This will have repercussions in that it will be difficult for ADM King to trust GEN MacArthur to operate naval forces in combined operations. The lack of FEAAF cooperation during Coral Sea and Leary's bungled use of the submarines chopped to MacArthur are indictments and indications that SWPOA was messed up beyond repair (MUBR)

As for Leary...

The navy’s man on scene in Australia, Rear Admiral Herbert F. Leary, like Hart, did not get along with MacArthur. Leary refused to send his few boats to assist the army on the north shore of New Guinea. Worse, he insisted on reporting directly through the navy’s chain of command to Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in Hawaii. MacArthur wanted all communication to and from his theater of operations to flow through his headquarters.

Comment: Leary was, besides a friend of FDR, an apple polisher, and a bureaucrat. He did not play well with others, when he saw he could be made the fall guy.

Leary was replaced with Admiral Arthur Carpenter to oversee naval operations in the Southwest Pacific. Carpenter and MacArthur were at odds from the outset and Carpenter also refused to support army operations in New Guinea. There were uncharted shoals, and the enemy owned the air, he argued. He too insisted on reporting directly to Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii.

Comment: Arthur Carpender. Sloppy scholarship. Otherwise, he is the same as Leary.

Now we jump to the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Summary: whether Adolphus Andrews or useless Herbert, one can see by the disorganized correspondence and bureaucratic missives (Mostly Leary) between CNO and Eastern Sea Frontier Actual that the squabbling between Army Air Farces and the USN frittered away LRMP assets and resulted in administrative hogties. Further, the bolo in command arrangements in the sea districts which ESF Actual should have handled in-command, was plonked onto King's desk. Whenever I read someone avoiding his responsibility like this (See Letters) and shoving his duty UP the chain of responsibility, I get the distinct impression that the person doing the buck passing is an apple polisher trying to paper trail shift the blame to someone else. I have no use for this nonsense. When MacArthur and Halsey failed to operate smoothly, their subordinates, FITCH and KENNEY developed private channels and figured out how to make AIRSOLS and 5th Air Force cooperate during CARTWHEEL. This is actually a ridiculous way to run a war, one knows?

Those are the glories of the 1920 National Defense Act.

Who screwed that one up?

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson signs National Defense Act ...​

 

[McPherson]

I agree on that, though it would mostly depend on the tactics used and not so much the few more aircraft or carriers available.

Tactics are defined by geography, available resources/means, objectives desired and the time available. One can allocate resources and adjust objectives to resources and means, refine tactics within those variables, but can do nothing about geography or time available.

More on this as I discuss ... the enemy.

Problems to solve for the IJN:

1. Get more coordination between the multiple forces available to them, especially between carriers strike groups and land based airpower located in the conflict zone. Historically this was pretty bad due to lack in communication, or due to commanders locally doing their own thing independently, with no real tactical plan in it. (Especially the commanders on ground based air groups were to blame here, as they threw away their limited amount of aircraft in uncoordinated small flights, where a coordinated combined strike would be far more effective.

This is not true. The Imperial Japanese Naval Service had a unified operational air command structure and doctrine that combined RIKKOS and seaborne strike air forces and air defense base forces into a unity which was at least on paper ideal. Such forces came under area fleet naval commanders and operated with remarkable efficiency compared to their American enemy., who had to cobble air cooperation arrangements together in spite of MacArthur and Halsey. The IJNAS problems arose purely as the result of incompetent admirals failing to exercise this command setup as designed. The notable land based air farce bunglers involved were

Shigeru Fukudome​

Example: Here is his interview.
Comments: some of his operational decisions pre-Philippine Sea make absolutely no sense at all. He was not too sharp during Leyte Gulf either.

Takijirō Ōnishi
Comments: he killed himself before he could be interviewed. He innovated in cruise missile warfare, but apparently he did not figure out how to use kamikazes in direct support of forces afloat.

Chūichi Nagumo
Comments: The 14th Air Fleet commander operated out of Saipan with the same incompetence he had displayed when he commanded Kido Butai. It would have been interesting to have records of his alibis.
=====================================================
Shigeyoshi Inoue
Comments: This commander operated according to unified IJNAS doctrine at Coral Sea and supported his CARDIV 5 well with RIKKO operations. The bunglers of Operation MO (Well the two main bunglers) were the people running the Port Moresby Invasion Support Force (Goto Aritomo) and Strike Force Unit (Takeo Takagi; aka "Braindead")

2. The separate aircraft carrier groups were a bit spread out too thin, with large gaps between them, preventing a more combined operational use. Grouping them together in fewer, but larger carrier groups was more effective, we the smaller CVL's grouped together were too weak to operate against even a single USN Task group, let alone four of them. A two task group split was more effective in terms of grouping airpower more compact for a heavier punch (theoretically).

There is nothing theoretical about IJN decision making in the main. Until the Coral Sea, the IJN had a massed aircraft carriers doctrine, which grouped types of flattops together according to operational characteristics. There was an aberration which the USN noticed at Wake Island when Yamamoto Isoroku ordered Nagumo to detach Cardiv 2 (Tamon Yamaguchi) to lend the incompetent Sadamichi Kajioka a helping hand. The other notable IJN name one notices at the Wake Debacle is Shigeyoshi Inoue as the area fleet commander.

There were actually two carrier task forces involved at Midway / Aleutians in two independent simultaneous operations, There were the First Mobile (air) Fleet under VADM Nagumo and the Second Mobile (air) fleet under RADM Kakuta Kakuji, (Another one of those IJN fellows who died on Saipan before he could be interviewed about his role at Midway. His decisions at Philippine Sea make even less sense than Fukodome's before Leyte Gulf.) Anyway, the Second Mobile (Air) fleet contained the IJN flattops that were not "attack" aircraft carriers. Those were tactical aircraft carriers more correspondent to the American Independence class, just as horrible in characteristics and just as misused in the attack aircraft carrier role after the Kido Butai was gut-ripped at Coral Sea and Midway.

Notice that all of these operations, including the frittering away of Cardiv 5, the slaughter of Cardivs 1 and 2 and the misuse in an unnecessary independent fritter operation of Cardiv 4, were all against Japanese Doctrine as formulated and codified by Shigeyoshi Inoue. The man responsible for these errors was Yamamoto Isoroku, probably, next to Erich Raeder and Karl Doenitz (tie for first), the most incompetent admiral of WWII.

3. The separation of Ugaki's Sentai 1 battleships (Yamato & Musashi) as independent surface action group was a mistake as this group could do nothing at all tactically given the vast numerical USN airpower present. If this unit was to be resent, add it to a CV battlegroup as AA escorts of some kind at best.

Bodyguard at ~ 25 knots against US CTFs? The IJN tried that idea and it did not work. San-Shiki shells, slow speed and enormous fuel consumption were the technical reasons, but the best reason was that these ships were poor AAA platforms. They were designed to sink battleships.

4. Most important: Get pilot training on an acceptable level long before the battle, as the rookie pilots with far too few airtime were not a good fighting force to start with. This problem was structural in the IJN and represented a long duration war in the first place as Yamamoto already understood before the war started and communicated this with the war-planners, who did nothing with this information.

Again this is not true.

By mid-1943, following the death of Yamamoto, the new Combined Fleet commander, Koga Mineichi, adopted the American carrier task force concept. Kakuta was promoted to vice admiral and given command of 1 Air Fleet, the land-based anvil against which 1 Mobile Fleet was to be the hammer. Time was short, and Kakuta supported the decision to send new pilots to carriers before they had received advanced combat training. He justified this on the grounds that he was getting the best 20% of the trainees, that they would not have to shake off any bad habits, and that they could learn on the job. Operational losses and fuel expenditures both rose.

1 Air Fleet was thoroughly worked over by American carrier raids in February 1944. The fleet was still trying to rebuild when the Americans returned with an invasion force in June, and 1 Air Fleet suffered massive losses and was unable to play a decisive role in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Kakuta compounded this failure by failing to be candid in his reports to Toyoda, leaving Ozawa with the impression that Japanese land-based air was still capable of supporting his fleet.

Kakuta likely committed suicide with the fall of Saipan after failing in an attempt to evacuate his headquarters by submarine.

As can be seen, it was understood that the time crunch was in play. Previous I have noted how the detonation of HIJMS Mutsu put the kibosh on the IJN air cadet program by blowing 1/3 of the IJNAS instructor cadre available and 1/5 of the pilot trainees who went down with that battleship.

Leary is an utterly worthless and incompetent admiral, incapable either of administration or leadership.

Well, I covered him.

1. Some prior training and actually talking to each other would help. The IJN needs to put its common sense hats on.

2. Let's consider carrier speeds:
Taiho, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Soryu, Unryu, Amagi: 33-34 knots
Zuiho, Chitose, Chiyoda: 28-29 knots
Hiyo, Junyo, Ryuho: 25-26 knots
The USN mid-1944 CTGs were usually made up of 2 big carriers and 2 smaller carriers. With that in mind, perhaps the following organisation?

• CarDiv1: Shokaku, Zuikaku, Chitose, Chiyoda (2 big CV, 2 CVL; theoretical total 204 operational planes) - these are the 1st carrier line, meant to be tough and take the brunt of the US attack when they are located. Chitose and Chiyoda are useful manoeuvrable little ships and can be used as fighter carriers.
• CarDiv2: Taiho, Soryu, Unryu, Amagi (1 big CV, 3 small CV; theoretical total 258 operational planes) - these are the fast and agile 2nd carrier line, meant to be mobile and launch counterstrikes while CarDiv1 is being engaged. I include Taiho due to her rookieness and toughness. She can also draw fire from her much more fragile teammates.
• CarDiv3: Hiyo, Junyo, Ryuho, Zuiho (2 small CV, 2 CVL; theoretical total 168 operational planes) - these are the weak and slow 3rd carrier line, mainly used to provide CAP, recon and ASW, and containing some reserve strike elements.

3. According to my sources, BatDiv1 (Yamato, Musashi) and BatDiv3 (Kongo, Haruna) were used as AA escorts in OTL's Philippine Sea for the CVLs of CarDiv3 in the Van Force. In my new organisation, following your suggestions, we might attach them to CarDiv1 instead to provide support and soak up damage.

4. Hard to rectify, this one. Latest possible POD?

Ozawa figured the optimum organization out prior to Philippine Sea. All (^^^) this does is slow him down.

Further reading.

Comment: Makes it clear just what a clown club was at work in the IJN.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

It's hard to disagree. Getting this Saratoga part of the scenario to work is looking like an exercise in implausibility. Though why that is desired when it could just cancel out another Japanese carrier there anyway, seems a bit puzzling.

Admittedly, it IS interesting if somehow there was another Japanese carrier at Coral Sea facing off against the historical US force and any changes that could lead to. How workable that can be is another consideration though.


Sargon

First point taken (this is to @CV12Hornet as well). Well, then I guess I won't be changing that part of history so much.

On the additional Japanese carrier at Coral Sea, I found something very interesting over on Combined Fleet on Kaga's TROM: (http://combinedfleet.com/kaga.htm)

9 February 1942:
KAGA strikes a reef at Palau while shifting mooring positions. Bilges forward are damaged, and only temporary repairs can be made at Palau. Leakage in her bow remains and maximum speed is reduced to 18 knots.

11 March 1942:
Arrives at Staring Bay, Java having surrendered two days prior.

15 March 1942:
Departs Starting Bay for Sasebo, Kyushu escorted by Desdiv 15 (KUROSHIO, OYASHIO, HAYASHIO) having been ordered to return home for full repairs by CinC 2nd Fleet.

22 March 1942:
Arrives at Sasebo for permanent hull repairs from reef damage and maintenance. Her air group is flown off to Tateyama Air Base for training during the maintenance period.

27 March 1942:
Enters Sasebo Naval Yard drydock.

8 April 1942:
Combined Fleet requests repairs to KAGA be expedited, as it is hoped to include KAGA in Operation "MO."

4 May 1942:
Repairs are completed. Undocked. Departs Sasebo for the Inland Sea to rejoin CarDiv 1. Arrives same day at Hashirajima.

So, after her accident, Kaga was hastily patched up and took part in major operations with the rest of the Kido Butai for another month. She was then sent back to Japan and spent five to six weeks under repair. 11 days after she entered repairs, Combined Fleet wanted her assigned to Operation MO. Her eventual place in the operation was taken

What I think can be done with a plausible POD is the following: Kaga gets less heavily damaged while in Palau and can maintain a higher speed, say 23 knots rather than 18 knots. She still has to be sent back to Japan for repairs, but they only take two to three weeks. She enters Sasebo drydock a couple days earlier thanks to her higher speed, say 25 March, and is under repair until 15 April (three weeks). This is still too late for her to take part in the Indian Ocean Raid, so, if nothing else is done, she will be idling in Japan until June and Operation MI. Even the bunglers in the IJN should recognise that this is a waste of one of the most experienced fleet carriers in the navy, and also the one with the largest carrying capacity.

Now, on 8 April, Combined Fleet requests that Kaga be sent on Operation MO. Now that she has replenished her airgroups, had her refit and trained up her aviators and crew in the Home Islands, this seems like a reasonable request. I thus think it likely that Kaga, after her repairs are completed on 15 April, will undock, embark her complement and set sail for Truk to work with CarDiv5. It is about 2000 nautical miles from Japan to Truk; if Kaga steams at a cruising speed of 15 knots (at which speed she has a range of 10000 nautical miles, so she should be good without tanker support) and taking into account an extra day or two in Japan preparing for departure, she will make this journey in about a week. She should thus get to Truk, at the latest, on 22 April.

This is well before Operation MO is scheduled to take place, so perhaps a few extra days' delay can be incurred in Japan for whatever necessary reasons; there is some flexibility. CarDiv5, with Shokaku and Zuikaku, will arrive at Truk on 25 April (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Zuikak.htm), at which point Kaga can report herself for action. She will probably be assigned to that unit and will work under RAdm Chuichi Hara.

The IJN now has three fleet carriers available to cover Operation MO; this causes no other changes in Japanese carrier operations as Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu are still doing the things they did in real life. Now considering their complements (http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Coral_Sea.php):

• Shokaku: 18 Zeroes, 21 Vals, 19 Kates (total 58 planes)
• Zuikaku: 20 Zeroes, 22 Vals, 23 Kates (total 65 planes)
• Kaga (potentially - same airgroup as at Midway): 18 Zeroes, 18 Vals, 27 Kates (total 63 planes - if any more can be scraped up it would be nice to have them)

For a total of 186 planes: 56 Zeroes, 61 Vals, 69 Kates. This is a strike force powerful enough to overwhelm TF17 if it gets to grips with it.

First, however, the MO Strike Force must find TF17. This is where I think Kaga can make her biggest impact on the battle. IOTL, Hara used significant numbers of his two carriers' Kates on recon duty. These were pretty successful at finding enemy ships; they just happened to find completely the wrong ones on 7 May. It is very much worth noting, though, that the two carrier forces were close together on that day and that the weather conditions greatly favoured the Japanese. In fact, a Furutaka scout plane from Goto's Cover Force located TF17 shortly after Hara launched his strike against Neosho, which I think indicates that the American carriers could be readily located.

The presence of Kaga and her huge TB complement (which, as a side note, is possibly the best and most experienced in the IJNAS at this time and so perfect for sea strike) will allow Hara to extend his search net by a significant margin and thus, potentially, locate TF17 before he finds Neosho. In which case, as both American carriers are in the same place and have been spotted as such, the entire strike is going to be dropped onto them. Furthermore, poor Frank Fletcher won't be expecting them as he is too busy searching the Jomard Passage for the invasion force. He will be blindsided and faced with such a huge Japanese strike, I don't think TF17 will last very long. In which case, Operation MO will probably be pressed on by VAdm Inoue (who, according to @McPherson, seems to have actually been pretty good at his job), with great repercussions for the rest of the war.

We might even get Operation FS attempted in place of Operation MI-AL, although I think that unlikely.

The main disadvantage to Kaga being part of the MO Strike Force, as I see it, is her speed. At 28 knots she is slower than the 34 knot Shokaku and Zuikaku, which may force them to proceed at a slower cruising speed, which in turn may lead to them arriving in the battle area a bit later. However, since Fletcher spent the entirety of 5 May and 6 May refuelling his ships, and the MO Strike Force arrived in the area early on 6 May, I see at most a delay of several hours, allowing battle to proceed as planned on 7 May.

This also doesn't change the fact that Takagi still is in command. However, with Hara in charge of the air battle, I am still inclined to think things go better. In which case, as Yorktown at the least is destroyed, Soryu will be saved at Midway if it still happens, and thus get to do the cool things that I wish she had done.

TL;DR: the most likely additional IJN carrier at Coral Sea would look to be Kaga. She could be a great help.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

MacArthur’s Navy: How the World War II General Led the Amphibious Assault Against Japan

Comment: VADM Hart took care of business and tried to do his job.

Comment: LTGEN Brereton (Incompetent golfer at FEAAF. ) and GEN MacArthur (Ego-attack, "Those are my toys!") and Sutherland (Power-trip. "I am the boss!") were not doing theirs, so Hart tried to make things happen in lieu of their inaction.

Comment: Debatable. Hart had his orders, which he actually had a hand in crafting from his end. Whether Stark agreed with him or not, I do not know, but the USNGS did and Hart acted as he thought best. MacArthur's accusation was typical MacArthur.

Comment: I prefer to suggest, that since MacArthur, Sutherland and Brereton threw the air power away, it was the only sensible naval move possible and Hart took it. This will have repercussions in that it will be difficult for ADM King to trust GEN MacArthur to operate naval forces in combined operations. The lack of FEAAF cooperation during Coral Sea and Leary's bungled use of the submarines chopped to MacArthur are indictments and indications that SWPOA was messed up beyond repair (MUBR)

As for Leary...

Comment: Leary was, besides a friend of FDR, an apple polisher, and a bureaucrat. He did not play well with others, when he saw he could be made the fall guy.

Comment: Arthur Carpender. Sloppy scholarship. Otherwise, he is the same as Leary.

Now we jump to the Eastern Sea Frontier.

Summary: whether Adolphus Andrews or useless Herbert, one can see by the disorganized correspondence and bureaucratic missives (Mostly Leary) between CNO and Eastern Sea Frontier Actual that the squabbling between Army Air Farces and the USN frittered away LRMP assets and resulted in administrative hogties. Further, the bolo in command arrangements in the sea districts which ESF Actual should have handled in-command, was plonked onto King's desk. Whenever I read someone avoiding his responsibility like this (See Letters) and shoving his duty UP the chain of responsibility, I get the distinct impression that the person doing the buck passing is an apple polisher trying to paper trail shift the blame to someone else. I have no use for this nonsense. When MacArthur and Halsey failed to operate smoothly, their subordinates, FITCH and KENNEY developed private channels and figured out how to make AIRSOLS and 5th Air Force cooperate during CARTWHEEL. This is actually a ridiculous way to run a war, one knows?

Those are the glories of the 1920 National Defense Act.

Who screwed that one up?

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson signs National Defense Act ...​

Thank you for the information!

 

[Kantai Kessen]

At this point you've piled on three points of divergence to try and get Saratoga to Coral Sea, which I think speaks to how unlikely it is. This on top of the point of divergence needed to get Soryu there.

Surely you see the problem.

Are these my three PODs for Saratoga? (This is to @Sargon as well). Ignoring Soryu for a bit.

1. Salinas not torped in Oct 1941.
2. Saratoga not torped in Jan 1942.
3. Neches not torped in Jan 1942.

I am inclined to think that 3 proceeds from 2, as Neches will not be merrily sailing around the Pacific alone; she will be assigned to support TF14 and thus will have the benefit of some destroyer escort. She also will be sailing on different routes to where she moved IOTL (which was to help out Lexington and TF11 in the Western Pacific when she got sunk by I-72: note she was unescorted at the time), so, IMO, it is entirely possible for her to avoid her OTL fate if Saratoga does not get damaged. So that means two PODs really.

As for 1, I believe that if we re-ran the scenario, Salinas would have a good chance of evading damage. Visibility was terrible on the day, about 1000 yards. It is also worth noting that the aim of U-106, the offending boat, was not spectacular. She struck the oiler with two torpedoes on the port side - fair enough so far. She then closed in on the starboard side to an even lower range on the now basically stationary Salinas, fired three torpedoes - and missed with all three. It is entirely possible in these conditions that Salinas gets lucky and avoids damage. Besides that, she was well-escorted, unlike Neches, with at least two DDs assisting her and attacking U-106 afterwards.

Torpedoes have notoriously low accuracy, and it is very possible that 1 and 2 happen; for the latter, perhaps I-6 has engine problems, fires a defective torpedo, or is otherwise unlikely. If 2 happens, IMO 3 will follow.

Perhaps I could write a TL on what follows. Call it 'A Tale of Two Torpedoes'.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

A more plausible scenario than Saratoga being at Coral Sea is getting Illustrious from the Eastern Fleet to the Guadalcanal theater in time for Santa Cruz and pairing her with TF64 for the needed escorts

 

[Kantai Kessen]

A more plausible scenario than Saratoga being at Coral Sea is getting Illustrious from the Eastern Fleet to the Guadalcanal theater in time for Santa Cruz and pairing her with TF64 for the needed escorts

Which carriers are you suggesting be used in the Indian Ocean then? Formidable and Victorious are needed to cover Operation Torch and Indomitable is out of action until February 1943 due to damage taken in Operation Pedestal. Furious is needed for ferry missions in the Mediterranean and then to cover Operation Torch. Apart from them, the Royal Navy has no carriers to replace Illustrious in the Indian Ocean, where she is needed to cover the invasion of Madagascar.

And even if she did get there, Lusty would need time to familiarise herself with American ships and planes, and practice working with American ships - see how long it took Victorious to really start jazzing with Saratoga in 1943. That will take time that is not really available to fit into the British timetable, and so I don't think she will be ready by October 1942 at all.

I was more interested in changes much earlier in 1942, pre-Coral Sea.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Notice that all of these operations, including the frittering away of Cardiv 5, the slaughter of Cardivs 1 and 2 and the misuse in an unnecessary independent fritter operation of Cardiv 4, were all against Japanese Doctrine as formulated and codified by Shigeyoshi Inoue. The man responsible for these errors was Yamamoto Isoroku, probably, next to Erich Raeder and Karl Doenitz (tie for first), the most incompetent admiral of WWII.

I find that extremely ironic, considering that Yamamoto and Inoue were actually pretty good friends and shared lots of the same ideas, e.g. not wanting to go to war with the US, believing in the strength of air power, knowing that the Decisive Battle would never come about. Yamamoto should have listened to his friend when he opposed the Midway operation; not to mention the fact that even Nobutake Kondo, the 2nd-most important man in the navy himself, was against it.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Going back to the main purpose of this thread. One way in which I see both Wasp and Soryu displaying their abilities in a straight-up carrier duel is if Midway goes differently from OTL. In fact, it SHOULD have, because Yamamoto's planning was schizophrenic to say the least. He wished to accomplish two aims at the island, which competed with each other and led to Nagumo, Genda and Fuchida creating the famous fuck-up that we all know and (kinda) love:

• Capture the island and secure it as a Japanese airbase and naval base.
• Destroy the American carriers who would try to come and stop this from happening.

Say that Yamamoto has an attack of common sense before the battle. Objective 1 is now thrust into the background; only a token force of transports is sent, to make the situation even more urgent for the Americans. Objective 2 is now the main plan.

So, come Midway, only one of Kido Butai's CarDivs bombs the island, in a pale imitation of what they threw at it OTL. The other CarDiv focuses on CAP and recon, trying to find the American carriers are bound to be out there. Once the strike is recovered, Kido Butai does NOT loiter to the north of the island and expose itself to near constant American air attacks, but hustles away and prepares to fight a carrier battle.

We'd then (possibly) see four well-prepared IJN carriers against three well-prepared USN carriers. I doubt this situation is going to yield the massive SBD slap-down of real life. We'd probably have a more balanced fight.

On one hand, this fight could be a sort of draw. But I am more inclined to believe that the highly trained and highly experienced Japanese carriers will outperform their American counterparts, Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance notwithstanding. This lets us have Soryu showing what she is capable of in a carrier duel.

For the purposes of the exercise, Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown are all sunk. Now the USN has only Saratoga and Wasp, and possibly (big if) Ranger in the Pacific, with perhaps a RN carrier for support. Wasp is now a frontline ship and will thus probably get to fight in more fleet battles, allowing us to see how she would have fared in such situations.

Thoughts? This is very rough and I literally thought this out in five minutes, so I don't know how plausible it is.

 

[McPherson]

I find that extremely ironic, considering that Yamamoto and Inoue were actually pretty good friends and shared lots of the same ideas, e.g. not wanting to go to war with the US, believing in the strength of air power, knowing that the Decisive Battle would never come about. Yamamoto should have listened to his friend when he opposed the Midway operation; not to mention the fact that even Nobutake Kondo, the 2nd-most important man in the navy himself, was against it.

After Coral Sea, Inoue and Yamamoto were no longer friends. Inoue apparently felt Yamamoto had not supported Operation MO with enough assets (true); because Yamamoto was fixated on AF (Midway) and Operation MI, and Yamamoto believed Inoue had lost his nerve and called off the Port Moresby invasion too soon, when the Americans and Australians were beaten and in retreat. (true). Both admirals seemed to act as if the other man was either pigheaded (Yamamoto) or a yellow coward (Inoue) and the friendship and respect for each other's opinions died in the weeks between Coral Sea and Midway. Of course, if either man had a common superior, a Japanese equivalent of CINCPAC, both men would have been reassigned to Sasebo and to the Japanese naval academy respectively as incompetents. Inoue lived to get that treatment as did Nagumo. Yamamoto WAS the Japanese version of CINCPAC. The Americans killed him in an ambush.

Going back to the main purpose of this thread. One way in which I see both Wasp and Soryu displaying their abilities in a straight-up carrier duel is if Midway goes differently from OTL. In fact, it SHOULD have, because Yamamoto's planning was schizophrenic to say the least. He wished to accomplish two aims at the island, which competed with each other and led to Nagumo, Genda and Fuchida creating the famous fuck-up that we all know and (kinda) love:

• Capture the island and secure it as a Japanese airbase and naval base.
• Destroy the American carriers who would try to come and stop this from happening.

Say that Yamamoto has an attack of common sense before the battle. Objective 1 is now thrust into the background; only a token force of transports is sent, to make the situation even more urgent for the Americans. Objective 2 is now the main plan.

THAT actually was Operation MI as planned. Does one seriously think a rump brigade of SNLF troops led by the fool, Ichiki, could take on Captain Parsons garrison? Not a chance at all, would the Japanese landing force make it.

So, come Midway, only one of Kido Butai's CarDivs bombs the island, in a pale imitation of what they threw at it OTL. The other CarDiv focuses on CAP and recon, trying to find the American carriers are bound to be out there. Once the strike is recovered, Kido Butai does NOT loiter to the north of the island and expose itself to near constant American air attacks, but hustles away and prepares to fight a carrier battle.

But only a pair of flattops did bomb Midway. And that is what Nagumo tried to do.

We'd then (possibly) see four well-prepared IJN carriers against three well-prepared USN carriers. I doubt this situation is going to yield the massive SBD slap-down of real life. We'd probably have a more balanced fight.

But it did.

On one hand, this fight could be a sort of draw. But I am more inclined to believe that the highly trained and highly experienced Japanese carriers will outperform their American counterparts, Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance notwithstanding. This lets us have Soryu showing what she is capable of in a carrier duel.

But it did not. Exactly what you wanted and described was Japanese intended and performed.

For the purposes of the exercise, Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown are all sunk. Now the USN has only Saratoga and Wasp, and possibly (big if) Ranger in the Pacific, with perhaps a RN carrier for support. Wasp is now a frontline ship and will thus probably get to fight in more fleet battles, allowing us to see how she would have fared in such situations.

The Japanese recon failed. And when it failed at Midway... like it did not at Coral Sea, because Inoue had used his shore based air the way it was meant to be used according to IJN doctrine in support of its shipborne air to track Fletcher and Fitch and apprise Takagi where the Americans were; (And his forces still lost.); the Americans would win at Midway in spite of all their amateurishness, and bungling. (Submarine recon and reportage was fair to good at the moments when it mattered.)

Thoughts? This is very rough and I literally thought this out in five minutes, so I don't know how plausible it is.

See my remarks. And get a copy of "The Shattered Sword". It is the go-to book in English on what I just wrote.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

After Coral Sea, Inoue and Yamamoto were no longer friends. Inoue apparently felt Yamamoto had not supported Operation MO with enough assets (true); because Yamamoto was fixated on AF (Midway) and Operation MI, and Yamamoto believed Inoue had lost his nerve and called off the Port Moresby invasion too soon, when the Americans and Australians were beaten and in retreat. (true). Both admirals seemed to act as if the other man was either pigheaded (Yamamoto) or a yellow coward (Inoue) and the friendship and respect for each other's opinions died in the weeks between Coral Sea and Midway. Of course, if either man had a common superior, a Japanese equivalent of CINCPAC, both men would have been reassigned to Sasebo and to the Japanese naval academy respectively as incompetents. Inoue lived to get that treatment as did Nagumo. Yamamoto WAS the Japanese version of CINCPAC. The Americans killed him in an ambush.

THAT actually was Operation MI as planned. Does one seriously think a rump brigade of SNLF troops led by the fool, Ichiki, could take on Captain Parsons garrison? Not a chance at all, would the Japanese landing force make it.

But only a pair of flattops did bomb Midway. And that is what Nagumo tried to do.

But it did.

But it did not. Exactly what you wanted and described was Japanese intended and performed.

The Japanese recon failed. And when it failed at Midway... like it did not at Coral Sea, because Inoue had used his shore based air the way it was meant to be used according to IJN doctrine in support of its shipborne air to track Fletcher and Fitch and apprise Takagi where the Americans were; (And his forces still lost.); the Americans would win at Midway in spite of all their amateurishness, and bungling. (Submarine recon and reportage was fair to good at the moments when it mattered.)

See my remarks. And get a copy of "The Shattered Sword". It is the go-to book in English on what I just wrote.

A pair of flattops' worth of planes: all four of CarDiv1's and CarDiv2's carriers launched against Midway.

I thought the IJN was serious about invading? TIL.

Was there any land-based air that could have been used at Midway? I guess not, but I'm an amateur and I don't know.

I intend to get 'Shattered Sword' for my birthday. Kinda feel that unless I read it I will forever stay an AH-Pacific War noob

 

[McPherson]

A pair of flattops' worth of planes: all four of CarDiv1's and CarDiv2's carriers launched against Midway.

I thought the IJN was serious about invading? TIL.

Was there any land-based air that could have been used at Midway? I guess not, but I'm an amateur and I don't know.

I intend to get 'Shattered Sword' for my birthday. Kinda feel that unless I read it I will forever stay an AH-Pacific War noob

1. Yes. 108 planes. Tomonaga, the strike coordinator bungled the raid aloft. That was one of the reasons, Nagumo ruffle shuffled his anti-ship deck strike in Cardiv 2 that he had on standby, and was caught in the middle of his re-arm re-spot cycle during those deadly five minutes.
2. It was the kind of operation, that when one digs down into the details, makes no sense at all. The way it was laid out, was: (1) air raid on Midway, then (2) surface bombardment, (3) landings, then (4) air battle with PACFLT flattops and Kido Butai with Midway IJNAS air garrison flying RIKKO and air search and then (5) decisive gunline action with PACFLT surface forces, and (6) Japanese ambassadors offer Americans terms for peace in Bern Switzerland which the Americans will be forced to accept since they no longer have a navy in the Pacific.
3. It was used in a fashion (Flying boats and long ranged land based LRMPs). (Emilys and Nells) It was routinely shot down or chased off.
4. Pacific War is just as complex or even more complex that the entire European War. There is so much going on in a single operation (Operation MI is the LARGEST single battle in spatial area in Human history, being about twice the size of the Eastern Front when all the pieces are sorted out.), that it is hard to track all the parts.

Japan attacks Midway and Aleutians_Map
Looks small?

Look at it again.

Dai Tōa senkyoku chizu : Japanese Illustrated Map of the ...

THAT is a more true comparator.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

Yes. 108 planes. Tomonaga, the strike coordinator bungled the raid aloft.

What exactly did he bungle? You cannot blame a Lt. for only 1/2 of the available planes being committed.

It was used in a fashion (Flying boats and long ranged land based LRMPs). (Emilys and Nells) It was routinely shot down or chased off.

This shows the ultimate fallacy of relying on land based aircraft for blue water reconnaissance' especially in the vast reaches of the Pacific in the 1940s.

Japanese ambassadors offer Americans terms for peace in Bern Switzerland which the Americans will be forced to accept since they no longer have a navy in the Pacific.

Although he said little after the war about the war one thing Ray Spruance said was that in all the war gaming they did at the Naval War College they could never recreate the level of victory that actually occurred at Midway. Now at the time of Midway, there were 7 Essex class carriers under construction and 17 on order, 7 Independence class light carriers under construction and 2 more on order, 115 escort carriers coming, the planes to fly off all of them, 6 Iowa Class battleships under construction, 2 Alaska Class large cruisers under construction, 4 Baltimore class heavy cruisers under construction and 10 more ordered. I could go on but Yamamota was right about one thing; there was no way they could win against this fleet.

 

[McPherson]

What exactly did he bungle? You cannot blame a Lt. for only 1/2 of the available planes being committed.

Picked the wrong island and wasted most of his strike force on it.

File:Midway Islands.svg - Wikimedia Commons

https://japanese-aviation.forumotion.com/t17-45-midway-islands-battle-june-4-1942

This shows the ultimate fallacy of relying on land based aircraft for blue water reconnaissance' especially in the vast reaches of the Pacific in the 1940s.

What were the FEAAF B-17s and the Midway based PBYs and RIKKOs doing at Coral Sea and Midway? or the Japanese RIKKOSs at Santa Cruz and Rennell Islands or 5th Air Force at Bismarck Sea?
=======================================================
Yamamoto was wrong about so much, that even though he was technically correct about the Americans refusal to negotiate after Kantai Kessen type results (Pearl Harbor), he still acted as if it was possible and still fought according to that doctrine.

So, what to make of the "Robert E. Lee of the Japanese Navy"?

 

[Kantai Kessen]

This shows the ultimate fallacy of relying on land based aircraft for blue water reconnaissance' especially in the vast reaches of the Pacific in the 1940s.

The Solomons would like to have a word with you.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

4. Pacific War is just as complex or even more complex that the entire European War. There is so much going on in a single operation (Operation MI is the LARGEST single battle in spatial area in Human history, being about twice the size of the Eastern Front when all the pieces are sorted out.), that it is hard to track all the parts.

Japan attacks Midway and Aleutians_Map

This map has given me an idea.

Would it be possible for Kido Butai to slip in behind Yamamoto's Main Force on the approach to Midway? This would give the carriers the much needed buffer that they missed out on IOTL.

Main Force consisted of:

• BatDiv1 (Adm Yamamoto): Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu
• DesRon3 (RAdm Hashimoto): Sendai + 8 DD
• Aviation Unit: Hosho, Chiyoda, Nisshin + 1 DD
• 2 oilers

This force could be a handy distraction and also provide recon thanks to the presence of the battleships (Yamato can carry 7 floatplanes; how many did she have at Midway?), the Hosho with her eight B4Ys and the seaplane tenders. It also looks as if the Japanese are going to attempt a battleship bombardment of the island and change American tactical decisions. Meanwhile, in the back Nagumo is protected and ready to strike when the American carriers do pop up.

 

[CV12Hornet]

This map has given me an idea.

Would it be possible for Kido Butai to slip in behind Yamamoto's Main Force on the approach to Midway? This would give the carriers the much needed buffer that they missed out on IOTL.

Main Force consisted of:

• BatDiv1 (Adm Yamamoto): Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu
• DesRon3 (RAdm Hashimoto): Sendai + 8 DD
• Aviation Unit: Hosho, Chiyoda, Nisshin + 1 DD
• 2 oilers

This force could be a handy distraction and also provide recon thanks to the presence of the battleships (Yamato can carry 7 floatplanes; how many did she have at Midway?), the Hosho with her eight B4Ys and the seaplane tenders. It also looks as if the Japanese are going to attempt a battleship bombardment of the island and change American tactical decisions. Meanwhile, in the back Nagumo is protected and ready to strike when the American carriers do pop up.

Possible? Yes. Would the Japanese actually do so? No, for two reasons.

The first is that as late as Midway the battleships were still considered the decisive arm of a naval action - they were hanging back so that once the carriers cleared away the Midway air garrison and then the American carriers, the battleships would go in and clean up the battleships Yamamoto expected the Americans to bring with them.

The second is that Nagato and Mutsu, as demonstrated later in the Solomons, were too slow by Japanese reckoning to force decisive action against carrier forces in an Advance Force role. Fine for engaging 21-knot Standards, though.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

Possible? Yes. Would the Japanese actually do so? No, for two reasons.

The first is that as late as Midway the battleships were still considered the decisive arm of a naval action - they were hanging back so that once the carriers cleared away the Midway air garrison and then the American carriers, the battleships would go in and clean up the battleships Yamamoto expected the Americans to bring with them.

The second is that Nagato and Mutsu, as demonstrated later in the Solomons, were too slow by Japanese reckoning to force decisive action against carrier forces in an Advance Force role. Fine for engaging 21-knot Standards, though.

So the POD in this scenario would be TF1 actually getting off the US West Coast and heading out to contest the Midway operation in a conventional battle-line engagement, with the carriers acting in recon and in preliminary strikes, with Yamamoto getting wind of this beforehand. At this time, IIRC, TF1 consisted of:

• Colorado
• Maryland
• Tennessee
• New Mexico
• Mississippi
• Idaho
• Pennsylvania

While BatDiv1 probably could not take on all these ships at once, they could certainly give it a hard time. There are seven Standards; Yamato is believed equal to three Standards, while the Nagatos can take one each. We'd thus have the 'Decisive Battle' that the IJN wanted, off Midway with battleships.

In order to effect this in turn, though, PacFlt's oiler situation needs to be MUCH better - and that's not readily fixed..