If you had control over the treaty of Versailles, what would the terms be?

The biggest problem of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was not enforced. Make sure that happens this time.

HOW? As soon as any element that infringes on the sovereignty of Germany and or makes reparations demands that take more than 10 - 20 years to pay for the thing is going to collapse sooner or later. Only reason that WW2 settlement held is Germany was occupied by armies glaring at one another.

France after 1870 was just WEAKER than Germany and couldn't hold them down by themselves. Hence all of the breakup German schemes floated around.

Michael
 
BadLogic, those are some excellent points. I will try to address them.

To my knowledge the Entente in 1914 did not attempt to make their situation look more intimidating to the Germans and Austro-Hungarians than it actually was, as was done with Bismarck's attempted proposal of Italy entering into an anti-French alliance. So there is that difference at least, although this will doubtless then devolve into an argument over Russian mobilizations that I could not care less about, since arguing about who started WW1 looks like a Wiking-ObsessedNuker debate; doubtless interesting, but why is this the 134th time it is being discussed?

True, but the Great Powers that comprised the Entente were demonstrably powerful and long-established, while the emerging Germany absolutely had to use bluff and playing one Power off against another in order to establish itself and it's interests (even the reasonable ones; not all German interests were, of course, reasonable).
I can't imagine arguing over Russian mobilization; it was clearly a factor and deserves critical inspection as such, but it wasn't the only factor.



Prussia annexed in 1866 Hannover, part of Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Hesse, and Frankfurt, as well as ultimately in addition annexing Alsace-Lorraine. There is also the territory annexed in Schleswig-Holstien. France did have territorial ambitions, it is true, but Prussians annexed four nations and territories from several others; that is hardly the work of a shrinking violet who had no territorial ambitions of their own and merely passively defended themselves against others throwing themselves against them…

Nor do I argue that Prussia was a shrinking violet. But then, why were areas of Germany occupied by other nations? As a result of war. How did France or Great Britain or Russia first consolidate into nations, and then become Great Powers? By annexing other polities. Unification of Germany was going to require some strong-arming, given the history of the region, but it was nothing that everybody else hadn't done, or was willing to do again (especially against non-European peoples, of course, but it's still aggressive expansion).

Edit: You might've noted, in the source you've been quoting from, this passage: "Most of the states taken in 1866 had willingly voted themselves out of existence. Such was the emotive power of German nationalism." So it would not be too compelling to suggest that Prussia engaged in extreme coercive ambition in at least these cases.

Furthermore, if we are to conclude that the German issue being settled by Bismarck was justified because the arrangements set up were unstable and conflict inducing, the same logic could be easily applied to justify Napoleon III's interventions in Italy. Unlike in Germany, in Italy Austrian domination over the country did produce a major war, in 1848, and additional bloody fighting in 1830 and 1820. Furthermore, Austria and Prussia were both at the Congress of Vienna; it is hardly as if the soldiers of France, Russia, and Britain marched in and made the Germans adopt the set up they did.

I figure a people such as the Germans (or the French, etc) have a certain right to try to create a unified nation -- but doing so will inevitably create temporary instability. Whether that instability lasts and leads to war depends partly upon the other nations' response (which, in the case of 19th century Europe, was not all that good, though it was predictable given the character of European Great Power politics established by France, Britain, etc). The consolidation process progresses as circumstances permit. I think it silly to think that the conditions created by the Congress of Vienna could, or should, be frozen in time forever. More on the Congress of Vienna in my next point.

Napoleon intervening in Italy was not the problem: the problem is that France had territorial goals in mind (the "price" of French assistance). This cannot even be explained by nation-forming; this is simple aggressive aggrandizement.

The Austro-Prussian war meanwhile started over the superb casus beli of the Austrians bringing the administration of Schleswig Holstein to the German Confederation's Court; if Prussia could find that as being a suitable casus beli, then it isn't like France claiming that they were denied territory promised to them is that much worse.

That perhaps was the immediate casus belli. The root cause was the insistence of the other Great Powers that both Prussia and Austria had to be included in the same German confederation, as established at the Congress of Vienna. This measure would, of course, help keep the German polities disunited (probably its intent), but it also created conditions (two heads in one body) that were very very likely to eventually lead to war.

Now, Prussia and Austria hadn't demanded those terms, nor were they realistically able to resist them (in the face of the other Powers). But France certainly had the choice of whether to attempt aggressive expansion at her neighbors' expense, and then going all foot-stamping angry when balked.


I'd also say that the threat of an alliance with Italy directed against France, as well as bringing in the Southern German states into Prussia, and thus assuming a position of superiority and geographic advantage against France, would constitute a serious threat to French vital interests. The results of such policies would have left the French without significant allies except possibly the already-brutally-beaten Austria, facing a two-front war against one state with a significantly larger industry and a similar and faster growing population, and… ahem, Italy. What French leader wouldn't express concern over such developments, and view them as a potential threat to French "vital interests"?

Yet by your same argument, the existence of the Franco-Russian Entente was a serious threat to Germany's vital interests. Was Germany therefore justified in seeking war to redress the situation? It gets a bit sticky, here; trying to decide what constitutes a threat justifying preventive war may require a long conversation.
My argument would be that a potential alliance with Italy, which might lead to a possible war at some point in the future, is a great reason for feeling threatened. But maybe not a great justification for immediately invading one's neighbor.

Further, must we assume that nations should strive to remain weaker than their neighbors, in order to avoid giving an excuse for war? That seems silly. By that argument, the German people should've said "Gee, we'd like to unify, but that would be unethical because we might become stronger than France". Anyway, who made France's sense of dominance the rightful condition of Europe, that must be maintained?



There is the historical evidence of what the French leadership did without Napoleon III to consider however. In the periods of 1815-1848 the French did fight a number of wars... (snip) ...one of which was a response to another nation's aggression, a second which secured the independence of Greece, and a third which was called upon by the Spanish ultra-royalists to suppress the liberalists, then I think that calling French policy in action in the 1815-1848 period aggressive would be rather of a stretch. And yet surely, there must have been some of the inklings of the Second Empire's politics; the 2nd Empire incorporated new factors of course, but it was not entirely removed from the milieu of French history of the preceding part of the century. Therefor, if we use that as a base, there must have been something new about the figure of Napoleon III that would have changed the nature of French foreign policy.

Not really. In fact, it is only reasonable to expect that, following the exhausting beat-down that France endured at the end of Napoleon I's wars, France would be temporarily unwilling to try again. And then, given the long, long history of glorious French dominance and expansion (from which factor the 2nd Empire could not be "entirely removed"), it would not be surprising if, after a few decades, she started feeling the urge to again take up her 'historic mission'. I contend that this would not depend on the rise of any given ruler; if Napoleon III hadn't gained power and made the attempt, within a very few years somebody else would have.

Fortunately, before she could be encouraged by successes, Prussia put a brake on her efforts.

Napoleon III was in addition elected on a variety of merits. National grandeur was one of them, but there was also the all-important factor of name recognition (vital in the rural areas), support from a variety of important personages, conservative religious positions, family, property, social order, paired with progressive/populist economic policies and an innovative election campaign. Its a winning combination; I'm sure that there was probably mentions about the grandeur of France, but just the internal matters and his election campaign would have sufficed on its own. Saying that the French only elected Napoleon III because they thought that he would conduct an adventurous foreign policy is either selling them too short or too high; elections that spin upon foreign policy are few and far between, and domestic concerns are generally far more important.

What did his name-recognition bring to mind for French voters? What expectations would it arouse? What did those "important personages" expect from Louis if he got elected? Even these factors could easily be support for the argument that Louis was elected with an expectation that he would restore France to aggressive dominance.

I agree that his espousal of liberal internal policies was a factor, too.

Furthermore, while it is true that there were those who cried for offensive operations, even during the declaration of war itself there were plenty who commented adversely upon it. To reuse my previously cited source;

Every man in the legislative body rose except the sixteen “irreconciliable republicans,” who had fillibus- tered the chief minister earlier and now remained stubbornly seated around their party leader, Le ́on Gambetta. Before war had even been declared, cracks were opening in the French nation.
The situation was painful for Ollivier; he was a former friend and ally of the very politicians who were now defying him. He was a former ad- versary of the eighty diehard Bonapartists or “mamelukes” on the far right, who now rather embarrassingly rallied to Ollivier, demanding that Gambetta and the others stand and show respect for the emperor and the army. Gambetta and the sixteen remained seated, one of them shouting: “we would be the first to stand for a national war in defense of our homeland. We will not stand for an aggressive, dynastic war!” To Ollivier’s chagrin, this logic quickly spread to the center benches, where moderate liberals, willing to work with the emperor if he liberalized and avoided adventures, listened carefully to the fencing between the republicans and the mamelukes.

The source from which you quote also makes plain that these were a minority; that the moderate liberals only "listened carefully to the fencing" but didn't join in opposition to the war, indeed that "France's liberal doyen", Adolphe Thiers, supported war but only objected that "this occasion is detestably badly chosen"; that the Right responded with "thunderous ovations" when Ollivier said "We accept it [war] with a light heart".

So yes, it is certainly relevant to show that there were objections to going to war on at least this occasion and pretext; but I think it important to also recognize that the Republicans who did so were in a distinct minority.

Finally, I'd take the British and their policies vis a vis the French with a grain of salt. The British were still expressing concerns that France would be a hegemonic force in Europe in the 1920s and 30s when the French had a population barely two thirds of Germany and an industry a third of the size, plus of course Italy and the Soviet Union around as other factors. The British always were frightened over somebody; what other nation could produce the troves of invasion literature when they had the world's strongest navy and their rivals hated each other far more than they hated them? France happened to have at the time seemingly the strongest position in Europe, naturally the British expressed concerns over that, as they did with everyone.

The British were certainly paranoid, and often had a Chicken-Little view of things. On the other hand, paranoia is only an illness if the other guy is not out to get you.
With regard to France, they were partly correct:
Even in the 1920's, France had the potential to establish something of a hegemony over Western Europe... as long as Germany was kept neutered and the USSR didn't venture too far from home. Who was to stop them? Spain? Nope. Britain? Not by herself. Belgium? Merely the first likely victim. The Dutch? No chance. Italy? Much weaker than France.
Where Britain's leaders erred was in failing to see that, after 1815 and 1870 and WW1, France was finally relinquishing her traditions of dominance and aggression. Note that Prussia and (later) Germany played crucial roles in all three of those conflicts...
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Caesar Biden
The biggest problem of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was not enforced. Make sure that happens this time.

HOW?
Instal a military backed occupation of ALL of Germany, Rheinland as in OTL and some garrisons in Berlin Hamburg, Munich and some other bigger cities until ToV is fulfilled.

... maybe also some LoN "supervisors" to give it a more "international peace keeping" look.
(not sure if Wilson would have backe that kind of "function" for the LoN. But USA didn't sign ToV as well as comming to the LoN.)
 
Instal a military backed occupation of ALL of Germany, Rheinland as in OTL and some garrisons in Berlin Hamburg, Munich and some other bigger cities until ToV is fulfilled.

... maybe also some LoN "supervisors" to give it a more "international peace keeping" look.
(not sure if Wilson would have backe that kind of "function" for the LoN. But USA didn't sign ToV as well as comming to the LoN.)

And of course, sadly, this gets us back to the problem of Entente resolve. OTL, they lacked the resolve to either impose harsh enough terms to partition, starve or de-industrialize Germany, or to apply the sustained effort to make less-harsh terms stick.
 
I see what you're saying, but let's take this apart and inspect the bits.

Hmm. I see where you're coming from.

I confess, I don't have the most detailed knowledge of French politics in the first 50 years after Napoleon. My understanding, however, is that the keys to Napoleon III's electoral success was mainly due to connection with Napoleon (which in turn was mostly because people - particularly in rural areas - remembered how Napoleon reformed the state and brought justice and stability after the chaos of the revolution) and secondly due to his promises to improve the social safety net.

As far as Britain not being willing or able to stop the French from conquering Belgium... I think you are doing a major disservice to the power and paranoia (which would turn out to be justified if France DID try to conquer Belgium) of the British Empire.

HOW? As soon as any element that infringes on the sovereignty of Germany and or makes reparations demands that take more than 10 - 20 years to pay for the thing is going to collapse sooner or later. Only reason that WW2 settlement held is Germany was occupied by armies glaring at one another.

France after 1870 was just WEAKER than Germany and couldn't hold them down by themselves. Hence all of the breakup German schemes floated around.

Avoiding the Great Depression would do it. Having a French government screw up its courage and retain/re-introduce the income tax so they had an actual efficient revenue gathering system during the 20s would give the French sufficient resources to MAYBE enforce the treaty (politics plays a big part in whether this can work, since France would still need to keep the support of Belgium and Italy and avoid the opposition of the UK.

A British government more worried about Germany could easily make sure Versailles was enforced.

fasquardon
 
Got a link to an AH, where this is achieved ? (without ASB ;))

Not that I've ever found.

I think there are two reasons for it:

1) Avoiding the Great Depression itself is very difficult to do.

2) No Great Depression changes the world so much that it blows the minds of any prospective TL writers.

fasquardon
 
Hmm. I see where you're coming from.

I confess, I don't have the most detailed knowledge of French politics in the first 50 years after Napoleon. My understanding, however, is that the keys to Napoleon III's electoral success was mainly due to connection with Napoleon (which in turn was mostly because people - particularly in rural areas - remembered how Napoleon reformed the state and brought justice and stability after the chaos of the revolution) and secondly due to his promises to improve the social safety net.

As far as Britain not being willing or able to stop the French from conquering Belgium... I think you are doing a major disservice to the power and paranoia (which would turn out to be justified if France DID try to conquer Belgium) of the British Empire.

A British government more worried about Germany could easily make sure Versailles was enforced.

fasquardon

I need to learn more about Louis Napoleon's era, too. You might be correct, though I have doubts at this point.

Oh, I think Britain would be willing to stop France; without powerful Continental allies, though, I doubt she'll be able. Against a land-based hegemonic power, her navy can only do so much. This is why Britain constantly needed Germans, Austrians, Dutch and Russians to do so much of the dying against Louis XIV, XVI, Napoleon, etc.

If Germany were really trying trying to create a hegemony hostile to Britain, why wouldn't Britain *already* be worried enough to ensure enforcement of the VT? Yet clearly she was not. I find this curious, unless the supposed threat had been seriously exaggerated for propaganda purposes.
 
Not that I've ever found.

I think there are two reasons for it:

1) Avoiding the Great Depression itself is very difficult to do.

Snip

fasquardon

In Brendan Simms' book Europe, the Great Depression became much worse than the Stock Market Crash would have made it, when the French (in retaliation for Curtius' proposing a customs union with Austria) used her economic leverage to bring down the Wiener Kreditanstalt bank. This created -- or greatly worsened -- Germany's banking crisis, which had a serious knock-on effect in the U.S. and the world.

I don't know the truth of this. But if so, while avoiding the Great Depression may be very hard to do, avoiding the worst effects of the Great Depression may be not so difficult. Either convince Curtius not to propose the customs union, or convince the French to stop drinking paint long enough to consider the likely effects of their retaliation -- and maybe find a less destructive way to oppose the customs union.
 
If Germany were really trying trying to create a hegemony hostile to Britain, why wouldn't Britain *already* be worried enough to ensure enforcement of the VT? Yet clearly she was not. I find this curious, unless the supposed threat had been seriously exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

Because clearly, the way to keep peace in Europe was to encourage a German hegemony to balance out the dread Franco-Polish alliance.

Well, at least you can say that British policy in the interwar period was successful. They made darn sure that neither the French nor the Poles dominated Europe!

In Brendan Simms' book Europe, the Great Depression became much worse than the Stock Market Crash would have made it, when the French (in retaliation for Curtius' proposing a customs union with Austria) used her economic leverage to bring down the Wiener Kreditanstalt bank. This created -- or greatly worsened -- Germany's banking crisis, which had a serious knock-on effect in the U.S. and the world.

I don't know the truth of this. But if so, while avoiding the Great Depression may be very hard to do, avoiding the worst effects of the Great Depression may be not so difficult. Either convince Curtius not to propose the customs union, or convince the French to stop drinking paint long enough to consider the likely effects of their retaliation -- and maybe find a less destructive way to oppose the customs union.

1) The stock market crash wasn't the cause of the Great Depression - it was an effect, and a relatively minor one at that. The proximate cause of the Great Depression was the Fed tightening rates in 1928, because they were worried that the US economy was overheating. Then, because the tightening was too late and too hard and because the entire world economy had been deeply damaged by WW1 and by the extraction of the economic surplus of Western Europe to pay off American loans (or in the German case to pay reparations) while at the same time having their ability to export to the US hamstrung by tariff barriers, the whole thing collapsed like a house of cards.

2) The banking crash in Austria and Germany was definitely a major event of the Depression years. However, close examination of the Wiener Kreditanstalt bank's balance sheet shows that the bank was already dead. It had taken on too many bad assets during the 1920s (in part due to the government forcing it to merge with every bank that failed in Austria during the 20s, in part due to incompetence and outright corruption - Kreditanstalt was, like most German and Austrian banks, buying its own shares to inflate prices) and was likely to have fallen even without the Great Depression.

Certainly, blaming the collapse on the French is... Silly. The proposed bail-out was not blocked because of "revenge". The French simply asked the Austrians to re-affirm their commitment to fulfilling the treaty of Versailles - specifically, the article that forbade any union between Austria and Germany. The Austrians refused. The Austrians COULD have accepted.

That said, I do not think that attempts to bail out Kreditanstalt would have succeeded. It would have been too little, too late and would have done nothing to save ordinary workers in Austria and the rest of central and eastern Europe from losing their jobs.

This said, there are things that could have reduced the impact of the Depression. To pick an example where French action would have made a difference: if the French had decided to continue to accept dollars and Stirling as reserve currencies (or at least put off clearing out their dollar and Stirling reserves for a few years) it would have noticeably eased conditions in 31, 32, 33 and 34.

fasquardon
 
True, but the Great Powers that comprised the Entente were demonstrably powerful and long-established, while the emerging Germany absolutely had to use bluff and playing one Power off against another in order to establish itself and it's interests (even the reasonable ones; not all German interests were, of course, reasonable).
I can't imagine arguing over Russian mobilization; it was clearly a factor and deserves critical inspection as such, but it wasn't the only factor.

Germany had had fifty years of being present and had a commanding position over the last ten years within Europe, after the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. If they were stronger than Russia, France, and only had Britain that was immune to pressure, then problems in their negotiating tactics in the run up to WW1 must have had more to do with the German's having bad negotiating tactics than a plot to shut them out. The second Moroccan crisis is an example of that; Germany had concerns that were legitimate, but they managed to have such hilariously bad diplomacy that they achieved getting the French and the British to link together more tightly against them.

Russian mobilization was more a general catch word in that I wanted to avoid an argument over the causes of WW1, which I don't have very much interest in since it is argued to death so often.

Nor do I argue that Prussia was a shrinking violet. But then, why were areas of Germany occupied by other nations? As a result of war. How did France or Great Britain or Russia first consolidate into nations, and then become Great Powers? By annexing other polities. Unification of Germany was going to require some strong-arming, given the history of the region, but it was nothing that everybody else hadn't done, or was willing to do again (especially against non-European peoples, of course, but it's still aggressive expansion).

There were minorities outside every state, except for the UK on their island. Russians had minorities in Galicia, the French (if we use the German standard of people speaking the same language) had minorities in Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Andorra, and once Germany was established within Germany, and Italy in Austria and France. By contrast, the Germans had a major presence when they formed in France (erased after 1870), Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. That isn't a great number of Germans in non-Germanic states as occupied by them; the only area one could plausible claim was occupied with a significant Germanic minority in a non-Germanic dominated nation was Alsace-Lorraine, and yet Alsace-Lorraine was not an enthusiastic participant in Germany once "liberated".

Edit: You might've noted, in the source you've been quoting from, this passage: "Most of the states taken in 1866 had willingly voted themselves out of existence. Such was the emotive power of German nationalism." So it would not be too compelling to suggest that Prussia engaged in extreme coercive ambition in at least these cases.

To my knowledge that was referring to the states which had willingly signed onto the German side; the four annexed states I make mention to were not de facto in favor of annexation. Except for Kassel, they appeared more favorable to the matter. Nassau was mixed, while in Hannover opposition was intense but the lower classes were promptly repressed and the upper classes gently brought onboard, which did bring a narrow accord into unification in the end. The source I am getting this from is Schmitt, A., Hans. Prussia's Last Fling: The Annexation of Hanover, Hesse, Frankfurt, and Nassau, June 15 - October 8, 1866. Central European History 8, no. 4 (December 1975) p. 316-347. It does appear to be anti-Prussian, but the information seems well presented.

The occupation of Frankfurt was apparently rather harsh in addition;

Only in Frankfurt, the smallest victim, did Prussia act without the
restraint which accompanied the seizure of Hanover, Hesse, and Nassau.
Instead it demonstrated how to "fleece the weak." Everywhere else the
sequestration of local funds was limited to defraying costs of admin-
istration and police. The free city, however, a center of banking and
finance, was immediately saddled with a levy of five million florins -
one year's pay for the entire Main Armee?and a requisition of three
hundred horses, and one pair of shoes for each Prussian soldier.60 On
July 20, the day after the money had been delivered, the Government
Plenipotentiary received notice that his home town was to furnish the
Prussian military treasury an additional twenty-five million florins
within twenty-four hours. When the city fathers and the town's leading
bankers countered that a municipality of ninety thousand souls could
not raise such capital in so short a time, General von Manteuffel threat-
ened draconic reprisals-an artillery bombardment and systematic plun-
dering by his troops. Bismarck, on being informed of the protest, in-
structed local commanders to block Frankfurt's communications, close
public places, and, if necessary, barricade all city gates until payment
had been received.
Since the city was still teeming with foreign diplomats, Prussian mis-
conduct received worldwide publicity. British, American, and Austrian
representatives dispatched indignant reports to their governments.61
The most extreme threats were never carried out, in fact soon actively
disavowed, but the general's ukase was seconded by a general break-
down of discipline. Officers rode their horses over the graves of the
municipal cemetery, individuals were assaulted on the street, and solid
citizens leaving town in their carriages were stopped and forced to con-
tinue on foot, after their horses had been confiscated.62 On July 29th,
finally, after Mayor Fellner's suicide, a delegation led by his successor,
Müller, was dispatched to Nikolsburg where they received news of the
city's impending annexation and where it was broadly hinted that the
indemnity would be remitted only if the community made a show of volun-
tary submission.63 This proposal did not end the emotional deadlock
between the Prussians and their tiny victim, and was rejected without
hesitation. The former federal capital had been reduced to a shadow of
its old magnificence. Patrician families had fled. Twenty-two confed?
erate and eight foreign legations had been closed. The liquidation of
confederate agencies and the Thurn and Taxis postal service idled the
heads of 350 households whose departure resulted in the estimated loss of
a half a million florins in annual revenue. Prussian impositions had in?
creased the public debt by sixty percent. The sovereign free city had
become a despoiled provincial town, divided into seven wards, each
headed by a civilian and a police commissioner. Nothing symbolized
more sharply its degradation than the occupation ofthe palatial quarters
ofthe former diet by the new Prussian prefect of police. Frankfurt sub-
mitted, of course, but not of its own free will.64
(pg. 338-339)

Furthermore, even if so, it was still annexation which was brought into effect by the war with Austria, and which occurred after Prussia had been able to occupy the regions and work to increase support for unification with them.

I figure a people such as the Germans (or the French, etc) have a certain right to try to create a unified nation -- but doing so will inevitably create temporary instability. Whether that instability lasts and leads to war depends partly upon the other nations' response (which, in the case of 19th century Europe, was not all that good, though it was predictable given the character of European Great Power politics established by France, Britain, etc). The consolidation process progresses as circumstances permit. I think it silly to think that the conditions created by the Congress of Vienna could, or should, be frozen in time forever. More on the Congress of Vienna in my next point.

Napoleon intervening in Italy was not the problem: the problem is that France had territorial goals in mind (the "price" of French assistance). This cannot even be explained by nation-forming; this is simple aggressive aggrandizement.

And yet the Germans did largely similar or worse things in the annexed states of North Germany, Frankfurt in particular, as France did in Savoy and Nice. Furthermore, if we use the rhetoric of nation building, I was vaguely under the impression that Savoy was French speaking, although Nice wasn't. I do not condemn the Germans for seeking their own nation - I believe in the precepts of nationalism - but the borders of such a state were quite clearly legitimately up for debate. The South German states were shown to be not merely an artificial entity, but had legitimate popular support behind them until the Franco-Prussian war. Support for them made sense, both in regards to balance of power and for national independence; it merely happened that Napoleon III was incompetent enough to manage to squander both.

That perhaps was the immediate casus belli. The root cause was the insistence of the other Great Powers that both Prussia and Austria had to be included in the same German confederation, as established at the Congress of Vienna. This measure would, of course, help keep the German polities disunited (probably its intent), but it also created conditions (two heads in one body) that were very very likely to eventually lead to war.

Now, Prussia and Austria hadn't demanded those terms, nor were they realistically able to resist them (in the face of the other Powers). But France certainly had the choice of whether to attempt aggressive expansion at her neighbors' expense, and then going all foot-stamping angry when balked.

My understanding was that the German Confederation was formed for mutual defense and coordination by the Germans themselves, and that to adopt the rhetoric that it was "imposed" upon them by a foreign force is giving far too little credit to the Germans themselves; are the French, British, and Russians responsible too for the decisions that the Germans themselves had made? According to Haldén, Peter. Republican continuities in the Vienna Order and the German Confederation (1815–66) European Journal of International Relations 19 No. 2 pg. 281-304

"In October 1814 the ‘German Committee’ was formed to begin formal negotiations. Prussia proposed a German constitution dominated by Austria, Prussia and the other kingdoms (Aretin, 1993: 156, 160). The proposals were defeated by the middle German powers and Austria which preferred a looser form of association (Schroeder, 1994: 541–544; Sheehan, 1989: 405)." (pg. 287-288)

That is hardly a foreign order imposed upon the Germans from afar.


Yet by your same argument, the existence of the Franco-Russian Entente was a serious threat to Germany's vital interests. Was Germany therefore justified in seeking war to redress the situation? It gets a bit sticky, here; trying to decide what constitutes a threat justifying preventive war may require a long conversation.
My argument would be that a potential alliance with Italy, which might lead to a possible war at some point in the future, is a great reason for feeling threatened. But maybe not a great justification for immediately invading one's neighbor.

Further, must we assume that nations should strive to remain weaker than their neighbors, in order to avoid giving an excuse for war? That seems silly. By that argument, the German people should've said "Gee, we'd like to unify, but that would be unethical because we might become stronger than France". Anyway, who made France's sense of dominance the rightful condition of Europe, that must be maintained?

France had concern over Germany annexing the South German states, which as shared by them as shown by their internal politics and the election of an anti-Prussian party in 1870, was shared by the South German states too until the Franco-Prussian war. Thus, until the bungling that led Napoleon III to start the war with the major balance of power concern being the South German states while simultaneously managing to land them onto the other coalition, South Germany could have only been unified with North Germany by force of arms. Wariness over the issue thus made sense; Napoleon III happened to be incompetent and to bring the South German states onto the other side.

The other issue was concern over Italy entering into an anti-French alliance with Prussia. In the case of Italy, the alliance itself doesn't seem to have been there, with Bismarck playing it up - but that Bismarck attempted to make it look to be legitimate and real when it wasn't is more of a condemnation of the Prussians than not. The apparent reason for Bismarck's attempt to produce the appearance of an alliance with Italy was that it was part of a plan to increase tensions with France. Prussia attempting to make it appear that France was being encircled and consciously drive such a fear of being outmatched and geographically encircled can only be viewed as being a way to promote tensions; in 1914 the Entente, whatever their effects on German politics, did not attempt the same policy of attempting to purposefully make the Germans feel surrounded.

Not really. In fact, it is only reasonable to expect that, following the exhausting beat-down that France endured at the end of Napoleon I's wars, France would be temporarily unwilling to try again. And then, given the long, long history of glorious French dominance and expansion (from which factor the 2nd Empire could not be "entirely removed"), it would not be surprising if, after a few decades, she started feeling the urge to again take up her 'historic mission'. I contend that this would not depend on the rise of any given ruler; if Napoleon III hadn't gained power and made the attempt, within a very few years somebody else would have.

Fortunately, before she could be encouraged by successes, Prussia put a brake on her efforts.

France was able to deploy the large armies into Spain in 1823, had a major fleet at Navarino, and in Belgium; weakened certainly, but still with significant capabilities. If you want to declare that the French throughout the period naturally ascribed to an aggressive foreign policy when there were no wars that one could characterize as aggressive-expansionist fought throughout the rest of the century you can, but it strikes me as rather a leap and ascribing far too much to an expansionistic and militarist tendency….

And of course, Prussia, mercifully stopped French tendencies and in turn annexed vast swathes of territory herself. I'm hardly seeing this as a great triumph for declaring Prussia to be the savior of European civilization from the Gallic menace.


What did his name-recognition bring to mind for French voters? What expectations would it arouse? What did those "important personages" expect from Louis if he got elected? Even these factors could easily be support for the argument that Louis was elected with an expectation that he would restore France to aggressive dominance.

I agree that his espousal of liberal internal policies was a factor, too.

Napoleon I did have policies on the field foreign which potentially may have swayed support (although as noted I find that doubtful for the 1848 election, at least to the degree in which such support makes a real difference), but that is ignoring the very real accomplishments of him on the domestic scene. The end of the chaos of the revolutionary period, general prosperity, a relatively liberal and meritocratic empire, the institution of the Napoleonic code, the reconciliation between France and the Catholic church, and if I recall stabilization of bread and grain prices. Furthermore, even today the saying is that the there is no such thing as negative publicity right? Simply somebody on the ballot that one knows is a huge benefit, relatively regardless of what they stand for. For the important personages; Adolphe Thiers and Victor Hugo were the ones noted as supporting his campaign, and Adolphe Thiers was unhappy about declaring war in 1870, while Victor Hugo; while I do not his position, foreign policy also seems to be low among his concerns.

The source from which you quote also makes plain that these were a minority; that the moderate liberals only "listened carefully to the fencing" but didn't join in opposition to the war, indeed that "France's liberal doyen", Adolphe Thiers, supported war but only objected that "this occasion is detestably badly chosen"; that the Right responded with "thunderous ovations" when Ollivier said "We accept it [war] with a light heart".

So yes, it is certainly relevant to show that there were objections to going to war on at least this occasion and pretext; but I think it important to also recognize that the Republicans who did so were in a distinct minority.

It was however, also after around four years of war scares and constant tensions; the votes that way would probably have been higher in vote of the war than at other times, as well at a time of internal political problems that could have thus easily led to increased political mobilization of the right behind the Emperor.

The British were certainly paranoid, and often had a Chicken-Little view of things. On the other hand, paranoia is only an illness if the other guy is not out to get you.
With regard to France, they were partly correct:
Even in the 1920's, France had the potential to establish something of a hegemony over Western Europe... as long as Germany was kept neutered and the USSR didn't venture too far from home. Who was to stop them? Spain? Nope. Britain? Not by herself. Belgium? Merely the first likely victim. The Dutch? No chance. Italy? Much weaker than France.
Where Britain's leaders erred was in failing to see that, after 1815 and 1870 and WW1, France was finally relinquishing her traditions of dominance and aggression. Note that Prussia and (later) Germany played crucial roles in all three of those conflicts...

No, the British fundamentally misjudged the balance of power, and assumed the French were far stronger than they actually were in the 1920s - just the same as with their assumptions in the 1850s and 1860s, although at least in the 1850s and 1860s the situation was closer to reality. France had military superiority over Germany, but this was paired with the tremendous problems of use - as shown in the Ruhr crisis, France was vulnerable to the Anglo-Saxon powers using economic pressure, and had to deal with the wider implications over actions vis a vis Germany, including lack of allies elsewhere (the only people who might come in was Poland, but the USSR threatened to invade them if so), and following the Locarno Treaties both Italy and the UK pledging to come in to the war on the German side if France launched an invasion - and vice versa of course, but that situation rather favors the militarily weaker power. And yet the British were still frightened over French hegemony, despite the French having the smallest population of any Great Power (after 1935 when Italy overtook them at least), and an industrial capacity only greater than Italy. That isn't a recipe for dominance over Europe.

The British probably weren't drinking lead paint, but they're also prone to strategic misevaluations and excessive concerns.
 
Because clearly, the way to keep peace in Europe was to encourage a German hegemony to balance out the dread Franco-Polish alliance.

I neither said this, nor do I believe it. The fact remains: if the British were so certain that Germany was set on creating a hegemony over Europe, they'd have to have been complete and utter morons to fail to enforce the Versailles Treaty.

Well, at least you can say that British policy in the interwar period was successful. They made darn sure that neither the French nor the Poles dominated Europe!

Nope. If France didn't try shenanigans in Europe during this period, it is quite likely due to getting curb-stomped in 1870, and bled white in 1914-18. If 1870 didn't finish off the traditional French desire for expansion, then WW1 did.


1) The stock market crash wasn't the cause of the Great Depression - it was an effect, and a relatively minor one at that. The proximate cause of the Great Depression was the Fed tightening rates in 1928, because they were worried that the US economy was overheating. Then, because the tightening was too late and too hard and because the entire world economy had been deeply damaged by WW1 and by the extraction of the economic surplus of Western Europe to pay off American loans (or in the German case to pay reparations) while at the same time having their ability to export to the US hamstrung by tariff barriers, the whole thing collapsed like a house of cards.

2) The banking crash in Austria and Germany was definitely a major event of the Depression years. However, close examination of the Wiener Kreditanstalt bank's balance sheet shows that the bank was already dead. It had taken on too many bad assets during the 1920s (in part due to the government forcing it to merge with every bank that failed in Austria during the 20s, in part due to incompetence and outright corruption - Kreditanstalt was, like most German and Austrian banks, buying its own shares to inflate prices) and was likely to have fallen even without the Great Depression.

Certainly, blaming the collapse on the French is... Silly. The proposed bail-out was not blocked because of "revenge". The French simply asked the Austrians to re-affirm their commitment to fulfilling the treaty of Versailles - specifically, the article that forbade any union between Austria and Germany. The Austrians refused. The Austrians COULD have accepted.

That said, I do not think that attempts to bail out Kreditanstalt would have succeeded. It would have been too little, too late and would have done nothing to save ordinary workers in Austria and the rest of central and eastern Europe from losing their jobs.

This said, there are things that could have reduced the impact of the Depression. To pick an example where French action would have made a difference: if the French had decided to continue to accept dollars and Stirling as reserve currencies (or at least put off clearing out their dollar and Stirling reserves for a few years) it would have noticeably eased conditions in 31, 32, 33 and 34.

fasquardon

Good info, thanks. I really need to get more knowledgeable about economics and finance. That's why I said "I don't know the truth" of Simms' claim.
 
I neither said this, nor do I believe it. The fact remains: if the British were so certain that Germany was set on creating a hegemony over Europe, they'd have to have been complete and utter morons to fail to enforce the Versailles Treaty.

My point was that relatively few of the decision-makers in Britain were worried about Germany.

Conversely, at least a few (and certainly Lloyd-George was one of them) actually were worried about the French and the Poles.

fasquardon
 
My point was that relatively few of the decision-makers in Britain were worried about Germany.

Conversely, at least a few (and certainly Lloyd-George was one of them) actually were worried about the French and the Poles.

fasquardon

Sorry, I took it as sarcasm!
 
My point was that relatively few of the decision-makers in Britain were worried about Germany.

Conversely, at least a few (and certainly Lloyd-George was one of them) actually were worried about the French and the Poles.

fasquardon

There were indeed in Britain a powerful group of decision makers and opinion makers that were not exactly utter morons but that rather were a mix of prickly morons and bastards.

They were the appeasers with Baldwin and Chamberlain and their fellows. They were also part of the members of the Round Table. I am refering, among other things, to Quigley's thesis and analysons.

Concerning Chamberlain and his fellow appeasers. The fact is that he did not finally endorse war because it was necessary but because he felt compelled to do so by british public opinion. That's also why he did not fight the war and de had to wait until Churchill became PM for Britain to actually fight.

Chamberlain and his fellows wanted a strong nazi Germany in order to bring the soviet union down.
 
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