If World War I breaks out several years later, does Russia still descend into revolution?

CaliGuy

Banned
If World War I breaks out several years later in comparison to our TL, does Russia still descend into revolution during World War I?

Basically, I am trying to figure out how much both Russian Revolutions were "predetermined" and how much various developments--such as the completion of the Russian Great Military Program in 1917--could have affected these revolutions (or lack thereof).
 
There war would be so different that it would be almost unrecognizable from our Great War. Russia will be in far better shape with a great deal more military reforms and economic growth, the Ottomans will have the railroad to Baghdad completed and be in an infinitely better place internally. Germany would be very leery of fighting both France and Russia in such a scenario unless they could confirm British neutrality.
 
Part of this question appears to be the impact of the personalities involved; i.e. Lenin and crew. Obviously I think the October revolution was highly dependent upon Lenin being on the ground to pull Russia fully into Communism as we know it, otherwise it might have simply been a more obviously socialist led event resulting in a republic, shades of Weimar. And then do we assume Nicholas II is still Czar? And does Russia suffer as much trauma to provoke a revolution?

Now I think as 1914 passes and we transition say into the 1920s then a Great War is now more highly dependent upon the perceived weakness of Germany. It is my opinion that Britain pursued its relationship with France and Russia not because they were weaker but because they were stronger. The logic being not left out of the victory. This must be balanced with just how relations evolve between Russia and Britain. If Russia appears to be getting too powerful and becomes a threat to the Empire then London should retreat from the Entente but it may very well not and any war will be far harder for Germany. But then Britain may return to neutrality and let the continent rebalance and of course Germany will revaluate the balance too.

The parallel issue is whether Russia was bound to have a violent inner struggle to reform its government? I think the wild card is Russia's domestic situation and how it reacts. Past 1914 the whole thing is wide open again.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Part of this question appears to be the impact of the personalities involved; i.e. Lenin and crew. Obviously I think the October revolution was highly dependent upon Lenin being on the ground to pull Russia fully into Communism as we know it, otherwise it might have simply been a more obviously socialist led event resulting in a republic, shades of Weimar.

Agreed that Lenin's and Trotsky's presence in Russia would be necessary for the Bolshevik Revolution to take place. However, if Germany has an opportunity to do this during wartime, it will send Lenin to Russia (as for Trotsky, I think that he lived in the U.S. back then and thus could get to Russia on his own).

And then do we assume Nicholas II is still Czar?

Yes, of course.

And does Russia suffer as much trauma to provoke a revolution?

Well, that is what I am asking here.

Now I think as 1914 passes and we transition say into the 1920s then a Great War is now more highly dependent upon the perceived weakness of Germany. It is my opinion that Britain pursued its relationship with France and Russia not because they were weaker but because they were stronger. The logic being not left out of the victory. This must be balanced with just how relations evolve between Russia and Britain. If Russia appears to be getting too powerful and becomes a threat to the Empire then London should retreat from the Entente but it may very well not and any war will be far harder for Germany. But then Britain may return to neutrality and let the continent rebalance and of course Germany will revaluate the balance too.

The parallel issue is whether Russia was bound to have a violent inner struggle to reform its government? I think the wild card is Russia's domestic situation and how it reacts. Past 1914 the whole thing is wide open again.

Agreed that Britain was likely to distance itself from the Entente starting from 1916-1917.

However, if World War I breaks out in 1916 or 1917 with Britain (and the U.S., of course) being neutral, will the Franco-Russian alliance have enough power to win this war before Russia descends into revolution?
 
Personally I think growing Russian strength will eventually become intolerable to the British, pair this with the fact that the German Navy is likely to stagnat as the Germans begin to focus heavily on their army to try and counter Russian growth will make them look like a tempting option especially since Germany will have likely roped the ottomans into whatever alliance system they have in place as that would mean the Might of the Russian bear will be spread out as they will be fighting the Germans, the Austrians, the ottomans and if the British do join the Japanese as well.

And since someone brought up railways, the British wanted a Cape to Cairo Railway and the Germans wanted the Berlin to Baghdad i wonder if you had the British in the alliance with Germany and crew if you could get some kind of super cape to Berlin railway, probably not but it would be super cool.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Has anyone seen a timeline on Russia without WW1?
There's some stuff about Russia here:

https://books.google.com/books?id=3...DAA#v=onepage&q=franz ferdinand lives&f=false

Personally I think growing Russian strength will eventually become intolerable to the British, pair this with the fact that the German Navy is likely to stagnat as the Germans begin to focus heavily on their army to try and counter Russian growth will make them look like a tempting option especially since Germany will have likely roped the ottomans into whatever alliance system they have in place as that would mean the Might of the Russian bear will be spread out as they will be fighting the Germans, the Austrians, the ottomans and if the British do join the Japanese as well.

And since someone brought up railways, the British wanted a Cape to Cairo Railway and the Germans wanted the Berlin to Baghdad i wonder if you had the British in the alliance with Germany and crew if you could get some kind of super cape to Berlin railway, probably not but it would be super cool.

I agree with you that, in the long-run, Britain would probably ally with Germany without World War I. However, this probably won't occur until the 1920s at the earliest; in contrast, if World War I breaks out in 1916 or 1917, Britain probably stays neutral (especially if Belgium isn't invaded).
 
There's some stuff about Russia here:

https://books.google.com/books?id=3I0pAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=franz+ferdinand+lives&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiwjPWeiIDVAhUH-mMKHR7EDHwQ6AEIJDAA#v=onepage&q=franz ferdinand lives&f=false



I agree with you that, in the long-run, Britain would probably ally with Germany without World War I. However, this probably won't occur until the 1920s at the earliest; in contrast, if World War I breaks out in 1916 or 1917, Britain probably stays neutral (especially if Belgium isn't invaded).
I wouldn't be so sure, should Britain chose to move away from the entente Germany becomes strategically vital, so I would expect that even without a formal alliance Britain would not allow Germany to be beaten.
We also have to consider what was likely Britain's favourite option for them to peel the French off the Russians.
The British would have been quite happy to keep the French as an ally and then sit back and watch the Russians and Germans duke it out.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I wouldn't be so sure, should Britain chose to move away from the entente Germany becomes strategically vital, so I would expect that even without a formal alliance Britain would not allow Germany to be beaten.

Memories of the Anglo-German naval arms race would probably still b e fresh for a while, though.

We also have to consider what was likely Britain's favourite option for them to peel the French off the Russians.
The British would have been quite happy to keep the French as an ally and then sit back and watch the Russians and Germans duke it out.

I doubt that France would just be willing to throw Russia under the bus like that, though. Indeed, France had a lot of investments in Russia and also wanted Alsace-Lorraine back from Germany.
 
Memories of the Anglo-German naval arms race would probably still b e fresh for a while, though.
I doubt it highly, the Naval arms race is highly overstated, even by 1914 the British wernt worried about the German Navy, I don't see that trend going away



I doubt that France would just be willing to throw Russia under the bus like that, though. Indeed, France had a lot of investments in Russia and also wanted Alsace-Lorraine back from Germany.
Yes but I said it was Britain's favourite way for things to go not France's
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Just to throw in a little ... disturbance :
In 1914 in Russia therer was a growing number of workers strikes suppoerted by the more ... "progressive" parts of the russian political spectrum already. It WAS already on the brink of another revolution.
In a way the war saved Russia from something similar to 1905/06, when the first reforms (which where then quickly turned again by the tsarists). Russia also had its "Burgfrieden" in July/August 1914.
 

trurle

Banned
Personally I think growing Russian strength will eventually become intolerable to the British, pair this with the fact that the German Navy is likely to stagnat as the Germans begin to focus heavily on their army to try and counter Russian growth will make them look like a tempting option especially since Germany will have likely roped the ottomans into whatever alliance system they have in place as that would mean the Might of the Russian bear will be spread out as they will be fighting the Germans, the Austrians, the ottomans and if the British do join the Japanese as well.

And since someone brought up railways, the British wanted a Cape to Cairo Railway and the Germans wanted the Berlin to Baghdad i wonder if you had the British in the alliance with Germany and crew if you could get some kind of super cape to Berlin railway, probably not but it would be super cool.
I must disagree with JackLumber. Of course, Russia, Ottomans and even Austro-hungarians will be stronger would WWI erupts later. What you should not miss is what countries not possessing that much organizational handicaps (US in particular, and Western European states) will grow even stronger in the environment of the self-accelerated technological explosion of 20th century. It mean later WWI will make Ottomans and Russians to fail even more miserably compared to OTL.

In particular, having railroad infrastructure in war (for example, Ottoman railroad to Baghdad) would be pointless without the means to protect it against enemy bombing raids.

Additional question is the probability of the Russian revolution before delayed WWI. I.m.h.o., revolution probability was low because of Stolypin Reform and large-scale migration to Siberia would weaken social tensions to some degree, at least in short term.

In brief: my forecast is even more German-centric delayed WWI. Also, earlier US intervention and much more total bloodshed (compared to OTL) because of terrible mismatch between available modern weapons and customary tactics.
I am afraid the Russia may fail military even before revolution. Or revolt against Tzar may erupt on the background of the rapid defeat, instead of attrition background as happened IOTL.
 
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Just to throw in a little ... disturbance :
In 1914 in Russia therer was a growing number of workers strikes suppoerted by the more ... "progressive" parts of the russian political spectrum already. It WAS already on the brink of another revolution.
In a way the war saved Russia from something similar to 1905/06, when the first reforms (which where then quickly turned again by the tsarists). Russia also had its "Burgfrieden" in July/August 1914.

It would had needed some serious critical situation, for example losing of war, before there would be revolution. They are quiet satisfied so long when there is peace and they can get food. There will be some pressure towards reforms but there hardly is revolution before general situation would be very messy. And army would crush these revolts easily. There is probably just more demostrations and strikes but not anything else.
 
And if they can confirm British neutrality?
They didn't care about British neutrality in 1914 In 1917 British neutrality would probably count for even less. The real problem for Germany was Austria's diplomatic position was crumbling . Romania is swinging hard against Austria and the death of King Carol wil put it in the Russian camp. Serbia could mobilize 400,000 men and Romania 500,000 men. While not the best in equipment, these armies are about on par with the Austrians. In a continential war, Romania is far more important than the British at least for the first six months which is what the Germans are thinking. While the war may last longer, you have to survive the first six months to get there and its doubtful that they could in 1917. The atitude of Italy is also becoming hard to determine

The British do fear Russia's growing might but they fear Bjorko even more. Its hard for the British to move towards Germany without losing Russia and Russia can offer the Germans far more- security against France, safe borders in the East and enough capital ships to tilt the balance against Britain.
 
Just to throw in a little ... disturbance :
In 1914 in Russia therer was a growing number of workers strikes suppoerted by the more ... "progressive" parts of the russian political spectrum already. It WAS already on the brink of another revolution.
In a way the war saved Russia from something similar to 1905/06, when the first reforms (which where then quickly turned again by the tsarists). Russia also had its "Burgfrieden" in July/August 1914.
The July strikes should not be read as a sign of political unrest. They are mostly limited to the Metalworkers and the leather plants and are more on economic conditions.
McKean in St Petersburg Between the Revolutioons notes that the peak occur on July8 when four trams are overturned because the police are gaurding Poincare on his state visit. The tram workers then refuse to go out without police protection and most workers simply couldn't get to their jobs See chapter 10
 
Agreed that Lenin's and Trotsky's presence in Russia would be necessary for the Bolshevik Revolution to take place. However, if Germany has an opportunity to do this during wartime, it will send Lenin to Russia (as for Trotsky, I think that he lived in the U.S. back then and thus could get to Russia on his own).

Agreed that Britain was likely to distance itself from the Entente starting from 1916-1917.

However, if World War I breaks out in 1916 or 1917 with Britain (and the U.S., of course) being neutral, will the Franco-Russian alliance have enough power to win this war before Russia descends into revolution?

My thinking is that 1914 is the "perfect" storm, if Europe can pass the July Crisis without war, and I do think that is a plausible option, then it faces other sparks in 1914 such as the potential Greek sinking of the Ottoman battleship to be delivered in August(?), and so on, but past 1914 the mental math of the various sides begins to shift. I am not certain we see the pressures just continue to build or not, I do not see a clear reason war needs to come as early as 1916 or 1917 lest you see something in Russia giving the Czar a push for war, but in that event Russia is the clearly the aggressor and I suspect the Entente fractures.

First let us ponder the likelihood of a shift in government in Britain, the Liberals are likely to lose the upcoming election due in 1917 I believe. Home Rule in Ireland is now the biggest (domestic) issue and although I do not think a conservative government will go isolationist, I think it refocuses on Empire and Ireland and lets the "understanding" with France go back to obscure at best. This is a factor elsewhere too. Every one of these states had internal issues to address or redress.

Germany will see an increasingly restless Socialist party seeking to assert its true power and the conservatives throwing up the road blocks, the liberals will need to choose sides along with the Zentrum, all likely leading to a lot of political in fighting that will redirect the focus inward. I do not see a revolution but the shadow of 1848 is there and the world will look ending to the Kaiser and elites, but I think Germany survives its next evolution towards true limited monarchy. Add to this the aging out of the generation who won in 1870 and feel confident in war as statecraft. This is another factor. We are in the beginning of a generation shift that will bring a whole new set of personalities to bear.

France will see the generation who lost in 1870 fade, a younger generation may not feel as attached to A-L, the French political winds may shift abruptly, if it heads vaguely left then Autocratic and arguable Theocratic Russia becomes a weird friend for Republican France. The populace of A-L was on the cusp of becoming better assimilated and one might see this hot spot become much cooler in ten or twenty or thirty years.

The USA will have a completely different election cycle in 1920 without the war and its "peace" from 1914 to 1919. And the Great Depression may be a very different economic shock, or not at all. One might see the USA go on a very different path indeed.

And so on. What of Germany switching to an oil-fired fleet in the 1920s? What effect of an oil boom in OE beginning in the 1920s? Butterflies and new threats to peace galore with every set of years passing.

But to return to your problem of a war delayed to 1916 or 1917, I think we have to wonder if Lenin ever gets to lead his revolution, since he will be that much older by the time Russia begins it crumble. And I agree that Russia had a lot of rigidity that must break rather than bend, I am not as certain a revolution like 1917 is the only outcome, we will have a lot of little nuanced changes that certainly can alter just how the thing crumbles. At bottom I think France and Russia will prove unable to over match Germany and A-H, especially with Italy on the side and both Bulgaria and the OE in the wings. It really takes the British Empire to balance the scales, and a long war of attrition in which no one can truly win (in part because Britain could entice the Italians, Romanians, Japanese, etc. to also enter the fray). This is why all discussions seem to obsess over British neutrality. And we assume Russia collapses (and A-H too) because any evenly matched conflict should be a grind and both those Empires had a lot of cracks that are a slippery slope once the state buckles. This is what frays my mind more often than not, one quickly finds oneself in a world so unlike what we endeavor to know.
 
My thinking is that 1914 is the "perfect" storm, if Europe can pass the July Crisis without war, and I do think that is a plausible option, then it faces other sparks in 1914 such as the potential Greek sinking of the Ottoman battleship to be delivered in August(?), and so on, but past 1914 the mental math of the various sides begins to shift. I am not certain we see the pressures just continue to build or not, I do not see a clear reason war needs to come as early as 1916 or 1917 lest you see something in Russia giving the Czar a push for war, but in that event Russia is the clearly the aggressor and I suspect the Entente fractures.

First let us ponder the likelihood of a shift in government in Britain, the Liberals are likely to lose the upcoming election due in 1917 I believe. Home Rule in Ireland is now the biggest (domestic) issue and although I do not think a conservative government will go isolationist, I think it refocuses on Empire and Ireland and lets the "understanding" with France go back to obscure at best. This is a factor elsewhere too. Every one of these states had internal issues to address or redress.

Germany will see an increasingly restless Socialist party seeking to assert its true power and the conservatives throwing up the road blocks, the liberals will need to choose sides along with the Zentrum, all likely leading to a lot of political in fighting that will redirect the focus inward. I do not see a revolution but the shadow of 1848 is there and the world will look ending to the Kaiser and elites, but I think Germany survives its next evolution towards true limited monarchy. Add to this the aging out of the generation who won in 1870 and feel confident in war as statecraft. This is another factor. We are in the beginning of a generation shift that will bring a whole new set of personalities to bear.

France will see the generation who lost in 1870 fade, a younger generation may not feel as attached to A-L, the French political winds may shift abruptly, if it heads vaguely left then Autocratic and arguable Theocratic Russia becomes a weird friend for Republican France. The populace of A-L was on the cusp of becoming better assimilated and one might see this hot spot become much cooler in ten or twenty or thirty years.

The USA will have a completely different election cycle in 1920 without the war and its "peace" from 1914 to 1919. And the Great Depression may be a very different economic shock, or not at all. One might see the USA go on a very different path indeed.

And so on. What of Germany switching to an oil-fired fleet in the 1920s? What effect of an oil boom in OE beginning in the 1920s? Butterflies and new threats to peace galore with every set of years passing.

But to return to your problem of a war delayed to 1916 or 1917, I think we have to wonder if Lenin ever gets to lead his revolution, since he will be that much older by the time Russia begins it crumble. And I agree that Russia had a lot of rigidity that must break rather than bend, I am not as certain a revolution like 1917 is the only outcome, we will have a lot of little nuanced changes that certainly can alter just how the thing crumbles. At bottom I think France and Russia will prove unable to over match Germany and A-H, especially with Italy on the side and both Bulgaria and the OE in the wings. It really takes the British Empire to balance the scales, and a long war of attrition in which no one can truly win (in part because Britain could entice the Italians, Romanians, Japanese, etc. to also enter the fray). This is why all discussions seem to obsess over British neutrality. And we assume Russia collapses (and A-H too) because any evenly matched conflict should be a grind and both those Empires had a lot of cracks that are a slippery slope once the state buckles. This is what frays my mind more often than not, one quickly finds oneself in a world so unlike what we endeavor to know.

I agree totally. In fact, there is only one thing there that I disagree with. The next UK general election was due to happen in 1915 due to the Parliament Act of 1911, and not in 1917. Everything else I agree with. I am sure that in 1914, it looked like the liberals were going to loose that election, not least of all due to the divisive issue of Irish Home Rule. Now if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated, and with no war in 1914, could there have been a civil war in Britain between the Irish Nationalists, Liberals and Labour on one side, and the Tories & Ulster Unionists on the other? If so, that would have major ramifications if that had happened? If not, then apart from the Tories winning in 1915, what else would have happened? And, what would the new attitudes of the Tory administration be to relations between Continental powers.

Also, if WW1 had still not happened by 1916, what would the effects of the 1916 Reichstag election be? Could you finally see an SPD majority in the Reichstag and/or a left wing chancellor imposed on the Kaiser? Was there a constitutional crisis waiting just up the road between the Kaiser and the left wing? But if there had been a major power transfer from Kaiser to Reichstag, and from right to left, would such a Germany want to get involved in any war that crops up, such as maybe an Austro-Hungarian war in which an unassasinated Franz Ferdinand tries to federalise Austria-Hungary only for the chauvinistic Hungarians to object?

I would put my money on that Austro-Hungarian War in which Franz Ferdindand's attempts to federalize the Empire are supported by the non-Hungarian ethnic groups but opposed by the Hungarians. Thus you have the civil war, and Russia might get drawn in trying to encourage Serbia to invade the southern slavic territories of the Empire? If they loose this war, there would definitely be a revolution (hopefully a non-Bolshevist one) but whether there would already be one before then, I don't know.
 
Just to throw in a little ... disturbance :
In 1914 in Russia therer was a growing number of workers strikes suppoerted by the more ... "progressive" parts of the russian political spectrum already. It WAS already on the brink of another revolution.
In a way the war saved Russia from something similar to 1905/06, when the first reforms (which where then quickly turned again by the tsarists). Russia also had its "Burgfrieden" in July/August 1914.
This. My take is that without the outbreak of war Russia descends into revolution in 1915.
 
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