Which emigration waves are we talking about here? Because early 20th c. emigrants went everywhere, and I really do mean everywhere. If the USA is less attractive than say, Australia or Argentina, they will go to Australia or Argentina. If Canada is more attractive (doubtful, that, but still), they WILL go to Canada. It just depends on the relative advantages of going to any particular place.
If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)
- Thread starter Saphroneth
- Start date
-
- Tags
- trent
Which emigration waves are we talking about here? Because early 20th c. emigrants went everywhere, and I really do mean everywhere. If the USA is less attractive than say, Australia or Argentina, they will go to Australia or Argentina. If Canada is more attractive (doubtful, that, but still), they WILL go to Canada. It just depends on the relative advantages of going to any particular place.
Saphroneth
Banned
None of those is analogous to trying to retake the United States - Louisiana was a French colony and Britain was at war with France, while the Northwest Territory was British and the Indians were being encroached on by the US.
No, the British arrive and force America to apologize for their breach of neutrality. The Confederates taking the territory they did is somethiing they did largely on their own power and often due to strong local support. SoCal had already tried to split off and was pro-Confederate, the territory between it and Texas was contested OTL, Kentucky was genuinely contested and in this TL because the Confederacy was winning they got it.
As for ways to hit the British, I assume you're referring to the slavery issue? Slavery is illegal in the British Empire and legal in Missouri, Maryland and Delaware, I'm not sure how it's something they can "hit" the British over especially given what's happening in Charleston.
No, I'm saying that American foreign policy is just as likely to be analogous to the Netherlands over Belgium, Britain over the Thirteen Colonies, Poland over Eastern Poland, Russia over Finland, Denmark over Holstein or Austria over most of the Austrian Empire or South Germanic Confederation as it is to France over Alsasce-Lorraine - which is to say, not an attempt to reclaim at all costs.
Those happened, but they were done by the Confederacy and -to those in TTL - it looks like the failing of the US that it happened not the nefarious actions of the British.
It's also becoming clear that the British are not willing to give the Confederacy a pass for acting the same way as the US did in 1861 - there's currently quite a large fleet getting ready to demolish the defences of Charleston.
Of course it's not impossible. It's also not inevitable, and for the US to maintain that kind of single minded political will over multiple election cycles seems unlikely to me. (If the Republicans are for heavy domestic military investment and reclaiming a country full of six or seven million arsey hillbillies and four million black people, then the Democrats will be in favour of peaceful coexistance and for everyone to shut up about compensated emancipation)
In the future, the US of TTL will be investing more (by a lot) into their military than OTL - certainly enough for a rather stronger militia, better equipment, and a coherent navy. However, the US has something of an ingrained cultural dislike for professional standing armies and for the US to build up a large corps of reserves seems distinctly unlikely.
This will, if I have the self control, be my last reply - it's not what the TL readers are here for, and I want to try and avoid engaging on this topic again.
I can't speak to the economics of it as that's outside my area of familiarity. But in your last point, you conflate the US economy doing worse than historically with the US accepting permanent economic harm. That's only true with a view of OTL to see the potential improvements over the TTL economy. You could make the same argument that IOTL we accept permanent economic harm from not doing something that IATL lead to a better economy. The comparison only works if you have an alternative to judge against. Additionally, a worse economy doesn't necessarily mean a bad economy. It gets back to the previous point in a way, in that people could certainly say the economy would be better with better relations with Britain, but it's still going along nicely. As you say, the US was experiencing phenomenal growth in the period, so even doing noticeably worse will still be quite good.
As for the points about revanchism other posters have discussed, and which seem to be a recuring theme of any discussion on this topic, I agree with RodentRevolution in that there's a tremendous amount of applying OTL contemporary American understandings and ideas back to the 1860's US without supporting why they apply. With regards to British-American relations, I am sceptical that revanchism will consistently be a significant force, since the territories taken by Britain are, frankly, marginal and limited. They cost the US nothing of real importance, so calling for their reclamation is unlikely to excite any passion or, more cynically, sway many votes. As such, there isn't much of a reason to pursue it. At the end of the day it's a done deal, and not worth trying to reverse. What I think revanchism will do, is deepen the anglophobia that already existed. Look at something like the Murchison Letter, for an exaple of American anglophobia being important. So I'm of the view that anglophobia will be a more frequent and more effective political tool, but will not have a significant impact on actual policy or relations.
Union-Confederate relations are honestly a more interesting question. The US has just lost an immense swath of its territory to a newly independent nation, and nows needs to figure out to live with that. I think the most likely course is for the US to largely accept that Confederate independence is a done deal, and figure out how to pursue their interests in light of that fact. That means building a working relationship with the new nation to conduct the everyday business of neighboring countries. Holding a grudge will become very expensive and very inconvenient very quickly. I think it is informative here to look at other nations in broadly the same period which underwent a similar loss of territory to a secessionist or independence movement.
By my reckoning, we've got the Belgian Revolution, Norweigian independence from Sweden, Irish independence from the United Kingdom, and the independence of the Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, none of these are perfect analogies to the US-CS situation, but in all of them a nation lost a substantial portion of their territory to an internal independence movement, not an external annexation. And in all of them, there was initial reluctance to accept the new situation, but an insatiable and burning desire for revenge and revanche was not the result in any of those situations. The nation that had lost territory licked its wounds, engaged in some needed soul-searching, and accepted that the loss was an accomplished fact, that had to be dealt with. That's telling about nations' tendency toward revanchism when territories are lost to idependence movements. But lets look at the poster child of revanchism-France. Although we think of the desire to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine as an all-encompassing passion of the Second Republic, that isn't really accurate. The 1880's and 1890's there was a Franco-German detente and even a loose informal alliance in colonial matters. The issue of Alsace-Lorraine was not a significant impediemnt to the normal conduct of relations and diplomatic maneuvering, even cooperation, until the rise of General Boulanger who championed ideas of revenge against Germany. That is exemplary of what seems to me a trend. The emergence of revanchism as captivating national polcy requires a charismatic leader to promote it. Otherwise the forces encouraging acceptance win out.
There will be serious butterflies here.The United States isn't going to let Confederates take advantage of the homestead act and the southern blacks won't be available for cheap labor, causing the need for more immigrants from Europe or Asia.Asian immigration will have serious long term effects seeing as how Japan and Britain aren't getting along at the moment.
Revanchist USA? Certainly sounds possible, I'd even say it's the most likely outcome given the larger context of the peace. Now, if it was just the few acres of wilderness to the poms with war against the rebels continuing then I'd expect revanchism wouldn't be significant... but the larger context and potential for a stab in the back 'myth' certainly pushes the risk of revanchism way up. But at the same time we've got enough examples elsewhere during the 1800s and 1900s pushing both ways in OTL that it's not the only plausible outcome.
Of cause, there's also a number of big wildcards that could influence opinion in the US either way:
1. British intervention was due to the stupidity of a Union naval captain and subsequent political bungling, not British aggression. How US politicians and the media play this could push strongly one for (if ignored)) or against (if considered, with likely strong blow back against Lincoln and the Republicans) revanchism.
2. Subsequent interactions between the British and CSA. How does the US read the 'current' Britain-CSA conflict? As a continuation of the neutral rights issue or as some form of conspiracy against America? The former would likely mitigate against revanchism, while the latter would press heavily towards it...
3. The longer term trajectory of the Confederacy. From OTL we know that much of the south later had significant value due to oil wealth, but that's not going to become significant until 1895-1910ish. And we've got a lot of factors with potential to play to the Confederacies' determent in the meantime... the dominance of cotton (between first the Union blockade and the 'current' conflict between the Rebels and the Poms alternate sources will be sought, possibly badly knocking down the South's revenue in the 1870s and 80s); the ongoing (well deserved and likely increasing) stigma arising from slavery (I severely doubt the South would consider abolition for at least a generation post-war); generally limited industrialization; existing breaches between the plantation owners and 'poor' whites (wonder if that could actually drive emigration from the CSA to USA...); lack of development of inter-state infrastructure due to various hardline states'-rights nuttyness. Hell! Ongoing issues from those will likely see any oil boom drastically cut back... if not turn the Confederacy into an out and out Banana republic (heh, that could be funny... Florida or Texas as the target of filibustering instead of various Central American states...). It could very well be that ITTL a Yankee's opinion of the South circa 1900 will be less grumbling about lost territory and more "I'm glad we're rid of that cesspit"...
Of cause, there's also a number of big wildcards that could influence opinion in the US either way:
1. British intervention was due to the stupidity of a Union naval captain and subsequent political bungling, not British aggression. How US politicians and the media play this could push strongly one for (if ignored)) or against (if considered, with likely strong blow back against Lincoln and the Republicans) revanchism.
2. Subsequent interactions between the British and CSA. How does the US read the 'current' Britain-CSA conflict? As a continuation of the neutral rights issue or as some form of conspiracy against America? The former would likely mitigate against revanchism, while the latter would press heavily towards it...
3. The longer term trajectory of the Confederacy. From OTL we know that much of the south later had significant value due to oil wealth, but that's not going to become significant until 1895-1910ish. And we've got a lot of factors with potential to play to the Confederacies' determent in the meantime... the dominance of cotton (between first the Union blockade and the 'current' conflict between the Rebels and the Poms alternate sources will be sought, possibly badly knocking down the South's revenue in the 1870s and 80s); the ongoing (well deserved and likely increasing) stigma arising from slavery (I severely doubt the South would consider abolition for at least a generation post-war); generally limited industrialization; existing breaches between the plantation owners and 'poor' whites (wonder if that could actually drive emigration from the CSA to USA...); lack of development of inter-state infrastructure due to various hardline states'-rights nuttyness. Hell! Ongoing issues from those will likely see any oil boom drastically cut back... if not turn the Confederacy into an out and out Banana republic (heh, that could be funny... Florida or Texas as the target of filibustering instead of various Central American states...). It could very well be that ITTL a Yankee's opinion of the South circa 1900 will be less grumbling about lost territory and more "I'm glad we're rid of that cesspit"...
US Ironclad specifications
Saphroneth
Banned
Ordnance department internal minute, representing a late stage in the discussion of tenders to go out for new ironclads.
Requirement 1: Shallow river gunboat.
Draft to not exceed 5 feet. Width and length to not be excessive.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against a twenty-pounder rifle charged with three pounds of powder firing a wrought iron bolt at a range of 20 yards, without spalling or severe working of the shield. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value (engines, battery, conning station) and the waterline.
Capable of carrying at least one 8" rifle, and of providing fire in all aspects.
Minimum contract speed 6 knots.
Requirement 2: larger river ironclad
Draft to not exceed eleven feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against an 11" Dahlgren gun charged with sixteen pounds of powder firing a wrought iron bolt at a range of 20 yards, without spalling or severe working of the shield. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value (engines, battery, conning station) and the waterline.
Capable of carrying at least two 11" Dahlgren guns or equivalent weight, and of providing fire in all aspects.
Minimum contract speed 8 knots. Must also be able to tow 3,000 tons of barges at a minimum speed of 3 knots.
Requirement 3: Harbour defence ironclad
Draft to not exceed eighteen feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against the heaviest weapons in service at a range of over 100 yards, when charged with the highest normal load of powder and firing wrought iron penetrating bolts. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value and the waterline, or the whole hull if the hull is wooden.
Capable of directing the fire of at least two of the most powerful weapons possible upon a given orientation.
Minimum contract speed 2 knots.
Requirement 4: Coastal service ironclad
Draft to not exceed eleven feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against the 11" Dahlgren gun when charged with 20 lbs of powder and fired at a range of 100 yards, and to protect the whole hull as well as engines, conning station and battery.
Capable of carrying two heavy guns, including at least one 15" Dahlgren gun or equivalent, and of firing these weapons at ten degrees of elevation; also capable of employing this firepower on both broadsides.
Minimum contract speed 8 knots.
Requirement 5: Sea service ironclad
Draft to not exceed twenty-five feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect the whole ship against the 11" Dahlgren gun when charged with 20 lbs of powder and fired at a range of 100 yards, and to protect the whole hull as well as engines, conning station and battery.
Capable of firing a broadside of at least four heavy weapons on either broadside, with the aggregate weight of the broadside cannon to not be less than 105,000 lbs (i.e. two 11" Dahlgren and two 15" Dahlgren, or larger numbers of smaller rifles)
Minimum contract speed 12 knots.
Internal discussions have hashed out many of the details of the expected roles for these ships. The reason for the specification in terms of resistance is the recognition that the 4.5" solid, backed armour of the Warrior at New York better resisted fire than the 11" laminated unbacked armour of the Monitor at the same battle; otherwise the intent is to allow designers to do their best within the restrictions.
The sea service ironclad is intended to be a battleship, the coastal service ironclad is intended to fight enemy forts, the harbour service ironclad to protect friendly ports, and the two riverine ironclads are intended to protect the Ohio river and tributaries (of which the Ohio in particular is now the US-CS boundary) while also having the power to adequately fight the river.
Notably the gunboat design is essentially supposed to resist field guns only - the 32-lber smoothbore would cause progressive damage.
Requirement 1: Shallow river gunboat.
Draft to not exceed 5 feet. Width and length to not be excessive.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against a twenty-pounder rifle charged with three pounds of powder firing a wrought iron bolt at a range of 20 yards, without spalling or severe working of the shield. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value (engines, battery, conning station) and the waterline.
Capable of carrying at least one 8" rifle, and of providing fire in all aspects.
Minimum contract speed 6 knots.
Requirement 2: larger river ironclad
Draft to not exceed eleven feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against an 11" Dahlgren gun charged with sixteen pounds of powder firing a wrought iron bolt at a range of 20 yards, without spalling or severe working of the shield. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value (engines, battery, conning station) and the waterline.
Capable of carrying at least two 11" Dahlgren guns or equivalent weight, and of providing fire in all aspects.
Minimum contract speed 8 knots. Must also be able to tow 3,000 tons of barges at a minimum speed of 3 knots.
Requirement 3: Harbour defence ironclad
Draft to not exceed eighteen feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against the heaviest weapons in service at a range of over 100 yards, when charged with the highest normal load of powder and firing wrought iron penetrating bolts. Armour to cover all areas of fighting value and the waterline, or the whole hull if the hull is wooden.
Capable of directing the fire of at least two of the most powerful weapons possible upon a given orientation.
Minimum contract speed 2 knots.
Requirement 4: Coastal service ironclad
Draft to not exceed eleven feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect against the 11" Dahlgren gun when charged with 20 lbs of powder and fired at a range of 100 yards, and to protect the whole hull as well as engines, conning station and battery.
Capable of carrying two heavy guns, including at least one 15" Dahlgren gun or equivalent, and of firing these weapons at ten degrees of elevation; also capable of employing this firepower on both broadsides.
Minimum contract speed 8 knots.
Requirement 5: Sea service ironclad
Draft to not exceed twenty-five feet.
Armour to be sufficient to protect the whole ship against the 11" Dahlgren gun when charged with 20 lbs of powder and fired at a range of 100 yards, and to protect the whole hull as well as engines, conning station and battery.
Capable of firing a broadside of at least four heavy weapons on either broadside, with the aggregate weight of the broadside cannon to not be less than 105,000 lbs (i.e. two 11" Dahlgren and two 15" Dahlgren, or larger numbers of smaller rifles)
Minimum contract speed 12 knots.
Internal discussions have hashed out many of the details of the expected roles for these ships. The reason for the specification in terms of resistance is the recognition that the 4.5" solid, backed armour of the Warrior at New York better resisted fire than the 11" laminated unbacked armour of the Monitor at the same battle; otherwise the intent is to allow designers to do their best within the restrictions.
The sea service ironclad is intended to be a battleship, the coastal service ironclad is intended to fight enemy forts, the harbour service ironclad to protect friendly ports, and the two riverine ironclads are intended to protect the Ohio river and tributaries (of which the Ohio in particular is now the US-CS boundary) while also having the power to adequately fight the river.
Notably the gunboat design is essentially supposed to resist field guns only - the 32-lber smoothbore would cause progressive damage.
Last edited:
Artillery training, Polish Revolt
Saphroneth
Banned
Artillery training course - Uhlans
(Polish Revolt title for artillerymen, adopted in common with Huszaria for rifle skirmishers)
Part 1 - mathematical training and drill
The new artilleryman spends several weeks alternating between morning mathematical lessons (specifically on ballistics and on how the firing angle and air resistance can be used to calculate trajectory) and drill (reloading and dry-firing a practice artillery piece).
Graduation from part 1 requires passing a mathematical exam and a minimum reload time for a gunnery team.
Part 2 - practical applications
The trainees are required to estimate distance and elevation, and calculate trajectory and flight time for various projectiles. They are also required to recommend how they would attack an enemy at the stated range and why (for example, grapeshot v canister).
To aid rapid training, the instructors do not have to rely on their own judgement - a booklet has been made with dozens of 'problems' to set or modify.
Part 3 - practice firing
Similar to part 2, but after some problems are posed the trainees will be required to give fire on the target instead of being graded. They are allocated three stand of each kind of ammunition for a given problem.
Once this process is over, the highest scoring trainees are allocated as gun captains and the rest as their supports - though it is made clear that anyone above a certain score is expected to be able to operate their gun.
(Polish Revolt title for artillerymen, adopted in common with Huszaria for rifle skirmishers)
Part 1 - mathematical training and drill
The new artilleryman spends several weeks alternating between morning mathematical lessons (specifically on ballistics and on how the firing angle and air resistance can be used to calculate trajectory) and drill (reloading and dry-firing a practice artillery piece).
Graduation from part 1 requires passing a mathematical exam and a minimum reload time for a gunnery team.
Part 2 - practical applications
The trainees are required to estimate distance and elevation, and calculate trajectory and flight time for various projectiles. They are also required to recommend how they would attack an enemy at the stated range and why (for example, grapeshot v canister).
To aid rapid training, the instructors do not have to rely on their own judgement - a booklet has been made with dozens of 'problems' to set or modify.
Part 3 - practice firing
Similar to part 2, but after some problems are posed the trainees will be required to give fire on the target instead of being graded. They are allocated three stand of each kind of ammunition for a given problem.
Once this process is over, the highest scoring trainees are allocated as gun captains and the rest as their supports - though it is made clear that anyone above a certain score is expected to be able to operate their gun.
As has been noted, cultural 'norms' can change over time - I wonder if this will be one of them.
The OTL USA hasn't lacked for charismatic leaders, but equally its leaders were generally good (and sometimes excellent) at realpolitik, which would argue against them advocating revanchism too strongly. I just can't see TTL USA (strongly democratic, liberal by 19th C standards, economically potent, generally 'one of the good guys') succumbing to the allure of a "we were betrayed, pick up your guns and let's get them" sort of leader. Public statements along the lines of "we need to be able to protect ourselves against the perfidious British" are a different matter, but actual military action? I don't think so - but that's just my opinion.
Could this be a way for the USA to wage economic war on the CSA? Encourage immigration by disillusioned poor whites from the CSA, thus gaining more workers in the USA whilst simultaneously increasing the CSA's reliance on slave labour, with all the difficulties that's going to bring in time?
It's certainly a risky tactic. Given the experience of Anglo settlers in Texas, American settlers in Oregon, and Bloody Kansas, topped off with the difficulty of differentiating between 'disillusioned' poor whites and a 'non-disillusioned' potential Fifth Column, I think it's probably not one they'd adopt. Ironically, the most reliable settlers they could attract would probably be black people- but I suspect they won't adopt that tactic either.
Speaking of disillusionment, I wonder if the Democrats are going to revive the 'Republicans= Know-Nothings' tactic in the 1864 election and accuse them of using Irish and German regiments as cannon-fodder. It's not true, of course, but this is politics we're talking about. They don't have to win anybody over, but if they can depress turnout among the fairly strongly Republican German communities it'll still contribute.
As I've said, I think this is far too potent an electoral issue to be ignored:
Last edited:
British Army circular, with notes from Duke of Cambridge
Saphroneth
Banned
Copy of a British Army circular on the main points to be addressed by army reform, with comments by the Duke of Cambridge. Much of the foul language has been removed.
- Reduce budget, the Army's budget is too high.
Absolute rot, army budget is price of security. Army performed reasonably in Canada, largely due to extra troops hired on over and above force size for Russian War; ability to use militia to cover home security; better weaponry.
- Abolish purchase of commissions.
Possible in isolation; value of bond for good behaviour important, but not critical. Cretinous to add to army budget reduction, purchase brings in good money and to compensate sitting officers for value of commissions recently purchased would be ruinous to attempt to reduce budget.
Purchase only permitted for qualified officers currently; gave us the Duke of Wellington.
Would consider making available fund for purchase by otherwise qualified officers, to be repaid on loss of commission if rank sold on?
- Abolish flogging.
Flogging important for discipline of the worst; controlled under other conditions; abolition unimportant. What other punishment for current flogging offences - execution?
- Reduce length of service, establish reserve force
Absolute, undifferentiated claptrap of the most odorous form; qualitative superiority of British soldier primary reason for victories of last decade; reservists not nearly as efficient as long service regulars; rapid advancement of weapons renders experience worthless; decreases average troop quality; barely an upside to be had; militia and volunteers tolerable for reserve force in time of emergency.
- Increase esprit de corps by associating militia and regular regiments, geographically assign regiments
Reasonable.
- Reduce colonial garrisons, centralize troops in Great Britain, encourage locally raised forces
Only a sensible policy if one has pretensions to predict the future; colonial garrisons greatly improve quality of local militia anyway; Canadian militia in late American war tolerably effective due to long training time with troops already in place; easier to reinforce existing garrison than invade captured colony.
- Abolish bounty money for recruitment
Removal of key recruiting tool foolish; makes army less attractive to better sort; another example of short sighted cost cutting
Almost entirely formed of policies invented in an office rather than developed from experience, the effects of the implementation of the aformentioned reforms would leave the Army smaller and less capable, with the only recourse being the idea that a long war or a lost war is cheaper than a quick, decisive victory.
- Reduce budget, the Army's budget is too high.
Absolute rot, army budget is price of security. Army performed reasonably in Canada, largely due to extra troops hired on over and above force size for Russian War; ability to use militia to cover home security; better weaponry.
- Abolish purchase of commissions.
Possible in isolation; value of bond for good behaviour important, but not critical. Cretinous to add to army budget reduction, purchase brings in good money and to compensate sitting officers for value of commissions recently purchased would be ruinous to attempt to reduce budget.
Purchase only permitted for qualified officers currently; gave us the Duke of Wellington.
Would consider making available fund for purchase by otherwise qualified officers, to be repaid on loss of commission if rank sold on?
- Abolish flogging.
Flogging important for discipline of the worst; controlled under other conditions; abolition unimportant. What other punishment for current flogging offences - execution?
- Reduce length of service, establish reserve force
Absolute, undifferentiated claptrap of the most odorous form; qualitative superiority of British soldier primary reason for victories of last decade; reservists not nearly as efficient as long service regulars; rapid advancement of weapons renders experience worthless; decreases average troop quality; barely an upside to be had; militia and volunteers tolerable for reserve force in time of emergency.
- Increase esprit de corps by associating militia and regular regiments, geographically assign regiments
Reasonable.
- Reduce colonial garrisons, centralize troops in Great Britain, encourage locally raised forces
Only a sensible policy if one has pretensions to predict the future; colonial garrisons greatly improve quality of local militia anyway; Canadian militia in late American war tolerably effective due to long training time with troops already in place; easier to reinforce existing garrison than invade captured colony.
- Abolish bounty money for recruitment
Removal of key recruiting tool foolish; makes army less attractive to better sort; another example of short sighted cost cutting
Almost entirely formed of policies invented in an office rather than developed from experience, the effects of the implementation of the aformentioned reforms would leave the Army smaller and less capable, with the only recourse being the idea that a long war or a lost war is cheaper than a quick, decisive victory.
Pretty much spot on, and well-written to boot. Is there any deeper significance to the Duke's slightly different views in these two areas?
Memo, on Army of Reserve, dated 24 September 1859
'I see no reason to object to the proposal made for taking men into the Army of Reserve who have been discharged by purchase, or for some modified physical defect, before completing their ten years' service. Some limit should, however, be fixed as to their length of service in the Army, say seven or five years, below which their services should not accepted for the Reserve...
'though no doubt there may be a considerable attraction to men of one locality serving together in the same corps, there is a great objection to it, especially in our Army, for the bad moral effect it may produce. We have many very unhealthy and bad stations for troops, as, for instance, Hong Kong and the West Indies. Regiments stationed there suffer greatly. A large call for recruits comes from these stations. The consequence will be a very bad moral effect produced in the locality where the Regiment is raised, and an utter inability to obtain men to complete such corps. In war an equally bad effect would be produced in the event of a Regiment being much cut up and requiring large drafts of men to complete. I have always understood that this effect during war was felt to be so unfavourable during the great wars of the Empire in France, that Napoleon gave up drawing Conscripts for Regiments from certain localities, and now the French Army, I understand, is replenished generally from the Conscripts from the entire country and not localised. Again, in voluntary enlistment such as ours, where the division of the country into districts is not known, and where no quarters are distributed according to population, there are many portions of the country which produce few, if any soldiers, whereas there are others, such as London and Liverpool and the manufacturing districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where the great proportion of the Army is drawn.
'How, then, are these Regiments to be completed or kept up, not connected with these favourable localities for recruiting? Take for instance the Highland Regiments, some of our very best corps. It would be impossible to keep them up if they were to be recruited from local connection only, there being a great many more Englishmen and Irishmen in these corps than Highlanders. Again, the feeling of partisanship engendered by local connection carried to any extent would be fatal to our system. It would produce the worst possible feelings between different corps, and the religious element, now so happily blended, would entail the most unfortunate results.'
Memo for General Peel, 1866.
'I think that the plan hinted at for allowing men after seven years' service in the ranks, if at home, to go on unlimited furlough, might fairly be tried, and would probably produce a certain number of men.'
Saphroneth
Banned
Part of the difference is that the American war has shown the extreme value of an already-constituted battalion at home compared to a reserve battalion at home - the time to rebuild them is going to be significant compared to the ship-them-over time.
The rest of it is that his view on associated regiments is not necessarily that they draw all their recruits from the region - and, from a cynical point of view, this is something he feels he can bend on somewhat, while the mobilized Militia somewhat impressed him in the American war (not that he'll admit it) so associated regiments is the thing he thinks least likely to wreck his army.
The rest of it is that his view on associated regiments is not necessarily that they draw all their recruits from the region - and, from a cynical point of view, this is something he feels he can bend on somewhat, while the mobilized Militia somewhat impressed him in the American war (not that he'll admit it) so associated regiments is the thing he thinks least likely to wreck his army.
Been looking for an online copy of the Military Life in full! Thanks for this link!
Saphroneth
Banned
Hm, here's a question I admit myself to be not knowledgeable on.
TTL, the states of Maryland, Maine, Missouri and California have lost chunks of their land area and population (in some cases substantial). Would those be redivided into new - and in many cases fewer - House districts straight away, or would they be left until the next census?
The reason this matters is the 1864 election, because house districts calculate electoral votes.
TTL, the states of Maryland, Maine, Missouri and California have lost chunks of their land area and population (in some cases substantial). Would those be redivided into new - and in many cases fewer - House districts straight away, or would they be left until the next census?
The reason this matters is the 1864 election, because house districts calculate electoral votes.
Actually I asked whether the US was going to have what was essentially its historical OTL economy (which was a boom bust cycle on steriods) in which case the historical immigration patterns would likely stand or is this war as postulated in this timeline going to permanently cripple the US economy which would affect immigration at least to some degree (and lead to more bitter feelings). The Homestead Act was in mid 1862 (and was a major plank for the GOP in three elections going back to 1856) so it seems very likely to occur.
another point on immigration to the US, the Railroads got immense amounts of free land to build the various Transcontinental Railroads. (Which was also a major GOP plank from 1856 onward... blocked by Southern Democrats until they seceded). They advertised heavily to fill up that land .. particularly in Scandinavia but also elsewhere in Europe (they wanted customers for after they built the railroads basically). This too seems unlikely to change without major changes in the US economy and policy (the need for those railroads being more rather than less obvious after British attacks on California).
Last edited:
Congressional Districts are based on apportionment which is based on the census every ten years. They come and go all the time ... recently several states lost districts while several others gained them as a result of the 2010 census. So no they wouldn't change until the 1870 Census which isn't that far off from the postwar era of your timeline. It would take a special act of Congress to change it, and no one is going to be too excited about that
The Old Northwest, or as it is now known, the Midwest, includes everything east of the Mississippi River by the Treaty of Paris, plus an ill defined area north of the Mississippi's source to the Lake of the Woods. The British were supposed to evacuate with 'all deliberate speed", the Jay Treaty in 1794 reaffirmed that promise
The British forts were still there in 1812
regarding the US copying the British regimental system (and recruitment by region). You might think the US would copy that, but it fought two wars against the Germans in the 20th Century who used that system, plus one against the Japanese who used that system and yet, here we are, nearly 100 years since the first time the US fought a war the Germans and nearly 250 years since we fought the British (who used that system) and the US Army refuses to use that system
Yeah, that seems odd to me too because there are clear benefits.
On the other hand, incidents like when Bedford VA lost a good portion of its adult males serving in the National Guard in less than a hour at Omaha Beach does play into that too. Similar things happened in the First World War with American National Guard units. Spreading the pain as it were to avoid catastrophe to a single community plays a part here. Incidents like when the Newfoundland Division suffered catastrophic losses at the Battle of Somme is a major disadvantage (to give a Canadian example) as does the fate of so many of the "Pals" battalions (a British one)
Yeah, that seems odd to me too because there are clear benefits.
On the other hand, incidents like when Bedford VA lost a good portion of its adult males serving in the National Guard in less than a hour at Omaha Beach does play into that too. Similar things happened in the First World War with American National Guard units. Spreading the pain as it were to avoid catastrophe to a single community plays a part here. Incidents like when the Newfoundland Division suffered catastrophic losses at the Battle of Somme is a major disadvantage (to give a Canadian example) as does the fate of so many of the "Pals" battalions (a British one)