If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)

[Saphroneth]

For what it's worth, I believe only one American was ever actually sentenced to death in the US for the slave trade, and that was during the ACW.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

That's an interesting dynamic. The British and Canadians will have an advantage at longer ranges, but the Americans will equalize that if and when they're able to close.

Depends on how you define "able to close" and "equalise".

“At Drewey’s Bluff, Virginia (May 13, 1864), I. Hermann, a Confederate infantryman, noticed the execution Union bullets were inflicting on a tall pine just within the rebel breastworks. Though the two firing lines had been only a hundred yards apart, Hermann noticed bark, needles and cones being knocked down the entire height of the tree down to the top of the breastworks. Hermann concluded that even though thousands of shots were fired in a high parabolic trajectory into the upper regions of the tree, thousands more were fired even higher and escaped any sort of visual detection.” Brent Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage, p. 581

We also know that 40 men of the 5th Connecticut scored 10% hits at a barn 100 yards away, of which only one bullet would have hit a man sized target. A British soldier of the third class - the worst of the army - could hit a man sized target 94% of the time on the range... and that the closest target was 150 yards. At the range and difficulty of target where the 5th Conn. hits 2.5% of the time, the average British no-hoper can hit 94% of the time.

Buck and ball is only more effective than a minie ball if it hits the enemy rather than going over their heads.

 

[Saphroneth]

Buck and Ball basically triples to quadruples the hit rate, if not more - at least, for "unaimed" fire, where it's chance if a shot hits. It's very important for the Americans, but it's not going to equalize things one on one.
Roughly speaking, given that Canadian troops have had rifle training but not a full course (not enough ammo) and are not experienced in being shot at then the average Canadian will be more accurate at long range and thus score hits out to ~300 yards with reasonable accuracy at ~100. With buck and ball, a hundred Americans at close range will put out something close to as many hits on a hundred Canadians as they take in return - both because massed formations like the Canadians will be using are more vulnerable to unaimed fire, because buck-and-ball is faster to reload than minie balls, and because the Canadian hit rate is not great. As 3/4 of the hits are buckshot, though, the average seriousness of the wounds will be less (though since musket balls but not Enfield rounds are supersonic that close the larger balls that hit will do more damage).
The overall result is that the American troops are very roughly as effective as the Canadian troops, maybe a little less. (Not surprising, both have had about the same amount of actual training and the Canadians have fired more shots.)

As for the British regulars, those are going to be highly superior even at close range. The accuracy is just worlds apart.




Something I intend to do today is to get some sense of the "total amount of black powder fires" the Union has over OTL before it runs dry. Fortunately I have some data supplied by TFSmith as a starting point (which is useful and probably unbiased).

 

[Saphroneth]

OTL stock pre-war (4 March 1861)
1.1 million lbs gunpowder
3.8 million lbs saltpeter (i.e. 4.8 million lbs gunpowder)
OTL purchases by 30 June 1862
7.7 million lbs gunpowder
5.2 million lbs saltpeter

The 5.2 million lbs saltpeter represents the DuPont purchase (caught in port by Trent) and does not take place TTL.

OTL issued by 30 June 1862: 7.7 million lbs gunpowder.

Thus, assuming that all the 7.7 million lb purchases were from sources available in the US despite the blockade (apart from the Dupont purchase) the Union's stock as of 30 June 1862 absent additional fighting would be about 5.9 million lbs gunpowder. (350 tons.) This also assumes that none of the gunpowder was in the several states which seceded after Lincoln was inaugurates, which I sincerely doubt (as they included Virginia, which contained Norfolk Virginia - a major military base.)



It sounds a lot (and is) but let's see how quickly it's used up.
Each field gun uses 1 lb of powder per shot.
Each 32-lber uses between 4 and 10 depending on the weight - average it to 7.
Each 64-lber uses 8-16 lbs.
Each 8" gun uses 8. (Or more for the rifles.)
Each 9" gun uses 10-13.
Each 10" gun uses 12-15.
Each 11" gun uses 15.
And the monster 15" Lincoln Gun uses 35.

Rifles use about 60 grains per shot, so about 0.0086 pounds.

Thus, 5.9 million pounds of powder grants

686 million rifle rounds
OR 5.9 million field gun fires
OR 840,000 32-lber fires
OR 490,000 64-lber fires
OR 737,500 8" fires
OR 490,000 9" fires
OR 420,000 10" fires
OR 395,000 11" fires
OR 169,000 15" fires


Most of the naval actions involved powder already issued and the loss of the vessel or fort, so we can ignore them for this purpose, but the New York action involved extra powder being provided. Here there was a capture of a major powder store in NY, though the scale is one I'm not sure of, and there were 32 9" and 14 8" issued with enough fires for a major action. (say fifty each).
Total consumption is at least 25,000 pounds of powder over OTL (about a ton).

We can also roughly estimate that "normal usage" of powder is 7.7 million lb a year (total used in the first 15 months) - if we halve this to represent conservative use of the remaining munitions, then the Union is expending a rough average of five tons a day. (More with heavy fighting, less without.)
This gives them about two months before they're in trouble - by "trouble" I don't mean "no gunpowder", but "no replacement gunpowder", so they can certainly keep fighting past that.
At the same rough scale of use the saltpeter from the Dupont purchase would give them an extra two years.

n.b. this does not include sulfur imports; OTL the Union got theirs from Zacatecas and this would be blocked in the event of war. They may not be able to convert all their on-hand saltpeter.
As for what they did later in the war - more imports from the British Empire and imports from Chile. All imports!



Overall picture: the Union can keep fighting for the summer, but not past that unless they buy saltpeter from the British. Alternative methods would take too long to bear fruit.
There's also not enough powder to casually use on rifle training - a full Hythe course would mean roughly a pound a man.

 

[Incognitia]

This is fascinating, Saphroneth. I was aware that the UK held a very strong position against second-rank powers in this period, but I had no idea of just how poor the US position would be while they're simultaneously fighting the Confederates. I look forward to seeing how things develop.

 

[Saphroneth]

As a further point of comparison, let's look at "normal powder load". We'll assume that there's enough ammunition for fifty "far" shots per gun, and ignore bursting charges.

USS Minnesota:

• 2 × 10 in guns
• 28 × 9 in guns
• 14 × 8 in guns

Total 25,300 pounds - more than ten tons of gunpowder. (This is enough to fight one broadside for about four hours, or both for two - very roughly.)


Warrior, on the other hand, had 26 68-lbers and 10 110-lbers. The 110-lber burned 12 lbs per shot (so 600 lbs per gun for fifty fires) and the 68-lber burned twenty (so 1,000 lbs). That means that to carry enough powder for a full shot load Warrior would need 32,000 pounds of gunpowder! (14.5 tonnes) - or to put it another way a broadside would mean 320 lbs of powder being burned.
Again ignoring bursting charges.

For comparison, the 35-ton RML gun of 1878 (which would go through any ship in this war the long way) used 110 lbs of powder per shot, but as they were only carried four to a vessel the requirement of powder was not extreme... though a main gun broadside would involve 440 lbs of powder.

 

[pjmidd]

Great TL,
Only point I have is the time to use up the gunpowder reserves seems a bit low. I would expect that as soon as the CSA realises the union has the problem, its going to target powder as a priority. Add in the distribution issues, a lot of powder will end up stored in the wrong places compared to where it ends up being needed, and the hurt would start earlier.

 

[Saphroneth]

Great TL,
Only point I have is the time to use up the gunpowder reserves seems a bit low. I would expect that as soon as the CSA realises the union has the problem, its going to target powder as a priority. Add in the distribution issues, a lot of powder will end up stored in the wrong places compared to where it ends up being needed, and the hurt would start earlier.

Well, that's one reason the Union purchased ~2500 tons of the stuff about this time OTL - it's just that the time the Trent took place it hadn't left port yet, and was OTL detained until it was determined war was unlikely. (TTL it's not let through for obvious reasons.)
What that time means is basically the time before the Union has no powder left in store and therefore needs to start taking it from the places it's been distributed to. e.g. forts may have half their powder load taken back and be ordered not to use their big guns (11" or the like) except in dire emergency, a blanket ban on target practice, no long range bombardments and so on - basically reducing powder use to the minimum they can. This is a subtle degradation of Union fighting ability which isn't easy to quantify (I'd need to roughly estimate powder consumption for the entire army!) but it's certainly there and will play a major role in the strategic environment in the latter half of the year.
Specifically, it's one of the reasons the Union is willing to take a peace that involves them giving up things - they're essentially unable to resist without making peace with someone. (If I were really evil I'd have the CSA inherit the contract for all that saltpeter!)

To give some idea of the scale of the difference, it's roughly equivalent to 170 million barrels of oil for Germany in WW2 in that it's two years' supply.

 

[diestormlie]

I likely. Give moar!

 

[Saphroneth]

25 April

10:30

The Union attack steps off from the hedge line at 400 yards. British fire switches from sniping to a set of full volleys, aiming for the American troops in the main column (the one they can see), and delivers punishing fire - with around 400 British troops at what is fairly short range for them, they are causing around eighty casualties a minute on the American forces.
The Canadian milita contributes relatively little in terms of casualties, especially with the Union forces not presenting an easy mass target, but their morale effect is considerable - they are about 70% of the defending British force and their volleys are quite intimidating. The smoke they pump out is somewhat inimical to the general musketry accuracy, but with only an average of fifty shots a second along the entire front the result is less than what would be produced by a single British regiment of the Napoleonic era (and much more widely spread).
The American reaction to this rifle fire is complex - first the attacking troops accelerate, hunkering down as if leaning into a heavy rain in order to keep moving forwards. At around a hundred yards, however, their morale begins to waver, and they go to ground in whatever scant cover they can gain before engaging in a firefight.

Were this a simple attack, the results would be bloody indeed for the Union - while their weapons are mostly percussion muskets (with almost as many flintlocks as rifles) and loaded with buck and ball, more effective at short ranges like these, the casualties being inflicted are disproportionately in favour of the British. They are picking individual targets (and the Canadian militia are also firing effectively at this range) while the Union force is trying to rely on sheer volume of relatively unaimed fire. However, the saving grace for the Union force is their flank column attacks - relatively unmolested, these get close enough to force the British supports to engage them, and at this point the 31st battalion commander orders a retreat in good order.

The Union artillery is quick to shift fire to this target of opportunity, graced with a skilled commander, and the Napoleons send a considerable volume of fire at this distant target (~800 yards on average) before returning to bombarding the main British line at long range (~1,200 yards - at this range solid shot is relatively ineffective, so shrapnel shot is used as this will burst and give the lead balls an extra 'kick'. Explosive shells are also employed.)

11:00
Casualties have been tallied and the Union commander has some sense of how many casualties he has taken - counting KIA and WIA, the ten-minute engagement cost around 700 casualties, possibly more. There are only a few British or Canadian bodies left behind, but in fact at least 200 were wounded by the American buckshot - though not very seriously in many cases. (As a point of curiosity, one Canadian militiaman is killed by a ball fired from a flintlock Brown Bess musket - one captured from his own Grandfather at Fort Erie nearly fifty years ago.)
There were also perhaps fifty serious casualties caused by the artillery fire as the British/Canadian delaying force retreated.

After around half an hour of slow artillery fire, the ammunition load the Union force is provided with is getting a little low - they are not provided with a huge quantity of shells, with ball and canister making up a substantial fraction - and the main attack is under planning.

This is a tricky exercise. The British have a line of embrasures and small redoubts just short of the canal, made with logs and mounded earth, and have torn down the hedge line between the first two fields to the east of the canal. As such there is a field of fire about 800 yards long.
As against this, the long-range artillery fire has clearly done some damage to the redoubts, and the Union commander decides that the best approach would be to close the range as soon as possible - the rifle fire has him worried.
Accordingly, he assigns the entire force (less 1,000 infantry and the cavalry to serve as artillery guards, and the whole as a flank guard). There are thus about 15,000 American troops getting ready to attack.
Additionally, he has anyone who claims to be a skilled hunter issued with one of the ~200 Enfields he has captured. Their task will be to drop out of the attack force at longer range and deliver suppressive fire - which will be needed, as he has noticed that there are range posts in neat lines along the field.
The attack steps off at 11:15.




At about this time, a British battery of field guns (six 12-lber Armstrong guns) begins setting up further upslope. They are nearly 2,500 yards from the American attack and 2,300 yards from the American artillery - well out of range of the Napoleon smoothbores.

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

Seems it wil be a bloody day

 

[Saphroneth]

Seems it wil be a bloody day

Very much yes, I'm afraid.

...oh, wait, I missed a bit that got deleted when my draft did. Added in now:

As a point of curiosity, one Canadian militiaman is killed by a ball fired from a flintlock Brown Bess musket - one captured from his own Grandfather at Fort Erie nearly fifty years ago

 

[Saphroneth]

11:15

The American assault steps off in three waves of 5,000 troops, around 200 yards apart.
Almost as soon as the first troops emerge from the hedge line, British rifles start to fire from the parapets. The volume of fire is not high - only about half a battalion is firing total, all the 1st class shots and no-one else - but there are so many American troops that a surprisingly large number of balls hit at this range. The American force troops onwards, taking one or two hits every few seconds.
Some of the American colonels of volunteers notice an odd detail - one which takes only a short time to understand. There are ranging posts out in the field, at intervals of ~100 yards, and each time the American force crosses one of the lines of ranging posts it takes many more casualties than otherwise.
Still, the attrition is slow for the first few minutes as the first wave crosses 200 yards. Then, as they reach 600 yards, the British 2nd class shots open fire as well.

This leads to a jump in the amount of shots seen coming from the parapet, and also an initial pulse of casualties. Some of the Union attackers hesitate, but the formation as a whole keeps them going.
Around 150 casualties have occurred so far, around one third of them fatal (usually due to a minie ball dropping down onto a vulnerable head at a steep angle).

Meanwhile, some way off to the left, the American field gun battery is interrupted in its cannonade when two shells whizz overhead from their forward left. The British Armstrong battery has come into play, and it is firing ranging shots - at an extremely long range by American standards, indeed their first shoot lands almost half a mile 'long' as the British artillerymen have underestimated the effect of the slight rise of ground.
Another pair of shells comes some twelve seconds later, landing some way closer to the American gun battery. Fire is returned, but halted after a moment because the guns are simply unable to fire this far. Rather than simply allow himself to be shot to pieces - as he imagines will happen - the response by the US artillery commander is to have his cavalry close in from the flanks while he limbers up and disperses his gunline. Splitting into individual batteries will allow him to keep up the fire support mission, and his command battery will remain here.
Almost as soon as the limbering-up has concluded, however, the Armstrong guns get the range. Firing at maximum rate, the six guns put out a total of twenty-four shells (both shrapnel and contact) over the next minute, and while the later shells in the shoot are less accurate than the earlier ones it leaves half the command battery guns disabled, all but one out of action and dozens of gunners dead.

The other four Union batteries keep moving, preparing to deploy again, and about 1,000 Union cavalry begin moving upslope to get at the Armstrong guns.



11:21
The first wave Union attack is now about 350 yards from the British position, and has taken something like 500 serious casualties and as many again light wounds. This first wave is starting to slow, the effect of the fire producing a considerable morale effect, but it is at about this point that the order goes up for the Union sharpshooters to drop out of the advance and begin firing back.
This order is obeyed by considerably more troops than the ~180 who should be, as some of the laggards take the opportunity to take up a position of greater perceived safety, but the snap and crackle of Enfields heartens the attacking Union troops somewhat (and especially the second and third waves, who can see it). This fire also makes the British troops more circumspect, thus reducing their accuracy somewhat, and inflicts a few casualties.
However, it is only about thirty seconds later that the first wave Union attack reaches the 300-yard range posts. This is where not just the British 3rd class infantry but also the Canadian militia have been trained to shoot, and around 4,000 Enfields total fire as the Union force passes this range marker - as does the 9-lber smoothbore integrated into the defence, firing canister.
The results are extremely nasty. The British regulars are less accurate than they would be on a rifle range, and the Canadians less than them, but nevertheless around four hundred casualties (more fatal than before as the range drops) hit over the course of a second or two. This causes the Union force to shiver, before shouted exhortations push them on - and, indeed, cause them to break into a run.

11:25
The Union cavalry runs into a British squadron of the 18th Hussars. Over the next few minutes, both sides dismount and go to cover, and a firefight develops - one which goes far worse for the American force than they had expected, since the 18th Hussars are armed not with muzzle loading carbines but with the Terry, a rifled breechloading cavalry carbine capable of a heavy rate of fire and high accuracy out to at least 800 yards. The initial squadron encountered is ultimately pushed back with heavy losses on both sides, but when the rest of the 18th arrive they use half their men to pin the Union cavalry and put in a saber charge from the flanks; the Union's cavalry is thus essentially routed.

Meanwhile, the Armstrong guns switch fire to a third Union artillery battery. By now the American artillerymen are justifiably jumpy, and when the position is bracketed a few men leave their position without orders. They survive, though the explosion of a caisson means many of their comrades are not so lucky.

At about 120 yards from the British position, the first wave Union attack has lost momentum completely and gone to ground. They are taking heavy casualties, though are now at least at a range they can cause casualties of their own.
Many of the British 2 and 1 class shots have been redirected to fire on the second Union wave, which is itself being made bloody by this accurate rifle fire at about 300 yards. There are by now thousands of Union casualties on the field, and the British and Canadian fieldworks are becoming a major psychological obstacle to the remaining attackers.

11:35
The third wave goes to ground along with the first two, at about 100 yards from the British line. These are all brave men, but are not properly trained for the situation they face - indeed, by now many of those armed with Enfields have been shot and killed by the British defenders.
Some relief is given by the heavy smoke clouds produced by the Union fire (smoothbore buck and ball) which makes targeting harder, but with so many men in a small space some hits are inevitable.
Worse, the chain of command is now uncertain - the main Union commander has become a casualty of war, and this has not yet been worked out.
At this point upwards of 1,600 Union troops are dead or seriously wounded, with about 200-300 British and Canadian combined in the same condition (and the lightly wounded fraction of the British-Canadian troops larger, due to the high portion of buckshot aimed at them).

11:45
After ten to fifteen gruelling minutes of contact, some of them being shelled by the Armstrong pieces to their north, the Union attacking force finally breaks. It has taken over thirty percent casualties and is essentially no longer fit for combat.
British casualties are considerably lighter, but the ten minutes of small arms fire has cost them nevertheless - around 1,000 are dead or seriously injured. A full pursuit is considered impossible for this reason, though the 18th Hussars are already moving in from the north (and will be delayed some ten minutes by stubborn resistance from the one Union regiment deployed north as flank guard, though relatively few casualties are caused on the Hussars by this).

 

[Saphroneth]

As an aside about the Terry (more properly the Calisher and Terry), it's got a unique action the best term for which is probably "bolt action", though it did not prove capable of making the jump from combustible cartridges to metal ones.

The accuracy of the British shown is fairly accurate though on the low side (I used the Inkerman figure, which is around 300 yards, for most of the close in section of the fight), the accuracy of the Americans is significantly boosted (I basically assumed that buck-and-ball multiplied their accuracy by four and assumed that their 100 yard accuracy was the same as their 50 yard accuracy).

 

[RodentRevolution]

As an aside about the Terry (more properly the Calisher and Terry), it's got a unique action the best term for which is probably "bolt action", though it did not prove capable of making the jump from combustible cartridges to metal ones.

The odd detail that probably prevented the move to metallic cartridges was that the Calisher and Terry carbine detonated its cartridge from the centre (by length) rather than from the rear as seen with metallic cartridges.

An article that details the rather complex action can be found here

It has a lot of handy pictures if you scroll down towards the bottom

 

[Saphroneth]

Taking a plunge into the ORs, I found this:

To assist the struggling left, I had already detached Coffin, with
his two guns. He moved across the field to the left and rear, and
opened upon the enemy within 300 yards. Here he remained, doing
signal execution, until be also exhausted his ammunition and withdrew.

And this:

Report of Maj. B. W. Frobel, C. S. Army, Chief of Artillery, of the battle
of Sharjpsburg.
OCTOBER 1, 1862.
CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders to report the participation of the
batteries under my command in the recent engagements-before Sharps-
burg, I would respectfully submit the following:
After bringing np the rear on the march from Boonsborough, Captains
iReillys and Bachmans batteries were placed in position by Colonel
Walton, about noon on Monday, September 15, on a hill to the right
of the turnpike road and a short distance in front of Sharpsburg, 0-ar-
dens 1)attery being held in reserve, in case the enemy should attempt
an advance by a bridge over the Antietam, still farther to the right.
We held these positions on.Monday night. On Tuesday a fierce can-
nonade was kept up between our batteries and those of the enemy, in
which Captain Reilly was ordered by Colonel Walton to participate
until his rifle ammunition was exhausted, but without any perceptible
result. Bachmans battery was at the same time exposed to a heavy
fire, but had orders not to reply. Tuesday night we occupied the same
positions.
On Wednesday morning the battle was again renewed. Captain Reilly
was sent to the rear to replenish, if possible, his exhausted ammunition.
At 8 a. m. Captain Bachman, with a section of Napoleon guns, was or-
dered to proceed to the extreme left of our line and report to General
Longstreet. Shortly after, he was placed in position in a corn-field and
opened on the enemy, distance 150 yards. The position was exposed
to the fire of the enemys sharpshooters, who occupied a wood not more
than 50 yards off. In a few minutes the section lost 3 men wounded (2
mortally) and 6 horses killed. Finding that to continue longer would
involve the loss of his guns, Captain Bachman withdrew to a hill near
by, and reported the section disabled, on account of the loss of men and
horses.

Both of these are from Sharpsburg/Antietam, and they're really, really bad. I mean, awful - both in the use of artillery and what they reveal about the use of infantry.

Firstly, the artillery which shoots its ammunition dry at 300 yards. Against the British they'd have died in about two or three volleys - that's short range for a Baker rifle, let alone an Enfield. (Sharpe would have been disappointed.)

Secondly, the artillery which takes about one casualty a minute against sharpshooters fifty yards away. For reference, that's short smoothbore volley range.

And remember, this is October 1862. The battles in this TL are happening months earlier!

 

[Saphroneth]

25 April
Afternoon

Over the next few hours, a complicated retreat takes place towards the east. Around four thousand Union troops are captured, though the majority of the Union assaulting troops actually make it across the Niagara river and back to the United States.
Their guns are all captured, but the British commander does not press his advantage - fearing that the same will happen to him in turn if he attempts a major advance.

He is initially praised for his defence of the Welland canal, but as the details of the battle become clear this turns to a very mixed opinion. His tactics are decried as passive, and the possible great victory that could have been won is seen as lost. It is considered particularly poor that only about one third of his force was engaged.


26 April
Two British ironclads, Leo and Sagittarius, transit the Welland canal. They will be employed in wresting control of the upper lakes from the Union, which will prove especially important as there are ships being constructed at Erie (Presque Isle from the last war). They will be joined as soon as possible by Libra, Scorpio and Pisces (now in transit from Britain).
Also on this date, a Confederate probing attack marches down the Rockville Turnpike. They make it through the fort ring (there is dead ground around the turnpike, and Fort Kearny is no more than a construction site) and Meade, now in charge of defending the Capital, deploys much of his reserve to defend Rock Creek.

27 April
Further Confederate forces are marching through the Rockville gap. Meade is ordered to repulse them, as by now some 24-lbers (naval guns taken from Norfolk Naval Yard, forming part of the CSA siege train) are firing into Fort Reno and Fort DeRussey from the less-protected Washington side.
Preparations for the attack will take until the 28th April.
At four in the afternoon of this date, McClellan's army launches an attack towards Confederate communications in the area of Bethesda. Much of the CS army in this area has been drawn off to reinforce the penetration of the DC fort ring, but McClellan has the misfortune to attack while further siege guns are being moved forwards - his troops come under a deadly crossfire from a dozen 32-lbers firing cannister and grape, and the assault bogs down.
McClellan decides to attempt normal approaches (essentially siege operations) in order to get his Parrott guns close enough to neutralize the 32-lbers with counter battery fire.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hm...

At this point the Union has critical force allocation problems. They haven't got as many men facing the Confederates as the CSA has facing them, because large numbers of troops are tied up facing the British - and because the CSA are recruiting heavily and taking advantage of access to the European market, so they're actually getting the better rifles this time.

So, try and picture the situation - you're Governor of Michigan. You've just heard of the Niagara battle, you're not sure the size of the Imperial force on the other side of the Detroit River in Windsor but you know it's roughly equal in size to the troops you have defending Detroit (if not larger) and then the order comes that you have to give up half the army defending Detroit (i.e. 10,000 infantry) and as many again from the Lower Peninsula, in order to reinforce McClellan and the armies holding the southern frontier.

What's your reaction going to be?

The same if you're Governor of NY, and asked for 10,000 to 15,000.

Doing all this would, if possible, mean about 40,000 extra troops - which might well manage to tip the balance in Maryland and Kentucky. But it would mean trying to face down the British with something like 40% of their number.



...anyway, I'm considering an attack on Presqe Isle bay at some point, featuring light-armoured American steamers and some defensive guns versus the Zodiacs. No gunboat support this time, which means the American craft are considerably more manoeuvrable.

 

[Saphroneth]

Further to the force allocation problem, this post (Robcraufurd guest post on 67th tigers' blog)
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/guest-post-rifles-trade-and-blockade_21.html
shows just how bad it is.


For the purposes of this TL, I will assume that Springfield converted with great efficiency back to trip-hammers, thus maximizing the output of their foundry in the absence of strategic materials, and that this nevertheless resulted in the loss of about two months' production by 30 June 1862. (- ~15,000 weapons) and that about half of the gun barrels shipped can be reproduced domestically. (- ~25,000 weapons). I'll also assume that what weapons make it through the blockade compensate for the loss of foreign-produced smoothbores with 40,000 surplus, and that the average state was equipped as well as the average of the seven states for which we have data - that is, as the average of NY, OH, MA, IA, NJ, ME and WI.

Based on these assumptions we end up with a shortfall of 500,000 weapons over OTL on 30 June 1862; this means that the front line strength of the Union's armies absent disarming the militia is 200,000 below requirement, once the 300,000 weapons in Federal armouries are all issued.
I do not think the Union had 200,000 armed militia in 1862 who were not required for at least something. Thus, the Union's front line strength as of 30 June 1862 in this TL is lower than the OTL even without further military casualties (of which the loss of shoulder arms are the most important - the capture early on of about 30,000 troops is not so important as the loss of their weapons).

This - coupled with the way the CSA can import many more weapons than OTL - is why the Union army is in trouble everywhere in this TL. It's got troops with much worse morale, less well armed, in smaller numbers, and trying to do much more.

Rather more worryingly, since the militia now does not exist as anything coherent (or armed) it means that there is almost no way to quickly put together a blocking force or reinforce an army that is defeated - or to block an army which bypasses a blocking point.
This raises the image of a Union army being defeated, and then having to fight a few days later with no real replacements or reinforcements - the same people are being put into the battle again.

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, I'm planning a naval battle on the Lakes... what do you think the Union commander will do here? He's got about a day's warning in advance of the battle (midday on the 28th) and the weather is blustery but not severe.

Spoiler

28 April

The Leo and Sagittarius close in on Presque Isle Bay and on Erie, Pennsylvania. This anchorage was the major construction centre in the War of 1812, and a number of small ironclads are being built here - two modified Casco class, one modified Passaic and one broadside ironclad, with the broadside vessel around two weeks from launching and the modified Casco monitors awaiting casing - with several lake ships undergoing conversion to armed vessels (gunboats, essentially) and five already back in the water, along with one heavier vessel (the Lawrence). There are also hasty earthworks set up to cover the entrance to the bay, holding a total of a dozen 32-lbers and six 8" and two 11" guns.

The Lawrence is a converted dispatch vessel, and mounts four 10-inch guns and eight 6.4" Parrott rifles - which have been provided with wrought iron bolts - as well as a dozen 32-lbers. She is supported by the Somers, Porcupine, Hunter and Chippeway, all paddle wheelers with two 8" pivot guns, and the screw Mary Todd with twelve 32-lbers.


This appearance of British ironclads was a surprise to the Union garrison commander, who considered both retreating past the bar and sallying out.