According to 'Narratives of Shipwrecks of the Royal Navy between 1793 and 1849' (from Project Gutenberg), the Royal Navy lost 31 ships through non-combat causes in the American theatre during the War of 1812. Of these, 14 went down off Canada; one off New York; one off Florida; one off Virginia; and 14 in the West Indies. These represent all causes, not just overwhelmed by the weather, so that the 14 ships in Canada include ships which sank coming into harbour (HMS Avenger), ships which the pilots ran aground (HMS Fantome), and ships which wrecked on sunken rocks (HMS Laurel). All in all, it doesn't seem like the weather was a particular hindrance in conducting the blockade- any more than the supply of coal would be.
If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)
- Thread starter Saphroneth
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those are hardly light losses when you consider that the RN had between 100-200 ships in theater at any time (depending on which year and what the British were doing)
So sure, the blockade can be done, but it won't exactly be cheap
Saphroneth
Banned
Three ships were lost off the US coast total, meaning in the actual execution of the blockade. That's one ship per year - and, well, it's worth noting that a substantial number of the ships actually in theater for this war would have been in theater anyway. They're the same ships that were on the NA&WI station, reinforced by another 40-50 or so ships.
So, six months into the war, nothing should have been lost yet; since I didn't butterfly away the loss of the Conqueror then things are pretty much as normal. When you factor in that steam ships can ride out the waves better than non-steam ships, the RN shouldn't have to fear storm activity overmuch, and since the rest of the going into or out of port is normal ship activity these vessels (on the NA&WI) would have been doing in peace as well as in war, there's no particular reason the blockade should lead to a loss of ships sufficient to impair its execution.
In the interests of a full and accurate portrayal, I might include some weather damage, along with a loss to a hurricane if the war continues. But it's unlikely to change the course of events.
Is this really your best argument? (If it is then... that's not very impressive.)
See, if I were making an argument like this, I'd rattle off all the US ships lost on blockade duty due to the weather. Assuming there were a large number of them (as would have to be the case for me to make the argument) then I'd then try to show that modern vessels of the type used by the RN were vulnerable.
But, again - cite your best argument, and say it's your best, so we can see what your most airtight argument against this TL is.
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making the point that the RN will find operations off the North American Atlantic coast expensive is hardly my only argument, nor has it been. 31 Ships in roughly 3 years, including the Caribbean (which would be a war zone in this conflict) and the Canadian approaches (the primary base area) works out to 10 ships a year more or less out of a force of 100-200 ships deployed. Which is 5%-10% loss rate to operational causes, not including combat losses. This is not crippling, but it is expensive.
It goes to the point that naval operations in general are going to be expensive and thus by themselves make this an expensive war that will causes some political issues back home in Parliament. Particularly as there is domestic opposition to such a thing in Britain itself.
As to other arguments. Just because you ignored me for a year doesn't make it my burden to repost literally dozens of posts on this topic (Anglo-American warfare mid to late 19th Century). You want to see them, feel free to look. It is a simple matter to examine some ones post history.
Major issues of concern are as follows: (in summary)
1. The speed that you have major forces moving against the United States from a crisis that developed November 8, 1861. There are time frames needed to make decisions, deliver orders, assemble forces which includes the movement of forces into position (even ships take time to assemble into a fleet), working up time (typically commanders work up their crews to develop a collection of ships into a unified combat force) and you have operations beginning on January 29 with the arrival of a British squadron off Norfolk. About 7 weeks. That seems inordinately quick.
During the Crimean War, the Allies assembled their fleets in Turkish waters in June 1853 after deciding on action in April 1853, and this with a much larger immediately available force (the British Med Fleet and French Med Fleet) in a area considered of vital interest. (a few weeks longer). Note that this was in spring and summer and in a much milder sea. The North Atlantic in winter is enough to give pause to mariners NOW, so I very much doubt that a British Admiral is going to launch any substantial campaign before spring. Which is basically April. Look at historical operations in this theater from previous wars, they were not as a general rule conducted in winter.
2. Your assumptions of American action seem flawed. If it is clear that the British are going to intervene, why is it assumed that the US Navy is not going to be recalled from blockade stations and assembled or sent out to sea based on plans that literally go back to the 1820s. Why is it assumed that the Americans would not take steps to reduce their vulnerabilities (scattered forces) and not send out raiders in case crisis becomes war?
3. Most arms orders from Europe were placed in early 1861 and arrived by the summer and fall of 1861, predating events here. While the British would indeed cease arms deliveries after November 1861, until they declare blockade, a formal act of war, why would arms deliveries cease until that event from other suppliers (which include Austria and various German states as well of course as Britain).
4. Why would Lincoln not order a general re examination of general strategy with the British entry? Why assume that Stanton (who isn't in Sec of War until January 1862) and his public pronouncements are general US policy? The US Army does have prudent commanders... including McClellan who if anything would be urging a strategic defensive until the US had more troops available. That same general would be indeed urging the US to strengthen its defenses and while in OTL those defensive measures were a relative low priority for much of the war, this would radically change if there is a real likelihood of crisis becoming war. In OTL McClellan has been accused of taking council in his fears for much of his active career as commander. This would seem far more likely in this situation, and diverting troops to guard the major ports and the Canadian border between the Great Lakes and Atlantic would be a certain first step. If nothing else the Governors and Congressional delegations in four states would be demanding it. So no Pennisular campaign would even be contemplated of course, and the hundreds of ships and thousands of wagons needed for that campaign (and the cause of the delays, not the lack of troops) are of no issue. Also remember Lee is not in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, Joseph E Johnston (a far more cautious and defense minded general) is.
5. There are dozens of shipyards on the Great Lakes some of which can build gunboats and even larger ships for operations there. The Lakes are literally frozen over between November and March of each year, with the exact dates varying each year of course. So of course is the St Lawrence River. There will not be any British gunboats transferred by water in that circumstance, while there is plenty of time to build a very large force of American ships to deal with such. Conversions of the existing very large American Great Lakes merchant marine which has numerous steam powered ships into gunboats, much as the 90 Day wonder gunboats for blockade duty in OTL, seems like a given. Then of course the Eads gunboats, built in Missouri, and who saw action in February 1862, could also have been built in quantity on the Great Lakes in a similar length of time (ordered August 1861, commissioned January 1862, first combat use February 1862). This would seem to imply that the US Navy has a major advantage in the inland seas that are known as the Great Lakes.
6. We have discussed elsewhere at length the terrain found along the border between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic. Most of it is either mountains or heavily wooded hills with few roads and only one rail line (from Portland to Canada) and while the Canadian communications are relatively few in terms of what is present and not much better in terms of capacity, the US has a massive advantage in terms of railroads connecting its likely primary base of operations at Detroit as well of course any campaign areas in upper New York State and Maine. The existence of already large forces in the Midwest means that concentrating forces to conduct offensive operations into the direction of York / Ontario favor logistically the US. Defending in the East and sea shore while attacking in the West is a viable strategy and one that according to at least two works of fiction seems the likely course. There is also the matter of an entire corps that was historically sent to garrison New Orleans that would still be in New England at this point, plus forces that were sent to garrison bases taken in North Carolina and South Carolina in 1862 (basically a field army altogether)
7. The political situation matters. The South wants Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri (not to mention New Mexico and points west), but after March 1862 there was never going to be a Confederate conquest of Missouri, Kentucky has been mostly secured and Maryland is the only potential possible area where the Confederacy might be successful. The Rebels have been defeated in March 1862 in New Mexico too and we have not had the really big battles like Shiloh yet. If the British, historical enemies, attack the United States (which is how Americans would see it) there would indeed be considerably more political support for Lincoln..
8. Defending DC. Already Washington has been made into a pretty powerful fortress that cannot be stormed without an atrocious price. While a blockade would hurt logistics, particularly in suppling the city, the garrison and the Army of the Potomac, a look at the railroads shows that pulling the Army of the Potomac back to Pennsylvania uses differed rail lines and puts it closer to its bases, while allowing sufficient track and capacity to keep DC and its garrison supplied. It also means that the Army of the Potomac can threaten any move by the Army of Northern Virginia to attack DC or Baltimore while screening Pennyslvania.
So how is that for starters? All of these have been pointed out repeatedly in other threads throughout the last two years. Feel free to look at the arguments and the responses. They are valid questions.
Bottom line, I feel that you have portrayed what would almost certainly be a massive total war into a "Splendid Little War" not much different than Crimea when the situation and theater of operations are more complex, and you are assuming that the United States would be as ineffectual in reaction as the British are in Harrison's books. There are reasons that the United States successfully fought the American Revolution and there are reasons that the British could not reconquer the United States nor even achieve much in terms of territorial gain in the War of 1812. I think you are glossing over those reasons substantially.
As to tactics, battles and the relative merits of superior British training vs American willingness to adapt and learn, I mentioned those in the "1860s War thread". But I think the general strategic issues are pretty well addressed above.
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Saphroneth
Banned
Let's see...
All the ships in the British squadron off Norfolk were already in the Americas as of the Trent affair, with the exception of those which OTL were sent as reinforcements. They're all in the NA&WI Squadron, so don't need to cross the Atlantic; their times of arrival at Bermuda are as OTL; thus, they could turn up off Norfolk at the time I have them doing it.
War warning as per plans, 8 Jan, Bermuda. Milne orders concentration.
9 Jan, War declared.
20 Jan, war confirmation arrives at Bermuda.
21 Jan, US gets confirmation that war is declared.
25 Jan, Milne sets sail from Bermuda.
Hero, Donegal, Agamemnon, Aboukir, Immortalite, Melopmene, Liffey, Spiteful, Rinaldo, Medea, Cygnet and Racer were all NA&WI squadron - it's only a matter of getting the go-ahead and moving them from Bermuda.
Note that Milne had over two weeks to plan and prepare in the certain knowledge war was coming, which is on top of having been planning since mid-November. The last ship he takes with him, Aboukir, only arrived the previous day, but it's him deciding to move quickly precisely so that he can throw off the Union's timetable. (Note that I specifically exclude the Terror, which could probably have done the job by herself.)
Also, it's not seven weeks - it's actually twelve. (7 Nov 1861 - 29 Jan 1862 is 83 days.) For it to be seven weeks from 29 Jan 1862 the incident would have to be 11 Dec 1861, which is two weeks after the news arrived in Britain!
It's not clear the British are going to intervene until the marked PoD, or a few days after - you may note that the US Navy is recalled from blockade stations, but the dispatch vessel sent to the Gulf is intercepted. The US Navy in the southern part of the Eastern Seaboard recalls to Port Royal and then sails north, however this change in posture takes significant time to recall all the blockaders. Some of them go out to sea, others escort the troops back from Port Royal. Many of the modern ships make it to NY.
As for whether the USN would send out raiders or not, I was not sure of the USN's actions. Either way, it would not substantially alter the events of the coastal attacks (apart from making them easier) if the USN's ships went out raiding, and the important convoys were all well defended - usually with a frigate or corvette.
The efficiency of the US's ships doing commerce raiding would be quite poor - they don't have anywhere to recoal and are not very fast vessels anyway. They'd be quickly reduced to sail.
As an aside, I find it quite amazing you criticize the British taking only twelve weeks to go from incident to action, while by this standard the US Navy shouldn't be reacting until mid-April! (the time of the PoD). As it is they send out a steamer literally the day after they hear of the declaration of war (the 22nd), and the Port Royal force has evacuated by the 16th Feb. This means it took them three and a half weeks to concentrate the entire Atlantic Blockading squadron and execute the move of 16,000 soldiers plus an entire naval base's personnel.
For more information I suggest the essay by robcraufurd:
EDITED to remove link to banned member's blog.
Essay posted on this site, starts here:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/1860s-army-comparison.394227/page-17#post-13008535
That's what they do in this TL. They shut down all offensive operations and divert troops to the northern frontier and to the eastern ports. This is why the British don't actually invade and destroy e.g. DuPont's powder mills, but it also means that offensives of early 1862 simply do not take place. This is a diversion of roughly 150,000 troops and everyone in training!
As for strengthening the defences, they also do this - in many cases I essentially grant the Union weapons they simply did not have OTL (e.g. fort guns). Boston OTL was defended by one condemned gun, but TTL they're fully stocked - the guns have to come from somewhere, but here I assume they were just found without harming the Union war effort elsewhere.
If you look back over the TL, you will see that I had the British ironclads transit up at the time of breakup on the St Lawrence - I know the place was frozen over.
As for the mention of the Eads gunboats, you are doubtless aware that a gunboat taking from August 1861 to Feb 1862 ordered at the time of the PoD would not be completing until June 1862. (The same applies to the 90 day gunboats - since no orders took place OTL, no orders take place in advance of the PoD and the 90-day gunboats would be completing early April at the earliest, and indeed unarmoured gunboats are shown on the Lakes. They're just defeated by the British ironclads.)
If you mean that the US would go on the offensive in the west of Canada, while this is somewhat plausible it would mean the US would be beginning their preparations at (or after) the PoD while the British had already been planning defence and training troops for a month and a half. It's possible some small success could have resulted, but TTL I've had them instead focus on defence for the simple reason they can't find the troops for an offensive in the west - they've had to remove approximately 150,000 men from the southern frontier just to hold a defensive on the eastern coast and northern frontier, with no weapons to increase their numbers, and as such to allocate the troops to attack in the west they'd need to strip somewhere important of defences. (Well, somewhere else important.)
As for political support for Lincoln, OTL the threat of war with Britain resulted in a run on the banks. You'll note that I've had nobody complaining about Lincoln's actions except for a noted Confederate sympathizer!
There's a reason that I had the Confederate armies - swollen considerably by absorbing troops formerly defending the CSA's coast - attack where I did. OTL the turnpike road was masked from any defending forts until one was built there to protect it well after the PoD - thus the Confederates largely bypass the fort ring. (It's a ring of forts, not a single continuous one, and as such has gaps in it - the Confederacy found one of the gaps.)
The Army of the Potomac is not in a fit state to intervene as it has fought several battles against the Confederacy, but the poor state of their weapons (see above about one third of the troops not having weapons able to be used well in the field; this is not corrected as it was OTL) and their numbers problem spell defeat. McClellan has another attempt at interfering but this also does not work; since then he's been trying to rebuild the Army of the Potomac to the point it can actually fight, and that's taken us up to the end of May.
So...
Some of these are cogent points, but in many cases I've already addressed them in the TL. Others assume things which are not the case either TTL or OTL, or seem to ignore the OTL British reaction to Trent (and the lack on the part of the Union), and perhaps the most peculiar is why you ask why the Union doesn't go on a defensive posture when that's exactly what they do.
I'm also extremely disappointed you didn't highlight one as your strongest, despite my repeated requests - I'm sure you'll pick whichever one you felt was insufficiently countered and call that your strongest retroactively, which is rather bad form.
In any case, I hope I've addressed most of these. Our biggest point of lack of agreement is probably the shoulder arm issue, and on that I'm confident I have the right of it - the combination of the Union asking for no more troops in Dec 1861 and the Union having something like 300,000 spare shoulder arms in early 1862 (with about 100,000 or more issued in the intervening six months) seems conclusive to me.
All the ships in the British squadron off Norfolk were already in the Americas as of the Trent affair, with the exception of those which OTL were sent as reinforcements. They're all in the NA&WI Squadron, so don't need to cross the Atlantic; their times of arrival at Bermuda are as OTL; thus, they could turn up off Norfolk at the time I have them doing it.
War warning as per plans, 8 Jan, Bermuda. Milne orders concentration.
9 Jan, War declared.
20 Jan, war confirmation arrives at Bermuda.
21 Jan, US gets confirmation that war is declared.
25 Jan, Milne sets sail from Bermuda.
Hero, Donegal, Agamemnon, Aboukir, Immortalite, Melopmene, Liffey, Spiteful, Rinaldo, Medea, Cygnet and Racer were all NA&WI squadron - it's only a matter of getting the go-ahead and moving them from Bermuda.
Note that Milne had over two weeks to plan and prepare in the certain knowledge war was coming, which is on top of having been planning since mid-November. The last ship he takes with him, Aboukir, only arrived the previous day, but it's him deciding to move quickly precisely so that he can throw off the Union's timetable. (Note that I specifically exclude the Terror, which could probably have done the job by herself.)
Also, it's not seven weeks - it's actually twelve. (7 Nov 1861 - 29 Jan 1862 is 83 days.) For it to be seven weeks from 29 Jan 1862 the incident would have to be 11 Dec 1861, which is two weeks after the news arrived in Britain!
Your picture of the Crimean War is quite unusual as war had not been declared at that point; indeed, Sinope was not for several months. April to June is also between one and three months, so at the most it's one week longer and on average should be a couple of weeks shorter. In any case, deploying as allies for the first time in decades is different from deploying unilaterally for the third time in one decade, and the British had a large fleet already on station in American waters.
It's not clear the British are going to intervene until the marked PoD, or a few days after - you may note that the US Navy is recalled from blockade stations, but the dispatch vessel sent to the Gulf is intercepted. The US Navy in the southern part of the Eastern Seaboard recalls to Port Royal and then sails north, however this change in posture takes significant time to recall all the blockaders. Some of them go out to sea, others escort the troops back from Port Royal. Many of the modern ships make it to NY.
As for whether the USN would send out raiders or not, I was not sure of the USN's actions. Either way, it would not substantially alter the events of the coastal attacks (apart from making them easier) if the USN's ships went out raiding, and the important convoys were all well defended - usually with a frigate or corvette.
The efficiency of the US's ships doing commerce raiding would be quite poor - they don't have anywhere to recoal and are not very fast vessels anyway. They'd be quickly reduced to sail.
As an aside, I find it quite amazing you criticize the British taking only twelve weeks to go from incident to action, while by this standard the US Navy shouldn't be reacting until mid-April! (the time of the PoD). As it is they send out a steamer literally the day after they hear of the declaration of war (the 22nd), and the Port Royal force has evacuated by the 16th Feb. This means it took them three and a half weeks to concentrate the entire Atlantic Blockading squadron and execute the move of 16,000 soldiers plus an entire naval base's personnel.
Please cite the timing of the arrival of these arms orders from Europe - not just conjecture, but actual details. It's worth noting that the Federal government had no spare weapons to give in December 1861 (instructing no more regiments were to be raised until asked for for want of shoulder arms) while the Federal government in June 1862 had 300,000 weapons spare; this indicates substantially over 300,000 of the ~600,000 weapons ordered arrived between December 1861 and June 1862. We also know that the British deliveries (to name but one) were almost entirely in 1862:
For more information I suggest the essay by robcraufurd:
EDITED to remove link to banned member's blog.
Essay posted on this site, starts here:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/1860s-army-comparison.394227/page-17#post-13008535
That's what they do in this TL. They shut down all offensive operations and divert troops to the northern frontier and to the eastern ports. This is why the British don't actually invade and destroy e.g. DuPont's powder mills, but it also means that offensives of early 1862 simply do not take place. This is a diversion of roughly 150,000 troops and everyone in training!
As for strengthening the defences, they also do this - in many cases I essentially grant the Union weapons they simply did not have OTL (e.g. fort guns). Boston OTL was defended by one condemned gun, but TTL they're fully stocked - the guns have to come from somewhere, but here I assume they were just found without harming the Union war effort elsewhere.
If you look back over the TL, you will see that I had the British ironclads transit up at the time of breakup on the St Lawrence - I know the place was frozen over.
As for the mention of the Eads gunboats, you are doubtless aware that a gunboat taking from August 1861 to Feb 1862 ordered at the time of the PoD would not be completing until June 1862. (The same applies to the 90 day gunboats - since no orders took place OTL, no orders take place in advance of the PoD and the 90-day gunboats would be completing early April at the earliest, and indeed unarmoured gunboats are shown on the Lakes. They're just defeated by the British ironclads.)
If you mean that the US would go on the offensive in the west of Canada, while this is somewhat plausible it would mean the US would be beginning their preparations at (or after) the PoD while the British had already been planning defence and training troops for a month and a half. It's possible some small success could have resulted, but TTL I've had them instead focus on defence for the simple reason they can't find the troops for an offensive in the west - they've had to remove approximately 150,000 men from the southern frontier just to hold a defensive on the eastern coast and northern frontier, with no weapons to increase their numbers, and as such to allocate the troops to attack in the west they'd need to strip somewhere important of defences. (Well, somewhere else important.)
But the Confederacy being beaten 'after March 1862' assumes the Union offensives of early 1862 happen. You earlier noted that the Union would not be going on the offensive in early 1862 and I concurred; thus I'm not sure why you suddenly have them happening again. As a consequence your point about Missouri and Kentucky - as well as New Mexico - is invalid.
As for political support for Lincoln, OTL the threat of war with Britain resulted in a run on the banks. You'll note that I've had nobody complaining about Lincoln's actions except for a noted Confederate sympathizer!
There's a reason that I had the Confederate armies - swollen considerably by absorbing troops formerly defending the CSA's coast - attack where I did. OTL the turnpike road was masked from any defending forts until one was built there to protect it well after the PoD - thus the Confederates largely bypass the fort ring. (It's a ring of forts, not a single continuous one, and as such has gaps in it - the Confederacy found one of the gaps.)
The Army of the Potomac is not in a fit state to intervene as it has fought several battles against the Confederacy, but the poor state of their weapons (see above about one third of the troops not having weapons able to be used well in the field; this is not corrected as it was OTL) and their numbers problem spell defeat. McClellan has another attempt at interfering but this also does not work; since then he's been trying to rebuild the Army of the Potomac to the point it can actually fight, and that's taken us up to the end of May.
So...
Some of these are cogent points, but in many cases I've already addressed them in the TL. Others assume things which are not the case either TTL or OTL, or seem to ignore the OTL British reaction to Trent (and the lack on the part of the Union), and perhaps the most peculiar is why you ask why the Union doesn't go on a defensive posture when that's exactly what they do.
I'm also extremely disappointed you didn't highlight one as your strongest, despite my repeated requests - I'm sure you'll pick whichever one you felt was insufficiently countered and call that your strongest retroactively, which is rather bad form.
In any case, I hope I've addressed most of these. Our biggest point of lack of agreement is probably the shoulder arm issue, and on that I'm confident I have the right of it - the combination of the Union asking for no more troops in Dec 1861 and the Union having something like 300,000 spare shoulder arms in early 1862 (with about 100,000 or more issued in the intervening six months) seems conclusive to me.
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regarding weapons, what was American production during this period.... I have posted links regarding total production before, but have yet to find one with specific monthly production. Do you have such figures? If not, we are both guessing, with your guess implying heavier British imports on the Union end than may or may not be known. Do you have the specifics on what was sent to the US vs the CSA, as the sources I have seen simply indicate total used in the war and thus exported by the British
Regarding luck... it does make it easier when deus ex machina prevents intelligent reaction by the enemy, such as intercepting the only dispatch ship sent to the Gulf Squadron (when ships were routinely going to Pensacola and Key West to refuel)
Regarding numbers, the Union is gaining pretty much the same number of troops by the cancellation of amphibious operations as the CSA is. Which means they are available elsewhere. There are armies available that have not yet been committed to action in the West.. Grants, Rosecrans for starters. Neither are needed in Missouri, one is sufficient to hold Kentucky (as Albert Johnson stripped many of these troops you state are available to fight his Shiloh battle), so that leaves immediately available a field army for operations out of Detroit, which is extremely well served by Railroads.
You haven't addressed the Great Lakes issues I mentioned at all... and yes it literally took only a few weeks to build the Eads Ironclads, which are going to be pretty dangerous in the Great Lakes and could easily be built just about anywhere (they were after all in OTL build on the banks of the Mississippi River).
Your choice of an operational plan by the CSA is predicated on Union incompetence. While I am far from a fan of McClellan (see the takes council in his fears mention), he was able to act reasonably effectively against Joseph E Johnson. So again, deus ex machina
Regarding time frames, you seem to assume that the United States in this situation, in a crisis leading to war, takes no effective action and has no effective warning by Adams (one of the best diplomats in US history) that the British are literally coming. Thus you presume no action by the United States in the intervening time, which again seems arbitrary. If war is reasonably certain, the Eads ironclads could be built from scratch by mid spring assuming a January start date, while conversion of merchant ships, which are basically docked for the winter on the Lakes, is a far easier and quicker matter.
I don't have specific single point argument... my argument is that the overall picture of the conflict you are proposing is complex and aside from its fictional nature (as it obviously never happened), is still subject to strategic realities governing such a conflict. You are putting your hand on the scales because you are certain that there is no way the Union can win. Your post history for two years makes that clear, so your lack of objectivity on the matter is clear. I have no obligation to argue and debate according to the rules you set down, not that I ever did, and frankly I am done with this. I have other things to do, other projects of more interest for now.
I have raised my concerns, pointed out where I think the weaknesses in this story are, and let the reader decide.
Saphroneth
Banned
Well, we happen to know the total number of US weapons produced as of 30 June 1862, and we also know that they used British steel in the manufacturing process.
We also know the total Federal imports as of 30 June 1862.
Procurements:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...3&node=waro0123:4&view=image&seq=867&size=100
+ 109,000 manufactured at Springfield.
Given that Federal production was largely dependent on British steel:
Weapons produced domestically = 140,000, of which at least 109,000 used British steel.
Weapons procured from overseas = 726,000.
Thus, of the 865,000 rifles procured, only about 30,000 of them were from a supply chain completely bereft of British or foreign components. That I have the Union suffering from a shortfall of 500,000 over OTL actually suggests the Union has obtained 335,000 rifles or smoothbores through or before the blockade!
The commesurate screw up by the British is that they completely miss the port in which Galena is being constructed - without that the British would have made a clean sweep.
No, they're not getting that many troops by cancelling amphibious operations because the Confederacy had far more troops defending the coast in early 1862 than the Union had in actual positions on the coast, and the Union doesn't get back most of the troops because they end up captured.
And I was counting those armies you cite as being "in Kentucky" or the like. They're part of what has to be stripped to allow for troops on the borders.
It did not literally take only a few weeks - it took several months. Cairo went from Aug 1861 to Jan 25 1862, which is roughly 17-18 weeks - this is not a 'few'.
As for general Great Lakes ship construction and conversion, I actually have that going on, but the British ironclads get there before the Union has a fleet able to destroy ironclads.
Um, it's to attack all along the frontier because the Union can't defend everywhere. Simple enough. The Union's not incompetent here, it's just got too many things to do with too few troops!
I assume the United States starts working as of the PoD. This is frankly generous because they had essentially no plans OTL - you're of course at liberty to cite examples of Union plans well advanced to put ships on the lakes, but absent that they have to scramble.
The PoD is that the Union does not agree a climb down, after all.
If by intervening time you mean the time between the Union not climbing down and the British declaring war, this is false. The Union is already ordering more ironclads before the British declaration has crossed the Atlantic.
As for "mid spring", correct in that they would be completing around mid-May. But by then the British have ironclads already on the lakes - note that the Zodiacs destroy a Union base on the lakes around this time.
anything from a peer reviewed scholarly work, or for that matter a popular history book? Because while emphatic in his beliefs and assertions (that you share), he has not published or even self published either of those things.
and what is your source regarding the use of British steel? Was it a matter of convenience or shortage of American steel? Was it because British steel was cheaper or that American steel was not available. These are reasonable questions that should be addressed. We do know that the United States produced overwhelmingly its own weapons, particularly after the initial mobilization period (the first year) As to ironclads, this was due to expected issues dealing with the Confederacy. Where any of these specifically ordered for a war with the British? If not, and the answer is for the most part, no, how many more could have been produced on a crash basis? Quibbling over the definition of 'few' is silly so I will skip that one, bottom line 17-18 weeks to build a warship which, along with its sisters, was a decisive weapon in the war in the West is still pretty damned quick wouldn't you say?
Sorry, New Orleans hasn't happened yet in January 1862 (it happened in April), nor has New Bern (same time period) which is the first sizeable land attack (previous battles were a handful of regiments, New Bern was a division sized action). So those troops are still in the Northeast, while evacuating hurriedly the North Carolina and South Carolina barrier islands that have been seized is a relatively simple matter with existing shipping. Painful in terms of losing the blockade but likely not that costly when a sensible American reaction is factored in. This in short means that roughly two corps of troops are not in the South when the British show up in your timeline, and in a more reasonable one, would still not have been sent
Regarding Missouri and New Mexico... those campaigns were decided by existing local forces, both volunteers and regulars, and did not require substantial reinforcement from the East, nor in the case of New Mexico, were California forces even out of Arizona by the time the campaign was decided. The POD would likely little effect either situation.
You asked for my criticism, so there you go.... there is far more of course, but that is the basics of it. You are writing a British wank. That's fine, there are of course plenty of America wanks on this forum. I all ask is that you just be honest about it.
Saphroneth
Banned
Well, there's about a hundred and twenty citations.
They are. In the thing I linked.
I had them order around twenty ironclads on the east coast - it's just that none of them actually get finished because the British have destroyed the shipyards.
Well, it's quick, but it's not a very effective weapons system. At least one City-class was pierced by a 32-lber, which is a weapon radically inferior to the 68-lber which was the standard British armour piercing gun, and since the average British sloop carried several 32-lbers on broadside the City-class would not have been very useful. Fundmaentally the Eads boats are armoured against field guns, not heavy warship pieces, and any Union ironclad intended to be proof against heavy warship pieces will take longer (and more resources).
I'm not counting New Orleans or New Bern - those troops are indeed still in the northeast. But the Jan 1862 garrison of Ship Island is lost, as is the significant garrison of the Port Royal area - you'll note that the evacuation does in fact take place TTL, it's just that they run into the British forces sailing up the East Coast (which is not hard to do) and lose several thousand troops due to ships captured. The majority get away, though.
The big loss is Fort Monroe, really.
They weren't sent TTL either.
This is more or less correct, though the CSA may send troops west to alter the result. My point is largely that you were assuming they and the Kentucky etc. campaigns would have taken place unaltered. (The Missouri force is also the one that would be raided to put troops in Michigan, so that might be altered.)
Well, since most of what you say I should do is something I'm already having the Union do...
I've provided sources for the rifles thing, so that's pretty much something that can be taken as fact. I've had the Union order dozens of ironclads as you recommend, I've not (as you seemed to assume) had several corps. of Union troops shipped south to be captured, I've evacuated the Carolinan barrier islands in a week (while you hold it would take several to move ships from Bermuda to the Chesapeake)...
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yes, the British destroyed the shipyards... because the British Navy is immune to shore fire and warships that are in the harbor shooting as well
basically everything you have happen is based on weighted scales that are pro British based on your assessment that can't be proven in spite of events that happened in OTL (when it came to attacking fortified harbors), makes assumptions that the US would find no alternatives to British steel, and a host of other factors.
But again, why are you getting sidetracked with this discussion when you know my lengthy objections and history of such, and for that matter that I was not alone in them. Regarding the Eads, you are right regarding defensive strength (and mission), but on the other hand, what about other armed ships that would certainly exist on the Lakes?
You don't need my approval and won't get it. So move on. I am. This thread is on ignore for me.
basically everything you have happen is based on weighted scales that are pro British based on your assessment that can't be proven in spite of events that happened in OTL (when it came to attacking fortified harbors), makes assumptions that the US would find no alternatives to British steel, and a host of other factors.
But again, why are you getting sidetracked with this discussion when you know my lengthy objections and history of such, and for that matter that I was not alone in them. Regarding the Eads, you are right regarding defensive strength (and mission), but on the other hand, what about other armed ships that would certainly exist on the Lakes?
You don't need my approval and won't get it. So move on. I am. This thread is on ignore for me.
Saphroneth
Banned
No, it's not - I did this whole piece about their destroying the forts. It was most of the first page, actually - the British Navy disabled the forts, in many cases destroyed the warships present (the Battle of New York being the main one where there were significant numbers of Union warships present) and destroyed the dockyards. Once the defences are destroyed and nothing's shooting at the RN, they can do what they want.
Worth noting that if the Union did send all their warships out to raid their dockyards would be defenceless - so you can hopefully see the justification for why I had much of the Union navy withdraw to NY rather than sally out to raid.
Now, the British option if they hadn't felt they could disable the forts present would have been to get hold of some of the Crimean mortar batteries. Those would have been able to destroy the dockyards from beyond the range of the defending guns.
The British tended to do quite well attacking fortified harbours. If you find an example of where I've had something take place during one of my lovingly detailed harbour attacks which is incorrect, then go ahead and cite it - using specifics.
As for the alternatives to British steel, the Union tried that - as you'd know if you read the bit I quoted. They had to steal the industrial secret and it still didn't work out well enough to avoid a significant drop in quality.
The other armed ships on the lakes would not be able to prevent the Zodiacs from getting on the lakes, and shortly thereafter would cease to be armed ships on the lakes. You can't fight a military ironclad invulnerable to 11" smoothbore fire with a converted civilian vessel fitted with a few spare cannon.
Nevertheless, thanks for giving your objections. I'm glad to have been able to address them - to my satisfaction, at least, and hopefully to the satisfaction of my readers.
(As an aside - the list of British bombardments and port attacks, 1854-64)
Russian War
Odessa (Apr 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Odessa
Petropavlovsk (Aug 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Petropavlovsk
(Russian victory, but against sailing craft)
Bomarsund (Aug 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bomarsund
Kerch, Taganrog and Yeisk (1855): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_of_Azov_naval_campaign_(1855)
(Incidently, the Russians claim Taganrog as a victory because the city was never occupied - however twice the RN came into port, destroyed the defences and sent landing parties to burn the docks and all stores)
Sveaborg (Aug 55): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Suomenlinna
Kinburn (Oct 55): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kinburn_(1855)
6x Naval bombardments of Sebastapol:
17th Oct 54
9th Apr 55
6th June 55
17th June 55
17th August 55
5th Sept 55
China
1st Canton (Oct 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Canton_(1856)
Bogue (Nov 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bogue_(1856)
Fatshan Creek (Jun 57): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fatshan_Creek
2nd Canton (Dec 57) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Canton_(1857)
1st Taku Forts (May 58): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1858)
2nd Taku Forts (May 59): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1859)
3rd Taku Forts (Aug 60): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1860)
Persian War
Bushire (Nov 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Persian_War
Japan Intervention
Kagoshima (Aug 63): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Kagoshima
2nd Shimonoseki (Sept 64): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimonoseki_Campaign
Eleven years of bombardments, of which two or three can be called a failure.
Odessa (Apr 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Odessa
Petropavlovsk (Aug 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Petropavlovsk
(Russian victory, but against sailing craft)
Bomarsund (Aug 54): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bomarsund
Kerch, Taganrog and Yeisk (1855): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_of_Azov_naval_campaign_(1855)
(Incidently, the Russians claim Taganrog as a victory because the city was never occupied - however twice the RN came into port, destroyed the defences and sent landing parties to burn the docks and all stores)
Sveaborg (Aug 55): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Suomenlinna
Kinburn (Oct 55): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kinburn_(1855)
6x Naval bombardments of Sebastapol:
17th Oct 54
9th Apr 55
6th June 55
17th June 55
17th August 55
5th Sept 55
China
1st Canton (Oct 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Canton_(1856)
Bogue (Nov 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bogue_(1856)
Fatshan Creek (Jun 57): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fatshan_Creek
2nd Canton (Dec 57) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Canton_(1857)
1st Taku Forts (May 58): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1858)
2nd Taku Forts (May 59): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1859)
3rd Taku Forts (Aug 60): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Taku_Forts_(1860)
Persian War
Bushire (Nov 56): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Persian_War
Japan Intervention
Kagoshima (Aug 63): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Kagoshima
2nd Shimonoseki (Sept 64): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimonoseki_Campaign
Eleven years of bombardments, of which two or three can be called a failure.
5 June 1862
Saphroneth
Banned
5 June
A trial takes place at Hythe, examining the various small arms available to the British Army - comparing muzzle loaders with breech loaders, and also using recently-captured Union smoothbore percussion muskets and percussion rifles as a comparator.
Among the muzzle loaders being put to the test are the old Minie and the new Enfield - with the two-band and three-band compared separately - and the Whitworth rifle. The P1861 short Enfield and Lancaster rifle fill out the muzzle loaders.
For the breech loaders - the true purpose of the trials - a Sharps rifle is present from the many the British government purchased before the Trent War, as are the Terry, the Westley-Richards, the Leetch, the Prince, the Nuthall and the Boileau.
The testing regimen is intended to minimize the relative impact of familiarity with the rifle - a cohort of eighty men have been put through the full Hythe course. None of the men have used a firearm before, and they have been randomly separated out into groups of five and each one trained using just the weapon they are assigned. They have been issued eighty shots for training, which has been completed by the date of the trial.
The aim of this is to compare the relative utility of the weapons by recently trained men - the kind of men who would be supposed to use the weapons in battle. This has led to complaints from Boileau, who holds that his weapon is superior once additional training has taken place, but the rules are not changed.
The results are interesting, especially as there is at the same time a trial taking place of a form of lubricated cartridge for a smoothbore gun (this forming the sixteenth and final group of five). This method is discovered to be able to achieve accurate hits at ranges of several hundred yards, though the time taken to fit the tight-fitting cartridge compares unfavourably with the reloading time of the Enfield rifles which are being used as the benchmark.
Of the muzzle loaders, the Lancaster scores highest on accuracy but lowest on reloading speed, with the Whitworth somewhere between the Lancaster and the Enfield. The reliable P1853 performs as expected, but the 1861 short Enfield slightly exceeds it in reloading speed while being comparable in accuracy at range.
Interestingly, the Springfield rifle-musket is judged to be of the same rough capability as the British Enfield rifles, but that the sights are insufficient to use this capability at long range.
Of the breech loaders, the results are mixed and the source of much debate. Many of the inventors present cite the best-of-five rate of fire combined with the best-of-five accuracy results, though this tends to obscure the actual results obtained - which are duly noted in neat columns to be published in RUSI. Each rifle is touted as being easy to fire, quick to fire, accurate over a comparable range to the Enfield and to be hard to foul; in large part these are borne out, though to different degrees.
After much data is considered, the verdict of the trials is to purchase 3,000 each of the Boileau, Terry and Westley-Richards - and, crucially, to give them to infantry regiments in place of Cavalry ones. Two regiments each will trial these new breechloaders, and the data will be added to the results of the cavalry comparisions (which have not yet come in).
(It seems perfectly appropriate for the result of the trials to be "more trials!")
A trial takes place at Hythe, examining the various small arms available to the British Army - comparing muzzle loaders with breech loaders, and also using recently-captured Union smoothbore percussion muskets and percussion rifles as a comparator.
Among the muzzle loaders being put to the test are the old Minie and the new Enfield - with the two-band and three-band compared separately - and the Whitworth rifle. The P1861 short Enfield and Lancaster rifle fill out the muzzle loaders.
For the breech loaders - the true purpose of the trials - a Sharps rifle is present from the many the British government purchased before the Trent War, as are the Terry, the Westley-Richards, the Leetch, the Prince, the Nuthall and the Boileau.
The testing regimen is intended to minimize the relative impact of familiarity with the rifle - a cohort of eighty men have been put through the full Hythe course. None of the men have used a firearm before, and they have been randomly separated out into groups of five and each one trained using just the weapon they are assigned. They have been issued eighty shots for training, which has been completed by the date of the trial.
The aim of this is to compare the relative utility of the weapons by recently trained men - the kind of men who would be supposed to use the weapons in battle. This has led to complaints from Boileau, who holds that his weapon is superior once additional training has taken place, but the rules are not changed.
The results are interesting, especially as there is at the same time a trial taking place of a form of lubricated cartridge for a smoothbore gun (this forming the sixteenth and final group of five). This method is discovered to be able to achieve accurate hits at ranges of several hundred yards, though the time taken to fit the tight-fitting cartridge compares unfavourably with the reloading time of the Enfield rifles which are being used as the benchmark.
Of the muzzle loaders, the Lancaster scores highest on accuracy but lowest on reloading speed, with the Whitworth somewhere between the Lancaster and the Enfield. The reliable P1853 performs as expected, but the 1861 short Enfield slightly exceeds it in reloading speed while being comparable in accuracy at range.
Interestingly, the Springfield rifle-musket is judged to be of the same rough capability as the British Enfield rifles, but that the sights are insufficient to use this capability at long range.
Of the breech loaders, the results are mixed and the source of much debate. Many of the inventors present cite the best-of-five rate of fire combined with the best-of-five accuracy results, though this tends to obscure the actual results obtained - which are duly noted in neat columns to be published in RUSI. Each rifle is touted as being easy to fire, quick to fire, accurate over a comparable range to the Enfield and to be hard to foul; in large part these are borne out, though to different degrees.
After much data is considered, the verdict of the trials is to purchase 3,000 each of the Boileau, Terry and Westley-Richards - and, crucially, to give them to infantry regiments in place of Cavalry ones. Two regiments each will trial these new breechloaders, and the data will be added to the results of the cavalry comparisions (which have not yet come in).
(It seems perfectly appropriate for the result of the trials to be "more trials!")
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This TL set in a period of history I've never really been interested in before but I'm still reading it so I guess its pretty well done.
To me this seems a bit much to produce 6x1,200 rifles for test purposes - is this inline with decisions of similar committees of the period - it strikes me as lot?
To me this seems a bit much to produce 6x1,200 rifles for test purposes - is this inline with decisions of similar committees of the period - it strikes me as lot?
Saphroneth
Banned
The 18th Hussars were equipped with the Terry as a trial, so it was certainly a thing that was done to try out guns in full regimental service. It's a little outside the norm, but I think it stands - it's basically because it's quite hard to choose between that lot!
The key here I think is that they're having the makers produce them - it's not the case that, say, there's a single factory being repeatedly retooled.
RodentRevolution
Banned
Likewise the Greene Carbine some 2,000 were ordered for trials purposes, some 6,000 Sharps carbines were ordered for trials in India and there are examples of other big trials I am not sure if the first 2,000 Westley Richards were meant solely for trials but these were delivered in four separate patterns (including the first with a botched chamber that was too short) before the definitive Pattern N0 5 was adopted.
I think six versions might be too many: unless there had been big changes to some of the rifles they'd rejected previously, I don't think they'd have made the cut this time round. But the rough quantity for each rifle is about right, if not a little small when you look at the average order.
Leetch: 15,000 ordered July 1855, reduced to 2,000 January 1856
Sharps: 6,000 ordered January 1856
Greene: 2,000 ordered 1856
Terry: Unknown quantity ordered 1858
Westley Richards: 2,000 ordered April 1861, 20,000 ordered autumn 1864
Saphroneth
Banned
Fair enough. So it looks like the Terry and the Westley-Richards would be on the "shortlist" - is that correct? I was basically making the list from "The Rifle And How To Use It".
For what it's worth, the British Government are being very cagey about this one - to adopt a rifle means to switch over the weapons of about 200,000 regulars, 260,000 auxiliaries, and to provide another hundred thousand or so weapons as spares in case of emergency. That is to say, they will be ultimately purchasing roughly half a million of whatever it is they pick - so it had better be good! (e.g. if they picked the Leetch, they could expect to spend £4 million on rifles.)
One expert, I presume, counts himself pleased that he is safe and secure at home, instead of being sent out to the front to be wounded, captured, tortured, bedded by beautiful women never mind that last one . . .
"I applied for the Board of Ordnance, for which I knew I was better qualified than most of its members, inasmuch as I knew which end of a gun the ball came out of."
Flashman At The Charge
"I applied for the Board of Ordnance, for which I knew I was better qualified than most of its members, inasmuch as I knew which end of a gun the ball came out of."
Flashman At The Charge