If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)
- Thread starter Saphroneth
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Saphroneth
Banned
was what you said at first.
is what you're saying now.
The thing is, the observed evidence (such as the laying down of the Dictator in August 1862 and her completion being delayed until November 1864, or the laying down of the Dunderberg in July 1862 and her non-completion during the Civil War, or the ordering of Puritan in July 1862 and her non-completion during the Civil War, or for that matter the way the "urgently" required New Ironsides completed a month late and required months of refits to fix major problems) is consistent with the idea that the Union was not capable of building large ironclads at speed. It is not consistent with the idea that they did not want to build large ironclads at speed, indeed the first three ironclads built were ready for service in March (Monitor) April (Galena) and either August or the next January (New Ironsides) which suggests that if they were going for speed they made a major mistake - if the Union had the same construction capability in 1862 as the British did in 1855-6 they should simply have built three ships on the Thunderbolt class model, which combined a heavy battery and very shallow draft with strong armour (as heavy, shallower, and as strong as that of the much-delayed New Ironsides) and which went from laying down to launch in three and a half months (as compared to six for New Ironsides).
Your posts suggest it was a deliberate choice not to build large ships, but as we've seen they did try - they just didn't finish them in anything like good time. Similarly the two Webb frigates (Re d'Italia and Re de Portogallo) took years to complete, and indeed had to have finishing work done in France.
Saphroneth
Banned
Okay, a bit of more general "under the hood" planning.
My aim is that something a bit like the Six Weeks War will develop in Germany, but with a few differences in terms of cause and effect. One of these is that the Prussians need to be wary of Russian involvement (and indeed French involvement) and so can't commit quite so strongly to the initial battle of annihilation, so as a consequence the war takes longer and is less dramatically one-sided (basically the Austrian allies take longer to deal with, the Austrians have time to fortify along a proper front line, and the Prussians have to be more methodical working through the entrenchments).
This in turn leads to a Germany that's more split between north and south, with the north looking to Prussia but the south more aligned with Austria. This is a consequence of what amounts to a Prussian-inspired (not backed, but inspired) overthrow of the House of Hanover in Hanover, making e.g. Bavaria more wary of Prussian liberalism.
The overall result of all this mess is essentially a North German Federation and a South German Federation, which both think of themselves as "Germany" and compete to be more "German". Questions on what "German" means to follow.
My aim is that something a bit like the Six Weeks War will develop in Germany, but with a few differences in terms of cause and effect. One of these is that the Prussians need to be wary of Russian involvement (and indeed French involvement) and so can't commit quite so strongly to the initial battle of annihilation, so as a consequence the war takes longer and is less dramatically one-sided (basically the Austrian allies take longer to deal with, the Austrians have time to fortify along a proper front line, and the Prussians have to be more methodical working through the entrenchments).
This in turn leads to a Germany that's more split between north and south, with the north looking to Prussia but the south more aligned with Austria. This is a consequence of what amounts to a Prussian-inspired (not backed, but inspired) overthrow of the House of Hanover in Hanover, making e.g. Bavaria more wary of Prussian liberalism.
The overall result of all this mess is essentially a North German Federation and a South German Federation, which both think of themselves as "Germany" and compete to be more "German". Questions on what "German" means to follow.
you are not taking into account the Union race to get an ironclad into service before the Virginia was completed
Saphroneth
Banned
I sort of am, and I'm not sure how you can think otherwise. My suggestion was that the Union should have built three Thunderbolts rather than one New Ironsides, or even one Thunderbolt rather than one New Ironsides as the Thunderbolts were superior for purpose. I'm not suggesting cancelling the Monitor (the fastest of the ironclads to build).
At the same time, I'm considering the whole of the Civil War including the Dictator and Dunderberg - both of which were decisions made after the Virginia was scuttled.
Though two Germanies goes against what a lot of fans of European history would have cheered for. I think the most popular ones are "AH United Germany" "AH one dominant German state with a few little guys" and "AH bunch of little German states"
Saphroneth
Banned
So I was looking at the logistical possibilities of moving troops around (to Maine) and I think it seems like it would be quite hard to get two divisions up there as early as I was thinking. The problem is essentially that the rail route from Boston to Portland handled (OTL) 15,200 ton-miles per day and 67,500 man-miles per day - and it's about 120 miles from Boston to Portland or 240 to Bangor. (This route also has to handle getting troops to Portsmouth NH.)
Assuming:
1) That the rail line's capacity can be doubled in wartime. (that is, that the above two-way figures become one-way figures)
2) That a train car is either 40 men or 8 tons.
Then you have roughly 60 carriages a day getting to Portland or 30 getting to Bangor. The first day can carry up 2,400 troops to Portland or 1,200 to Bangor, but then you start needing to supply what's already there - which means 10 lbs per man, eventually, averaged over a full division slice.
If we assume they front-load getting things to Portland, then you can get a full division's worth of men there in about six days. This is just men with personal effects, and they can't manoeuvre or fight as they have no artillery yet.
Then you need to start moving the artillery and the horses. The horses will each take up roughly a ton of "space", and so one day can bring in about 480 horses - but each horse needs fodder, something like 26 lbs, and so on day two you're hauling tons of fodder per train. The artillery will take up a carriage each, and it's worth remembering that this logistics route also needs to provide the hundred or so guns to upgrade Portland harbour's defences.
Under this set of generous assumptions, then the Union may be able to get everything they need into Portland inside the four weeks between the reinforcement decision and the landing at Saco Bay. Under some perhaps more realistic assumptions (such as the idea that the rail line's capacity could not be doubled in wartime, or that the Boston to Portland did not have enough passenger carriages to manage sixty a day early on.) perhaps not.
There's also the question of the need for supplies. A balanced force of 15,000 or so Present would require about 75 tons a day, which would need to travel an average of 160 miles (with 3/5 of the force around Portland and 2/5 further north) - this equates to 12,000 ton-miles per day going north just supplying the force in Maine once it's in place. This is only possible if the rail line's capacity can be increased (it OTL had about 7,600 ton-miles per day going in each direction), and suggests that in reality the movement into Portland would become asymtotic (i.e. the force would increase at a diminishing rate until it reaches the point that the whole of the line's capacity is taken up by transporting food and fodder).
Put bluntly, I don't think the Union can get Casey (Portsmouth), Heintzelmann (Portland) and Butler (Bangor/Augusta) fully in place - they don't have the rolling stock. They can get the infantry there, but not full combined arms forces and as such they'd be quite weak to a manoeuvring enemy (that's in Portland - Portsmouth is much closer and thus easier to build up/supply).
They might also not be able to fully rearm the forts with their designed load of guns.
Functionally, what this means for the portrayal of a Portland campaign is that (once the British cut the line through Saco) the forces left in Maine will have trouble successfully manoeuvring. I'd have the previously-listed number of infantry present, but they'd be basically "garrison forces" without enough transport to make major moves away from the rail line and without their full complement of field artillery. (The justification here being that the transport would be sent later, once it's warm enough that a campaign makes sense).
As for what this means for the British landing? Well, their landing of four brigades of infantry with artillery support is based on a slightly different concept of operations - the one the British used on campaign OTL. The men would take about three days of food and carry it on them (e.g. hardtack) and would have relatively minimal transport landed on the day - just enough to move their artillery. Then the next day they'd land the horses and wagons for the transport wing - a single transport ship of 300 tons can carry enough supplies for a 12,000 man combined arms force for five days, this is why sea transport was so useful at the time - and if they needed to make regular approaches would rely on this method for supply, which is quite doable with horse transport as the landing beach is only a day's wagon march from the objective.
Assuming:
1) That the rail line's capacity can be doubled in wartime. (that is, that the above two-way figures become one-way figures)
2) That a train car is either 40 men or 8 tons.
Then you have roughly 60 carriages a day getting to Portland or 30 getting to Bangor. The first day can carry up 2,400 troops to Portland or 1,200 to Bangor, but then you start needing to supply what's already there - which means 10 lbs per man, eventually, averaged over a full division slice.
If we assume they front-load getting things to Portland, then you can get a full division's worth of men there in about six days. This is just men with personal effects, and they can't manoeuvre or fight as they have no artillery yet.
Then you need to start moving the artillery and the horses. The horses will each take up roughly a ton of "space", and so one day can bring in about 480 horses - but each horse needs fodder, something like 26 lbs, and so on day two you're hauling tons of fodder per train. The artillery will take up a carriage each, and it's worth remembering that this logistics route also needs to provide the hundred or so guns to upgrade Portland harbour's defences.
Under this set of generous assumptions, then the Union may be able to get everything they need into Portland inside the four weeks between the reinforcement decision and the landing at Saco Bay. Under some perhaps more realistic assumptions (such as the idea that the rail line's capacity could not be doubled in wartime, or that the Boston to Portland did not have enough passenger carriages to manage sixty a day early on.) perhaps not.
There's also the question of the need for supplies. A balanced force of 15,000 or so Present would require about 75 tons a day, which would need to travel an average of 160 miles (with 3/5 of the force around Portland and 2/5 further north) - this equates to 12,000 ton-miles per day going north just supplying the force in Maine once it's in place. This is only possible if the rail line's capacity can be increased (it OTL had about 7,600 ton-miles per day going in each direction), and suggests that in reality the movement into Portland would become asymtotic (i.e. the force would increase at a diminishing rate until it reaches the point that the whole of the line's capacity is taken up by transporting food and fodder).
Put bluntly, I don't think the Union can get Casey (Portsmouth), Heintzelmann (Portland) and Butler (Bangor/Augusta) fully in place - they don't have the rolling stock. They can get the infantry there, but not full combined arms forces and as such they'd be quite weak to a manoeuvring enemy (that's in Portland - Portsmouth is much closer and thus easier to build up/supply).
They might also not be able to fully rearm the forts with their designed load of guns.
Functionally, what this means for the portrayal of a Portland campaign is that (once the British cut the line through Saco) the forces left in Maine will have trouble successfully manoeuvring. I'd have the previously-listed number of infantry present, but they'd be basically "garrison forces" without enough transport to make major moves away from the rail line and without their full complement of field artillery. (The justification here being that the transport would be sent later, once it's warm enough that a campaign makes sense).
As for what this means for the British landing? Well, their landing of four brigades of infantry with artillery support is based on a slightly different concept of operations - the one the British used on campaign OTL. The men would take about three days of food and carry it on them (e.g. hardtack) and would have relatively minimal transport landed on the day - just enough to move their artillery. Then the next day they'd land the horses and wagons for the transport wing - a single transport ship of 300 tons can carry enough supplies for a 12,000 man combined arms force for five days, this is why sea transport was so useful at the time - and if they needed to make regular approaches would rely on this method for supply, which is quite doable with horse transport as the landing beach is only a day's wagon march from the objective.
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Hmmmm...........question is now which Germany France fears (or favours) more.
The liberal North Germans who are probably industrialising like mad or the less liberal and more agrarian South Germans who are backed by Austria whom France only just fought a war against in 1859. Prussia undermining Hanover will probably earn them enemies in the UK as well as in the more absolutist German kingdoms. If Austria is not embarrassed in the Six Weeks War analogue then France's fear of German unification is probably not very strong. The North / South German split has potential to become entrenched for some years until North Germany believe they have a chance of military victory - but in that case France, Russia and Austria would all be against "liberal" North Germany. And UK may still be grumpy enough over Hanover not to bother with NGF.
May have to wait for revolutions in South Germany before unification can be considered.
Saphroneth
Banned
I'm not so sure about that one - Ernest Augustus was utterly loathed in Britain. George V was not quite so unpopular, but it's likely that TTL he'll repeat his OTL decision of overruling Parliament so as to side with Austria.
You know what, I'm going to go ahead and mention it - simply because it shows how important manoeuvre is in the days before Continuous Frontage.
The below is the map of the positions as of McClellan's relief.
(The map uses Roman numerals, which are a later convention.)
The thing to notice about this map is that McClellan has utterly humbugged Lee. Lee's army is split into two wings (Longstreet and Jackson) and, by way of a combination of good scouting and hard marching (aided by an outbreak of foot-and-mouth which struck the Confederate Army a few weeks after it did the same to the Union one) McClellan has not only got between the wings but he's managed to block all the passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains. Slocum's 13th Corps is left up north to block the Potomac, but everyone else in McClellan's army is down south and he has nearly a three-to-one superiority to bring to bear on Longstreet.
The West Point Atlas of American Wars, the source that created,the map, disagrees with you. According to them:
"It took from 26 October through 2 November for his army to cross the river; and then he moved slowly south, complaining continuously about unpreparedness."
"Lee countered by dividing his army, again leaving Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, while he himself retired deliberately before McClellan's advance. There was considerable cavalry fighting during the movement, with most of the successes going to the Union cavalry. By 6 November, the opposing forces were disposed as shown on the map."
"Apparently, McClellan had no specific plan. In his subsequent writings, he mentioned an intention to turn westward toward Little Washington to get between the separated Confederate forces and defeat them in detail, but none of his actions at that time support this claim. And, in any event, Jackson still hung on the Federal right rear, while Lee had plenty of maneuver room."
Saphroneth
Banned
If the map's correct on distances, McClellan moved fifty miles in four days (from 2 to 6 November). That doesn't seem to be too slow to me.
Jackson doesn't have a route to get through the mountains, though, the passes are all blocked.
Note that on the next page Jackson hasn't moved, despite there having been nearly two weeks in between the two images.
In any case - on the 7th McClellan's cavalry captures the crossings of the Hazel (you can see Pleasanton's been pushed out to the river in the image). It's hard to see why he would do this if he wasn't planning on turning the Confederate flank, and it's an action which does support the claim - while Lee has got things completely wrong and is advising Jackson that he should prevent McClellan from occupying the roads west of Massanutten Mountain.
Essentially the assumption being made by the interpretation you mention is that McClellan had no interest in winning the war or in attacking. The very fact he did so at Antietam should show otherwise, and he has a considerably greater advantage here than there.
When I complained that in TTL "They move neither troops nor arms to defend the Canadian border?" you replied "They had already ordered up everything they could find." even though your timeline shows them ordering up nothing.
Saphroneth
Banned
As I've already noted on another thread, you miscounted. That was my reply to your question of
They do nothing to find new foreign sources of arms and ammunition?
My reply to
They move neither troops nor arms to defend the Canadian border?
was
No OTL plans existed for more than a few regiments, so they have to scramble.
If this is your best remaining argument then it's rather unimpressive; if not, then please present your best remaining argument.
The Union had no plans in place for a Trent War in OTL, because there was no Trent War in OTL. The Union had no plans in place for a war with the Confederacy, either, but that doesn't mean they did nothing when the Confederacy attacked Ft Sumter and declared war on the US.
Let me note that the Royal navy did not have Springsharp to help them design their ships. If the British planned to create an ironclad that could fit through the Welland Canal, please cite your source, don't just say you have one. Trying to fit the Aetna class through the Welland canal would be like trying to fit a longboat into a bathtub. I never claimed that the Aetna class was unseaworthy; I pointed out that any ship that could fit through the Welland Canal would have a shallower draft and narrower beam than the Monitor.
Saphroneth
Banned
What it means is that it took them weeks to get a few regiments to Washington (four regiments there on 26 April, two weeks after Sumter), and three months to deploy a field army of corps strength.
In any case, I do have the Union reacting, I just don't have the Union reacting immediately because they have no plans. They deploy troops to the border with Canada and to the coast and react in other ways once they've made their plans, they just can't do so quickly enough to get inside the reaction time of the British Empire because the British had already-made plans with forces ready to carry them out.
If you've read the TL, you'll notice that the US moves against Canada almost as soon as the weather permits (their attack on the Welland).
Well, no, they just had a large staff of experienced professionals. I used Springsharp to show the design was possible to fit down the Welland.
I'm relying on someone else's description of the contents of WO33/11 at Kew, which included a description of the naval planning figures for Canadian defence. This included mention of six new ironclads to operate on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, which were to be £300,000 for all six and with a build time of 90 days.
Not really, the scale difference is considerable. A rowboat in a bathtub, maybe.
What you said was:
But not only do we have an example of the Aetna being a shallower-draft ironclad than the Monitor which was considerably more seaworthy (as it was able to cross the open ocean including cruising under its own power) but we also have examples of (non-ironclad) ships of both shallower draft and narrower beam than the Monitor which were able to make ocean transit and fit through the Welland - specifically, HMS Britomart, which served on Lake Erie.
Essentially, your argument from unseaworthiness relies heavily on the Monitor design being as seaworthy as you can get within its draft and beam (as you bring those up, strongly implying that reduced beam would reduce seaworthiness) but we have strong evidence that the thing that made Monitor unseaworthy was her very small freeboard. Ships on the Aetna pattern (and my Springsharp design, for example) have quite high freeboard, making them quite seaworthy.
How much do you think the strain on the railways could be alleviated by local requisition? Obviously, this would only work if the force was moving, or else drawing its supplies from a widening area, but could local fodder with wagon transport free up space on the trains?
Saphroneth
Banned
Temporarily, yes - but generally speaking forces are assumed to get about half their fodder from forage when on the move through fresh country.
I'm looking at the steady-state situation of a force (e.g.) waiting for the weather to clear. I'm not sure whether the 50 tons per 10,000 men figure includes forage or not, unfortunately!
Up near Rouses Point, for example, there's not going to be nearly enough supplies to get hold of long term as the area is sparsely populated; around Portland it may be different for a short while, but the amount of fodder stockpiled in a town is a reasonable approximation for the estimate of the amount needed until more is available, and you'll need to supply more to replace what gets used up anyway.
The practical conclusion I reach from all this is that the infantry will probably be in place but the transport, cavalry and artillery will probably largely not be.
Well, of course there's always Captain Nemo's Nautilus....
Saphroneth
Banned
I'm thinking more about HMS Hotspur or the CSS Mannassas, just slightly more underwater.Well, of course there's always Captain Nemo's Nautilus....
The CSS Manassas was a fascinating idea, particularly considering the constraints of her hull size and industrial support available to build her.