If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)

[cerebropetrologist]

To the best of my knowledge, the only ironclad designs the British had in January 1862 were the Warrior class (Length 128m, beam 17.8m, draught 8.2m), the Defence class (Length 92m, beam 16.5m, draught 7.9m) and the Hector class (Length 85.4m, beam 17.2m, draught 8m)

You are very much mistaken. They also had the Aetna class (three variants, all of them with less than 9 feet draft) and the Thunderbolt class. None of these ships took very long to design or build, especially not with experienced builders.

They must also have had the design for HMS Achilles (laid down August 1861), and HMS Minotaur, Agincourt and Northumberland (laid down September and October 1861). You couldn't get them on the Great Lakes, of course, but you couldn't get Warrior on there either.

You are correct that Immortalite took ten days, but that does not change my point. In actual history, Immortalite, which was rated at 12.3 knots, took 10 days to travel from Bermuda to the Chesapeake.

How do you think the speed of the Immortalite was affected by the fact that the captain had been told it was 'imperative that I should on arrival have at least three days full Steaming in reserve'? Do you think the need to preserve coal sped the ship up, or slowed it down? Why do you insist on using only a single point of data when the return voyage (through a gale, with prevailing winds, but with no need to preserve coal) took four days (3PM on 23 January to 2PM on the 27th)?

It would be possible for them to leave the colliers and supply ships ungaurded, but why would Admiral Milne take the risk?

1) Are the ships travelling slowly like the Immortalite, in which case they'd arrive with three days of coal in reserve? Or are they travelling quickly, in which case four days may not be an unreasonable estimate?
2) This isn't the 1940s, when fleets need a logistics train: these ships are pretty much self contained. What supplies (other than coal) do you feel the force would have run out of by their arrival at the Chesapeake?
3) Why is the Royal Navy unable to obtain either coal, or the other supplies you suggest they need, from Confederate ports like Norfolk?

However, in looking in detail, we're in danger of missing the bigger picture: that your evidence is insufficient to support your conclusion. Your belief is that the TL

lets Britain ignore friction, logistics, and the laws of physics.

Unfortunately, you haven't given any evidence that Britain is being given special treatment. All you've done is to highlight a generalised issue with the calculation of ship travel times: that ships are assumed to move too quickly.

You were also arguing that this TL is just as biased as pro-Union ones. In pro-Union timelines, you see Britain unable to cross a 150ft river while the Union instantly traverse much larger bodies of water, or British vessels being between two and five times less capable than Union ones. As such, if you want to make the claim of specific bias rather than generalised error, you need to find instances of Britain being allowed to 'ignore friction, logistics, and the laws of physics' while the Union is still affected by them.

 

[Alex Zetsu]

Just ignore Fiver, seriously. We refuted him before and if he doesn't listen, well let him believe what he wants

 

[Fiver]

I'd be remiss if I didn't bring everybody's attention to that 'for a war where national survival was not at stake' point. What that means is that the Union can do anything it wants, because 'national survival is at stake', and the British can't, because it isn't. Never mind the fact that the Trent War isn't a war for national survival: it's a complete diplomatic blunder on the part of the Union which it can get out of as quickly as it got into it (though not without a certain degree of humiliation). But that wasn't what I intended to highlight when I started this post.

This sprang out of a discussion about which was more of a Trent War cliché: authors overstating the Union, or the British. I hope it may not be inappropriate, therefore, to compare and contrast:

• Britain acting 'with a speed and unanimity unheard of'= A declaration of war being issued through the royal prerogative powers (which the cabinet has already agreed will be the result of an American refusal to hand over the prisoners) without months of cabinet deliberation or multiple resignations (ITWNMUOTOS)
• The Union NOT acting 'with a speed and unanimity unheard of'= The whole of the Confederacy re-joining the Union to fight the British (Stars and Stripes Forever); a secessionist vice-presidential nominee, who pledged to wage war alongside the Confederacy (and whose son did just that), being described as 'a loyalist at heart' and leading Union troops in the Pacific Northwest (BROS).

• 'incorrectly claims the US initially had no troops or arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border' = Accurately representing the number of troops present near the Canadian border on the outbreak of war
• Losing 70% of the Canadian militia, and having no British troops move for a period of four months during which the British government is apparently planning a sneak attack on the United States = Fine.

My point that a Trent war is not a war of national survival for Britain is exactly that and nothing more. You are putting words in my mouth when you say I claim it would be a war of national survival for the Union - I offered no such opinion. You put even more words in my mouth who you say "that means is that the Union can do anything it wants" when I said nothing of the sort, nor even implied it. In the Civil War cliche' thread, I never said whether authors overstated Union or British capabilities more, I merely noted that authors have done both. I did not complain that TTL did not include months of deliberation - again you put words in my mouth. I did not endorse the clearly ridiculous idea idea of "whole of the Confederacy re-joining the Union to fight the British", again you put words in my mouth. Nor did I endorse the idea of "a secessionist vice-presidential nominee, who pledged to wage war alongside the Confederacy (and whose son did just that), being described as 'a loyalist at heart' and leading Union troops in the Pacific Northwest (BROS)" which is ridiculous as well. I did say that the author of TTL 'incorrectly claims the US initially had no troops or arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border', and I mentioned three specific groups. They might not be enough, but there were a lot more than zero troops and arms available - there being no troops on the border initially does not invalidate that point. I did not say that "Losing 70% of the Canadian militia, and having no British troops move for a period of four months during which the British government is apparently planning a sneak attack on the United States" was fine, I have no idea what TL you are referring to and again you are putting words in my mouth.

 

[galveston bay]

2) This isn't the 1940s, when fleets need a logistics train: these ships are pretty much self contained. What supplies (other than coal) do you feel the force would have run out of by their arrival at the Chesapeake?
3) Why is the Royal Navy unable to obtain either coal, or the other supplies you suggest they need, from Confederate ports like Norfolk?

However, in looking in detail, we're in danger of missing the bigger picture: that your evidence is insufficient to support your conclusion. Your belief is that the TL

Unfortunately, you haven't given any evidence that Britain is being given special treatment. All you've done is to highlight a generalised issue with the calculation of ship travel times: that ships are assumed to move too quickly.

You were also arguing that this TL is just as biased as pro-Union ones. In pro-Union timelines, you see Britain unable to cross a 150ft river while the Union instantly traverse much larger bodies of water, or British vessels being between two and five times less capable than Union ones. As such, if you want to make the claim of specific bias rather than generalised error, you need to find instances of Britain being allowed to 'ignore friction, logistics, and the laws of physics' while the Union is still affected by them.

regarding point 2..... The technology of steamships is far less reliable in the 1860s compared to the 1940s, so there is that rather important point. Plus there is the fact that a fleet train in the 1940s includes oilers and tankers. So apples to oranges comparison there.

regarding point 3 .... no anthracite coal (that is in Pennsylvania) While the South had enough
bituminous coal to get by, but whether it has sufficient production to support the Royal Navy would require some evidence.

It is not required to attack another timeline (which is effectively dead in this forum and in any event hasn't been updated elsewhere in several months and was unfinished in any case) to criticize this timeline. Nor does anyone have to attack Harrison, Tsouras, Conroy etc. The issue and criticisms about your timeline should be all that matters in this particular thread.

Now in the other thread, regarding cliches, sure, compare and contrast.

 

[Saphroneth]

My point that a Trent war is not a war of national survival for Britain is exactly that and nothing more.

Then it doesn't mean anything and is a pointless argument.

I did not complain that TTL did not include months of deliberation - again you put words in my mouth.

But you say Britain is acting with a speed and unanimity unheard of. What would not be "acting with a speed and unanimity unheard of" - that is, what would you consider realistic?

I did say that the author of TTL 'incorrectly claims the US initially had no troops or arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border', and I mentioned three specific groups.

Where do I say this, then? If precise wording matters, then cite where I say it.

They might not be enough, but there were a lot more than zero troops and arms available - there being no troops on the border initially does not invalidate that point.

Then cite where I say there were no troops available instead of there being no troops on the border.

I have no idea what TL you are referring to and again you are putting words in my mouth.

Cerebro is trying to point out that just about every other published timeline on the Trent Affair is far worse, and generally heavily pro-Union - and that you should put my timeline (as you put it) allowing the British to break the laws of physics in context. (For that matter you should substantiate the laws-of-physics claim).

regarding point 2..... The technology of steamships is far less reliable in the 1860s compared to the 1940s, so there is that rather important point. Plus there is the fact that a fleet train in the 1940s includes oilers and tankers. So apples to oranges comparison there.

Yes, that's the point. In 1940 a fleet had a logistics train; in 1860 it did not have to.

regarding point 3 .... no anthracite coal (that is in Pennsylvania) While the South had enough
bituminous coal to get by, but whether it has sufficient production to support the Royal Navy would require some evidence.

Are you suggesting that it requires specific evidence to demonstrate that the South had enough coal to replenish a dozen ships for a few days steaming in their foremost naval yard?

It is not required to attack another timeline (which is effectively dead in this forum and in any event hasn't been updated elsewhere in several months and was unfinished in any case) to criticize this timeline. Nor does anyone have to attack Harrison, Tsouras, Conroy etc. The issue and criticisms about your timeline should be all that matters in this particular thread.

It's a useful comparison point, because (for example) you are specifically criticizing the idea that a few hundred tons of coal could be found in the entirety of Norfolk Virginia, whereas you have little or nothing but praise for a timeline which has as a fundamental foundational assumption that Canada could mobilize more pro-America rebels than loyal citizens.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

In the Civil War cliche' thread, I never said whether authors overstated Union or British capabilities more, I merely noted that authors have done both.

Yes, but your position must be at least that the two are equally overstated. Otherwise, you would have agreed with me when I said:

I don't think I've seen a single Trent War timeline which allows Britain to enjoy the kind of blatant cheating that seems to come as standard with the Union. For instance: Union troops get repeaters while the British get muskets, hundreds of ironclads pouring off the slips, spar torpedoes invented and deployed within a few weeks, and so forth.

Alternatively, you could have ended your list of complaints about this TL with 'Obviously none of these are as egregious as pro-Union bias, but...'

My point that a Trent war is not a war of national survival for Britain is exactly that and nothing more.

You actually said 'the British empire,' which implied the Canadians were not that bothered about getting invaded, but fortunately you've clarified the point. Unfortunately, the only other interpretation I can come up with is that you think the British would drag their heels in a Trent War because it's 'only' the ownership of Canada and neutral rights at sea which are at stake. So what exactly did you mean by it? Which decisions are too swift and unanimous, and how slow and controversial should they have been?

I did not complain that TTL did not include months of deliberation - again you put words in my mouth.

You said 'I'd expect there to be some debate on the issue first'. How much debate should there have been, beyond whatever took place at the overnight cabinet meeting on 8/9 January which implemented a pre-agreed decision to go to war? Which cabinet members do you expect to argue against war when they have already agreed to the ultimatum - and upon what evidence is your belief based?

I have no idea what TL you are referring to

It's BROS. This suggests three possibilities:
1) You haven't read BROS
2) You have read BROS, but don't remember it
3) You have read BROS, but didn't notice the bias
In any of these three cases, I'd suggest it's a little foolhardy to argue that the British are as overstated as the Union. It would suggest that you're overlooking one of the most famous and, indeed, notorious pro-Union timelines created, which is rather like arguing about M. Night Shyamalan's directorial career without mentioning The Sixth Sense.

 

[Saphroneth]

I did say that the author of TTL 'incorrectly claims the US initially had no troops or arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border', and I mentioned three specific groups.

I'm still not sure what you meant by this - I've gone back and looked again, but about all I can find is things like my explaining that in order to place anything like enough troops on the border or coast the Union has to strip large amounts of force from other commands.

Which means your

I mentioned three specific groups. They might not be enough, but there were a lot more than zero troops and arms available - there being no troops on the border initially does not invalidate that point.

(which totals roughly 20,000 to 30,000 all told, some of them difficult or impossible to retrieve in the event of a Trent war) is distinctly inadequate and my position holds.


More generally, though, what you don't seem to grasp is that in several occasions during the writing of this timeline I deliberately allowed the Union leeway which is ahistorical, so as to make up for any unrecognized biases of my own:

• The British miss attacking a vulnerable port (Mystic) despite knowing about it.
• The Union retains roughly historical rifle production (but not imports)
• The Union's gunpowder supply lasts through to June, despite my own research and accounting strongly suggesting they would have run out.
• The Union produces heavy guns and heavy rifles much faster than OTL.
• The Union produces ironclads faster than OTL and has many more such projects going at once.
• The British are just plain passive for the most part, on land.
• After Fort Delaware the Union have all their naval forts fully rearmed, even though this would take far more guns than they had in stock.
• The Union deploy functional mines in about two months from a standing start.

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, so, ORBAT time! (everyone cheers)





Firstly, here's a provisional ORBAT for a cross-border raid on Fort Montgomery, minutes to hours after the news of the war being confirmed.


British
Grenadier Guards (5 companies) (train A)
3x Armstrong guns (40 lber or 20 lber if available, but I can't find when the first position guns went down the sleigh route; otherwise 12 lber) (train B)
1 coy Royal Engineers (train B)
functionally about 450-500 men and three guns

US
3 coys, 7th US Infantry (functionally about 240 men)
Fort Montgomery (no artillery)

This is basically a pre-arranged attack. I'm not sure, but I think this one's going to be a victory for the British - being shelled with no reply is very demoralizing, and the US troops are outnumbered about 2:1 to boot, with the nearest reinforcements hours away by rail.
Then they demolish the fort by blowing up the completed bastions and anything else useful. It's not really supportable (too easy to cut off) but the destruction makes the job of maintaining US supply routes towards Montreal harder and means there's a need for more garrison troops.




Secondly, here's the setups for fighting around Portland.

British landing force

One corps, formed of four infantry brigades in two divisions.

1/10th, 2/16th, 1st New Brunswick Volunteers
1/11th, 58th, 2nd New Brunswick Volunteers

2/20th, 76th, 1st Nova Scotia Volunteers
36th, 55th, 2nd Nova Scotia Volunteers

Plus artillery (roughly 4 field 2 position), and some Royal Marines as the pathfinders

Lands near Saco and has a regiment or two occupy the town, cutting the rail line to Portland. The rest of the corps (call it 11,000 troops total) advances northeast towards


US defensive force

Present in and around Portland

Heintzelman's division

2 Mich, 3 Mich, 5 Mich, 37 NY (in Portland defences, 3000)
3 Maine, 4 Maine, 38 NY, 40 NY (in Portland, 3000)
57 PA, 61 PA, 63 PA, 99 PA, 105 PA (spread along north side of the bay, 4000)

Elsewhere in Maine

Butler's division

Two brigades - one in Augusta, one along the Grand Trunk up towards the Coaticook area to prevent an attack by those means (this I'm not sure about, might be that the Penobscot and Kennebec would be more strongly defended). 6500 PFD total.

Note that the majority (60%) of the force I've assigned to the area is where it can face the British landing in a short period of time - this may be incorrect. (e.g. if the Union plans to try for the sledge route there may be two brigades around Portland and one marching east from the Bangor railhead)



What this means is a battle between about 7,000 to 10,000 British infantry (with artillery) and roughly the same number of Union troops, outside Portland, with a British squadron hanging around outside so the Union can't completely strip their sea forts. Given British advantages in troop training, weapons and experience (about half the Union troops have seen no combat experience and are in recently raised regiments, the other half have seen First Bull Run, while the British are two-thirds long service regulars and one-third prewar active militia), I strongly suspect this would result in a British victory overall.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

I was using "ironclad" as in a full-fledged warship, not a floating battery such as the Aetna class or the Thunderbolt, but you are correct those floating batteries were ironclad. The Aetna class was Length 52.6m or more, beam 13.4m, draught 1.8 to 2.6m. The Thunderbolt was Length 52.7m, beam 14.6m. The Welland Canal had locks that were 45.7 meters long, 8.1 meters wide, and 3.1 meters deep, so these ships won't fit through the canal. either. In January 1862, Britain had no ironclads that could fit through the Welland Canal and all the designs they did have took more than 90 days to build.

1) If your definition of 'ironclad' is 'a full-fledged warship,' of course they're not going to fit through the Welland Canal locks. You can't get full-fledged wooden warships in them either.
2) I notice you do not acknowledge that all these existing floating batteries could get onto Lake Ontario, where they could attack targets like the Union naval facility at Sackett's Harbour.
3) You don't know whether they have a design for Great Lakes ironclads: all you know is that they didn't build any.
4) Scaling down an existing design of a real warship whose merits and flaws are known is much quicker than starting a new design from scratch. This is why using the Union in your comparative figures is inaccurate.
5) All the other designs took longer than 90 days to build because, as you've pointed out, they're much bigger than Great Lakes ironclads. The only ships which really compare are the floating batteries (though still bigger), so let's focus on them for now.
a) The constructors of the floating batteries are all building a new type of ship for the first time (separate firms were contracted to build the wooden-hulled Aetna-class and the iron-hulled Erebus-class)
b) At the same time as building this new ship, the constructors had to develop a supply chain to provide them with iron plates. Though the forging and rolling of these was a relatively new technique at the time of the Crimea, by the Trent there is a well-established supply chain currently providing dockyards with plates for the many other ironclads then under construction.
c) The decision to construct the floating batteries came very late in the war, by which time the British had already ordered 156 gunboats. This increased the demand for labour and raw materials, as well as the attention of Royal Navy officials whose responsibility it was to supervise and advise on construction. As these gunboats are still in existence at the time of the Trent, there is only the need to build replacements. This, therefore, means that the constructors of Great Lakes ironclads can work more quickly than the constructors of Crimean floating batteries.

Oh, and while we're at it. Posted three months ago:

Busk is wrong. Racer made 9.313 knots on trial on her first commission (Times, 23 July 1858). Rif Winfield's British Warships in the Age of Sail 1817-1863 has it as 9.519 knots, but let's take the lower figure in the interests of prudence.

Posted on Monday:

Posted three months ago:

Busk is wrong. Racer made 9.313 knots on trial on her first commission (Times, 23 July 1858). Rif Winfield's British Warships in the Age of Sail 1817-1863 has it as 9.519 knots, but let's take the lower figure in the interests of prudence.

Posted on Thursday:

I provided a source that said Racer could hit 6.8 Knots. What is your source that Racer could do 9.3?

Also posted on Monday:

¯\_(ツ)_/¯

 

[Saphroneth]

Thanks for the source. It doesn't invalidate my point that steaming directly into a gale should reduce speed, damage ships, and separate them.

So, here's the crucial question - does this difference in speed (between the speed of the ships under steam without a gale, and whatever the speed of the ships is with the OTL gale you determine as being in place TTL) actually affect the conclusion of the TL?

I would submit it does not, because Milne leaves Bermuda on the 25th of January and does not begin active operations against anyone until the 8th of February - a total time difference of fourteen days. In short there is so much slack built into the timeline that your protest does not functionally change the outcome of events.

Of course, as I've repeatedly stated, I've assumed the weather does nothing for either side and that the climate is the important bit.



However, I should also note something which you seem to have missed - that the gale described in the source you use (which I admit I trusted your interpretation of) is a gale from the northeast. This is why it took the Immortalite ten days to make the trip - it was sailing into the gale (in the first part of the month the winds were from the west, so Immortalite would be able to run with the wind when heading eastwards, thus allowing her to reach Bermuda at speed).
When the fleet as a whole leaves Bermuda TTL, assuming your source is correct on the winds for TTL, it would have a strong wind coming from the northeast while sailing north and west (more west than north) and so the gale would effectively be a little aft of the beam, thus if anything making the passage speedier (while also more difficult, it's true, but then I do allow for about a week and a half of repairs and logistics work after reaching the Chesapeake).
Dealing with a wind on the beam is relatively trivial compared to dealing with a wind from ahead.

I was using "ironclad" as in a full-fledged warship, not a floating battery such as the Aetna class or the Thunderbolt, but you are correct those floating batteries were ironclad. The Aetna class was Length 52.6m or more, beam 13.4m, draught 1.8 to 2.6m. The Thunderbolt was Length 52.7m, beam 14.6m. The Welland Canal had locks that were 45.7 meters long, 8.1 meters wide, and 3.1 meters deep, so these ships won't fit through the canal. either. In January 1862, Britain had no ironclads that could fit through the Welland Canal and all the designs they did have took more than 90 days to build.

Funny thing, by many definitions the Monitor type was also a floating battery - the British "floating batteries" were called that because the term ironclad had not yet been coined, and were considerably larger in total displacement than Monitor was.

In addition, we have evidence from here
http://www.shipscribe.com/marvap/630c.html
that small ironclads can be designed and built at extremely high speed. These are French ironclads, it's true, not British, but they're small enough to easily fit down the Welland canal and the first one took 26 days to go from ordering to delivery.

 

[Unknown]

More generally, though, what you don't seem to grasp is that in several occasions during the writing of this timeline I deliberately allowed the Union leeway which is ahistorical, so as to make up for any unrecognized biases of my own:

• The British miss attacking a vulnerable port (Mystic) despite knowing about it.
• The Union retains roughly historical rifle production (but not imports)
• The Union's gunpowder supply lasts through to June, despite my own research and accounting strongly suggesting they would have run out.
• The Union produces heavy guns and heavy rifles much faster than OTL.
• The Union produces ironclads faster than OTL and has many more such projects going at once.
• The British are just plain passive for the most part, on land.
• After Fort Delaware the Union have all their naval forts fully rearmed, even though this would take far more guns than they had in stock.
• The Union deploy functional mines in about two months from a standing start.

If you think BROS is pro-Union, read Harry Harrison's series of books about the Trent Affair sometime; that makes BROS, no kidding, look pro-British by comparison...

 

[Saphroneth]

If you think BROS is pro-Union, read Harry Harrison's series of books about the Trent Affair sometime; that makes BROS, no kidding, look pro-British by comparison...

They seem cut from a very similar cloth, honestly. Stars and Stripes is certainly more out-and-out ridiculous, but BROS is insidiously mendacious.


Anyway, hopefully that gets across that I've tried to be more fair than most (if not all?) Trent-type works that have been formally published. Now, I need to find a good base map for doing the Canada campaign mapping...

 

[Cockroach]

Stars and Stripes is certainly more out-and-out ridiculous, but BROS is insidiously mendacious.

I suppose the obvious analogues are:

Stars and Stripes is the poorly made B movie... you can switch your brain off and enjoy it on a purely popcorn level or you can take ironic enjoyment in how bad it is.

BROS is the highly biased "documentary" made by pompus windbag with delusions of grandeur and a broken smart phone for a camera. If you enjoy it you probably need to take a one way trip to the local nuthouse.

 

[galveston bay]

Funny thing, by many definitions the Monitor type was also a floating battery - the British "floating batteries" were called that because the term ironclad had not yet been coined, and were considerably larger in total displacement than Monitor was.

.

by tonnage, draft, mission and activity the Monitor was an armored gunboat (as were her successors)

the New Ironsides was an armored sloop

the Union didn't bother with anything bigger as historically they weren't needed

 

[edgeworthy]

I suppose the obvious analogues are:

Stars and Stripes is the poorly made B movie... you can switch your brain off and enjoy it on a purely popcorn level or you can take ironic enjoyment in how bad it is.

BROS is the highly biased "documentary" made by pompus windbag with delusions of grandeur and a broken smart phone for a camera. If you enjoy it you probably need to take a one way trip to the local nuthouse.

We do not hate Stars and Stripes, we mock it, and we gain much enjoyment from making fun of it.
We are often offended by it as well, much in the style of The Patriot.

BROS tends to invoke the universal response of "Americans!"

(We then mock it and enjoy doing so)

 

[Saphroneth]

by tonnage, draft, mission and activity the Monitor was an armored gunboat (as were her successors)

She could equally be referred to as a floating battery, as her official designation on the US Navy Register was "United States Battery Monitor". Gunboats do more things than the Crimean floating batteries could, but which of those things could Monitor do that the Aetna could not?

the New Ironsides was an armored sloop

But she was so poorly manoeuverable that she had to be towed into position during some bombardment missions - that functionally makes her not dissimilar from the Crimean floating batteries, and she also has a similar broadside.

Depending on what the term "floating battery" is supposed to mean, it could be that Monitor qualifies or it could be New Ironsides qualifies. It's very hard, however, to come up with a description for "Floating Battery" which the Crimean Ironclads would fit but which neither Monitor nor New Ironsides fits. (Without, that is, making the definition impractically narrow).


The underlying reason why Thunderbolt, Aetna et al were called "floating batteries" is simply that "ironclad" was a word not coined until 1862. If the term had been around they would have been called "ironclads".

the Union didn't bother with anything bigger as historically they weren't needed

Manifestly they did build bigger - the Roanoke was a conversion, but took a year and was terrible, while the Dictator and Puritan were certainly attempts at building battleship-size ironclads.
Larger ships would have been useful for things like attacking Charleston, where the New Ironsides had a "terriffic battery" by comparison to all other USN armoured ships and was considered very useful for that. So either there was a useful need they didn't see, or they decided not to build larger for some other constraint - like, say, problems with trying to build something that big in the amount of time they had.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

She could equally be referred to as a floating battery, as her official designation on the US Navy Register was "United States Battery Monitor".

Not just her official designation, either.

It's very hard, however, to come up with a description for "Floating Battery" which the Crimean Ironclads would fit but which neither Monitor nor New Ironsides fits.

Role works fairly well: a floating battery is designed primarily to engage fortresses and fixed defences, or to act as a fixed defence in itself. The Stevens battery was a battery (unsurprisingly), but the Monitor and New Ironsides- which were built in large part to engage the Virginia as well as to assist with bombardments- weren't. Similarly, Virginia was there to break the Union blockade, so isn't a battery.

However, people need to avoid conflating what a ship was designed to do with what it was capable of doing. The Crimean ironclads would certainly be capable of engaging other ironclad ships, but it wasn't their primary purpose when they were built.

(We then mock it and enjoy doing so)

Actually, I wouldn't say I've enjoyed working on BROS. I mean, I've found it satisfying to pull it apart and show just how much is wrong with it, but there's a real core of nastiness in it (which I think came across in the author's interactions, both here and elsewhere).

 

[Saphroneth]

Role works fairly well: a floating battery is designed primarily to engage fortresses and fixed defences, or to act as a fixed defence in itself. The Stevens battery was a battery (unsurprisingly), but the Monitor and New Ironsides- which were built in large part to engage the Virginia as well as to assist with bombardments- weren't. Similarly, Virginia was there to break the Union blockade, so isn't a battery.

That's fair enough, though I think the later Monitor-type vessels (e.g. the Passaics or the like) which spent most of their life bombarding forts might give them the battery designation.

However, people need to avoid conflating what a ship was designed to do with what it was capable of doing. The Crimean ironclads would certainly be capable of engaging other ironclad ships, but it wasn't their primary purpose when they were built.

And this is of course very true. Similarly the Warrior wasn't built to fight forts, but would be quite good at it before the advent of Palliser shells.

 

[galveston bay]

Larger ships would have been useful for things like attacking Charleston, where the New Ironsides had a "terriffic battery" by comparison to all other USN armoured ships and was considered very useful for that. So either there was a useful need they didn't see, or they decided not to build larger for some other constraint - like, say, problems with trying to build something that big in the amount of time they had.

they would have had a lot of trouble getting over the bar at Charleston and elsewhere

really deep water ports don't show up until routine dredging becomes an option, particularly in the South (as most of the ports are at the mouths of rivers and constant silting is a problem)

 

[Saphroneth]

they would have had a lot of trouble getting over the bar at Charleston and elsewhere

New Ironsides, draft 15 foot 8 in. There was at least a couple of feet of leeway during spring high tide, but more importantly the New Ironsides had a block coefficient of 0.72 - and, without overly impacting her draft, could have been made a few feet wider and a fair deal longer. If she'd been as long as the Niagara she could have been over 7,000 tons displacement, for example, giving her a much greater fighting displacement.

Of course, Dictator shows they were willing to build ships of 20 foot draft and 4,400 tons - it's just that it took two years.