If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)

[Richter von Manthofen]

I think that a force that has 1/3 men available will not necessarily have smaller armies. They will concentrate their manpower in fewer armies of probably just a bist smaller size than the larger nation. So Canada Might easily have a main army of 60-70k men and a few hovering as 25-30K.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think that a force that has 1/3 men available will not necessarily have smaller armies. They will concentrate their manpower in fewer armies of probably just a bist smaller size than the larger nation. So Canada Might easily have a main army of 60-70k men and a few hovering as 25-30K.

As it happens, in the case of the Confederacy (with smaller manpower than the Union) they concentrated a fairly substantial fraction of their manpower in the Army of Northern Virginia (with good reason, if that had been convincingly beaten it'd be the end of the line). The reason they couldn't concentrate more is that they had a problem of guarding the coasts.

The British and Canadians have essentially five primary points of contact with the Union, and most everything else is handled by boats with guns (i.e. gun boats and the like):

1) Sarnia/Detroit. This got a British army corps of about 13,000 All Ranks and support from about the same amount of militia. (So 27,000 all told)
2) Niagara Isthmus. This got a little bit more in the way of militia and likewise a British army corps - mainly to protect the vital Welland. So about 30,000.
3) Kingston. Largely handled by militia with perhaps a division of British troops (if that), the main defence is simply that there's a patrolled river in the way. Call it 15,000.
4) Montreal. This is the big one because it's the point the US concentrated their main invading army and because the British/Canadian target is not too far from the border. This one has perhaps 40K troops, counting three divisions of British troops (one corps plus one division) and most of the Lower Canada militia.
(Quebec is too far off to easily attack, though it'd have the remains of the militia).
5) Maritimes/Maine. Handled by the Maritimes militia, not Canada proper, and the Maritimes militia happens to be both large and quite good. This one's probably on the order of 40K as well (a British army corps and a lot of militia).

The numbers are a bit woolly because in some cases casualties were suffered and in other cases the numbers include short-term emergency militia. The key point though is that the real punch of the contact points where combat is expected (1,2,4,5) is their British army corps, who have roughly the logistic footprint of a small Union army corps and roughly the firepower of the entire Army of the Potomac (though they're less durable than an entire army if they can be held in place long enough to actually inflict casualties).
The combination is actually very hard for the Union to deal with, they have real problems concentrating enough combat power to stop the British from punching through them and if they do then they're so compact that their armies can be outflanked easily by the militia.
I'd say a really good manoeuvrist like McClellan could do something useful with fixing and turning movements (his Army of the Potomac as he had ready to take to the Peninsula would probably be able to manoeuvre by wings and overtax a British army corps), but the generals who actually won the OTL Civil War (specifically Grant, Meade and the like) had a distinct tendency for frontal attacks and trying to win with mass and attrition - and that's a way to utterly break your own army unless you have so many troops you can run the British out of bullets...

 

[Fiver]

But Canada doesn't have to spread everyone over such a large area. The correct operative number is 1/3 of 300,000, which is 100,000 present - more than I plan on using

British North America could, with privation, probably support a total of 100,000 men in the field, but just like the Confederacy did not have its 300,000 men massed in a single army, British North America could not had its 100,00 men massed in a single army. It's basic logistics. Also, how are you dealing with the fact that for the sedentary militia "the period of active service was limited to six months" and that in the 50 years leading up to the Trent Incident, "Little attempt had been made to develop or improve it; no provision was made for arming, clothing, or paying it; and the annual muster had become little more than a civilian enrolment, inconvenient because of the interruption of business, and sometimes excessively convivial."

Did the Americans have these plans in place in OTL?
As for the list:
1) Yes, but they have major problems arming them.
2) What can they do? All their iron comes from Britain.
3) They had already ordered up everything they could find.
4) No OTL plans existed for more than a few regiments, so they have to scramble.
5) They do, but there's not a lot of heavy guns to go around so they do as much upgrading as OTL.
6) They cancel it.
7) They do not recall the blockading squdrons.
8) Lincoln does as OTL, and turns to the Library of Congress for guidance.

We're not talking about OTL, we're talking about TTL, where the only response that you show the Union makes to the breaking off of diplomatic relations and possible war is for the Union to call up another 200,000 troops. You show us nothing about the Union doing anything to increase domestic production of arms or ammunition. You show us nothing about the Union trying to find new foreign sources of arms and ammunition. Your claim that "All their iron comes from Britain" is wrong - in 1860 the US produced 821,000 tons of iron and imported 395,000. Your claim that the Union had no troops nor arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border is also clearly wrong, at a minimum there are the 15,000 troops of the Burnside Expedition which you previously did not mention being cancelled, plus forces from the Department of New England and the Department of New York. You show us nothing about the Union trying to upgrade harbor defenses along the Atlantic coast or the Great Lakes with greater threat of war, more would have been done more than in OTL, even if only a little. The Library of Congress is a research library, not an advisory board. And I'd expect the Union Navy to at least alert the Naval Squadrons that war is possible,

Was that from the base of the Chesapeake or further up?

The Immortalite left Annapolis on the 22, cleared Chesapeaake Bay on the 23rd, reached Bermuda after dark on the 27th, and entered harbor on the 28th.

It's actually how fast the British declared war during the Crimea - first working day after the news of the ultimatum being rejected.
As for knowing Wilkes acted without orders, that's not the issue - what they know is that, by requesting arbitration, the Lincoln administration have stated that they believe the law is on their side.

True, but that's not an outright rejection, so I'd expect at least some debate unless the British Cabinet was thoroughly convinced that the law was on the Union's side and thus was sure to win any arbitration.

1) According to my source, the British had this plan already in place - to order ironclads straight off to deliver in 90 days. They'd done the planning over the course of December.
2) Because the British planned to attack US harbours, just as they built the Aetna and Thunderbolt class to do, and because the British planned to place ironclads on the Canadian lakes.
3) You onlu need to tweak the Aetna class a little. I did actually SpringSharp out a possible design, the Zodiacs. (Aetna herself had 1.83 m draft)
4) As above, I SpringSharped it. The Aetnas had backed 4" armour.
5) Monitor was a terrible design. As for the Aetna class, Terror crossed the Atlantic successfully before Monitor was even launched.
6) Monitor was a terrible design, and a modified Aetna class would beat them on the last three. I'm also not sure how fast you're imagining the Union building these ironclads.

The British planned to attack US harbors, but you were claiming they were also planning on sending ironclads through the Welland Canal and that 3 days after declaring war, the British had completed and approved plans for ironclads that could fit through the Welland canal using armor originally designed for HMS Warrior. The Aetna class was between 52.6 and 56.7 meters long - The Welland Canal had locks that were 45.7 meters long. The Aetna class was between 13.4 and 13.8 meters in beam - The Welland Canal had locks that were 8.1 meters wide. Neither Aetna class, nor any other ship that Britain had was capable of fitting through the Welland Canal, and it would take more than tweaking - the Aetna has to lose 7 to 11 meters in length and about 6 meters in beam. And the Aetna class - "At 200 yards such vessels could not resist a 68-pounder with a 16 lb charge." Any ironnclad that could fit through the Welland Canal would be inferior to the Monitor in speed, maneuverability, armament, armor, and seaworthiness.

But the penetration is what I'm highlighting, not the hit rate.

After the tower had been hit 18 times over the course of the first day, 'The tower was but superficially injured".

 

[Saphroneth]

British North America could, with privation, probably support a total of 100,000 men in the field, but just like the Confederacy did not have its 300,000 men massed in a single army, British North America could not had its 100,00 men massed in a single army. It's basic logistics.

Actually, the Province of Canada could support about 100,000 in the field with privation. The Maritimes could probably support another 50,000 or so because their militia is both well trained and active.

Also, how are you dealing with the fact that for the sedentary militia "the period of active service was limited to six months" and that in the 50 years leading up to the Trent Incident, "Little attempt had been made to develop or improve it; no provision was made for arming, clothing, or paying it; and the annual muster had become little more than a civilian enrolment, inconvenient because of the interruption of business, and sometimes excessively convivial."

By not expecting the militia to fight in the open field - that's the job of the British long service regulars - and by having the militia train continuously for about four months before their first use.

We're not talking about OTL, we're talking about TTL, where the only response that you show the Union makes to the breaking off of diplomatic relations and possible war is for the Union to call up another 200,000 troops.

If you can provide examples of OTL Union planning to this effect, then I'll be happy to factor it in. The Union doesn't have much time between the PoD and the British declaration of war.

You show us nothing about the Union doing anything to increase domestic production of arms or ammunition.

That's because they'd already ordered well over half a million rifles domestically - of those well over half are never delivered at all in the entire ACW. The US is tapped out for domestic arms production.

ED: found the numbers.

In the period to July 1862, after sixteen months of war, Springfield Armoury had produced 109,810 rifles.[6] The private sector, from which the government had ordered 854,000 Springfield rifles by the end of 1861, fell lamentably short of matching this performance.[7] By 30 June 1862, they had delivered only 14,267 Springfield rifles: the total of all weapons received by the Federal government from private firms, including ‘common sportsman’s rifles’ and smoothbore muskets, was 30,788.[8] Of the 854,000 weapons contracted for by January 1862, only 205,000 would be delivered before the end of the war in April 1865.[9]

You show us nothing about the Union trying to find new foreign sources of arms and ammunition.

But they're already purchasing everything they can - "not a gun more could be purchased if all the states were in the market and the price doubled".

Your claim that "All their iron comes from Britain" is wrong - in 1860 the US produced 821,000 tons of iron and imported 395,000.

Sorry, maybe I wasn't clear. All their gun iron comes from Marshall and Mills ironworks in Sheffield.
This is one of my main sources.


ED: here's the big quote:

Most damningly, the Springfield Armoury – the only government armoury remaining to the North, responsible for 89% of the modern weapons manufactured to 30 June 1862 – obtained its iron from England.[107]

Although much more publicity is given to the adoption of American machinery by the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield, the Springfield Armoury had been envious of British barrel-manufacturing techniques long before the British commission made their inspection. In America, barrels were formed and welded under a trip hammer, a laborious process which produced barrels which frequently failed under proof, while British barrels welded by rolling were quicker to produce and more reliable.[108] Attempts to roll-weld barrels using American machinery and iron failed: it was only in 1858, when the Springfield Armoury bought an English rolling mill, 50 tons of English iron and a Birmingham operative by the name of William Onions to supervise the work, that the Armoury successfully rolled its first barrels.[109] Onions remained the only trained barrel-roller at Springfield until the outbreak of the Civil War, when necessity led to the importation of four more machines and the training of other workers in the art. But English iron was as important as English machines to this roll-welding technique: only the iron produced by a single English firm was sufficiently homogeneous, contained the right quantity of phosphorous, and possessed a ‘fine, uniform distribution of slag particles’ with ‘relatively low liquidus temperature’.[110] As a biography of one of the leading American industrialists makes clear:

no first-class gun-metal was available in the United States. The supply of such metal had to be imported at high cost from Europe. A little came from Scandinavia, but most of it from Great Britain… during months when the British attitude became more and more alarming, the United States remained dependent on Marshall & Mills. The British ironmasters had the formula; the Americas did not.[111]
Put simply, at the time of the Trent Affair the United States could not produce a modern musket without British assistance. This is why the statistics for gun-barrel exports are so high in early 1863: after Union industry had tooled up to produce locks and stocks, it still needed British barrels. It was only after Hewitt travelled to Staffordshire on a personal project of industrial espionage, pleading with off-the-clock Marshall and Mills workmen in a local pub to give him the secret of making their iron, that the United States was capable of producing its own gun-barrels.[112] At the end of 1863, Edwin Stanton proclaimed proudly:

Among the arts thus improved is the manufacture of wrought-iron, now rivalling the finest qualities of the iron of Sweden, Norway, and England… This country until the present year has relied upon those countries for material to make gun-barrels, bridle bits, car-wheel tires, and other articles requiring iron of finest quality[113]
Not only did Stanton disguise how this improvement had come about, but his confident statement disguised the significant flaws Trenton iron possessed. By February 1864, Springfield was complaining about the uneven quality of the new product; Remington ‘found inspection losses on contract barrels so great as to make it necessary either to abandon this iron or ask that the inspection be made less rigorous.’[114] Even after Trenton began to produce iron, British exports remained significant. They were almost the sole source of steel for gun barrels, as well as producing the majority of files required to finish domestic guns.[115]

A Trent War would have given the Union two choices. Its first choice would have been to let its arms factories fall silent while it attempted to stumble upon the secret of marking Marshall iron. However, as the complaints of 1864 show, even stealing the secret from Britain proved to be no panacea. Its second choice would have been to scrap all its expensively acquired barrel-rolling machinery and revert to trip-hammers, a decision which would have meant a temporary stoppage of business for the Springfield Armoury and probably a permanent one for several private manufacturers who had invested heavily in plant and machinery. However, trip-hammering would have produced an inferior product, dramatically reducing the number of barrels which passed proof, and in turn increasing the cost and decreasing the quantity of Springfields available. More critically, it was the shortage and poor quality of domestic iron used for trip-hammered barrels that had persuaded the government to move towards roll-welding in the first place.[116] If the supply had been inadequate pre-war, it was hardly likely to be sufficient to meet the Union’s threefold new challenge: fighting an additional foe in Britain, as well as a better-armed Confederacy, while simultaneously stepping-up domestic production to replace a sizeable proportion of the European imports on which it historically relied.

Your claim that the Union had no troops nor arms that they could move to defend the Canadian border is also clearly wrong, at a minimum there are the 15,000 troops of the Burnside Expedition which you previously did not mention being cancelled, plus forces from the Department of New England and the Department of New York.

I did not make that claim; I said the US had no plans for more than a few regiments. They can of course send troops, but they'll have to organize this largely post-PoD. (This they do, in my TL - they start running into force allocation problems, though.)

You show us nothing about the Union trying to upgrade harbor defenses along the Atlantic coast or the Great Lakes with greater threat of war, more would have been done more than in OTL, even if only a little.

But there's only so many guns to go around - in many cases I use fort armament states as of OTL late 1862, not OTL Trent. In the case of Boston I assume that enough guns arrive to completely arm the forts; this is a rule I use generally, except with Fort Delaware and Fort Monroe (both of which are hit quite early on and in the case of Fort Delaware I use the late-1862 case).
In effect I assume that the Union does do this upgrading. They just can't upgrade with weapons that can actually stop a determined US attack (the 15" Rodman and 8" Parrott, of which - as of March 1862 OTL - one each exist.)

As for the Great Lakes, again I assume the Union does the upgrading, and in most cases the British do not challenge the defences up here except with ironclads. (Though I don't bother detailing the gunboat war, which is essentially about even until British ironclads show up.)

The Library of Congress is a research library, not an advisory board.

Perhaps so, but it's Lincoln's OTL reaction to when McClellan had Typhoid fever:

this quote from Russel H. Beatie's second volume on the Army of the Potomac, dealing with the period when McClellan was down with typhoid:
'The president had relied on Scott. He was gone. Now, he relied on McClellan; but he was incapacitated. He turned to the Library of Congress- it would always respond- for standard texts on strategy and military affairs, including Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science.' (page 433; note 13 cites Miers, Lincoln Day by Day, January 8 1862)

So in January 1862, the President of the United States was reading a book saying that in the event of war with Canada it was vital to attack Montreal.

And I'd expect the Union Navy to at least alert the Naval Squadrons that war is possible

Either the Union abandons the blockade or they do not. If they don't it's largely as I displayed it; if they do before they get confirmation it's war, then they would have done so in OTL (IMO).

True, but that's not an outright rejection, so I'd expect at least some debate unless the British Cabinet was thoroughly convinced that the law was on the Union's side and thus was sure to win any arbitration.

The British ultimatum made clear that any reaction except full compliance would mean war.

The British planned to attack US harbors, but you were claiming they were also planning on sending ironclads through the Welland Canal and that 3 days after declaring war, the British had completed and approved plans for ironclads that could fit through the Welland canal using armor originally designed for HMS Warrior.

No, I'm claiming that they were planning on sending ironclads through the Welland canal and that they had plans to send tenders to the various shipbuilders. That's pretty much how the British operated.

As for using the Warrior armour, it's the simple option - Warrior only used A1 quality plate and a lot of plate batches were rejected. Using the rejected batches on ships is perfectly sensible.

And the Aetna class - "At 200 yards such vessels could not resist a 68-pounder with a 16 lb charge." Any ironnclad that could fit through the Welland Canal would be inferior to the Monitor in speed, maneuverability, armament, armor, and seaworthiness.

The Aetna class plates were hammered wrought iron - the Warrior plates (which I propose using) were rolled wrought iron, greatly superior. As for the 16 lb charge on the 68 pounder, you're talking about perhaps the most powerful armour piercing gun in the world at the time - the original design for Monitor could not resist it when it used steel shot, the energy density in foot-tons per inch of circumference is too great for 8" cast iron laminate (such as on Monitor).

For comparison, the 68 pounder with wrought iron shot (standard issue) penetrates four inches of unbacked rolled wrought iron at 150-250 yards using standard service charges of 16 lbs; the 11" with wrought iron shot (not standard Union issue and in fact considered dangerous) penetrates more like 3 inches at best, even using the late-war 20 lb charge instead of the 1862-era 15 lb charge.

When fully backed, 4.5" plate of Warrior's type resists at around 60 foot-tons per inch.

So let's take the Wellandmax design that I used Springsharp for, the Zodiac class. I'll be the first to say the armour is extremely heavy (141 tons of the total 878 tons displacement) and the form is very boxy to get maximum displacement for the underwater dimensions, but it can mount 8 68 pounders total (half that of the Aetna class) and manage a speed of about five knots. (They'd need a tow upriver, but that's fine.)
Slower than Monitor? Yes. Less manoeuverable? Debatable, actually - depends on the water depth, and Monitor was very clumsy. Armanent? Superior to Monitor, four 68 pounders per broadside beats two 11" turret guns owing to energy, energy density, speed of reloading and volume of fire. Amour? Superior to Monitor again - Monitor's armour was 5% silica and was essentially cast-iron, and was also laminate (the worst kind) and unbacked (which is bad for the resistance of the armour).
Seaworthy? The Terror crossed the Atlantic in a fighting condition, and these ones could be caulked to be gotten across (as was done in the Crimea for the Aetna class, possibly unnecessarily). They all had higher draft than the Monitor, and did not sink under tow as she did.


Incidentally, the source you quote is very much simplifying things. From DK Brown (Before the Ironclad) we get the actual account of the firing test, where:

The next trials, in October and November 1858, involved firing against the armour of two of the floating batteries, Erebus with an iron hull and Meteor with a wooden hull, and was intended to compare the effectiveness of the different materials in resisting the impact of shot. The Erebus had iron armour of 4in nominal thickness (probably rolled too thinly) over 5 ½ in of oak. Its effectiveness was enhanced by sloping the side at 30 degrees to the vertical. Behind this was a ⅝ in iron plate supported on iron frames. (From the drawings, these were 4 ½ in deep, probably angle bars with 3in x 3in backing angle in a ‘Z’ shape.)

The firing ship was again the Snapper, at 400yds, in the ‘1,200yd’ creek at Fareham. The aiming point was in line with the main mast, between the ports and 2ft above the waterline. The first hit was from a 32lb shot with a 10lb charge, which caused a dent and a few small cracks. A 68lb shot with a 16lb charge broke out a piece 11in x 12in, but did not penetrate. The side was bulged in over an area 3 ½ ft x 3ft to a depth of 1 ¼ in. The second 68lb shot broke the lower corner of the plate, then broke up, and the fragment pierced the side. The inner skin was torn over an area of 2ft x 14in, a beam knee was broken and driven in 2ft and two frames were cracked. Many rivets and bolts were broken and 700 pieces of iron were picked up on the gun deck.

The Meteor fared much better. She also had a nominal 4in of iron backed by 6in oak. Behind this, the timbers were 10in deep, 4in apart, and filled in solid with another layer of oak behind this, 9in thick at the top, thinning to 4in at the bottom. The armour was attached by bolts with their heads countersunk into the armour and passing right through the side and lining, fastened by washers and nuts inside. Snapper’s first shot was from a 32pdr causing no significant damage. Three 68lb shot, one of which was of wrought iron, caused some cracking and a few pieces of armour were broken off. The shots themselves were broken but nothing penetrated the side. Two or three bolts were ‘started’, but did not break. The next day began with two 32lb shot which caused little damage. Two 68lb shot caused more extensive cracking of the armour and broke a bolt. The shots broke up and did not penetrate. Finally, a sand-filled shell was fired from the 68pdr with a 12lb charge at a range of 300yds, which did no harm.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 5704-5721). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.

From the foregoing experiments, the advantage of the Meteor class of battery over the Erebus has been fully established. Throughout the experiments with the former, it does not appear that the damage inboard would at any time have proved seriously inconvenient to the men fighting the guns; whereas with the latter vessel, not only did the shot on one occasion penetrate her side, scattering the fragments over the gun deck, but every hit, not penetrating, caused bolt heads and nuts to be scattered about the deck, doing apparently as much damage as a volley of grapeshot.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 5722-5726). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.

Note that the Meteor (with wooden backing, as did Aetna) was indeed able to resist 68 pounder shots fired with 16lb charge, with 0 penetrations out of 5 shots fired. The trials showed conclusively that backing is very important for an ironclad of the day; Warrior and Aetna had sufficient backing, Erebus and Monitor did not. (If you read the TL, you'll see that I describe this very problem - spall - extensively.)

After the tower had been hit 18 times over the course of the first day, 'The tower was but superficially injured".

Yes, because the tower is ten feet thick. The masonry of US forts tended to be 4-6 feet thick.
What I'm talking about happening here to the Union forts is essentially what happened to Fort Pulaski - just with British guns instead of Union, and with guns with a much larger bursting charge.

 

[Saphroneth]

Oh, almost forgot. "Forces from the Department of New England and the Department of New York" means taking troops from two departments which have, combined, 11,000 men Present For Duty in December 1861. They actually need an infusion of troops just to defend against a possible British landing.

 

[Knightmare]

You know, as "fascinating" as these debates are, could we move on?

 

[Saphroneth]

You know, as "fascinating" as these debates are, could we move on?

It's useful to make sure that I've not missed something obvious, but you have a valid point.


So, here's my plans for the next couple of months:

Spoiler

The formation of a committe on the British Army issue.
Preliminary design work on the Monarch and the Captain!
Things in China which are not a million miles off guessing
Prez. McClellan being competent, therefore boring
The continuation of Robert E. Lee's political career
Napoleon III being mildly annoyed at the rotation rate required for French troops to keep his committment to his ally going
Belated handover of the Ionian Islands to Greece
Danish army reform (long story short, they go for repeaters - a choice of mixed value)
Probably Puritan gets to actually appear doing something?
Possibly the death of Dickens in an accident - not a rail one, though, just malicious serendipity
And, perhaps, things Kicking Off in Japan.

 

[diestormlie]

Why Dickens?

 

[edgeworthy]

Why Dickens?

Good point, IRL he died young at 58.
And he did visit the US, both before and after the Civil War.

Spoiler

He also had some very un-complimentary things to say about the United States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Notes#Critique_of_US_society_at_the_time comparing the slums of New York poorly with the East End of London, and taking issue with a hostile press, and Americans pirating his work and violating international copyrights, how the wheel turns! And having problems with Federal Tax Collectors

 

[cerebropetrologist]

how are you dealing with the fact that for the sedentary militia "the period of active service was limited to six months"

But it wasn't.
'LXV: The Militiaman so taken or drafted for actual service from the Sedentary Militia, shall serve during one year unless sooner disbanded, and may then be replaced by others taken as aforesaid, and shall not be liable to be again taken until all others in the same class shall be taken; but the men in Volunteer Militia Companies shall serve for the time for which they have engaged to serve, which time shall not be less than five years… No Volunteer shall leave the service, either with or without notice, at any time when the Militia are called out, unless he be regularly discharged or have served out the time for which he engaged.' (1855 Militia Act; my emphasis)

Even if you hadn't been wrong, it's hard to see why the Canadians should struggle with six months if the Union didn't struggle with a Federal service limit of 90 days. Section 4: 'no officer, non-commissioned officer or private of the militia shall be compelled to serve more than three months in any one year, nor more than in due rotation with every other able-bodied man of the same rank in the battalion to which he belongs.' (1792 Militia Act)

The Immortalite left Annapolis on the 22, cleared Chesapeaake Bay on the 23rd, reached Bermuda after dark on the 27th, and entered harbor on the 28th.

The Immortalite left Chesapeake bay at 3PM on 23 January, in the knowledge that there would be no war, and arrived at Bermuda at 2PM on the 27th. Are you really concerned that it's described as arriving on 8 January with no time of arrival given, when it would have left the Chesapeake bay at daylight on 5 January? Even if you insist that the notification must have been on the 8th, don't you think it's possible that Immortalite might have sent a boat in or passed a message via the pilot in order to let Admiral Milne know as soon as possible?

(Incidentally, Immortalite took ten days to reach the Chesapeake, not eleven. It left Bermuda at daylight on the 26th, and arrived on the evening of 4 January. I wasn't going to point this out, but either a day matters or it doesn't.)

I'd expect at least some debate unless the British Cabinet was thoroughly convinced that the law was on the Union's side and thus was sure to win any arbitration.

They would reject arbitration because the Union is so obviously wrong, not because it's right. Think about it: you come home from work and find someone sat in your car trying to hot-wire it. You tell them to get out; they suggest that a neutral third party be invited to establish the proper facts of who the car belongs to. What would your reaction be?

After the tower had been hit 18 times over the course of the first day, 'The tower was but superficially injured".

Maybe Milne realised that 18 hits was around the number than a single floating battery was capable of achieving in two broadsides. He might also have realised that 163 rounds hit the tower over the four days of the test, but 68 were from 32pdrs, 11 were 68pdr hollow shot, and 44 68pdr shell- none of which were considered optimal for attacking forts.

You know, as "fascinating" as these debates are, could we move on?

Sorry, but it's worth thrashing some of these things out for the eventual version 2. If people don't want chatter distracting from the story, it might be worth using the ignore list temporarily.

 

[Saphroneth]

Good point, IRL he died young at 58.

He was in a very nasty train crash at 53 (June 1865), one which came close to killing him. It's malandipity.

 

[diestormlie]

He was in a very nasty train crash at 53 (June 1865), one which came close to killing him. It's malandipity.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sadly not everything in an AH goes better than in the OTL - even in a somewhat optimistic one like this.

 

[Saphroneth]

13 July

An access agreement is negotiated between Poland (referred to in the documents as "Congress Poland" in order not to say for certain that the state is independent) and the Kingdom of Prussia, for access up the Motława river. This provides Poland with an important route to the sea.


15 July

Cowper Coles presents his design sketches for the Captain to the turret committee. Much to his disappointment, they do not immediately declare them a work of genius - instead finding exception with the freeboard, the rigging, various minor features and (especially) the strange-seeming turret design.
Coles' turrets here are essentially enclosures on the centreline of the ship, and in order to achieve this they surround the masts themselves - each mast pokes up through the middle of a turret, of which there are three, and the design thus allows for six guns to fire on the broadside or two directly ahead or astern.

The solution in Monarch is much simpler (the two turrets are at either end of the superstructure, with masts not constrained by turret placement), but does mean that there are blind arcs - in order to shoot on these arcs the guns would have to fire shells right through the masts.


19 July

A maritime accident takes place, where the Bohemian runs aground off the coast of Ireland in the middle of a storm. The ship's damage is too extensive to save her, and she breaks up after about an hour - during which roughly two hundred and sixty of the three hundred and twenty passengers are rescued.
Among those who does not survive is the author Charles Dickens, whose efforts to save his young lover Ellen Teman result in her survival and his death. The news of their relationship will cause something of a scandal in the Victorian world, though muted by the circumstances in which it has been revealed.


22 July

Napoleon III is apprised of the number of French soldiers who arrive in Mexico each year to keep up the French commitment there (replacing those returning home, usually as a result of some illness). The numbers are mildly worrying, though it does mean that much of the French army is gaining experience of dispersed deployment.


27 July

The Danish Army, after much consideration, determines to replace or augment their muzzle-loading rifles with a large supply of the Spencer repeating rifle. It is hoped that this transition will reduce the danger from future engagements with Prussian infantry, as it would permit Danish troops to produce a similar if not greater overall volume of fire.


30 July

Much to the surprise of some, President McClellan has been proving to be quietly competent. (Some are more surprised about the quiet than the competence.)
On this date, the first of the Long Island forts is laid out - these defensive works are anticipated to take several years to fully complete, on account of the many demands on the time of construction workers and the high level of quality required.


3 August

It is moved in Parliament that a committee on Army Reform should be established, particularly in light of the relative proximity of the expirations of the enlistments of most soldiers associated with the post-Crimea buildup (whose enlistments would end around 1867-8).


5 August

Ericsson is asked somewhat sarcastically if the Puritan can actually hit targets more than 300-400 yards away, a reference to how his Passaic design was found in later analysis to have a 15 inch gun slated for a port designed for a smaller weapon. This would completely prevent the gun elevating or being aimed, thus making it essentially worthless against distant targets - the first bounce of the cannonball would render it unable to penetrate even British armour of 1862, while a shell would be destroyed.
The engineer assures his questioner that the guns will elevate, and indeed that they will be quite accurate at long range. (This last is perhaps an exaggeration.)


8 August

The Duke of Cambridge is assured that he will not be forced to enact the recommendations of the Army committee - rather, that the committee will issue strong recommendations (and that any recommendations he strongly disapproves of will go to a full Parliamentary vote). This alleviates some of his worries.

 

[Saphroneth]

So a bit of thought on the evolution of the British Army into the 1870s, TTL. (And the French.)


The first thing to point to is artillery - with experience of both SBML guns (Crimean War) and RBL guns (American War) in quick succession the British can see all the genuine advantages of the Armstrong gun, and can as such frame their requirements.

Basically, I imagine their requirements for any future replacement gun to be that the gun must perform notably better than the existing Armstrong guns on the gestalt of ease of use, cost, accuracy, sustained ROF, burst ROF, range, penetration and bursting charge (as well as the properties of the more specialized shells). So they'll hold off on Armstrong-Elswick field guns until they're more developed, but might replace their position guns sooner (as the flaws of the Armstrong gun are greater in larger pieces).


The approach to the rifle is pretty similar. The Snider's good, and if the Brits stick to their historical trajectory they won't replace it for nearly a decade (with the Martini-Henry, capable of a longer range by way of higher muzzle velocity - and also using smaller bullets, thus easier logistically and to load) but if someone comes up with a really spectacular improvement they'll go for it.



As for the French, some time fairly soon the Chassepot is likely to come along. This is a huge military development and will probably provoke a shift by the French towards the firing line all by itself, it's got a higher rate of fire (at full speed) than the Martini-Henry and is pretty accurate. In the OTL Franco-Prussian War, the Germans were actually defeated at long range by Chassepot fire - the thing which let them close the range to where their own weapons were effective was the support of Krupp artillery pieces and the sheer ammunition consumption of the Chassepot.

TTL the French are looking very interested in Creusot steel artillery, somewhat earlier than OTL. They might end up with a slightly bipolar doctrine, where they insist on both long ranged fire on the defensive and bayonet assaults on the offensive...



ED: and the issue of the organization of the British Army. I have it somewhat tentatively decided that localization is going to take place, but not to the extent of the OTL reforms. Instead regiments will be grouped into regional depots (e.g. between six and fifteen battalions sharing one depot) and the idea is that it will be possible to enlist into a regiment, a depot, or the army as a whole.
The result will, hopefully, not have too many of the flaws of Cardwell.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Basically, I imagine their requirements for any future replacement gun to be that the gun must perform notably better than the existing Armstrong guns on the gestalt of ease of use, cost, accuracy, sustained ROF, burst ROF, range, penetration and bursting charge (as well as the properties of the more specialized shells).

Have they gone side-closing for the larger pieces yet? I don't think it's been mentioned in the thread, so I assume not.

 

[Saphroneth]

Have they gone side-closing for the larger pieces yet? I don't think it's been mentioned in the thread, so I assume not.

I'm not actually sure of the details of the breech - that's an area in which I lack sufficient expertise.

In performance terms it's about as good as what the French naval guns were using at the same time in OTL, or a bit better, but the resultant guns are less effective than an RML gun of the same period and bore. The key difference is that it doesn't rely on muscle power to close - the force of the explosion is directed such that it doesn't try to unseal the breech.

 

[Thoresby]

ED: and the issue of the organization of the British Army. I have it somewhat tentatively decided that localization is going to take place, but not to the extent of the OTL reforms. Instead regiments will be grouped into regional depots (e.g. between six and fifteen battalions sharing one depot) and the idea is that it will be possible to enlist into a regiment, a depot, or the army as a whole.
The result will, hopefully, not have too many of the flaws of Cardwell.

Well you'e writing the TL so it will be as successful as you want and I agree with you re: the desirability of longer service terms for colonial service. That said I think getting rid of General Service would be a step forward, to quote Palmerston

"...there is a great disinclination on the part of the lower orders to enlist for general service; they like to know that they are to be in a certain regiment, connected, perhaps, with their own county, and their own friends, and with officers who have established a connection with that district. There is a preference frequently on the part of the people for one regiment as opposed to another, and I should think there would be found a great disinclination in men to enlist for general service, and to be liable to be drafted and sent to any corps or station."

So I'm also a fan of the County Regiment due to the esprit de corps and and recruitment point. That said if I was the Duke of Cambridge I would probably go for a three legged system with recruits initially enlisting on a 9 year contract with 3 years to be served in the active army and the rest in the Reserves. At 3 years men can either chose to go into the Reserves or sign on for a 12 year enlistment which would come with a Pension. So you would have:

County Regiment
1st Battalion: Long service (12 year term), for non-Indian colonial service and source of all NCO's.
2nd Battalion: Short service (3 year active), for home and General War service.
3rd Battalion: Reserve battalion made up of ex long service NCO's and short service men doing their 6 years in the reserves.
4th Battalion: Ditto

The final element would be a resurrected Indian Army made up of men recruited on 10 or 15 terms for service in India in British Indian Army Regiments with a decent pension (or possibly an Australian land grant) at the end.

The reason for a having a dedicated Indian Army is while Britain's other colonial commitments came and went (see Canada, South Africa, NZ etc.) and the number of battalions needed increased or shrank over time India was a pretty static requirement so the benefit of having units that were permanently stationed their and thus got to really know country is worth the extra bother of having mono-purpose units.

 

[Saphroneth]

That said I think getting rid of General Service would be a step forward, to quote Palmerston

You still have to allow for different levels of interest in different regiments. So the regiment-region-general service system means someone can "enlist in the 88th" or they can "enlist in the West Irish" and in the latter case they fill out the ones which have fewer direct recruits. It's also an easier ask to say to a lad trying to join, say, the Royal Scots Fusiliers, that "I'm sorry, lad, the Royal Scots Fusiliers are oversubscribed - but would you be interested in joining the Lowland Scots regional depot, and we'll find you a good slot?" (Whereas with general enlistment he could theoretically end up in a Devon regiment...)

So I'm also a fan of the County Regiment due to the esprit de corps and and recruitment point.

The problem with the county regiments is that they were too small to work properly. You need to link more battalions if you're going to do it that way, and in that case why get rid of the old numbers?

The reason for a having a dedicated Indian Army is while Britain's other colonial commitments came and went (see Canada, South Africa, NZ etc.) and the number of battalions needed increased or shrank over time India was a pretty static requirement so the benefit of having units that were permanently stationed their and thus got to really know country is worth the extra bother of having mono-purpose units.

India wasn't really a static requirement - remember we're not very long past the Mutiny! There's a dedicated Indian Establishment, though.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

So I'm also a fan of the County Regiment due to the esprit de corps and and recruitment point.

The problem is that Cardwell/Childers leave some counties without regiments, and demolish a lot of existing esprit de corps in the creation of linked battalions. The recruitment point is also rather sketchy, as between 1883 and 1900, only three regiments managed to draw 70% or more of their recruits from men born in their regimental district. The average was 38.5%, and the lowest (the Cameron Highlanders) was 9.6%.

All in all, there seem to have been two different sets of motivations. New recruits are split c.50-50 between those who want to join a local regiment (not necessarily the exact one whose regimental district they were born in), and those who want to join a particular regiment for reasons of history, uniform, etc. Existing soldiers and reservists, meanwhile, primarily want to serve with men they know and under officers they know.

the benefit of having units that were permanently stationed their and thus got to really know country is worth the extra bother of having mono-purpose units.

The problem comes when you need to send additional battalions out, which have never been to India before and lack a cadre of experienced senior officers and NCOs.

It's also an easier ask to say to a lad trying to join, say, the Royal Scots Fusiliers, that "I'm sorry, lad, the Royal Scots Fusiliers are oversubscribed - but would you be interested in joining the Lowland Scots regional depot, and we'll find you a good slot?"

There's also a logistical advantage. Let's imagine you send a recruiting party out, and get fifteen recruits for fifteen different regiments. Under Cardwell, you'd have to send each of those men to their own regimental depot, scattered around the country- more expense, more risk of desertion. Under a regional depot system, you can pack them off in groups, with most of them will going to their closest regional depot.