If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)
- Thread starter Saphroneth
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Saphroneth
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OTL. I like finding these little snatches of OTL to put in, to show that History Is More Complicated.
Saphroneth
Banned
Incidentally, here's an interesting point. We actually have evidence of how McClellan would govern (he got drafted as Governor of New Jersey, much to his surprise)
I've been reading a lot about McClellan recently, and the guy actually has a lot better luck TTL - and I don't just mean the Presidency. OTL he was dicked about so much.
Like... the Peninsular Campaign, over the course of one week (the week of his army actually moving to the Peninsula) he had over a third of his army stripped away. His constant requests for reinforcements were just asking again and again for McDowell's corps to be sent to him by sea, but the Administration told him they'd send McDowell by land - then countermanded the movement orders to McDowell. This happened at least twice, and was a major source of both his delay and his vulnerability outside Richmond (he had to stretch his lines to the northeast to try and link up with McDowell, as he was ordered, but they never actually said McDowell wasn't coming - just that he was delayed - and told McClellan to keep his flank extended).
There's so much more of this kind of thing, like how McClellan appears to have been removed deliberately just after the 1862 elections. I think the one which makes me stare the most is just post-Antietam, when McClellan's army (which had just force-marched dozens of miles and then fought several intense battles despite being largely composed of recruits - it was thrown together from remnants in two weeks) needed resupply.
For a month he was denied supplies he desperately needed (thus delaying his army's ability to fight and march) by the sneaky trick of sending all the supplies to a small detachment of the Army of the Potomac which happened to be inside Washington DC... instead of to the large actual Army of the Potomac sixty miles away.
I've been reading a lot about McClellan recently, and the guy actually has a lot better luck TTL - and I don't just mean the Presidency. OTL he was dicked about so much.
Like... the Peninsular Campaign, over the course of one week (the week of his army actually moving to the Peninsula) he had over a third of his army stripped away. His constant requests for reinforcements were just asking again and again for McDowell's corps to be sent to him by sea, but the Administration told him they'd send McDowell by land - then countermanded the movement orders to McDowell. This happened at least twice, and was a major source of both his delay and his vulnerability outside Richmond (he had to stretch his lines to the northeast to try and link up with McDowell, as he was ordered, but they never actually said McDowell wasn't coming - just that he was delayed - and told McClellan to keep his flank extended).
There's so much more of this kind of thing, like how McClellan appears to have been removed deliberately just after the 1862 elections. I think the one which makes me stare the most is just post-Antietam, when McClellan's army (which had just force-marched dozens of miles and then fought several intense battles despite being largely composed of recruits - it was thrown together from remnants in two weeks) needed resupply.
For a month he was denied supplies he desperately needed (thus delaying his army's ability to fight and march) by the sneaky trick of sending all the supplies to a small detachment of the Army of the Potomac which happened to be inside Washington DC... instead of to the large actual Army of the Potomac sixty miles away.
Saphroneth
Banned
Better for the right man to slaughter thousands failing to achieve anything than for the wrong man to win bloodlessly, I guess.
ED: heck, McClellan's relief fills me with rage every time I read about it because it was so utterly pointless.
Is this the aforementioned Penisular Campaign or elsewhere?
And really? He was stymied because of his Politics?
Saphroneth
Banned
You know what, I'm going to go ahead and mention it - simply because it shows how important manoeuvre is in the days before Continuous Frontage.
The below is the map of the positions as of McClellan's relief.
(The map uses Roman numerals, which are a later convention.)
The thing to notice about this map is that McClellan has utterly humbugged Lee. Lee's army is split into two wings (Longstreet and Jackson) and, by way of a combination of good scouting and hard marching (aided by an outbreak of foot-and-mouth which struck the Confederate Army a few weeks after it did the same to the Union one) McClellan has not only got between the wings but he's managed to block all the passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains. Slocum's 13th Corps is left up north to block the Potomac, but everyone else in McClellan's army is down south and he has nearly a three-to-one superiority to bring to bear on Longstreet.
The relief of McClellan paralyzed the army for about a week and a half as Burnside took over.
Campbell put it well:
The below is the map of the positions as of McClellan's relief.
The thing to notice about this map is that McClellan has utterly humbugged Lee. Lee's army is split into two wings (Longstreet and Jackson) and, by way of a combination of good scouting and hard marching (aided by an outbreak of foot-and-mouth which struck the Confederate Army a few weeks after it did the same to the Union one) McClellan has not only got between the wings but he's managed to block all the passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains. Slocum's 13th Corps is left up north to block the Potomac, but everyone else in McClellan's army is down south and he has nearly a three-to-one superiority to bring to bear on Longstreet.
The relief of McClellan paralyzed the army for about a week and a half as Burnside took over.
Campbell put it well:
Elsewhere, see above. Loudon Valley is a very poorly studied campaign, probably because it shows McClellan being a complete genius and Lincoln utterly screwing up...
It's hard to work out why, but it seems to be just that he wanted to defeat the South quickly instead of utterly destroying them. There are so many decisions made by various higher-ups in the Administration which are all but impossible to understand, like closing down recruiting in the Spring despite denying all McClellan's requests for more men on the grounds Washington needed more defenders...
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Do you mean 'foot-and-mouth or is it a jokey reference to a kind of 'loose lips sink ships' scenario?
Saphroneth
Banned
I can never remember which it is - when the last big epidemic came along I always heard it on the radio as "Foot 'n' mouth" and didn't know what vowels were missing.
Thanks! I wasn't sure because I know you sometimes put in a bit of sly humour.
How many troops are you planning on cramming into Canada? The Confederacy, with some privation, managed about 300,000 troops present, with their biggest army peaking at about 90,000 men and it's second biggest at about 60,000. Canada had roughly 1/3rd of the population the Confederates, so we can expect it to be able to support one army of 30,000 and second of 20,000 in the field.
All the US does is call up an additional 200,000 volunteers? They do nothing to increase domestic production of arms and ammunition? They do nothing to find new foreign sources of arms and ammunition? They move neither troops nor arms to defend the Canadian border? They make no preparations to upgrade harbor defenses along the Atlantic coast or the Great Lakes? They don't delay or reassign the Burnside Expedition. They don't reconsider their plans for the Blockading Squadrons? They don't appoint a General-in-Chief who isn't prostrated by typhoid?
It took the Immortalite 11 days to reach the Chesapeake. As the captain later reported "Throughout the whole passage I encountered moderate Gales from the N.W. and West, with a high sea; and only succeeded in making Cape Henry on the evening of the 4th instant. At this time I found the Fore Yard sprung and the Ship leaking excessively throughout her Decks, Waterways, Topsides, and Bends." The return trip in OTL took 4 days, even with favorable winds.
That's faster that Britain choose to declare war on Germany in World War II. The British Cabinet would know Wilkes acted without orders and the Lincoln administration would have offered international arbitration on the incident. Britain might still choose war, but I'd expect there to be some debate on the issue first.
But none to the United States? Is this supposed to be a timeline where the stereotype of Perfidious Albion is the truth?
There are several flaws with this point.
1) Governments do not move this fast. Let's look at the Union's acquisition of a new ironclad design. May 30, 1861 - the US Department of the Navy starts studying the maintenance and supply of the blockade. June 2, the conclude ironclads will be needed for this strategy. July 4, the Department of the Navy requests funding for from Congress. July 19, a bill is introduced. August 3, the bill passes providing funding for ironclads and a board to select designs. September 16, the design for the Monitor is approved. October 4, the contract to build the Monitor is signed. Total time 127 days, yet you have the British manage it in 3.
2) Why would the Royal Navy think they need to build a brown water ironclad navy? The Union started building ironclads in a response to the direct threat from the Confederates building an ironclad. The Union navy poses no direct threat to the harbors of Britain. This plan would likely be opposed by the War Office, the Exchequer, and elements of the Royal Navy as an unnecessary expense.
3) The Welland Canal had locks that were 45.7 meters long, 8.1 meters wide, and 3.1 meters deep. Making an ironclad small enough to fit through that would be rather challenging. The Monitor had a length of 54.6 meters, a beam of 12.6 meters, and a draft of 3.2 meters, so the British are going to need a much smaller ship to fit in the Welland Canal. So far, I've found one type of ironclad with a shallow enough draft, the City class ironclads, but that design would have to radically changed - halving the width and dropping the length by 1/6th. If such a design was even possible, it would probably halve the amount of engines and armament that could be carried, which would mean 6 guns and a top speed of 4 knots. I expect Punch would have a cartoon of "Seymour's Bathtub Navy".
4) The best armor on the City class ironclad was 2.5 inches. Ironclads small enough to fit through the Welland Canal wouldn't have the power to move if covered in rejected plates for the Warrior.
5) The Monitor was unsuited for the open ocean, but it had a greater draft and a much greater beam than an ironclad that could fit through the Welland Canal. I'd expect at least half of these British mini-ironclads to sink under tow from Britain to Canada, probably earning the nicknames of "Seymour's Folly" and "Iron Coffins".
6) The Union would be able to build Monitors directly on the Great Lakes in Chicago, Buffalo, Cleveland, and probably Detroit. Any British ironclads that can fit through the Welland Canal should be outnumbered against Union ships that out class them in speed, maneuverability, armament, armor, and seaworthiness.
I think you meant Prince Alfred. Sending him to safety seems odd - the British royal family has traditionally been willing for younger brothers of the heir to go in harm's way.
The Monitor hasn't even launched, let alone seen combat, so designs for the Passaic and the Casco classes don't exist yet.
Your numbers seem a bit off. 2.6 million men served in the Union Army over the course of the war. Of them roughly 200,00 were Irish; 50,000 were Canadian; 50,000 were born in England; and 20,000 were French Canadian, for a total of about 320,000 men. In January, 1862, the Union Army had about 575,000 men, so about 70,000 of the men serving at that time would have been former British subjects. A 30% desertion rate among them would be about 20,000 deserters, not 100,000.
At least the Canadians are polite enough warn someone that they're at war.
That's the US Navy's only preparation? No second or third ships to make sure the message to the Blockading Squadrons get through? No preparation to sink ships in harbor channels to deny them to the British? No telegraphs to the San Francisco to warn the Pacific Squadron. No attempts to contact the Africa Squadron, the Brazil Squadron, and the East India Squadron? No attempt to contact the Burnside Expedition, if it sailed in TTL? No offering letters of marque against British shipping?
Hutton appears to have forgotten a few key details about the Battle of Bomarsund, like complete failure of sailing vessels with steam power being sufficient to reduce the fortress; the ten thousand French soldiers under General Baraguay d'Hilliers who landed behind the fortress and bombarded it with artillery; the "The landing of three short 32-pr. naval guns, four field-guns from the ships, and a rocket tube, on the 10th, was superintended by Rear-Admiral Chads, whose people had to drag them for four miles and a half over execrable ground to the point which had been selected as the site for the British battery", and that after three days of bombardment from land and sea, "No great amount of damage was done to the fortress; but the officer in command, General Bodisco, perceived that his position was desperate; and, at about mid-day, he exhibited a white flag"
Why is Milne so impressed? The test took place on solid ground, from an elevation, in generally good weather, over several days, against an unmoving target at a known, fixed distance that wasn't firing back. A "large proportion' of the rounds completely missed the tower.
And sails directly into a heavy gale.
To get to the bridge, the HMS Orpheus and HMS Hydra have to sail 5 miles up this river. In January the water wouldn't be this high and the Saco River would probably be clogged with ice. If they somehow make up the Saco River and drop the bridge, the Union can just rebuild the raiilroad bridge. Even if the river isn't impassible, I doubt HMS Orpheus would make it - two years later, by a combination of refusing to wait for a pilot, ignoring his sailing master, the most current chart, and warnings from land; Commodore Burnett managed to sink his ship and kill himself and most of his crew in broad daylight and good weather.
HMS Chesapeake had been decommissioned in Sheerness on October 17, 1861.
It's 631 nautical miles from Bermuda to the Chesapeake Bay, so this would require an average speed of 7.5 knots. Even in clear weather, colliers and supply ships could not have traveled that fast. Neither could the Racer. Of course, Milne's force didn't sail in clear weather, it sailed into a heavy gale. And it's the darkest part of the month, with the 29th being a new moon. Milne's task force will be damaged and scattered. Some of his ships will probably be forced to turn back, some might even be sunk by the weather. Milne's first ships probably won't reach the Chesapeake Bay until around February 3, with the last collier or supply ship limping in as much as a week later.
And has anyone told the Confederates that the US and Britain are at war? If so, the CSA naval forces at Gosport Naval Yard may sail in support of the British.
Remember that Journal of the Royal Artillery report you mentioned? It has a lot to say about the reliability of Moorsom fuzes - 'Twenty-one 68-pr. and seven 32pr. shells in all, were fired with Moorsom's percussion fuzes; of these, 9 burst at the muzzle of the gun, affording a clear proof that these fuzes will not stand the full service charges ordered to be used with all shells. The same thing has happened with 11 out of 72 shells fired at Portsmouth or Shoeburyness in experiments ordered since the promulgation of of the order in question. It was at first imagined, that there might be some difference between the fuzes of recent manufacture, and those of earlier date, and accordingly some of the oldest that could be found were selected. They bore the dates 1851 and 1852. Of the 32-pr. shells, 10 lbs. charges, fired with recent fuzes, the premature bursts were 4 in 7. Of the 68-pr. shells, 16 lbs. charges, fired with recent fuzes, the premature bursts were 6 to 12; and of those fired with the fuzes of 1851-52 were 3 to 9, a difference sufficiently in favor of the old fuzes, to merit investigation, but not enough to exempt them from the above remark. It was considered a waste of ammunition to fire more of them on the present occasion, and not unattended with danger to to the bystanders; they were therefore withdrawn." They also said "The Committee, after the failure of the Moorsom's fuzes, proceeded with a new percussion fuze proposed by Mr. Pettman."
Saphroneth
Banned
But Canada doesn't have to spread everyone over such a large area. The correct operative number is 1/3 of 300,000, which is 100,000 present - more than I plan on using.
Did the Americans have these plans in place in OTL?
As for the list:
1) Yes, but they have major problems arming them.
2) What can they do? All their iron comes from Britain.
3) They had already ordered up everything they could find.
4) No OTL plans existed for more than a few regiments, so they have to scramble.
5) They do, but there's not a lot of heavy guns to go around so they do as much upgrading as OTL.
6) They cancel it.
7) They do not recall the blockading squdrons.
8) Lincoln does as OTL, and turns to the Library of Congress for guidance.
Was that from the base of the Chesapeake or further up?
It's actually how fast the British declared war during the Crimea - first working day after the news of the ultimatum being rejected.
As for knowing Wilkes acted without orders, that's not the issue - what they know is that, by requesting arbitration, the Lincoln administration have stated that they believe the law is on their side.
The Halifax one will inform North America.
1) According to my source, the British had this plan already in place - to order ironclads straight off to deliver in 90 days. They'd done the planning over the course of December.
2) Because the British planned to attack US harbours, just as they built the Aetna and Thunderbolt class to do, and because the British planned to place ironclads on the Canadian lakes.
3) You onlu need to tweak the Aetna class a little. I did actually SpringSharp out a possible design, the Zodiacs. (Aetna herself had 1.83 m draft)
4) As above, I SpringSharped it. The Aetnas had backed 4" armour.
5) Monitor was a terrible design. As for the Aetna class, Terror crossed the Atlantic successfully before Monitor was even launched.
6) Monitor was a terrible design, and a modified Aetna class would beat them on the last three. I'm also not sure how fast you're imagining the Union building these ironclads.
I do mean Prince Alfred, yes, but the key point is that he needs to get home - his father's funeral.
I'll admit I allowed the US to speed up a lot. I decided they'd use the names even for these ATL ironclads.
I said there would be a 30% desertion rate among the ~100,000 British subjects; that is, about 30,000 deserters.
Also, the Union army at this time did not have 575,000 men; that source is wrong. The actual Aggregate Present and Absent is 525,000.
Your count of 2.6 million is incorrect; that's the number of total enlistments, many of which are double-counting or counting for men who then purchased a substitute; by contrast a lot of the British subjects were enlisted early on with promises of officer rank (which were then reneged on). This seems a good environment for a high desertion rate.
Canada is British.At least the Canadians are polite enough warn someone that they're at war.
There was no Brazil Squadron or Africa Squadron at the time (to my knowledge) and the East India squadron was one ship.
As for the telegraphs to San Francisco, I'll admit I made some mistakes in the West Coast section - most of both squadrons were spread all along the coast, the Union squadron was not concentrated in San Francisco.
But the penetration is what I'm highlighting, not the hit rate.
That sand bar and those tides are still fatal today. Late last year a fishing boat got lost going over the bar. The skipper sailed in and out of there every day too.
I would personally give Commodore Burnett a break on that one!
Saphroneth
Banned
My source had suggested that the storms from the California megastorm had largely ended by mid-Jan. I've generally not assumed the weather is on the side of either party in this one.
In any case, the entire fleet does have steam power.
I'm not sure about how much ice there'd be - thanks for raising that one. My intent had been essentially that the British would drop the bridge and then keep coming back to prevent any repairs. (The last place there's a permanent barrier that would block vessels rising up the river is within Armstrong rifle range of the bridge.)
As for Orpheus, I dislike the idea of using historical parallelism of that level (this person crashed once, therefore they will crash every time they show up in a TL). It smacks of compressing all the British navigational mistakes of several years into one (I've not done anything similar for the Union, for example, and I could easily justify having Monitor just plain sink at anchor).
Good catch, I may have gotten confused as James Hope is still the CiC East Indies and China (flag Chesapeake) until 8 Feb 1862. It looks like the actual vessel that should have done this is the Imperieuse (another Imperieuse class) to which he transferred her flag. Fortunately Imperieuse does not appear in this TL so I'll just swap her in.
Would four days of travel require an average speed of 7.5 knots? 25th to the same time on the 29th is effectively 100 hours, and that means an average speed of 6.3 knots - within the capabilities of Racer under steam alone - though I could of course change it to be the "first division" of Milne's command which arrives then. The gale is tricky, because of The Inevitable Butterfly Effect, but it's the kind of thing that led me to use "steam alone" speed.
As for supply ships, some fast merchant vessels of the time could make twelve knots on a single run across the Atlantic. I don't think a little over six is impossible for fleet supply ships.
A fair point, though the source does note that the failures are associated with the newly ordered use of the full service charge previously used for solid shot only (and not the partial charge for which they were designed - the full charge was causing enough concussion that the fuze fired early, but the lesser charges did not) and that the Pettman fuze replaced them fairly promptly. (It's also the Armstrong Pillar fuze which matters as much as the Moorsom one).
I think there's still an advantage there for the British, especially if this problem is known.
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Why not pick a closer example? Over the course of the war, Vermont mobilised 17 battalions of infantry, 1 cavalry regiment, 3 light artillery batteries, 1 heavy artillery company, and 3 companies of sharpshooters. Vermont had a population of 315,098; Upper and Lower Canada combined had a population of 2,507,657. That suggests that the Canadas could field 135 battalions of infantry, 2 battalions of sharpshooters, 7 regiments of cavalry, 23 light artillery batteries, and 7 heavy artillery companies. If you take only the troops that Vermont had in service as at the end of 1862, which equated to 16,000 men, it suggests Canada could have fielded 127,333 men.
British ultimatum to Germany: morning of 3 September 1939
British ultimatum expires: 11AM, 3 September 1939
Neville Chamberlain declares war: 11:15AM, 3 September 1939
There's no requirement to do so. In 1812, Madison delivered the declaration of war to the British minister in Washington Augustus Foster. Foster asked for a suspension of hostilities until the news could reach London, and Madison refused him (sources: 1, 2). As a result, the British can hand the declaration of war to Adams and consider their job done- even if the news is already on its way to their own squadrons.
It isn't working.
'We have the same old story to tell to-day about the non-communication by telegraph which has bothered us for several days past' (Marysville Daily Appeal, 31 December 1861)
'Early last evening, while the wires of the Overland Telegraph were working, we were promised dispatches from the East. But the reception of private dispatches was continued until a late hour, and then we were informed that news could not be received. The heavy gale probably deranged the wires. At this particular juncture there is great anxiety to hear from the seat of war, as the culmination of the contest is believed to have arrived. The telegraphic wires between this city and San Francisco were not in working order last evening. By the Overland Mail we have details of Eastern news to the 18th ult.' (Sacramento Daily Union, 9 January 1862)
'Swain, the telegraph operator, sends word that on the San Francisco line he finds a large number of the poles down between this city and the San Joaquin, the ground being so thoroughly saturated that they were easily blown over. Ladd, who went out on the Sacramento line, has not been heard from yet. It may be days before we get a dispatch from Sacramento and San Francisco.--Stockton Republican, Jan. 16th' (Sacramento Daily Union 18 January 1862)
'Messrs. Street and Ladd, of the overland telegraph company, have been taking a voyage along the wire to ascertain their condition. They were unable to report favorably on any immediate prospect of resumption on the line. At a point near Mokelumne City the party sailed over the submerged wires' (Marysville Daily Appeal, 28 January 1862)
From 'Up and Down California in 1860-1864; The Journal of William H. Brewer: Book 3, Chapter 1, THE RAINY SEASON':
'San Francisco; Friday, January 31:... All the roads in the middle of the state are impassable, so all mails are cut off. We have had no “Overland” for some weeks, so I can report no new arrivals. The telegraph also does not work clear through, but news has been coming for the last two days. In the Sacramento Valley for some distance the tops of the poles are under water!'
'San Francisco; February 9:... The telegraph is now in working order, and we had news this morning—up to 5 P.M. last night from St. Louis—surely quick work.'
It doesn't matter anyway, though, because the Pacific squadron isn't in San Francisco- it's strung out along the Pacific coast, with its flagship USS Lancaster stuck in Panama with a cracked crankshaft.
San Francisco: USS St Mary's (22), USS Active (4), USRC William L. Marcy (6), USRC Shubrick (3), USRC Joe Lane (3)
Mazatlan, Mexico: HMS Termagant (24), HMS Mutine (17) [?]
Acapulco, Mexico: USS Narragansett (5), USS Saranac (9)
Panama/Tobaga: USS Cyane (18), USS Lancaster (26); HMS Tartar (18)
Callao, Peru: USS Wyoming (6); HMS Bacchante (51), HMS Clio (21)
Valparaiso, Chile: HMS Cameleon (17)
Interestingly, the British mail ships from Southampton to St Thomas and St Thomas to Colon (i.e. Panama) are as quick as the Union's two potential methods of notification. Those methods are US mail ships from New York to Aspinwall (assuming it doesn't get captured) or the overland telegraph to San Francisco (assuming it had been working) followed by a mail ship to Panama (assuming it doesn't get captured by Termagant or Mutine). However, as I understand it, all these points were being saved for ITWNMUOTOS v2.
Milne doesn't need colliers and supply ships to sail 631 nautical miles to the Chesapeake. Did you notice in the letter which you posted that HMS Immortalite arrived with 'at least three days full Steaming in reserve'?
Busk is wrong. Racer made 9.313 knots on trial on her first commission (Times, 23 July 1858). Rif Winfield's British Warships in the Age of Sail 1817-1863 has it as 9.519 knots, but let's take the lower figure in the interests of prudence.
Nope.
'we who were engaged at the Governor's headquarters recognized the gravity of the situation, and that under existing conditions our State would have to provide largely for its own defense. Indeed there were many official and semi-official intimations from Washington that the threatened safety of that city would require the retention there of all the troops then near it, and that few could be spared from other quarters should there occur a declaration of war by England, as then seemed imminent — in other words, that we would have to take care of ourselves...
'the conditions of defence of the city were very faulty, and though the United States engineers had plans for completing the works and armaments so as to bring them fully up to the times, these would require years, and the dangers we were confronting were imminent... Some attention was also given to the defences on the lakes and northern frontier, though nothing practical was attempted'
- Colonel Silas W. Burt (former Assistant Inspector General of the New York National Guard), Memoirs of the Military History of the State of New York during the War for the Union, 1861-65; here for the important sections, or here if you want to read the whole thing.
Nitpick: It's not full, it's distant. Charges for the 68pdr are 16lbs distant, 12lbs full, 8lbs reduced; charges for the 32pdr are 10lbs distant, 8-4lbs full and 6-2.5lbs reduced. The section of the report not quoted stipulates that the guns were firing with these distant charges, although you can tell that it's distant charges with which the fuze has a problem from the information given:
'Twenty-one 68-pr. and seven 32pr. shells in all, were fired with Moorsom's percussion fuzes; of these, 9 burst at the muzzle of the gun, affording a clear proof that these fuzes will not stand the full service charges ordered to be used with all shells... Of the 32-pr. shells, 10 lbs. [distant] charges, fired with recent fuzes, the premature bursts were 4 in 7. Of the 68-pr. shells, 16 lbs. [distant] charges, fired with recent fuzes, the premature bursts were 6 to 12; and of those fired with the fuzes of 1851-52 were 3 to 9'
And also from the later tests performed in 1862:
'2. Ten Moorson and twenty Pettman fuzes were fitted to 32pdr shells and fired at a ship with 2.5lb [reduced] charges, distance 200 yards. All the Moorsom, and nineteen of the twenty Pettman fuzes, burst the shells on striking and at about equal distances inside the ship.
3. Twenty Moorsom and ten Pettman fuzes were fitted to 68pdr shells and fired with 16lbs [distant] charge and 16 degrees elevation. With the Moorsom fuzes, there were three premature bursts, but none with the Pettman...
4. Fifteen of each description of fuze were fitted to 68pdr shells and fired with 16lbs [distant] charge and 0.75 degrees elevation. With the Moorsom fuzes there were four premature bursts but none on grazing...
It should be here recorded that before the introduction of the Moorsom fuzes, they were frequently tested with high charges, and that out of the last 160 fired in 1851 (before they were finally adopted) from 32pdrs with 10lb [distant] charges, there was only one premature explosion.'
It really depends what you mean by 'long range'. An 8lb full charge will send an 8in shell 1020 yards at 2.5 degrees, and I think that would be pretty conclusively 'long range' at sea.
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Saphroneth
Banned
Oh, hey, an inaccurate source. Always got to watch out for those!
That's correct - as it doesn't materially affect the outcome of the war I decided to largely leave it.
Ah, yes, the California Megastorm. Perhaps the only time in history that the Royal Navy could sail directly up to Sacramento town hall...
It's kind of funny that the original objection was to my militia callout of about 40,000 All Ranks, because that was literally General Militia Order #1.
My general prediction is that, for the course of the summer, the Canadian militia can sustain roughly 80,000 Present Under Arms without any particular strain (and without considering the Maritimes), and can surge extra if it becomes necessary. The number's not precise, but it's enough to do what I show happening IMO.
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Probably just trying to hedge his bets in keeping the workers happy.
Saphroneth
Banned
It's hard to tell - Napoleon III was complex. He certainly admired much about Britain, and consciously set out to outdo Hyde Park; conversely he could be provoked into rash action, as in the case of the Franco-Prussian War.
Saphroneth
Banned
Putting these ones side by side really reveals the problem with them.
The Confederate Army has as quoted their number "Present" (and it's not really accurate - Livermore's numbers suggest 425,000 Present i.e. Aggregate Present as of April 1862, an underreporting of 40%) while the number quoted for the Union Army in April 1862 is 575,000 (which is an error - the source linked states the Aggregate Present and Absent as the Aggregate Present, and then adds in the 50,000 Absent a second time. The actual return is clear that Union Aggregate Present at that date is 475,000) and is greater even than the number of men carried on the rolls - it's roughly an overreporting of 23%.
But the other number quoted for the Union army is even worse - 2.6 million men.
Here's the problem, though. The vast number of enlistment papers signed in 1861 (totalling about 700,000 papers) expired before the end of the war, as none was for more than three years. This, coupled with the big surge of 9 month enlistments in late 1862 (about 90,000) which also expired, and the 90,000 3 month volunteers in April 1861, means that the actual number of men who served in the Union army is likely much lower as men enlisted multiple times. (Livermore estimates that about 1.55 million men served in the Union army or militia for at least one day.)
So the Confederate strength and Union strength are reported very differently. Comparing Aggregate Present with Aggregate Present the numbers are about 12% different, while comparing your stated strengths the Union Army is 92% stronger. Making the same errors the other way around one would present the Union peak strength Present as about 400,000 and the Confederate Army in April 1862 as 525,000.
This, oddly, is actually a common Lost Cause argument! The Lost Cause holds that they were superior individual fighters and could fight multiple battles and win when heavily outnumbered on the strategic and tactical scale; as we can see here, the Union was actually not much stronger than the Confederacy in the first half of 1862, and depending on whether Black Slaves were carried on the rolls for the CSA (not bloody likely) the CSA may actually have had more effectives available.
What's also curious is the way that it always seems like people want to shift the discussion to 1864 or so - when the Union army genuinely was about twice the size of the Confederate one, and when the Confederates had about 315,000 PFD left available (Lost for the Cause - note not Aggregate Present). Of course, that's after a very large number of Confederate casualties.
What does that mean for the Canada case? Well, if the Confederacy's able to support three times the troops as Canada, then Canada can support (425,000 / 3) = 140,000, and the largest single army would be (115,000 / 3 = 38,000) Present.
The argument based on "largest single army supported" is facetious, though. If it were true then the Canadians would be unable to move more than a certain number of men into an army, prevented by... magic?
In reality I think it's likely that Canada would not mobilize that thoroughly. Combined with British troops the total number of troops under British OpCon in North America might reach 150,000, but that's including Maritimes troops and more than a third of the army being British regular troops. This would be split into five British Army Corps to do the main thrust of the fighting at a total of maybe 60-70,000 regulars and 6,000 militia, about 60,000 militia on defence (including about three field corps in fortifications, perhaps 30,000 men doing that job) and the remainder wherever they're needed.