The Union ideas about the defence of New York,the Austrian ideas about their drill, the Brits on Gibraltar, Plan 65, Jackie Fisher's ideas... All these claims that people are making.
If they will not meet us on the open sea (a Trent TL)
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The Union ideas about the defence of New York,the Austrian ideas about their drill, the Brits on Gibraltar, Plan 65, Jackie Fisher's ideas... All these claims that people are making.
Saphroneth
Banned
Okay, so.
The Union ideas on the defence of NY are broadly functional. They're a vast improvement over what they had, though the system is still vulnerable - frankly an invulnerable defensive system is probably not achievable (not until at the least the days of reinforced concrete bunkers and very long range guns) but it's a lot more difficult to breach.
They could also sow massive minefields, but that's simply not going to wash for one of the really busy ports of the world.
The Austrians are pretty much as OTL (i.e. riding for a big fall if they come up against someone with actually good accuracy drill).
The British on Gibraltar are just upgrading the guns - I just phrased it amusingly, and they're planning on replacing old cannon with new ones instead of making the place the world's largest artillery museum.
Plan 65 isn't a claim, it's a war plan. It's just got a load of pre-done staff work in case of a war with the USA, and is intended as the start of the ops work (not the end). It's certainly not a statement of intent.
And Fisher's views are fairly accurate in some ways, at least in his assessment of the limitations of things like the ram or the shell gun - a 7 inch Palliser shell of 115-120 lbs has about a 1.5 pound bursting charge. It's a lot more dangerous than a solid shot, especially confined by such thick walls to tamp it, but it's not nearly enough to inflict slaughter on the crew. (for comparison the common shell is 10% payload by mass in this weight class).
The reloading time helps a bit, but if Lissa tells us anything it's that it's not very easy to sink a ship. (Though of course Fisher is the sort to try.)
Saphroneth
Banned
Collingwood. Whoops, will fix.
If they made plans to go after other nations, the plans would have some kind of code. E.g. a plan for war with the US in 1873 would be plan 73-blue, a plan for war with Britain would be 73-red.I'm sure everyone wants to know who will be targeted when they get to Plan 66.
They're about as aggressive as Plan Red or Plan Green from 20th century America - having the plan is not in and of itself aggressive.
Just got done reading this whole thing, enjoyed it very much. Thank you Saphroneth for all your hard work.
On the subject of spar torpedoes, I would have thought the criticism of the ram (that the target can just move) would equally apply. I think he is saying the spar torpedoes are better because small boats can use them?
On the subject of spar torpedoes, I would have thought the criticism of the ram (that the target can just move) would equally apply. I think he is saying the spar torpedoes are better because small boats can use them?
Saphroneth
Banned
The reason he doesn't slam the spar torpedoes compared to the ram is twofold - firstly, a ram needs the right combination of positions and movement vectors, while a spar torpedo only needs the right combination of positions.
The second is that it doesn't take a large, fast ship to successfully use a spar torpedo (while it does a ram).
1 May - 11 June 1865
Saphroneth
Banned
1 May
In the Paraguayan War, an official alliance is signed - the war is now Paraguay versus Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
There is no especial indication that Francisco Solano López (elected president of Paraguay, much like his father was for twenty years) is particularly intimidated by the way his nation of 450,000 people is now outnumbered roughly 25:1.
2 May
Nursing an elbow broken by a rifle bullet, Chamberlain successfully manages to break out of the Chamla valley - the key moment being an uphill charge of the 11th Bengal cavalry led by Lt. Colonel Dighton Probyn (VC) which manages to break through a Pashtun force at the cost of notable casualties. The 11th Bengal Cavalry subsequently attack the Pashtun camp, causing a collapse in discipline and allowing for a brigade-front advance in open order by the Snider-equipped battalions of Chamberlain's force.
His management of the long battle comes in for severe criticism after the fact (especially as his artillery was insufficiently far from the fighting front and most of the gunners are now dead) but his success answers some of the criticisms - as is ever the way, a victorious general looks much better than a defeated one.
5 May
The Admiralty sets up a "plans and preparations board", a staff of professionals (with Admiral Milne the first head) whose task is to do the planning work "in advance" of any possible war breaking out. For example, the board is to evaluate both the prospective targets of port attacks (with a view to keeping them up to date) and the logistics of blockade and convoy, ahead of time.
An illustration of the kind of work the Preparations Board will become familiar with in future is an analysis of a possible blockade of the Confederacy (both in concert with another power and absent help from that other power). One notable conclusion reached is that the current state of Confederate rail and the length and nature of the Confederate coastline makes a blockade quite tricky, though a successful capture of Savannah (Georgia) would remove all of Florida's coastline from the possible ports of entry for blockade-runners.
It is also noted that securing Spanish cooperation would be key in such a venture - Havana is well placed as a blockade running port - and that stopping up the mouth of the Chesapeake would be a useful way to materially injure the Confederate navy.
11 May
President McClellan and General Grant have a long discussion about McClellan's vision for the Army of the United States, in which the two men discuss how best to ensure a competent cavalry and artillery for the Union - these two being less amenable than the infantry to a "militia" style of part time training. One key point that comes out of the discussion is that US regular cavalry and artillery units should be trained as cavalry (not dragoons) and artillery (not as infantry, as many of the nominal artillery regiments often act), as these roles - properly stressed - create the institution which would be needed to properly increase size in time of war.
This is, however, likely to cost.
13 May
HMS London suffers from a failure of sail drill while working in towards Valletta harbour, and runs aground on a shoal. This is not particularly dangerous - it is near low tide and so the screw liner can float off after only a couple of hour - but it is very embarrassing.
16 May
The Joint Committee on Railways (composed of both MPs and Lords) reaffirms the requirement and intent for a complete circle underground rail line in London. The current state of the system has the Metropolitan Line's existing route (from Paddington to Moorgate) to be extended east to Tower Hill and west to Brompton, and plans a second route (the "District" line) which will connect Brompton and Tower Hill in a different way.
Various schemes have been both considered and rejected, and it is felt that the ideal route is one which incurs as little purchase cost as possible - even if this means a less straight and thus longer route - though this is not set in stone.
Meanwhile, in Paris, arguments have been going on about their potential urban rail system for ten years and show no sign of abating.
19 May
Chamberlain's forces burn the mountain fortress of Malka after a short siege and a storming operation led by a regiment of Gurkhas (four of whom will later receive the VC). Pleased with the successful conclusion of the campaign, Chamberlain orders a withdrawal to India (functionally to the Sindh).
21 May
Francis Galton (an English polymath with an especial focus on statistics) begins writing an article on the scientific possibility of heredity of ability - that is, the idea that there are not merely alleles for skin colour, hair colour, eye colour and the ability to roll the tongue, but also for intelligence, perfect pitch, and other such positive mental and physical qualities.
22 May
A large explosion rocks Atlanta (Georgia) where several tonnes of gunpowder have exploded. The explosion's source is not clear, but it is suggested that it may have been a suicidal slave.
24 May
The Confederate Congress proposes a law that states that all government-approved suppliers of explosives (i.e. gunpowder) must avoid any ignition materials entering their facilities - especially in the hands of slaves. A poor safety record will be considered grounds for the lucrative business of supplying the Confederate Army (and thus the Navy) to go elsewhere.
27 May
The Orenberg campaign begins in Central Asia. This comes as a surprise to many - the forces present are the ones that were expected to go after Poland upon the opening of the summer campaign season - and uses large supply dumps set up in Orenberg as the logistical base for a large movement to Chymkent (currently under light Russian control).
The Orenberg campaign has the support of many of Russia's best rail engineers and is slowly extending the rail line from Orenberg towards Chymkent (in addition to the military aspects of the move, which will place a very large force in Chymkent by the standards of the region). It is not known precisely how long it will take until the expansion (or military campaign) is complete, though some sources suggest that the aim of the Russian operation is to make it at least as far as Samarkand over the next few years.
31 May
The Paraguayans secure an early strategic coup in Mato Grosso, successfully disrupting the flow of precious minerals from this province. This puts an unexpected hole in Brazilian governmental revenues, though they still have several Brazilian sources of income to draw upon.
4 June
The line survey on the Confederate trans-continental railroad project is completed. The planned route is New Orleans - Schriever - Lafayette - Lake Charles - Beaumont - Houston - San Antonio - Del Rio - Sanderson - Alpine - El Paso - Deming - Lordsburg - Benson - Tucson - Maricopa - Yuma - Palm Springs - Ontario - Los Angeles, repeatedly passing close to the Mexican border. (The usefulness of it as a jumping-off point for invasion of Mexico is carefully not stated.)
The line is expected to take a few years to construct.
11 June
Battle of the Riachuelo in the Paraguayan War.
The Paraguayan concept of operations in the battle involves taking advantage of the way that Brazilian crews of their fleet lie on shore at night, only boarding their vessels for the day's work; as such, several hundred troops are to be put ashore and board the Brazilian vessels, thus capturing them.
Things do not go quite according to plan, as when the attack takes place - in heavy fog shortly after sunrise - the Brazilian crews are in the midst of returning to their vessels. A bloody battle takes place, with the Paraguayans losing the Ygureí and Salto Guairá (along with all but two of the seven barges full of troops, most of which are already holed and sinking when they deliver their infantry) but managing to capture the Amazonas and Belmonte; the Jequitinhonha and two Brazilian gunboats (Ipiranga and Araguari) are destroyed, and the remaining Brazilian corvettes (Beberibe and Parnaíba) are badly knocked about.
With the Paraguayans now in possession of the largest two ships on the river, the later belief is that they could have won a decisive victory and destroyed the Brazilian navy here; however, as it stands most of the Brazilian crews manage to escape.
In the Paraguayan War, an official alliance is signed - the war is now Paraguay versus Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
There is no especial indication that Francisco Solano López (elected president of Paraguay, much like his father was for twenty years) is particularly intimidated by the way his nation of 450,000 people is now outnumbered roughly 25:1.
2 May
Nursing an elbow broken by a rifle bullet, Chamberlain successfully manages to break out of the Chamla valley - the key moment being an uphill charge of the 11th Bengal cavalry led by Lt. Colonel Dighton Probyn (VC) which manages to break through a Pashtun force at the cost of notable casualties. The 11th Bengal Cavalry subsequently attack the Pashtun camp, causing a collapse in discipline and allowing for a brigade-front advance in open order by the Snider-equipped battalions of Chamberlain's force.
His management of the long battle comes in for severe criticism after the fact (especially as his artillery was insufficiently far from the fighting front and most of the gunners are now dead) but his success answers some of the criticisms - as is ever the way, a victorious general looks much better than a defeated one.
5 May
The Admiralty sets up a "plans and preparations board", a staff of professionals (with Admiral Milne the first head) whose task is to do the planning work "in advance" of any possible war breaking out. For example, the board is to evaluate both the prospective targets of port attacks (with a view to keeping them up to date) and the logistics of blockade and convoy, ahead of time.
An illustration of the kind of work the Preparations Board will become familiar with in future is an analysis of a possible blockade of the Confederacy (both in concert with another power and absent help from that other power). One notable conclusion reached is that the current state of Confederate rail and the length and nature of the Confederate coastline makes a blockade quite tricky, though a successful capture of Savannah (Georgia) would remove all of Florida's coastline from the possible ports of entry for blockade-runners.
It is also noted that securing Spanish cooperation would be key in such a venture - Havana is well placed as a blockade running port - and that stopping up the mouth of the Chesapeake would be a useful way to materially injure the Confederate navy.
11 May
President McClellan and General Grant have a long discussion about McClellan's vision for the Army of the United States, in which the two men discuss how best to ensure a competent cavalry and artillery for the Union - these two being less amenable than the infantry to a "militia" style of part time training. One key point that comes out of the discussion is that US regular cavalry and artillery units should be trained as cavalry (not dragoons) and artillery (not as infantry, as many of the nominal artillery regiments often act), as these roles - properly stressed - create the institution which would be needed to properly increase size in time of war.
This is, however, likely to cost.
13 May
HMS London suffers from a failure of sail drill while working in towards Valletta harbour, and runs aground on a shoal. This is not particularly dangerous - it is near low tide and so the screw liner can float off after only a couple of hour - but it is very embarrassing.
16 May
The Joint Committee on Railways (composed of both MPs and Lords) reaffirms the requirement and intent for a complete circle underground rail line in London. The current state of the system has the Metropolitan Line's existing route (from Paddington to Moorgate) to be extended east to Tower Hill and west to Brompton, and plans a second route (the "District" line) which will connect Brompton and Tower Hill in a different way.
Various schemes have been both considered and rejected, and it is felt that the ideal route is one which incurs as little purchase cost as possible - even if this means a less straight and thus longer route - though this is not set in stone.
Meanwhile, in Paris, arguments have been going on about their potential urban rail system for ten years and show no sign of abating.
19 May
Chamberlain's forces burn the mountain fortress of Malka after a short siege and a storming operation led by a regiment of Gurkhas (four of whom will later receive the VC). Pleased with the successful conclusion of the campaign, Chamberlain orders a withdrawal to India (functionally to the Sindh).
21 May
Francis Galton (an English polymath with an especial focus on statistics) begins writing an article on the scientific possibility of heredity of ability - that is, the idea that there are not merely alleles for skin colour, hair colour, eye colour and the ability to roll the tongue, but also for intelligence, perfect pitch, and other such positive mental and physical qualities.
22 May
A large explosion rocks Atlanta (Georgia) where several tonnes of gunpowder have exploded. The explosion's source is not clear, but it is suggested that it may have been a suicidal slave.
24 May
The Confederate Congress proposes a law that states that all government-approved suppliers of explosives (i.e. gunpowder) must avoid any ignition materials entering their facilities - especially in the hands of slaves. A poor safety record will be considered grounds for the lucrative business of supplying the Confederate Army (and thus the Navy) to go elsewhere.
27 May
The Orenberg campaign begins in Central Asia. This comes as a surprise to many - the forces present are the ones that were expected to go after Poland upon the opening of the summer campaign season - and uses large supply dumps set up in Orenberg as the logistical base for a large movement to Chymkent (currently under light Russian control).
The Orenberg campaign has the support of many of Russia's best rail engineers and is slowly extending the rail line from Orenberg towards Chymkent (in addition to the military aspects of the move, which will place a very large force in Chymkent by the standards of the region). It is not known precisely how long it will take until the expansion (or military campaign) is complete, though some sources suggest that the aim of the Russian operation is to make it at least as far as Samarkand over the next few years.
31 May
The Paraguayans secure an early strategic coup in Mato Grosso, successfully disrupting the flow of precious minerals from this province. This puts an unexpected hole in Brazilian governmental revenues, though they still have several Brazilian sources of income to draw upon.
4 June
The line survey on the Confederate trans-continental railroad project is completed. The planned route is New Orleans - Schriever - Lafayette - Lake Charles - Beaumont - Houston - San Antonio - Del Rio - Sanderson - Alpine - El Paso - Deming - Lordsburg - Benson - Tucson - Maricopa - Yuma - Palm Springs - Ontario - Los Angeles, repeatedly passing close to the Mexican border. (The usefulness of it as a jumping-off point for invasion of Mexico is carefully not stated.)
The line is expected to take a few years to construct.
11 June
Battle of the Riachuelo in the Paraguayan War.
The Paraguayan concept of operations in the battle involves taking advantage of the way that Brazilian crews of their fleet lie on shore at night, only boarding their vessels for the day's work; as such, several hundred troops are to be put ashore and board the Brazilian vessels, thus capturing them.
Things do not go quite according to plan, as when the attack takes place - in heavy fog shortly after sunrise - the Brazilian crews are in the midst of returning to their vessels. A bloody battle takes place, with the Paraguayans losing the Ygureí and Salto Guairá (along with all but two of the seven barges full of troops, most of which are already holed and sinking when they deliver their infantry) but managing to capture the Amazonas and Belmonte; the Jequitinhonha and two Brazilian gunboats (Ipiranga and Araguari) are destroyed, and the remaining Brazilian corvettes (Beberibe and Parnaíba) are badly knocked about.
With the Paraguayans now in possession of the largest two ships on the river, the later belief is that they could have won a decisive victory and destroyed the Brazilian navy here; however, as it stands most of the Brazilian crews manage to escape.
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Saphroneth
Banned
Incidentally, the battle mentioned above is a bit closer to how Riachuelo really should have gone in OTL! OTL the Brazilians hadn't started boarding their ships yet, but for some unfathomable reason the Paraguayan force - stuffed full of extra infantry to board ships - went ahead and tried to sink the Brazilian ships with shellfire and shot instead of just capturing a substantial fraction of the Brazilian navy (and as such there was a rather nasty defeat for the Paraguayans).
OTOH, with all those sailors the Brazilians don't have a ship for, perhaps they might go looking for Navy Surplus...
OTOH, with all those sailors the Brazilians don't have a ship for, perhaps they might go looking for Navy Surplus...
Saphroneth
Banned
At this point we pause a bit, to address the issue of the Andrew.
My conception of Britain's building program is that it's not hugely different to OTL - perhaps a bit quicker for some ships, but others have been held up due to the fulfilment of other contracts (and the wait to see if Armstrong will produce good weapons).
As such, the "Black Battlefleet" of British ironclads is something like this.
Iron hulls
Warrior
Black Prince
Defence
Resistance
Hector
Valiant
Achilles
Prince Albert (coast defence)
Minotaur (fitting out)
Agincourt (fitting out)
Northumberland (on slips)
Bellerophon (fitting out)
Wooden hulls
Prince Consort
Caledonia
Ocean
Royal Oak
Royal Sovereign (coast defence)
Royal Alfred (fitting out)
Research (sloop, considered unworthy)
Enterprise (sloop, considered unworthy)
Favorite (sloop, fitting out)
Zealous (fitting out)
Repulse (slipways, waiting for decision on how to convert)
Lord Clyde (fitting out)
Lord Warden (on slipways)
Pallas (fitting out)
Most of the above ships noted as "fitting out" are actually quite close to completion in an emergency - the arguments taking place are about habitability and cabin layouts, things which are important for long-use ships.
Penelope has been ordered and the design for Hercules is being finalized, and the other discussion work is on how to start the turret projects - as such the Monarch is slowly taking shape.
What's also interesting to note is that, when all the big ironclads fitting out above are completed over the next year or so then the RN will have roughly 20 ironclad battleships. This is enough that it's quite possible to wind down the use of wooden battleships on most stations (though the big frigates like Topaze will last another decade and more).
None of the above considers the smaller ironclads, like the two Lavas which are to be completed and then sail to Pearl Harbour fairly soon. Now that will be an adventure, especially as the Suez Canal hasn't been built yet. (The transit method will essentially amount to building a wooden external hull for them, and to their being shepherded by a couple of off-duty liners and several colliers.)
(there's also Scorpion and Wivern, which were purchased TTL, and a couple of others along similar lines for port actions.)
My conception of Britain's building program is that it's not hugely different to OTL - perhaps a bit quicker for some ships, but others have been held up due to the fulfilment of other contracts (and the wait to see if Armstrong will produce good weapons).
As such, the "Black Battlefleet" of British ironclads is something like this.
Iron hulls
Warrior
Black Prince
Defence
Resistance
Hector
Valiant
Achilles
Prince Albert (coast defence)
Minotaur (fitting out)
Agincourt (fitting out)
Northumberland (on slips)
Bellerophon (fitting out)
Wooden hulls
Prince Consort
Caledonia
Ocean
Royal Oak
Royal Sovereign (coast defence)
Royal Alfred (fitting out)
Research (sloop, considered unworthy)
Enterprise (sloop, considered unworthy)
Favorite (sloop, fitting out)
Zealous (fitting out)
Repulse (slipways, waiting for decision on how to convert)
Lord Clyde (fitting out)
Lord Warden (on slipways)
Pallas (fitting out)
Most of the above ships noted as "fitting out" are actually quite close to completion in an emergency - the arguments taking place are about habitability and cabin layouts, things which are important for long-use ships.
Penelope has been ordered and the design for Hercules is being finalized, and the other discussion work is on how to start the turret projects - as such the Monarch is slowly taking shape.
What's also interesting to note is that, when all the big ironclads fitting out above are completed over the next year or so then the RN will have roughly 20 ironclad battleships. This is enough that it's quite possible to wind down the use of wooden battleships on most stations (though the big frigates like Topaze will last another decade and more).
None of the above considers the smaller ironclads, like the two Lavas which are to be completed and then sail to Pearl Harbour fairly soon. Now that will be an adventure, especially as the Suez Canal hasn't been built yet. (The transit method will essentially amount to building a wooden external hull for them, and to their being shepherded by a couple of off-duty liners and several colliers.)
(there's also Scorpion and Wivern, which were purchased TTL, and a couple of others along similar lines for port actions.)
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Armstrong on gunnery
Saphroneth
Banned
William Armstrong, internal EOC note on guns and armour
Experiments have shown that the best way of measuring the efficaciousness of a gun is to examine the penetrative power in terms of the force exerted, in foot-tons, compared to the circumference of the round, in inches. Thus the penetration power and the resistance may be expressed in foot-tons per inch; a gun of forty foot-tons per inch will penetrate the same armour as another gun of forty foot-tons per inch. Thus we may also compare armours by their foot-tons per inch in resistive power.
This may also be expressed in terms of a thickness of good wrought iron, rolled and of the best quality, as this is the most effective means of resisting shot and shell yet devised for the thickness it bears, but it would be better to keep in mind foot-tons per inch - armour of one country may be inferior to that of another, but a foot-ton is a foot-ton and an inch is an inch.
So long as the foot, the ton and the inch are the normal British measures, of course.
We must conclude that, in future, the thickness of armour must increase. Thus it is not right for us to continue to build the same guns, the same shells, but it is right for us to continually press to increase the power of the guns.
For a comparison, we must consider the armour of the past. The Erebus, with four inches of rolled iron and poorly backed, has roughly 38 foot tons per inch with the angle of her sides in account; the French Gloire's hammered plates are 16 but when backed become 40. The 4.5 inch rolled plates of the Warrior are about 28, but when backed become 61.
The new Bellerophon is about 90 foot tons per inch in the whole system. To place this in relative difference, the 25 inches of oak of the old ships of the line was but 16 foot tons per inch - there is a great improvement in the efficacy of wood as a shield when it is fronted by iron.
It has been shown by direct experiment that the resistance of single armour plates varies as the square of the thickness, but that for a "laminate" of plates bolted together or left resting together this does not apply - thus, eight inches of one inch plates is not nearly so strong as a single eight inch plate (though it is stronger than eight times the strength of a one inch plate).
Now, to how this is calculated. The penetrating power in foot-pounds per inch is the weight in pounds of the shot, times the square of the velocity in feet per second, divided by twice the effect of gravity and by the circumference of the shot in inches.
The weight in foot-tons per inch is this number divided through by 2,240.
Thus, for a seventy-two pound shot which travels at 1,700 feet per second with a diameter of eight inches - the old 68 pounder gun - the "work" is about fifty-eight foot tons per inch, and so we may see that the design of the Warrior was well thought of - it resists the guns of the time.
For a more modern gun such as our own guns of the last few years, compare the two seven inch guns, the 110 pounder and the 120 pounder. The 110 pounder could handle but an initial velocity of 1,100 feet per second, and so the work done was but 42 foot-tons per inch; the new gun has 1,525 feet per second, and the work done is 88 foot-tons per inch.
If a gun could be built that would handle the same great velocity of the old 68 pounder gun of 112 cwt - to whit, over 2,000 feet per second - then the work that might be done is nearly one hundred and sixty foot-tons per inch. We can see that the great want for the construction of a fine gun is a fine system of metallurgy, and that the great want for fine armour is the same.
It is amusing to imagine how the late American War might have gone had we had the guns of today only a few years ago. The best estimates for the resistance of "Monitor" are that the turret may have resisted with fifty or sixty foot-tons per inch, and so the 120-pounder would put shot right through the turret even at far range. (For all the values given are for the initial velocity of the gun.)
Thus I think the importance of the larger gun is not the "racking" effect, but the "punching" effect - for a gun of common proportion, the circumference goes up linearly with the bore, but the size of the powder chamber and the mass of the round go up as the cube of the bore. A gun of 14 inches, with the same initial velocity as the 120 pounder (due to the same ratio of the powder charge and the round), would be expected to fire a projectile of nearly half a ton and to have a penetration of three hundred and fifty-four foot tons per inch - a power which would not be ably resisted by even a single plate of fifteen inches (unbacked) - if such a plate may be achieved.
A larger gun is of no worth if it cannot thus increase the density of the energy of the round! We must not fall into the American trap of seeing mere mass as the key to defeating armour.
Experiments have shown that the best way of measuring the efficaciousness of a gun is to examine the penetrative power in terms of the force exerted, in foot-tons, compared to the circumference of the round, in inches. Thus the penetration power and the resistance may be expressed in foot-tons per inch; a gun of forty foot-tons per inch will penetrate the same armour as another gun of forty foot-tons per inch. Thus we may also compare armours by their foot-tons per inch in resistive power.
This may also be expressed in terms of a thickness of good wrought iron, rolled and of the best quality, as this is the most effective means of resisting shot and shell yet devised for the thickness it bears, but it would be better to keep in mind foot-tons per inch - armour of one country may be inferior to that of another, but a foot-ton is a foot-ton and an inch is an inch.
So long as the foot, the ton and the inch are the normal British measures, of course.
We must conclude that, in future, the thickness of armour must increase. Thus it is not right for us to continue to build the same guns, the same shells, but it is right for us to continually press to increase the power of the guns.
For a comparison, we must consider the armour of the past. The Erebus, with four inches of rolled iron and poorly backed, has roughly 38 foot tons per inch with the angle of her sides in account; the French Gloire's hammered plates are 16 but when backed become 40. The 4.5 inch rolled plates of the Warrior are about 28, but when backed become 61.
The new Bellerophon is about 90 foot tons per inch in the whole system. To place this in relative difference, the 25 inches of oak of the old ships of the line was but 16 foot tons per inch - there is a great improvement in the efficacy of wood as a shield when it is fronted by iron.
It has been shown by direct experiment that the resistance of single armour plates varies as the square of the thickness, but that for a "laminate" of plates bolted together or left resting together this does not apply - thus, eight inches of one inch plates is not nearly so strong as a single eight inch plate (though it is stronger than eight times the strength of a one inch plate).
Now, to how this is calculated. The penetrating power in foot-pounds per inch is the weight in pounds of the shot, times the square of the velocity in feet per second, divided by twice the effect of gravity and by the circumference of the shot in inches.
The weight in foot-tons per inch is this number divided through by 2,240.
Thus, for a seventy-two pound shot which travels at 1,700 feet per second with a diameter of eight inches - the old 68 pounder gun - the "work" is about fifty-eight foot tons per inch, and so we may see that the design of the Warrior was well thought of - it resists the guns of the time.
For a more modern gun such as our own guns of the last few years, compare the two seven inch guns, the 110 pounder and the 120 pounder. The 110 pounder could handle but an initial velocity of 1,100 feet per second, and so the work done was but 42 foot-tons per inch; the new gun has 1,525 feet per second, and the work done is 88 foot-tons per inch.
If a gun could be built that would handle the same great velocity of the old 68 pounder gun of 112 cwt - to whit, over 2,000 feet per second - then the work that might be done is nearly one hundred and sixty foot-tons per inch. We can see that the great want for the construction of a fine gun is a fine system of metallurgy, and that the great want for fine armour is the same.
It is amusing to imagine how the late American War might have gone had we had the guns of today only a few years ago. The best estimates for the resistance of "Monitor" are that the turret may have resisted with fifty or sixty foot-tons per inch, and so the 120-pounder would put shot right through the turret even at far range. (For all the values given are for the initial velocity of the gun.)
Thus I think the importance of the larger gun is not the "racking" effect, but the "punching" effect - for a gun of common proportion, the circumference goes up linearly with the bore, but the size of the powder chamber and the mass of the round go up as the cube of the bore. A gun of 14 inches, with the same initial velocity as the 120 pounder (due to the same ratio of the powder charge and the round), would be expected to fire a projectile of nearly half a ton and to have a penetration of three hundred and fifty-four foot tons per inch - a power which would not be ably resisted by even a single plate of fifteen inches (unbacked) - if such a plate may be achieved.
A larger gun is of no worth if it cannot thus increase the density of the energy of the round! We must not fall into the American trap of seeing mere mass as the key to defeating armour.
Fascinating series of updates.
I get that you want cause and effect next to each other in the Timeline but that is about a month too fast. Even for a short, knee jerk reaction bill to become law it has to be drafted (a couple of days), introduced (which means getting in the queue), debated (even if for 10 minutes), voted on and then it needs to repeat the same stages in the other house before going to the president to be signed.
I get that you want cause and effect next to each other in the Timeline but that is about a month too fast. Even for a short, knee jerk reaction bill to become law it has to be drafted (a couple of days), introduced (which means getting in the queue), debated (even if for 10 minutes), voted on and then it needs to repeat the same stages in the other house before going to the president to be signed.
The jedi?I'm sure everyone wants to know who will be targeted when they get to Plan 66.
Saphroneth
Banned
A quick look at the Confederate navy.
So at this point the CSN's had a few years of peace to build up. They've got a small cruising fleet of sloops in the process of working up (including one or two very fine British-built commerce raiding cruisers) and three big wooden-sided frigates named for early (US) presidents.
They've also got a riverine fleet, largely composed of shallow draft wartime ironclads (and a few built since) and those river vessels they didn't release back to the commercial market.
But the most important ships are the ironclads. There's the Charleston, which was their purchased French screw liner (now razeed and plated, so she's roughly on par with Gloire at a first glance) and the Jefferson Davis (which may get a renaming to Confederacy) which is their Totally Domestic Honest ironclad that only uses a few British guns to supplement their own rifles and which is a fine piece of work. Aside from that, most domestic ironclads are along Virginia's lines - low-slung angled casemate ironclads, with rams fitted to give them a possible weapon in case their enemy is too heavily armoured.
There's also a couple of somewhat-updated turret rams on order from Laird (replacements for the Laird Rams, which were purchased by the British and which I left out of the above list at first!) and probably another ironclad or two being built in Britain or France, though they may be some of the last sane designs for a good while as we are approaching The Very Silly Time.
As for weaponry, the Confederacy's rifles are a little more advanced than those of the Union (they started focusing on rifles sooner) and they're also a lot more willing to buy overseas - they'll happily purchase Krupp, Creusot or Elswick if they can get a chance and it fits into their concept of design. My rough mental picture for the CSA's ironclad fleet is that they're a bit like that of late-19th-century Japan or 1860s-1870s Italy, which is to say they're not able to do all the work themselves but they don't need to buy everything overseas either.
So at this point the CSN's had a few years of peace to build up. They've got a small cruising fleet of sloops in the process of working up (including one or two very fine British-built commerce raiding cruisers) and three big wooden-sided frigates named for early (US) presidents.
They've also got a riverine fleet, largely composed of shallow draft wartime ironclads (and a few built since) and those river vessels they didn't release back to the commercial market.
But the most important ships are the ironclads. There's the Charleston, which was their purchased French screw liner (now razeed and plated, so she's roughly on par with Gloire at a first glance) and the Jefferson Davis (which may get a renaming to Confederacy) which is their Totally Domestic Honest ironclad that only uses a few British guns to supplement their own rifles and which is a fine piece of work. Aside from that, most domestic ironclads are along Virginia's lines - low-slung angled casemate ironclads, with rams fitted to give them a possible weapon in case their enemy is too heavily armoured.
There's also a couple of somewhat-updated turret rams on order from Laird (replacements for the Laird Rams, which were purchased by the British and which I left out of the above list at first!) and probably another ironclad or two being built in Britain or France, though they may be some of the last sane designs for a good while as we are approaching The Very Silly Time.
As for weaponry, the Confederacy's rifles are a little more advanced than those of the Union (they started focusing on rifles sooner) and they're also a lot more willing to buy overseas - they'll happily purchase Krupp, Creusot or Elswick if they can get a chance and it fits into their concept of design. My rough mental picture for the CSA's ironclad fleet is that they're a bit like that of late-19th-century Japan or 1860s-1870s Italy, which is to say they're not able to do all the work themselves but they don't need to buy everything overseas either.
Saphroneth
Banned
And to continue the not-actually-an-update thing, a bit of thinking on how US and CS doctrine may well work after all this.
The US has seen from the fights with Britain that it's possible to get a lot of firepower - offensive or defensive - into a small frontage, or to spread the amount of firepower they'd be used to much wider than they expected. Given the 1861-2 US style of "build a big army", I imagine they'd try to fight in comparatively close order - not quite a two-deep firing line, but not far off - and use that as a fixing formation. Roughly speaking this means that a division of 6,000 troops (with reserve) is about a mile and a half wide, or 4,000 men per mile. (As opposed to 6,000 men per mile in the OTL civil war)
This is not an invulnerable formation, even with rifle training, but it's a lot closer to it than it would be without rifle training. With pre-next-war US regulars I'd expect them to repel most feasible enemy attacks with a main line and a support line - with volunteers and other half-trained troops it's an invitation for trouble, though the second line behind the first prevents a catastrophic breach for long enough that reinforcements/reserves can be moved in.
So if we use this number - that in a major battle the US would be deploying at 8,000 men per mile - we can see that this actually gives them a lot more options than in OTL. For comparison Meade's army at Gettysburg was at about 26,000 men per mile - a US army of the quality stated would be able (or willing, at least!) to hold the Fish-Hook with a third the men Meade used, and can use the surplus to turn the Confederate flank.
The Confederacy has faced Britain in 1863 (Sniders) but not 1862, and (impressed by the deadliness of British skirmishers) the message they've taken is different - based on successes in assault elsewhere, the CS Army doctrine that's developing is basically a recapitulation of Impulse Warfare (clouds of skirmishers to screen the main force and suppress defenders, main force making attacks in column over very narrow frontage with the aim of breaking the enemy line and then sending cavalry through) but with the artillery concentrated as grand batteries instead. This is actually very dangerous in the 1860s, though it rapidly becomes less so as technology advances and training (and Union artillery) improves - against well trained and entrenched troops with cartridge rifles it's very risky and depends strongly on the skirmishers and artillery suppressing the defending resistance line, against troops with poor training it's a good way to win a campaign very rapidly. If the Confederate army at Gettysburg tried this against OTL Meade, it would quite likely have broken into the Union lines and caused absolute havoc.
How much either army can actually do their doctrine is another matter.
Of course, of the two the CSA's got the distinct problem that on mobilization it's actually formed of roughly a dozen smaller armies, each of which has their own ideas about what works best. (Marylanders are likely to be trained in position warfare, Virginians have a certain fascination with marching hard and fighting by manoeuvre, Indians Just Wanna Have Raids...) It's also the one more likely to be rethought if something goes badly wrong overseas, as it's based on theory.
The US has seen from the fights with Britain that it's possible to get a lot of firepower - offensive or defensive - into a small frontage, or to spread the amount of firepower they'd be used to much wider than they expected. Given the 1861-2 US style of "build a big army", I imagine they'd try to fight in comparatively close order - not quite a two-deep firing line, but not far off - and use that as a fixing formation. Roughly speaking this means that a division of 6,000 troops (with reserve) is about a mile and a half wide, or 4,000 men per mile. (As opposed to 6,000 men per mile in the OTL civil war)
This is not an invulnerable formation, even with rifle training, but it's a lot closer to it than it would be without rifle training. With pre-next-war US regulars I'd expect them to repel most feasible enemy attacks with a main line and a support line - with volunteers and other half-trained troops it's an invitation for trouble, though the second line behind the first prevents a catastrophic breach for long enough that reinforcements/reserves can be moved in.
So if we use this number - that in a major battle the US would be deploying at 8,000 men per mile - we can see that this actually gives them a lot more options than in OTL. For comparison Meade's army at Gettysburg was at about 26,000 men per mile - a US army of the quality stated would be able (or willing, at least!) to hold the Fish-Hook with a third the men Meade used, and can use the surplus to turn the Confederate flank.
The Confederacy has faced Britain in 1863 (Sniders) but not 1862, and (impressed by the deadliness of British skirmishers) the message they've taken is different - based on successes in assault elsewhere, the CS Army doctrine that's developing is basically a recapitulation of Impulse Warfare (clouds of skirmishers to screen the main force and suppress defenders, main force making attacks in column over very narrow frontage with the aim of breaking the enemy line and then sending cavalry through) but with the artillery concentrated as grand batteries instead. This is actually very dangerous in the 1860s, though it rapidly becomes less so as technology advances and training (and Union artillery) improves - against well trained and entrenched troops with cartridge rifles it's very risky and depends strongly on the skirmishers and artillery suppressing the defending resistance line, against troops with poor training it's a good way to win a campaign very rapidly. If the Confederate army at Gettysburg tried this against OTL Meade, it would quite likely have broken into the Union lines and caused absolute havoc.
How much either army can actually do their doctrine is another matter.
Of course, of the two the CSA's got the distinct problem that on mobilization it's actually formed of roughly a dozen smaller armies, each of which has their own ideas about what works best. (Marylanders are likely to be trained in position warfare, Virginians have a certain fascination with marching hard and fighting by manoeuvre, Indians Just Wanna Have Raids...) It's also the one more likely to be rethought if something goes badly wrong overseas, as it's based on theory.
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Saphroneth
Banned
A quick bit of thought on the British Army - specifically, their strength.
The British have at this point fought three big wars in a decade (defining a big war as one where the militia needs to be called out) - Crimea, India and Trent. Of the three, the Trent went best from a land perspective (specifically, they actually had the required force!) and so I think it's likely that they'll try to keep roughly that level of force available or expand it somewhat - my rough estimate is that the British Army for the next several years will be
110 foot regiments (of which numbers 1-25 have 2 battalions and the 60th has four battalions) for 110+25+3 = 138 battalions
+ 8 Guards battalions
+ four Rifle Brigade battalions
for a total of 150 foot battalions. (This is British Army, not counting the armies of the Presidencies in India or e.g. the RCR)
Of these, the ideal would be that they'd have the ability to deploy as many as six corps (72 battalions) in extremis to a non-India hot spot, though this assumes that the hot spot has a pre-war garrison as well.
To this end, they would like to have about eighteen disposable cavalry regiments (currently they have 31 total regiments, and I think they'd want to expand this by a few to allow for all the cavalry in India). They would also like to have 36 disposable non-horse artillery batteries (field and position batteries) and another twelve disposable horse batteries.
The result of all this is that - well, the British are quite happy for the most part with what they have, though they would like to make the numbers neat. It's not much more than they had historically and which they sent to Canada TTL.
Of course, this is a little more costly than OTL. Not crippling, but noticeable.
The British have at this point fought three big wars in a decade (defining a big war as one where the militia needs to be called out) - Crimea, India and Trent. Of the three, the Trent went best from a land perspective (specifically, they actually had the required force!) and so I think it's likely that they'll try to keep roughly that level of force available or expand it somewhat - my rough estimate is that the British Army for the next several years will be
110 foot regiments (of which numbers 1-25 have 2 battalions and the 60th has four battalions) for 110+25+3 = 138 battalions
+ 8 Guards battalions
+ four Rifle Brigade battalions
for a total of 150 foot battalions. (This is British Army, not counting the armies of the Presidencies in India or e.g. the RCR)
Of these, the ideal would be that they'd have the ability to deploy as many as six corps (72 battalions) in extremis to a non-India hot spot, though this assumes that the hot spot has a pre-war garrison as well.
To this end, they would like to have about eighteen disposable cavalry regiments (currently they have 31 total regiments, and I think they'd want to expand this by a few to allow for all the cavalry in India). They would also like to have 36 disposable non-horse artillery batteries (field and position batteries) and another twelve disposable horse batteries.
The result of all this is that - well, the British are quite happy for the most part with what they have, though they would like to make the numbers neat. It's not much more than they had historically and which they sent to Canada TTL.
Of course, this is a little more costly than OTL. Not crippling, but noticeable.
On the other hand Britain is rather running out of people to fight in this TL. Relations with Napoleon III aren't great but he's busy in Mexico, the Russians are distracted and the Germans are focused on each other. Anyway based on the last 250 years (ever since the Dutch Revolt) Britain isn't going to be sending a land force to the continent except as a stiffener to an ally. Outside of Europe with the US knocked down a peg who is there to fight? Add to that Ironclads making much of the Royal Navy obsolete I think it's time for budget cuts!
How much of a difficulty, in practice, would the need to get the right position and movement vectors pose? I've seen it claimed that ramming would only work on stationary ships, which seems far too strong a claim and is difficult to reconcile with incidents such as the sinking of HMS Victoria in 1893.