Even with best case weather, for the German Army to reach Moscow requires them to meet their goals regarding rates of advance and also defeating Soviet forces at Moscow. The USSR would still have a difficult first three weeks because of the absence of the second strategic echelon due to mobilization and the military-political state, possible low peacetime readiness in border districts, certainty of first strike by the German Army, the unsuccessful existing structure of Soviet forces, unpreparedness in military theory regarding strategic defensives, envelopments and withdrawals, superior density of German Army forces and force deployments (how many tanks can be crammed into 10 km of space). After these three weeks the second strategic echelon is mobilized from the interior and could be strategically redeployed wherever, Soviet high command has established the idea of defensive zones of multiple defensive lines on the route to Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad. The idea then becomes halting the advance of the German Army by a strategic defensive with defense in depth at these defensive zones wherever possible with echeloned defensive lines and the Red Army extended over operational depths with tactical and operational-tactical (Army or front level) level agressive operations. These aggressive operations led to tank battles like in the case of the Battle of Brody. All of this while contending with an enemy that has had preperations and nearly all the military-economic resources of Western Europe at its disposal. German losses during just June and July are absolutely staggering in terms of equipment (not so much manpower) which certainly changes the operational-strategic outlook even with best case weather.