That ignores that from 1943 to 1945, 9 million fit males came of age within the pre-war borders of the USSR (of which a significant proportion were admittedly conscripted into the Red Army as it was) and a further 3 million were coming of age annually up through to 1947. As it was, when the war ended the Soviets had around one-and-a-half million men from the 1945 class of conscripts in replacement training from the first of the bi-annual call-ups. The decline in strength of rifle divisions was the result of a conscious decision to divert manpower into reinforcing and creating more artillery and tank units, not from an absolute shortage of men.
Completely
and utterly false according to Soviet draft data which I've already provided; 1943 class, for example, was only 900,00 men. Outside of using more prisoners and Central Asians, manpower was tapped out in early 1943 besides several million they could liberate behind the lines but even that was largely used up as they moved West.
That firstly ignores that it took years for those B-24s and B-17s to break Nazi Germany.
No, it took about a year from the late Spring of 1943 to the Fall of 1944. This was also without the advantages the Western Allies had in 1945, namely that medium bombers and fighter bombers are readily available for use against the Soviet logistical net, which proved devastating for the Germans when unleashed upon them in late 1944.
The British planners for Unthinkable, who were intimately familiar with the capabilities and limitations of air power operating against lines of communication having had ample experience with it against the Germans, did not believe they could achieve such a total collapse of Soviet logistics so rapidly.
In May/June of 1945, Post-War reviews of how effective bombing had been had yet to be completed, meaning that contemporary views have much less merit than us using declassified sources from both sides.
Additionally, looking at that map I'm seeing rail lines that would still be available to the USSR in the event Warsaw, Lublin, and Lwow were destroyed. For, the lines going through East Prussia and that one I can see that runs between Lublin and Warsaw. This is, of course, assuming the atomic bombers are not intercepted and shot down.
Ah yes, the Soviets can
definitely support multiple fronts using minor supply lines, or a
single railway from East Prussia which will be under the utter focus of conventional attacks or nuked in September of 1945; as time progresses the Americans will swarm the Soviets in nuclear devices and bombers, while having air superiority. There is no chance of the West failing to destroy these targets, and I find it impossible they can sustain the same forces they did historically in East Germany in 1945 using less than 25% of the same railways.
Classic case of lying with statistics. Those figures are in comparison to Soviet production during the war, not for usage.
Uh, no and any review of this statement would show that; I'm lying with statistics, but then you acknowledge the Soviets were overwhelmingly dependent on Western production as the original claim dictated?
Overwhelmingly, the Soviets used their domestic pre-war stocks throughout the war, with lend-lease inputs only being enough to cover losses. Locomotives is a good case in point: per The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945, the Soviets started the war with 24,000 locomotives, lost an estimated 2,000 to the Germans during the course of the war, and through lend-lease received 1,900. An additional 2,000 locomotives, as well as 120,000 railcars, were subsequently captured in the late-stages of the war.
And now they cannot replace losses, which was the point. I also noticed you cited locomotives, but not ability to replace track.
I've always wondered where that 59% figure comes from, since the numbers shipped and consumed don't support it. Between June 1941 and May 1945, the Soviets record expenditures of just under
3 million tons of high-octane aviation fuel and
received 1,197,587 tons, which works out to around 40%.
You source doesn't include citations for its claims, l
ikely because if it did it would've been exposed as debunked Soviet claims. Even taking it at face value, a 40% reduction in AV Gas is a MAJOR force reduction hit.
Most discussions on this also ignore the fact that American lend-lease furnished the Soviets with six refinery complexes outfitted with the catalytic cracking processes for the domestic production of high-octane aviation fuel, but those refineries were still there and still producing when lend-lease stopped and would still be providing large quantities of high-octane avgas to the Soviets.
Said production was already counted towards Soviet domestic production, which we've both already established is nowhere near meeting Soviet needs.
This is further ignoring that the capture and retrieval of German and Romanian petro-chemical industries would have furnished the Soviets with further capacity for the production of high-octane avgas, so using the metrics of 1941-1944 for Soviet mid-1945 avgas production is flawed to begin with.
You mean the German and Romanian facilities the Western Allies spent the last year bombing to hell, currently occupy large amounts of, and have bases around Europe well within range of hitting the sources they don't hold?
Your implication that the German counterattacks against Soviet exploitation forces is likewise dubious, since the VVS was unable to do the sort of flexible CAS the WAllies did, instead generally doing stuff like interdiction patrols in set regions. This seems to be taking a correlation for a causation. By and large those German counterattacks were stopped not by the Soviet VVS but by Soviet mechanized forces conducting the exploitation. Fire support for such efforts was largely provided by assault guns and tank destroyers, not by aviation.
Source comes from Creveld's study on the matter, which I've seen both you and Wiking cite. You're welcome to provide an alternative source to contradict it, but just claiming its false does not make it so.
Long on generalization, absent on specifics, and rather contrary to the historical data we do have. The Soviets didn't have trouble producing high-octane fuel for all the masses of new late-model piston engine and jet fights they were flying around in the late-1940s, their rolling stock in 1945 was about the same size as it was pre-war and that had handled the war time needs rather admirably,
Because there is a difference between
peacetime fuel needs and cargo transfers via rail nets versus
wartime? Unless you're arguing the Soviets use magic of course.
Soviet industry expanded significantly which indicates large production of machine tool spare parts and metal production
Because they were receiving 25% of their machine tools via Lend Lease.
and Soviet technological and managers personnel were enough to design and manufacture all sorts of high technological items from radars to jet engines to atomic bombs. Sounds more like standard Western underestimation of Soviet technical-industrial capabilities (the sort that made them believe the USSR could never build an atomic bomb) then sound analysis.
Just ignore their extensive spy nets acquiring said technology through means such as Klaus Fuchs or the Brits outright sending them engines. I'll also point out you were the one who previously cited this source in question the last time we sparred on this topic; same with regards to Art over on AHF.
Indeed, the very next paragraph, which you quite notably left out, goes on to state that since the USSR was "diverting a substantially higher percentage of its limited resources to war-making capacities, more than offset its poverty and placed itself in a position of conventional military superiority."
Which further drives home my point, in that their economy cannot economically sustain fighting a war without Western aid.
I've already dealt with the Avgas question, but would further note that Soviet aircraft production in 1945 was already on route to outstrip it's 1944 production figures by around 10,000 aircraft. Furthermore, the Soviets in 1945 did have a functioning high-altitude interceptor force, which the Cold War force was built upon. It wasn't built from scratch.
And yet they still got nearly a third of their aircraft from the West which, when compared to loss ratios against the Germans, shows how dangerous this lacking is. As for their HAIF, it was a limited one which had no real experience given the nature of the Eastern Front, and it should be noted it took years to get that Cold War force in place. The West, meanwhile, has P-51s, P-47s, and now P-80s with which to quickly and decisively seize control of the air and escort bombing missions with.