If the U.S. invades North Vietnam, does China militarily intervene?

CaliGuy

Banned
If the U.S. would have invaded North Vietnam during the Vietnam War (similar to how the U.S. invaded North Korea during the Korean War), would China have militarily intervened in the Vietnam War on the side of North Vietnam (just like it did in the Korean War on behalf of North Korea)?

Any thoughts on this?
 
It partly depends on when; the earlier the better, generally. When the US became more intervention-oriented, China's initial response was to prepare for their own country being invaded, and urged the DRV to retire to the hill country, rather than stand and fight, but as Johnson dawdled through 64-5, they became more secure in aiding the DRV, sending them logistical and AA personnel and thus freeing up more men for the conquest of the RVN. At that point, actually killing Chinese soldiers in ground combat ran a serious risk of provoking an international conflagration.

If China did intervene, though, it's hardly an instant loss scenario; the nature of the country meant that the Chinese could probably only deploy about 20 divisions into SE Asia, and the US military thought 8 American divisions would be more than a match for them without the use of any nuclear weapons. China wasn't that eager for a Great Power war with the United States after the Korean War either. In terms of writing a timeline, China not intervening directly after an American invasion in 1964 and Chinese intervention resulting in stalemate along the 17th Parallel are fairly plausible.

Considering their troubled relationship with North Vietnam and China, I don't think the Soviet Union would initiate a strategic nuclear exchange over North Vietnam. China alone didn't have a nuclear stockpile in the same universe as the US in the 60s, and probably wouldn't initiate an exchange without Soviet assurance, which would be difficult to come by.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
It partly depends on when; the earlier the better, generally.

The better for the U.S., you mean--correct?

When the US became more intervention-oriented, China's initial response was to prepare for their own country being invaded, and urged the DRV to retire to the hill country, rather than stand and fight, but as Johnson dawdled through 64-5, they became more secure in aiding the DRV, sending them logistical and AA personnel and thus freeing up more men for the conquest of the RVN. At that point, actually killing Chinese soldiers in ground combat ran a serious risk of provoking an international conflagration.

OK.

If China did intervene, though, it's hardly an instant loss scenario; the nature of the country meant that the Chinese could probably only deploy about 20 divisions into SE Asia, and the US military thought 8 American divisions would be more than a match for them without the use of any nuclear weapons.

How many divisions did China deploy during the Korean War?

China wasn't that eager for a Great Power war with the United States after the Korean War either. In terms of writing a timeline, China not intervening directly after an American invasion in 1964 and Chinese intervention resulting in stalemate along the 17th Parallel are fairly plausible.

So, basically, both of these scenarios are plausible--with the former being more plausible the earlier the U.S. invasion occurs and the latter being more plausible the later the U.S. invasion occurs--correct?

Also, why exactly didn't the U.S. invade North Vietnam in 1964-1965 in our TL?

Considering their troubled relationship with North Vietnam and China, I don't think the Soviet Union would initiate a strategic nuclear exchange over North Vietnam. China alone didn't have a nuclear stockpile in the same universe as the US in the 60s, and probably wouldn't initiate an exchange without Soviet assurance, which would be difficult to come by.

Wasn't North Vietnam a Soviet ally, though?
 
The better for the U.S., you mean--correct?



OK.



How many divisions did China deploy during the Korean War?



So, basically, both of these scenarios are plausible--with the former being more plausible the earlier the U.S. invasion occurs and the latter being more plausible the later the U.S. invasion occurs--correct?

Also, why exactly didn't the U.S. invade North Vietnam in 1964-1965 in our TL?



Wasn't North Vietnam a Soviet ally, though?
Yes, North Vietnam was a Soviet ally, but AFAIK the USSR didn't have large personnel contingent in North Vietnam and as of the mid60s it would have been very difficult to get the Chinese to let them stage any volunteers out of south China. They were able to intervene with air power in Korea as they could base out of the USSR and be virtually untouchable.
 
No. People often don't appreciate how fragile Mao's regime was in 1950, which was what led to him intervening. It had literally been less than a year since the main body of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces had retreated to Taiwan, and they still controlled Tibet, large areas in other provinces, Hainan Island, and other places. ROC troops based in Burma were attacking also, and there were nationalist guerrillas all over the country. Mao had no nukes, little international recognition, a relatively diminished military, and a serious political and military rival to deal with. If U.N. troops had invaded (and MacArthur quite honestly might have done this entirely on his own authority; the plans he authored all called for nuking/invading China after all), they could have posed an existential threat to Mao's regime. This insecurity made Mao perceive it as being very important to keep U.N. troops away from the Yalu.

By the time of the Vietnam War, the notion that the U.S. could do that was laughable. Mao was unquestionably in control, the Chinese military was far stronger than in the 1950s (when it caused enough trouble in Korea), and most importantly he had nuclear weapons. The U.S. wasn't going to mess with a power like that and everybody knew it.
 
Also, why exactly didn't the U.S. invade North Vietnam in 1964-1965 in our TL?

You mean "the US and RVN"; ARVN troops would have been included, just as RoK troops were in 1950.

There were several reasons:

Fear of Chinese intervention.

"international opinion".

The "consensus" in US military and diplomatic leadership that the war should be "contained".

For instance, the Communists very flagrantly used Eastern Laos for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, moving lots of troops and supplies into South Vietnam at will. But the "Laotian accord" of 1962 (signed by 14 countries) allegedly "neutralized" Laos. And the Communists refrained from attacking the "Royal Government of Laos". So US leaders let the Communists get away with the Trail operations, rather than open a new front in Laos.

If US/ARVN forces entered North Vietnam, that would definitely "open a new front", which spooked US leaders.
 
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How many divisions did China deploy during the Korean War?
It varied, but for most of the war, eighteen frontline divisions, if Wiki's ORBATs are to be trusted.


Wasn't North Vietnam a Soviet ally, though?
It's complicated. Early in the war, they joined China in denouncing the Soviet Union for 'revisionism' and its policy of peaceful coexistence, but eventually came to depend on Soviet aid more than Chinese.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
No. People often don't appreciate how fragile Mao's regime was in 1950, which was what led to him intervening. It had literally been less than a year since the main body of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces had retreated to Taiwan, and they still controlled Tibet, large areas in other provinces, Hainan Island, and other places. ROC troops based in Burma were attacking also, and there were nationalist guerrillas all over the country. Mao had no nukes, little international recognition, a relatively diminished military, and a serious political and military rival to deal with. If U.N. troops had invaded (and MacArthur quite honestly might have done this entirely on his own authority; the plans he authored all called for nuking/invading China after all), they could have posed an existential threat to Mao's regime. This insecurity made Mao perceive it as being very important to keep U.N. troops away from the Yalu.

By the time of the Vietnam War, the notion that the U.S. could do that was laughable. Mao was unquestionably in control, the Chinese military was far stronger than in the 1950s (when it caused enough trouble in Korea), and most importantly he had nuclear weapons. The U.S. wasn't going to mess with a power like that and everybody knew it.
Very interesting point(s)! :)

However, I have a question--didn't China at least in part militarily intervene in Korea in 1950 due to Stalin making such intervention a condition for large-scale Soviet aid to China?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
You mean "the US and RVN"; ARVN troops would have been included, just as RoK troops were in 1950.

Yes; correct!

There were several reasons:

Fear of Chinese intervention.

Was this a rational fear or an exaggerated one (as Asp argues here), though?

"international opinion".

Wouldn't U.S. allies have supported such a U.S./South Vietnamese move, though?

The "consensus" in US military and diplomatic leadership that the war should be "contained".

For instance, the Communists very flagrantly used Eastern Laos for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, moving lots of troops and supplies into South Vietnam at will. But the "Laotian accord" of 1962 (signed by 14 countries) allegedly "neutralized" Laos. And the Communists refrained from attacking the "Royal Government of Laos".) So US leaders let the Communists get away with the Trail operations, rather than open a new front in Laos.

If US/ARVN forces entered North Vietnam, that would definitely "open a new front", which spooked US leaders.

OK; understood.

However, I still wonder if that was a miscalculation on the part of the U.S.; after all, North Vietnam and its allies the Viet Cong would continue to pose a threat to South Vietnam as long as they had a base to operate in. In this regard, conquering North Vietnam would have significantly reduced the amount of territory and resources that the Vietnamese Communists would have had at their disposal.
 
Very interesting point(s)! :)

However, I have a question--didn't China at least in part militarily intervene in Korea in 1950 due to Stalin making such intervention a condition for large-scale Soviet aid to China?

That kind of grew out of my original point though...Mao needed the aid to shore up his regime and be less vulnerable. Even without Stalin throwing down the gauntlet IMHO Mao was motivated enough to do it on his own.
 
It varied, but for most of the war, eighteen frontline divisions, if Wiki's ORBATs are to be trusted.

.

A good OB for November 1950 (time of intervention) for the Chinese can be found on page 52 of this work
http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/cmh/ebb_and_flow.pdf
(9 field armies organized into 2 army groups, total of 30 light infantry divisions plus some support and combat support units)

I can't find any other online sources but this work is superb regarding details

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2591755-the-forgotten-war

I loaned it to a friend of mine so I don't have it handy at the moment but I recall some good OB information in it
 
Was this a rational fear or an exaggerated one (as Asp argues here), though?

Probably exaggerated - but one should recall that Vietnam was only 11 years after Korea; that is, the Korean War ended in 1953, and major US intervention in Vietnam began in 1964. There were many veterans of the the 1950-51 retreat in high positions.

Wouldn't U.S. allies have supported such a U.S./South Vietnamese move, though?

Should have; but (and I don't get this at all) a lot of Europeans and South Americans and neutrals simply didn't acknowledge that North Vietnam had invaded South Vietnam already. (Not across the DMZ, but covertly via the Ho Chi Minh trail.) Note the outrage over "US bombing of Cambodia" - which happened only because there were tens of thousands of Communist troops operating extensive bases in eastern Cambodia.

However, I still wonder if that was a miscalculation on the part of the U.S.; after all, North Vietnam and its allies the Viet Cong would continue to pose a threat to South Vietnam as long as they had a base to operate in. In this regard, conquering North Vietnam would have significantly reduced the amount of territory and resources that the Vietnamese Communists would have had at their disposal.

You are absolutely right. I have read that the North Vietnamese leadership persisted in the war, despite losing just about every battle, and enormous casualties, because the US policies were so flagrantly stupid in obvious ways that sooner or later the US side had to lose. They were right.
 

Greenville

Banned
I don't see Chinese military intervention simply because there is no desire for a wider war. It's my impression that the Chinese hated the regime in Hanoi anyway and wanted it gone too.
 
I don't see Chinese military intervention simply because there is no desire for a wider war. It's my impression that the Chinese hated the regime in Hanoi anyway and wanted it gone too.

Conversely, this could be a golden opportunity to replace the regime in Hanoi with a pro-Chinese one, all in the name of defending fellow communists, though this runs the risk of attracting Moscow's ire.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I don't see Chinese military intervention simply because there is no desire for a wider war. It's my impression that the Chinese hated the regime in Hanoi anyway and wanted it gone too.
I thought that the Chinese liked the idea of a pro-U.S. regime in all of Vietnam even less than they liked the Hanoi regime?
 
I thought that the Chinese liked the idea of a pro-U.S. regime in all of Vietnam even less than they liked the Hanoi regime?
In this respect the contemporary example of North Korea may be a useful analogy.

A client state can be incredibly irritating but still, under the circumstances, too vital to risk destabilizing.
 
From what I remember from talking to people who had some knowledge of the possible Chinese reaction it was believed that the Chinese would not react to a US invasion of North Vietnam because unlike the Korean war the threat to the Industrial hart of China was much less.
 

trajen777

Banned
In Kissinger book (On China) details the thoughts of the many meetings with Mao and there opinion of NV. Their was little loss between China and NV. However at the same time an allied Vietnam would not be welcome. So the best situation is an invasion and conquest with a neutral NV government or combined Vietnam. So a side agreement could have been worked out
 
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