Assuming that Germany is able to gain air superiority over Southern England but Hitler realizes an invasion is impossible, how bad can the Germans bomb Britain in the Blitz?
I kind of wanted my fellow board members to make their own assumptions about this scenario. However, let's say that Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Walther Wever didn't die in 1936. This is the same POD used in Michele's A Better Show in 1940. Unlike that timeline, SeaLion is called off by Hitler. The Germans then begin bombing British cities. How bad can it get from here on out?The Luftwaffe did bomb Britain in the Blitz. It will be that bad. They did not win the Battle, as evidenced by the withdrawal of the Ju-87, which can only operate effectively with air superiority. This had already been shown once during the Battle of France. The Me-110 was a good bouncer, but a very poor bounced fighter, and they were being bounced and were withdrawn during the BoB. As you might presume, I don't understand the question, which differs slightly from the thread title. It might be more appropriate to explain the methodology that made the winning of the Battle, or the gaining of air superiority over England/Britain possible, and what kind of Blitz you had in mind.
Huh? During the Blitz monthly losses INCLUDING combat losses were sub-2% and often even less than 1%.Even if not a single bomber is combat damaged operating losses will still run above 2 - 3 percent each mission. That has serious effects in 4 - 6 months. The only way to reduce that is by waiving a maximum effort & allowing crew adequate rest and time for perfect maintenance.
Total losses could have been as high as 600 bombers, just 1.5 percent of the sorties flown. A significant number of the aircraft not shot down after the resort to night bombing were wrecked during landings or crashed in bad weather.[2]
Effectiveness of bombing
The military effectiveness of bombing varied, the Luftwaffe dropped around 45,000 short tons (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz, which disrupted production and transport, reduced food supplies and shook the British morale. The bombing also helped to support the U-boat blockade, by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping and damaging 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) more. Despite the bombing, British production rose steadily throughout this period although there were significant falls during April 1941, probably influenced by the departure of workers of Easter Holidays, according to the British official history. The official history volume British War Production (Postan, 1952) noted that the greatest effect on output of warlike stores, was on the supply of components and dispersal of production rather than complete equipments.[170][3]
In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of the industry, at first because of damage to aircraft factories and then by a policy of precautionary dispersal.[9] In April 1941, when the targets were British ports, rifle production fell by 25 percent, filled-shell production by 4.6 percent and in small-arms production 4.5 percent.[9] The strategic impact on industrial cities was varied; most took from 10–15 days to recover from heavy raids, although Belfast and Liverpool took longer. The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack.[9]
The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had OKL exploited the vulnerability of British sea communications. The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable.[3] OKL instead sought clusters of targets that suited the latest policy (which changed frequently) and disputes within the leadership were about tactics rather than strategy.[171] Though militarily ineffective, the Blitz cost around 41,000 lives, may have injured another 139,000 people and did enormous damage to British infrastructure and housing stock.[2]
http://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/ger...failed-ndash/story-16581699-detail/story.htmlRegarding the Luftwaffe strategic offensive, I find some amusement that one of the safest places to spend the BoB and the Blitz was the Rolls Royce factory in Derby. One crackerjack crew chose a solo adventure from a posted list of targets, and decided to place a bomb there, and did so, in 1942. It's quite a story. IMHO, it was one of the most critical target areas of the time and more so in 1940.
However, let's say that Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Walther Weber didn't die in 1936. This is the same POD used in Michele's A Better Show in 1940. Unlike that timeline, SeaLion is called off by Hitler. The Germans then begin bombing British cities. How bad can it get from here on out?
I suspect it'd be down to perception as much as reality; look weak and potential allies edge away while potential enemies (and the UK has a lot of them) start paying attention to undefended bits of the Empire. If it looks like the UK is finished then it soon will be.So lets say Hitler, seeing the Luftwaffe success, decides he can bring the British to the peace table this way, and delays Barbarossa until England makes peace.
The losses over Britain (after September 1940) were certainly manageable, compared to the attrition over the Soviet Union in 41-42. With the changes in a "Better show in 40" the Luftwaffe has better weapons and training etc, to maintain such a thing.
With the Balkans, Crete and Rommels NA offensive happening like in OTL, with Tobruk and Malta falling over the summer/fall 41 and no Soviet Union in the war and the USA not in yet (lets say with Soviet Union neutral, Japan chickens out and doesn't attack), more shipping losses than OTL.
Would Britain even grow weary of this and come to the peace table?