If the Luftwaffe wins the Battle of Britain but there is no SeaLion, how bad can the Blitz get?

Assuming that Germany is able to gain air superiority over Southern England but Hitler realizes an invasion is impossible, how bad can the Germans bomb Britain in the Blitz?
 
The Luftwaffe did bomb Britain in the Blitz. It will be that bad. They did not win the Battle, as evidenced by the withdrawal of the Ju-87, which can only operate effectively with air superiority. This had already been shown once during the Battle of France. The Me-110 was a good bouncer, but a very poor bounced fighter, and they were being bounced and were withdrawn during the BoB. As you might presume, I don't understand the question, which differs slightly from the thread title. It might be more appropriate to explain the methodology that made the winning of the Battle, or the gaining of air superiority over England/Britain possible, and what kind of Blitz you had in mind.
 
Air superiority over Britain means air superiority over the channel as well, basically closing it down for significant convoys. Ports within range of the Luftwaffe get hit pretty hard, and the naval bases like Portsmouth may become untenable. Terror bombing will continue, but one of the Luftwaffe's problems is that other than things like airfields and ports which are pretty obvious their target intelligence was not good. The question is can hitting ports, airfields, marshalling yards - the obvious targets - combined with the U-boat offensive be enough to starve Britain out or cause it to throw in the sponge.
 
The Luftwaffe did bomb Britain in the Blitz. It will be that bad. They did not win the Battle, as evidenced by the withdrawal of the Ju-87, which can only operate effectively with air superiority. This had already been shown once during the Battle of France. The Me-110 was a good bouncer, but a very poor bounced fighter, and they were being bounced and were withdrawn during the BoB. As you might presume, I don't understand the question, which differs slightly from the thread title. It might be more appropriate to explain the methodology that made the winning of the Battle, or the gaining of air superiority over England/Britain possible, and what kind of Blitz you had in mind.
I kind of wanted my fellow board members to make their own assumptions about this scenario. However, let's say that Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Walther Wever didn't die in 1936. This is the same POD used in Michele's A Better Show in 1940. Unlike that timeline, SeaLion is called off by Hitler. The Germans then begin bombing British cities. How bad can it get from here on out?
 
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Assuming a maximum bombing effort is made...

The weight in bombs possible is to small by several orders of magnitude to cripple Brit industry.

A anti shipping campaign, with the air force concentrating on the ports may have results, but that requires perfect coordination with the Navy. Near ASB.

Even if not a single bomber is combat damaged operating losses will still run above 2 - 3 percent each mission. That has serious effects in 4 - 6 months. The only way to reduce that is by waiving a maximum effort & allowing crew adequate rest and time for perfect maintenance.
 
Best cases for the Germans:

a) The Germans don't lose 400 or so bombers. These are then available for Barbarossa, applied to army group North means Leningrad falls in 1941 and follow up effects of that.

AND/OR

b) The Germans inflict enough damage, inflict extra shipping losses, the British are on their heels a bit more, that this effects the med later, perhaps the British don't defend Crete, saving a couple hundred JU52 transports for Barbarossa.

I agree with Carl above that there just isn't enough capability to effect Britain in the direct sense unless you mine ports, and then the effect would be temporary as the Germans can't really maintain air superiority over Liverpool over the long haul.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd think there'd be a major political crisis if the RAF has to withdraw from Southern England in 1940 and the Luftwaffe has free reign in daylight hours to bomb England as it wants. In "Most Dangerous Enemy" by Stephen Bungay about the Battle of Britain he posits a strategy in which the Luftwaffe could have won the air war in Summer 1940, which would involved using the Sturmregiment, i.e. the guys that captured Eben Emael, in Operation Biting type missions to capture the technology of the Chain Home system and blow it up, both shutting down sites and allowing for electronic counter measures to be designed based on the captured technology and technicians brought back. He also suggests using the Bf110 as a fighter-bomber like ErpGrp. 210 to smash up the radar sites. Once having blinded the RAF and with constant bombing to keep the sites from being rebuilt, the suggestion was to use the intel already had and accurate to hit fight production factories; this was done later in the OTL campaign with some success, but too late to really matter and then not targeting all production. Bungay, a Brit, thinks the Luftwaffe could have won the campaign, but his strategy relies on a fair bit of hindsight IMHO, especially in terms of the use of the Bf-110, as ErpGrp. 210 was just testing out the tactics that the Bf-110 would become famous for in July-August, right when the Luftwaffe needed ALL the Bf-110s as fighter-bombers and capable of such tactics. Plus then the commando raids required a high degree of intel about British radar sites and defenses that I think the Germans lacked. All of what he suggests is certainly doable, but IMHO only with hindsight given the thoughts of the people in charge at the time.

But assuming that the Germans think of all that and pull it off, forcing Fighter Command to abandon Southern England, then things get interesting politically in Britain, as invasion panic gets racheted up, while the public fallout from unimpeded, or at least limited impeded, Luftwaffe daylight operations over Britain without radar early warning of their raids would be pretty bad. I somewhat disagree that daylight bombing in Summer 1940 would be only as bad as the Blitz IOTL, as that ignores the potential that the Luftwaffe would lose far less bombers and aircraft if they won the BoB and forced a British withdrawal out of Southern England, while then having much better aim by day than by night. They could bomb quite a bit more hard and run multiple missions per day if they really wanted to push their crews, aircraft and pilots (they did during the Blitz IOTL). As stated by other posters this means the Channel is pretty much shut down to all shipping, even coastal shipping, as IOTL by September non-coastal shipping and all ships over a certain tonnage were not allowed to use the Channel. That's a pretty serious blow to Britain transportation, as their transportation was not really set up to rely solely inland rail to move supplies around the country; IOTL the banning of much shipping through the Channel forced the evacuation of something like 1 million people from London because of the supply difficulties, though they found spreading them around inland overburdened the rail system just as much, but in different places. Also by bombing by day they don't need to area bomb and can use smaller formations flying lower to hit targets, as unlike in Germany in 1942-45 ground based air defenses are tiny and fighter defenses would be limited with a withdrawal, so smaller, lower flying groups of bombers could attack with a high degree of precision against industrial or even civilian targets. The US had a high degree of accuracy when flying at 15,000 feet or less, but when flying over Germany they had to fly at 20,000 feet or more, often even 24,000 feet and above to avoid FLAK fire and to try and make it harder for fighters to get at them. Not an issue for the Luftwaffe in 1940 Britain where the RAF has withdrawn out of Southern England and lost radar cover.

Likely bombing gets pretty bad, but nothing like 1944-45 levels of Allied daylight bombing of Germany. However like in 1944-45 fighters can strafe trains and public transport to a much greater degree, which was a huge part of collapsing the German transport system IOTL and would cause the overburdened British rail system major problems:

Even if not a single bomber is combat damaged operating losses will still run above 2 - 3 percent each mission. That has serious effects in 4 - 6 months. The only way to reduce that is by waiving a maximum effort & allowing crew adequate rest and time for perfect maintenance.
Huh? During the Blitz monthly losses INCLUDING combat losses were sub-2% and often even less than 1%.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#Luftwaffe_losses
Total losses could have been as high as 600 bombers, just 1.5 percent of the sorties flown. A significant number of the aircraft not shot down after the resort to night bombing were wrecked during landings or crashed in bad weather.[2]

Flying during the day would actually reduce losses due to accidents and overtired pilots/crew, as a fair few fell asleep during night missions or made mistakes when flying. Plus they wouldn't need to use KG100 pathfinders or radio guidance that could be jammed to find targets.

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I think I misunderstood the operating losses statement, which would refer more to maintenance/rest issues than actual losses of aircraft. Still, the Luftwaffe kept up a relatively high rate of missions for months with a relatively constant operational rating around 60% on average IIRC (some months higher, some lower, though with worse ratings that rapidly rose in the last two months of the Blitz due to the high demand for sorties with fewer aircraft as many were transferred to the Balkans for operations there).

Effectiveness of bombing
The military effectiveness of bombing varied, the Luftwaffe dropped around 45,000 short tons (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz, which disrupted production and transport, reduced food supplies and shook the British morale. The bombing also helped to support the U-boat blockade, by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping and damaging 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) more. Despite the bombing, British production rose steadily throughout this period although there were significant falls during April 1941, probably influenced by the departure of workers of Easter Holidays, according to the British official history. The official history volume British War Production (Postan, 1952) noted that the greatest effect on output of warlike stores, was on the supply of components and dispersal of production rather than complete equipments.[170][3]

In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of the industry, at first because of damage to aircraft factories and then by a policy of precautionary dispersal.[9] In April 1941, when the targets were British ports, rifle production fell by 25 percent, filled-shell production by 4.6 percent and in small-arms production 4.5 percent.[9] The strategic impact on industrial cities was varied; most took from 10–15 days to recover from heavy raids, although Belfast and Liverpool took longer. The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack.[9]

The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had OKL exploited the vulnerability of British sea communications. The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable.[3] OKL instead sought clusters of targets that suited the latest policy (which changed frequently) and disputes within the leadership were about tactics rather than strategy.[171] Though militarily ineffective, the Blitz cost around 41,000 lives, may have injured another 139,000 people and did enormous damage to British infrastructure and housing stock.[2]
 
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If the Luftwaffe can gain air superiority they can close the English Channel to naval and transport traffic. This means convoys carrying food and other necessities are effected in multiple ways:
1. Further casualties if they use South coast routes. If they avoid southern ports then the 'safe' ports become choked due to overloading and hence are vulnerable to air or submarine attack.
2. Loss of convoy escorts, at sea, in harbour and under construction.
3. Reduced production of replacement shipping
4. More effective submarine operations, given fewer ASW patrols (surface and air)
5. More German resources available for additional aircraft and submarine production, leading to further reduction in shipping.

At the time the UK imported approximately 70% of it's food consumption, around 20 million tons of shipping a year. Reduce this enough and a surrender is inevitable.

Depending on when the RAF lose then Operation Fork may be cancelled, disrupted or pre-empted, further reducing the effectiveness of convoys. The Germans might even attempt to capture the Faroes.
 
A worse Blitz ??
Bad.
Very, very bad.

I remember an elderly uncle (by marriage) telling of his fire-watch nights on the roof of Liverpool's Anglican cathedral. An ex-merchant seaman, he'd had no problems trotting up and down that 'sloping deck' with a bucket of sand and a 'dust pan'. He'd prize sizzling incendiaries out of the lead cladding, take them away. Behind him, the Mersey dock-front and many of the Victorian terraces dissolved in flames...

Didn't help that bombers' gunners shot at searchlights and AA guns, or raked historic land-marks such as the Cathedral and George's Hall 'in passing'...

IIRC, there was an 'Iron Cross' promised to any Luftwaffe crew who managed to breach the splendid road tunnel that linked Liverpool to Birkenhead. IC Second Class for collapsing the near-parallel rail tunnel. Law of Unintended Consequence ensured a LOT of bombs were thus dropped in the river that might otherwise have done yet more damage ashore. Then again, given the search-lights, the AA guns, the sea of flames plus 'fog of war', a lot of bombs and mines intended for the river or docks landed in the suburbs. Hitting the high sandstone ridge *usually* resulted in prompt detonation.

But, some bombs were 'booby-trapped', targeting UXB crews. Some had bad fuses. Some buried themselves in pockets of soft ground. As a bomber's 'stick' was eg 'Four of These' or 'Three of These plus One of Those', an individual aircraft's doings would be obvious. Three newly-wrecked properties in a gapped row meant the fourth whatsit had either 'hung up' or was lurking in the gap. Three in a row meant the fourth could lurk at either end. Local builders unto the third generation employed due care laying 'ground-works'. Then 'Cable Company' crews trenched every soft verge and found a few more. Clang !! Run away ! Run away ! And, yes, call the UXB team...
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But, the Luftwaffe were operating a long, long way from home, and there was no 'Underground' to ferry bail-outs to safety. And, if the RAF struggled during the day, they could surely organise night-fighters. More raids, more tired crews, more damaged planes might mean a lot more of the 'West Coast' crews would not make it back across the Pennines and North Sea...
 
They luftwaffe didn't have the strategic bombers available to bomb Britain as much as the Allies bombed Germany. Never comparable. Best thing they could do was disrupt, not demolish.

Although, depending on what "win battle of britain" means the V-1's and V-2's will give the British isles terrible nightmares. If it goes on long enough it could mean devastation.

It would be bad, but not bad enough it would cripple the UK fully, they would just require more aid from overseas.

I wonder how much the luftwaffe could hold back the RAF, if they take the upper hand at some point. It could mean free range for the rockets.
 
Regarding the Luftwaffe strategic offensive, I find some amusement that one of the safest places to spend the BoB and the Blitz was the Rolls Royce factory in Derby. One crackerjack crew chose a solo adventure from a posted list of targets, and decided to place a bomb there, and did so, in 1942. It's quite a story. IMHO, it was one of the most critical target areas of the time and more so in 1940.
 

Deleted member 1487

Regarding the Luftwaffe strategic offensive, I find some amusement that one of the safest places to spend the BoB and the Blitz was the Rolls Royce factory in Derby. One crackerjack crew chose a solo adventure from a posted list of targets, and decided to place a bomb there, and did so, in 1942. It's quite a story. IMHO, it was one of the most critical target areas of the time and more so in 1940.
http://www.derbytelegraph.co.uk/ger...failed-ndash/story-16581699-detail/story.html
 
However, let's say that Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Walther Weber didn't die in 1936. This is the same POD used in Michele's A Better Show in 1940. Unlike that timeline, SeaLion is called off by Hitler. The Germans then begin bombing British cities. How bad can it get from here on out?

So lets say Hitler, seeing the Luftwaffe success, decides he can bring the British to the peace table this way, and delays Barbarossa until England makes peace.

The losses over Britain (after September 1940) were certainly manageable, compared to the attrition over the Soviet Union in 41-42. With the changes in a "Better show in 40" the Luftwaffe has better weapons and training etc, to maintain such a thing.

With the Balkans, Crete and Rommels NA offensive happening like in OTL, with Tobruk and Malta falling over the summer/fall 41 and no Soviet Union in the war and the USA not in yet (lets say with Soviet Union neutral, Japan chickens out and doesn't attack), more shipping losses than OTL.

Would Britain even grow weary of this and come to the peace table?
 
So lets say Hitler, seeing the Luftwaffe success, decides he can bring the British to the peace table this way, and delays Barbarossa until England makes peace.

The losses over Britain (after September 1940) were certainly manageable, compared to the attrition over the Soviet Union in 41-42. With the changes in a "Better show in 40" the Luftwaffe has better weapons and training etc, to maintain such a thing.

With the Balkans, Crete and Rommels NA offensive happening like in OTL, with Tobruk and Malta falling over the summer/fall 41 and no Soviet Union in the war and the USA not in yet (lets say with Soviet Union neutral, Japan chickens out and doesn't attack), more shipping losses than OTL.

Would Britain even grow weary of this and come to the peace table?
I suspect it'd be down to perception as much as reality; look weak and potential allies edge away while potential enemies (and the UK has a lot of them) start paying attention to undefended bits of the Empire. If it looks like the UK is finished then it soon will be.
 
Huh, most posts here seem to assume that having won the Battle of Britain, the Germans acquire practically unlimited air superiority.
Of course that's not the case, even if Fighter Command gets so weakened that it has to withdraw north.

1. The Germans wouldn't achieve air superiority beyond the range of the Bf 109s. That's so obvious that it doesn't need explanations. Even within the marginal area of range - places like central London or Plymouth - things can still get tricky for the German fighter escort. The main port for cross-Atlantic convoys is Liverpool, well beyond the range of Bf 109s.
2. The Germans will still have cloudy days. While the Germans winning the Battle of Britain already is an extremely low probability event, should it ever come to pass, it would still take time, at least the same time as the actual Battle, if not more. Meaning that the Germans will achieve this air superiority over the Southern edge of Britain by October 1940. Now, the USAAF did bomb Germany effectively during daytime in the fall-winter of 1944, through constant cloud cover, but they had a) experience in sustained strategic bombing campaigns, b) good intel, c) ground radar targeting, d) 100 times the payload of the Germans in 1940. The Germans lack all of the above in 1940.
3. As to the issue of "closing the Channel", in actual history the British did stop sending cargo convoys through the Straits of Dover in daylight, and they still won the war. In this scenario, they might stop daylight coastal traffic along the Western end of the Channel, which they didn't do in our timeline - hardly a game changer.

The key issue, in conclusion, isn't military but political. Will the British people accept the fact that the Germans can bomb them in daylight with near impunity?
I'd say they will.
1. Actually this scenario isn't all that much worse than real history. The Germans did bomb London and other cities in daylight, and they continued to do so with snap raids and fighter-bomber harassment raids. To the British public, it won't be all that easy to understand the difference. Sure, in OTL they read in their newspapers that the Germans lost hundreds of aircraft... it was an exaggeration, and the newspapers can still exaggerate enemy losses in this TL.
2. Research done on the Germans shows that the strongest impact of city bombing on morale is when one's city is bombed for the first time, and for the first two or three times. After that, the effect diminishes significantly. One gets used to nearly anything, the Londoners showed they could get used to two months of night bombing with a raid nearly every night. I think they could get used to a little bit addition of daylight bombing on top of that.
 
I don't like to get involved in discussions I started by myself, but one thing I felt Michele ignored in A Better Show in 1940 was that Walther Wever surviving would mean much better Luftwaffe production. Instead, he seems to assume that Ernst Udet would reach a similar position in the Luftwaffe hierarchy.
 
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