If the Cuban Missile Crisis became nuclear war, which large cities would survive?

[Dayton Kitchens]

I think all of you though when suggesting what targets the Soviets might attack are thinking about it in a more modern mindset where the Soviets had more than 10,000 presumably reliable warheads. This wasn't the case in 1962 either in terms of reliability or number.

I figure for most targets of real military value (those that could threaten the Soviet Union) the Soviets would attack them with at least four warheads each even if only one was really needed to make up for targeting problems and reliability issues. This drastically cuts back the warheads that might be available for attacking non aligned countries.

I really doubt he Soviets are going to waste warheads on the middle eastern nations. Also I think both the U.S. and the Soviets won't use all their nuclear weapons because they will want to maintain a strategic reserve for the post war world.

 

[An Oklahoman]

I'm more skeptical, given the lack of the USSR being able to deliver bombs and Warheads to CONUS

SAC planning of the era was to blast a path thru China so B-52s could enter the USSR from the SouthEast unmolested by Chinese jets

1.) The USSR possessed the capacity to strike the US with strategic bombers and missiles. One should understand though that the total number of ballistic weapons that could strike the CONUS was limited to a couple of dozen.

2.) Why would the US even need to nuke China in order to infiltrate the Soviet Union The most common route would have been over the polar ice caps and directly into the Soviet Union. Perhaps some targets would be hit from the south, emanating out of bases in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.

 

[BlueTrousers]

In 1962, the Soviets had 3,322 nuclear weapons. A few hundred at most could be assigned for targets in North America, and of those between half and 90% wouldn't reach their targets. The balance, about 3,000, would be available for use elsewhere or as a strategic reserve.

That's not enough to hit everything you might wish to - the British government in 1967 estimated that there were enough targets in the UK alone for 673 devices, some getting four or six weapons. But keeping 1,000 weapons in reserve, and with two to four weapons per target, that's 500 to 1,000 targets, almost entirely in Europe. The nuclear weapons bases will be the priority, everything else will have to take what's left. Admittedly, that's fewer than I thought, but it's still an awful lot of targets.

Remember, too, that many weapons will be delivered by bomber. That means increased accuracy, and the ability to 'back up' an unreliable missile - if the primary target is already destroyed, the bomber can hit a secondary target.

 

[O'Alexis 89]

In 1962 wasn't NATO headquarters still in Paris?

Whoops, it was. NATO moved its HQ to Brussels in 1966... Which means that, if the Cuban Crisis became WW3 (if it's called like that), Paris would have been one of the worst places to be.

And Spain wasn't part of NATO in 1962. Though Portugal was.

Mistake combo, Spain joined in 1982, but I believe it would have been targeted anyway (cf. above)

 

[marathag]

1.) The USSR possessed the capacity to strike the US with strategic bombers and missiles. One should understand though that the total number of ballistic weapons that could strike the CONUS was limited to a couple of dozen.

2.) Why would the US even need to nuke China in order to infiltrate the Soviet Union The most common route would have been over the polar ice caps and directly into the Soviet Union. Perhaps some targets would be hit from the south, emanating out of bases in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.

Most of their bomber force was Tu-95 Bears, and didn't have Stand Off missiles at this time, and the more survivable Mya-4 Bison just didn't have the range

The ADC, ANG and Navy had more interceptors in CONUS than the USSR had bombers.
Then add in that most large Metropolitan areas were protected by Nike Hercules, Nike Ajax, and BOMARC SAMs, but it was unlikely for any Soviet Bomber to reach the Canadian Border

China: simply to let Guam and SEATO based B-52s a path to SE bits of the USSR, and second, they were seen as allies of them, even with the evidence of the split to come.
Gen Powers was taking no chances, so most PLA airbases were to be nuked, and Peking, for good measure

 

[Apollo 20]

Most of their bomber force was Tu-95 Bears, and didn't have Stand Off missiles at this time, and the more survivable Mya-4 Bison just didn't have the range

The ADC, ANG and Navy had more interceptors in CONUS than the USSR had bombers.
Then add in that most large Metropolitan areas were protected by Nike Hercules, Nike Ajax, and BOMARC SAMs, but it was unlikely for any Soviet Bomber to reach the Canadian Border

China: simply to let Guam and SEATO based B-52s a path to SE bits of the USSR, and second, they were seen as allies of them, even with the evidence of the split to come.
Gen Powers was taking no chances, so most PLA airbases were to be nuked, and Peking, for good measure

There's a discussion earlier in this thread or on another which gave me pause in my prior thinking that the Bears were going to have a rough go getting to their targets. Air defense is difficult and since none of those missile systems were tested in combat conditions, how well or poorly Soviet bombers would do is somewhat conjectural. I came away with the strong sense that it would be mistaken to presume that none of the Soviet bombers would get through.

Agree with you on China. Still viewed as an enemy by those whose memories of Korea and fighting them were still less than a decade old in 1962. As much as I love the CMW timeline, I didn't agree with the idea that China would be spared completely; China is too big, too much a potential enemy, too close to allies and too Communist to escape unscathed. The targeting data from the late 1950s backs that up with many targets being listed for the PRC.

 

[marathag]

There's a discussion earlier in this thread or on another which gave me pause in my prior thinking that the Bears were going to have a rough go getting to their targets. Air defense is difficult and since none of those missile systems were tested in combat conditions, how well or poorly Soviet bombers would do is somewhat conjectural. I came away with the strong sense that it would be mistaken to presume that none of the Soviet bombers would get through.

Bears with contra-rotating turboprops had a massive radar return, and with decades of ADC&ANG intercepts, there were no problems in tracking them, high or low altitude.

SAGE, DEW, Mid Canada and Pine Tree Radar nets were all operational, plus airborne platforms like the EC-121

Then US fighters were pretty much optimized to shoot down bombers, which proved a problem later, as shooting nuclear tipped AAMs at Mig 17s wasn't an option in SEAsia.

 

[MageOhki]

Air defence is just that hard.

In the 1950s, NORAD reckoned on being able to take down 30% of attacking aircraft, and in the 1980s SAC reckoned on taking about 25% losses attacking the Soviet Union. Those figures are fairly consistent with WW2 and Vietnam experience. Even on the worst day of LINEBACKER II, when the B-52s flew in straight and level on predictable flightpaths with no ECM, they still only took about 10% losses to the most hostile air defence environment ever flown against.

[/quote]

The problem with these comparisons: while I do agree with the maxim, the best defense is a good offense, it DOES not take into account several factors.
Attackers:
1: Quality of the attackers. Bison and Bears would have been in primus, 1940's era desgins/builds, without effective ecm(see previous posters)
2: Numbers of attackers. Let's be nice and assume the Russians got all 160 bombers off the ground.
That's still only 160 older slow designs.

Defense
1: Range. Contrary to any other defense, the CONUS System at the time had a MASSIVE range of intercept. Even Vietnam's system had only an effective range of about 100 miles of warning. This gives time of intercept far longer than any air defense had in history.
2: Numbers. Over a thousand interceptors and other fighters to intercept. Lots of SAM installations. (Hundreds)
3: Quality. 1960's build, with practical theory and experience, and as pointed out, 1.5kt burst warheads, to boot.

The fact of the matter is NORAD had NOT been tested, and no one knew for a fact how it'd all work. All other ADA networks faced far less range of defense, and MUCH less AIRCRAFT to back it up, vs, frankly much larger NUMBERS, which is a factor IN the low kill rates.

in this 1962 situation?

Whole other ball of wax.

 

[BlueTrousers]

All other ADA networks faced far less range of defense, and MUCH less AIRCRAFT to back it up, vs, frankly much larger NUMBERS, which is a factor IN the low kill rates.

The 30% figure is what ADC reckoned they could do, and about 50% better than the best IADS achieved. It's probably optimistic, such self-assessments almost always are.

Part of the problem is, the USSR might only be able to attack a few points, but you don't know which ones they'll choose. So most of the defences never see an enemy bomber.

 

[elektro]

The 30% figure is what ADC reckoned they could do, and about 50% better than the best IADS achieved. It's probably optimistic, such self-assessments almost always are.

Part of the problem is, the USSR might only be able to attack a few points, but you don't know which ones they'll choose. So most of the defences never see an enemy bomber.

Agree with this. NORAD and SAGE were tested in the Skyshield exercises and it did quite poorly, with an intercept rate less than 10%. Granted, this was against RAF Vulcans but it's unlikely you'd see anything better than 30-40% even with use of tactical nuclear warheads.

 

[MageOhki]

Agree with this. NORAD and SAGE were tested in the Skyshield exercises and it did quite poorly, with an intercept rate less than 10%. Granted, this was against RAF Vulcans but it's unlikely you'd see anything better than 30-40% even with use of tactical nuclear warheads.

*shakes head* Vuclans are high speed desgins, referring to my point once again, "time of intercept" Take a GOOD LONG LOOK at the _RANGES_ and TIMES involved. Vs. NUMBERS.

Those Bison and Bears had 12 hours. WITHOUT any ECM to fuzz up the picture, Vuclans had better. I know the exercise referenced, and it was a cold start exercise, a bolt from the blue, with no warning, and a 'lull' situation (in other words, they were trying to simulate a Russian surprise attack as effective as Pearl)

Again, I don't see 30% intercept, as a high, not in Oct-Nov '62, not with the alert forces being literally in the air, prepped and loaded. You are all missing several key points:

Bears and Bisons did NOT have effective counter measures. Were SLOW. Even at best, assuming they tried a ocean attack, instead of going though the massive radar belts over the Pole, they'd still give at least 25-30 minutes raid warning. Vuclans only gave about 11, and that was by JAMMING.

In a state where there's a seriously large number of interceptors already in the air, supersonic (4x+ the speed of the bombers...) Cal Bear in his AANW (FE, now), gives an awesome example of what'd happen, pretty much to the letter. Attack force with TWICE the number (and generally somewhat similar bombers, too) gets one or two bombers though, and that WAS a 'suprise' attack, mostly. In this situation? Whole other ball of wax.

None of you who are saying "this is the best they'd do!" (and ADC's studies were BASED on the VUCLAN or similar desgins, NOT The BEAR or Bison (we really didn't think they were THAT bad. Remember, Intel was spotty at best, and it's always better to OVERESTIMATE your foe, than underestimate)) are taking what the studies ACUTALLY referenced, instead of what they _acutally faced_. I've talked to ADA officers, who make this their carrer, and they pretty much all agree that with what was in the air in '62, the alert status of ADC, the works? Admittedly it's now 50+ years of hindsight, but one of them, stated he acutally thought not a single bomber would get though, and only 2-3 of the missiles from Cuba would have hit, That's IT. He admitted that was somewhat optimistic, but he figured at most, CONUS at worst, would have taken 5-8 hits, at most.


For Air defense, the three keys are "Time of intercept capability, numbers of possible interceptors, numbers of enemy"

Again: Nothing like what proto-NORAD was in 1962 had ever been tested for real. Period. And we seriously overestimated the quality of the attackers. As well as numbers.

ADC's studies were all based off "bolt from the blue, worst case, with EQUAL equipment to our own." NOT what they actually faced.

Side note: The studies weren't wrong to assume the worst, but the amount and quality they'd have faced in this situation, was far, far, far less than they expected, and they'd have been on a trip wire.