The status of the British Army after Dynamo and Ariel is well known. Out of twelve "Class A" divisional equipment sets in Britain, ten had been sent to France and lost there and the other two were only saved because they hadn't gone to France yet. The two dozen divisions in Britain preparing to defend against the German invasion were poorly equipped, and the militias in an even worse state. Improvised anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles were common even among regular troops. Chemical weapons had been distributed to airfields for use against the invasion beaches. Obstacles and demolitions had been prepared across the South East, and large amounts of infrastructure had already been disassembled by the time the Luftwaffe abandoned the Battle of Britain.
Despite these issues with the British Army, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy were still thoroughly effective and modern fighting organizations. The RAF was seriously threatened by the Luftwaffe offensive through July, August, and September. The RN, on the other hand, still maintained some of the most capable naval forces in the world defending the Home Isles, and there was no comparable German fleet to bring the British to heel. Bismark had been sunk in May and the Twins were both in drydock recovering from Norway, where a quarter of the German surface fleet had been lost, mostly to the RN.
If the anti-invasion workup on the ground during the Battle of Britain had been mostly political maneuvering by the new Churchill government, as is often posited and as is seemingly supported by the transfer of 150 tanks to Egypt at the height of the crisis, why did Churchill also order such a risky operation as the transfer of British gold reserves to Canada?
Fundamentally, what were the British looking at that told them that the Germans had a chance of success? Was there a sense of German invincibility on the ground after the invasions of Poland and France when Norway and the Netherlands told different stories about the German navy and air forces? Were there fears that the Luftwaffe could keep the Royal Navy out of the Channel long enough to get tanks and supplies across? Did Churchill think that Parliament might force him to surrender the instant German forces landed instead of letting the Army fight it out in the South East?
Despite these issues with the British Army, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy were still thoroughly effective and modern fighting organizations. The RAF was seriously threatened by the Luftwaffe offensive through July, August, and September. The RN, on the other hand, still maintained some of the most capable naval forces in the world defending the Home Isles, and there was no comparable German fleet to bring the British to heel. Bismark had been sunk in May and the Twins were both in drydock recovering from Norway, where a quarter of the German surface fleet had been lost, mostly to the RN.
If the anti-invasion workup on the ground during the Battle of Britain had been mostly political maneuvering by the new Churchill government, as is often posited and as is seemingly supported by the transfer of 150 tanks to Egypt at the height of the crisis, why did Churchill also order such a risky operation as the transfer of British gold reserves to Canada?
Fundamentally, what were the British looking at that told them that the Germans had a chance of success? Was there a sense of German invincibility on the ground after the invasions of Poland and France when Norway and the Netherlands told different stories about the German navy and air forces? Were there fears that the Luftwaffe could keep the Royal Navy out of the Channel long enough to get tanks and supplies across? Did Churchill think that Parliament might force him to surrender the instant German forces landed instead of letting the Army fight it out in the South East?