If Reagan respectfully asks to attend Brezhnev's funeral Nov. 82, less dangerous '83?

This was pre KAL. I think it was the spring of 1983 where we did a massive naval exercise off the coast of Kamchatka testing their radar vulnarabilities and responses. We also did something off of Murmansk in 81 or 82 as I recall. We were seriously screwing with them.

Able Archer November 2, 1983 was post KAL September 1, 1983. As far a screwing with them it was a 2 way street.
 
Primarily, Able Archer. And we on the U.S. side were slow on the uptake. The Soviets had an actual fear we would use a military exercise as cover for the real thing. We still needed military exercises of course, but we could have been smarter about not feeding into this psychology quite so much. To our credit we did phase way back the inclusion of political leaders in the exercise. But we also introduced a new type of secret communication, which we may have viewed just as an improvement and a step forward, but to the Soviets it was just one more line of evidence. In addition:

introduction of a new generation of intermediate range nuclear missiles to West Germany,

Reagan's 'evil empire' speech,

Before one of his radio broadcasts, Reagan making a joke that Congress had outlawed Russia and bombing starts in five minutes


But Able Archer was a command and control exercise. No actual military units were being moved around as in the type of exercise the Soviets always figured to mask an actual attack (as they had planned), it was all messages and responses.
 
That's what I understand saved the day. In their own operation RYAN, the Soviets used live human spies to watch military forces and also political leaders to see if they and/or their families were moving to secure locations.

The previous (complicated!) reference, which is also a CIA study, talks about this:
http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/film/ciawar.htm#HEADING1-08

I'd like to find additional reference(s). If you're reading this and it interests you, please jump in if you have the time.
 
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That certainly WAS the truth regarding China under Mao, who had an even lesser understanding of the long term effects of massive releases of atomic radiation than the Soviets did. And I wouldn't have thought that possible.:rolleyes:
I mean whether the Soviets genuinely feared and worried that Able Archer (Nov. '83) might be cover for the real thing.

Now, I kind of think the "logic" of confidence and posturing demands that you view absorbing the radiation from a first strike as acceptable. Kind of shows how damnable the logic running through the whole thing is.
 
I mean whether the Soviets genuinely feared and worried that Able Archer (Nov. '83) might be cover for the real thing.

Yet another sign of senile thinking by the men at the top. Too many people still fighting the Great Patriotic War, or even in the case of the most elderly the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War.

Now, I kind of think the "logic" of confidence and posturing demands that you view absorbing the radiation from a first strike as acceptable. Kind of shows how damnable the logic running through the whole thing is.

According to Kruschev's memoirs, which have proven to be mostly accurate when not dealing with his own behavior under Stalin, Mao was at a meeting of the minds with his people and the Politburo, when he made a most chilling statement to the audience: "So what if there is an atomic war! We'll just fuck ourselves another six hundred million!":eek:

The interpreters had a hard time screwing up the courage to make a direct translation of that, rather than cleaning it up. Mao was so ignorant about genetics, the effects of atomic radiation on DNA, and even plain biology in general, that he didn't realize that the first thing to strike in radiation sickness is sterility. Especially male sterility. It only takes 50 Rads exposure (or one hour at 50 Roentgens) to insure 100% sterility of a given population.

Mao lived in a bubble where none dare tell him the truth. Amazingly, even Stalin seemed to have a better understanding of the dangers than Mao, though Krushchev understood better than either of them. Indeed, he understood better than any Soviet leader this side of Gorbachev.:)
 
What I've always found interesting about the War Scare of 1983 (Able Archer Crisis) is that the WORST case presented (that the Soviets thought it was real and were preparing for nuclear war) had the Soviets preparing for a

retaliatory nuclear strike.

In other words to hit NATO back if NATO actually launched an attack.

I've heard for years that if the Soviets really thought an attack was coming they would undoubtedly strike......FIRST.

If the worst we've heard about 1983 was in fact true, then this indicates that at the highest levels, the Soviets had lots of doubts about NATO actually launching a war (probably thanks to the East German spy they had had the highest level of NATO).

Otherwise the Soviets would've pulled the trigger.
 
According to Kruschev's memoirs, which have proven to be mostly accurate when not dealing with his own behavior under Stalin, Mao was at a meeting of the minds with his people and the Politburo, when he made a most chilling statement to the audience: "So what if there is an atomic war! We'll just fuck ourselves another six hundred million!":eek:

The interpreters had a hard time screwing up the courage to make a direct translation of that, rather than cleaning it up.
What a quote! Somehow this should make it into a movie, including the part with the interpreters blushing, hesitating, and stammering.

Now, the interesting part, our own liberals and humanists on the American side, say the Federation of American Scientists(?) or Physicians for Social Responsibility, are often treated by their fellow citizens as naive at best, and at worse as commies themselves. There seems to be a real shortage of people and respect for people who are trying to steer a middle course, hey, I accept the current situation as a given, I'm just trying to add some stabilizing features, and hopefully we can continue to move forward in a somewhat positive way. Rare.

And do we really think it's going to be that different on the Chinese side?

And what was really lost during the cold war was, say, for the Soviets and Americans to be competing on who could do a better job on genuine economic development in Indonesia. This kind of thing.
 
I've heard for years that if the Soviets really thought an attack was coming they would undoubtedly strike......FIRST.

If the worst we've heard about 1983 was in fact true, then this indicates that at the highest levels, the Soviets had lots of doubts about NATO actually launching a war (probably thanks to the East German spy they had had the highest level of NATO).

Otherwise the Soviets would've pulled the trigger.
So, at least on this occasion we can say, KGB agents were benefactors of humanity! Which might sound like a thoroughly curious statement to make about an organization we think of using underhanded methods to prop up an ossified system. But on this occasion, they provided accurate information that war didn't look like it was happening. (as well as East German agents, who I like even less!)

I have heard that the Soviet official policy was that they would not launch a first strike, of course all kinds of exceptions in practice, including kind of the crazy logic of 'launch under warning' (and you better be right).

Now, we in the U.S. said we would use nukes to protect western Europe if conventional forces were failing, but then we kind of had to because the Warsaw pack had more conventional forces.

As far as intermediate range missiles in Europe, yes, our allies did want to know that we were all in, but there may have been an asymmetry in that we were closer to Soviet command centers than they were to ours.

One asymmetry I don't think is talked about near enough is that we on the American side had our "triad" of land-based missiles, subs, and bombers, whereas the Soviets were mostly invested in land-based, which are the ones most vulnerable to a first strike. So, one conclusion I draw from this is that we may not want to harass the Soviet sub program too much, because this makes for a more stable situation which directly benefits us.

And I guess I agree with President Reagan that intermediate-range missiles in Europe are a hair-trigger element we're better off without, just how to negotiate them down in a relatively equal way and handle the transition.
 
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What I've always found interesting about the War Scare of 1983 (Able Archer Crisis) is that the WORST case presented (that the Soviets thought it was real and were preparing for nuclear war) had the Soviets preparing for a

retaliatory nuclear strike.

In other words to hit NATO back if NATO actually launched an attack.

I've heard for years that if the Soviets really thought an attack was coming they would undoubtedly strike......FIRST.

If the worst we've heard about 1983 was in fact true, then this indicates that at the highest levels, the Soviets had lots of doubts about NATO actually launching a war (probably thanks to the East German spy they had had the highest level of NATO).

Otherwise the Soviets would've pulled the trigger.

I've read that Able Archer wasnt as big a deal as we make it out to be. Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev was quoted as saying he didnt think it was a big deal. The Reforger exercises were a bigger deal to them. That's not to say it wasnt a poorly timed exercise. But, other than putting a few jets in Poland on alert, they took no known additional precautions.
 
So, this guy is saying the Russians weren't so worried about Able Archer, while they were about Reforger. Didn't the two military exercises have a lot of overlap and similarities?
 
As far as how Reagan might do it . . .

Alright, the Soviets reached nuclear parity in the 1970s. And by '79 and '80, many Americans were feeling weak, not so much for overall defense levels and strategic balance of powers. But primarily for Vietnam and Iran, that is, for messy, convoluted situations which didn't go our way. And the problem may have been more on the goal-setting end, rather than the operational end.

When Brezhnev passed away on Nov. '82, that was two years after Reagan's election. Two years after the military build-up, which actually started under Carter. Is that enough time for Americans to feel strong again?

Reagan doesn't need to come to an immediate answer. He can take a read on the situation. The first call might be to his wife. They have a good marriage and if he's going to go, he needs her there as a person who genuinely thinks it's the right thing to do. And one lesson from West Wing is that you don't staff out informing the spouse. Then Reagan might talk to his own chief of staff, his best allies in Congress, Congressional leadership on both sides of the aisle, and our NATO allies, maybe starting with Margaret Thatcher in the UK.

Ooooh, that's a lot of people to call. Okay, Ronnie going to tell people he's considering going and keep it relatively brief. He does need to call NATO allies and out of respect talk to each head of state himself, including smaller nations like Belgium and even Luxembourg.

If less than one third of people think it's a good idea, the public's not ready. Reagan would be leading from three miles down the road.

If it's between one-third and two-thirds, it could go either way. Ronnie would probably be well advised to ask people if he can count on them to publicly support him, and if they're in a position with their constituents to do it.

And let's say Ronnie eventually asks House Speaker Tip O'Neill and his wife and Senator Majority Leader Howard Baker and his wife to attend with him. Baker begs off, saying it's not good if it's two Republicans and one Democrat, that it would be better if Reagan and O'Neill just go.

So, President and First Lady Reagan and House Speaker and Mrs. O'Neill attend funeral services for Comrade Secretary General Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

President Reagan has made a conscious decision not to talk politics. He and Nancy are simply there to pay their respects in a low-key, understated, and dignified manner. And then they fly home.
 
So, this guy is saying the Russians weren't so worried about Able Archer, while they were about Reforger. Didn't the two military exercises have a lot of overlap and similarities?

Not in the least. Reforger actually practiced bringing additional forces to Germany (hence the name) and several thousand troops and equipment were transported to Germany during the exercises.

Able Archer as stated was a command exercise. Basically radio messages and responses. No actual troops and weapons being used.
 
As far as how Reagan might do it . . .

Alright, the Soviets reached nuclear parity in the 1970s. And by '79 and '80, many Americans were feeling weak, not so much for overall defense levels and strategic balance of powers. But primarily for Vietnam and Iran, that is, for messy, convoluted situations which didn't go our way. And the problem may have been more on the goal-setting end, rather than the operational end.

When Brezhnev passed away on Nov. '82, that was two years after Reagan's election. Two years after the military build-up, which actually started under Carter. Is that enough time for Americans to feel strong again?

Reagan doesn't need to come to an immediate answer. He can take a read on the situation. The first call might be to his wife. They have a good marriage and if he's going to go, he needs her there as a person who genuinely thinks it's the right thing to do. And one lesson from West Wing is that you don't staff out informing the spouse. Then Reagan might talk to his own chief of staff, his best allies in Congress, Congressional leadership on both sides of the aisle, and our NATO allies, maybe starting with Margaret Thatcher in the UK.

Ooooh, that's a lot of people to call. Okay, Ronnie going to tell people he's considering going and keep it relatively brief. He does need to call NATO allies and out of respect talk to each head of state himself, including smaller nations like Belgium and even Luxembourg.

If less than one third of people think it's a good idea, the public's not ready. Reagan would be leading from three miles down the road.

If it's between one-third and two-thirds, it could go either way. Ronnie would probably be well advised to ask people if he can count on them to publicly support him, and if they're in a position with their constituents to do it.

And let's say Ronnie eventually asks House Speaker Tip O'Neill and his wife and Senator Majority Leader Howard Baker and his wife to attend with him. Baker begs off, saying it's not good if it's two Republicans and one Democrat, that it would be better if Reagan and O'Neill just go.

So, President and First Lady Reagan and House Speaker and Mrs. O'Neill attend funeral services for Comrade Secretary General Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

President Reagan has made a conscious decision not to talk politics. He and Nancy are simply there to pay their respects in a low-key, understated, and dignified manner. And then they fly home.

I think its more an issue of the various factions in the administration and who Reagan decides to listen to: hardliners in the cabinet who thought any negotiation was bad or moderate real politiks who favored continual dialogue. After detente burned out, a lot of people favored a hardline and it took a few years for the both the Soviets and Americans to adjust to the change in tenor. So, to get your outcome, you need a different path for detente which open releases so many butterflies that it effectively creates a whole different dynamic.
 
Dayton, thanks for the info on Reforger.

Dunning, I'd just say that Reagan himself was in the camp which favored dialogue. What I envision is that he moves a year or two quicker than he did in OTL.
 
Dayton, thanks for the info on Reforger.

Dunning, I'd just say that Reagan himself was in the camp which favored dialogue. What I envision is that he moves a year or two quicker than he did in OTL.

Well, I am close to posting the first chapter of a TL that will have a section discussing exactly this topic. And, well, to be generous, its a little bit more complicated. Check out the bios/memoirs of Al Haig, Bud MacFarlane, William Casey, George Schultz, and Anatoli Dobrynin if you are interested in learning more.
 
Now, the interesting part, our own liberals and humanists on the American side, say the Federation of American Scientists(?) or Physicians for Social Responsibility, are often treated by their fellow citizens as naive at best, and at worse as commies themselves. There seems to be a real shortage of people and respect for people who are trying to steer a middle course, hey, I accept the current situation as a given, I'm just trying to add some stabilizing features, and hopefully we can continue to move forward in a somewhat positive way. Rare.
Because many of the people that tried to steer a "middle" course would denounce people that supported the KKK and then make excuses for, for example, W.E.B. Dubois even though he defended the extermination of the kulaks. Don't try and put the rejection of "liberals and humanists" ALL on the right- they deserve SOME blame but the "liberals and humanists" failed to deal honestly with the crimes of Stalinism and the question of the guilt of the pro-Soviet left.
 
It should be noted also that there was a massive NATO naval exercise in the North Atlantic in early 1981 that involved 83 ships led by the U.S.S. Eisenhower plus the HMS Invincible. It featured U.S., U.K. Norwegian, and Canadian warships.

Despite spies in the U.S. and two RORSAT satellites launched to track the force and later a large number of recon planes, the Soviets were unable to locate and track the force. It made it all the way to within easy striking distance of Soviet territory and basically was still undetected until the force chose to reveal itself. American F-14 Tomcats were making mock attacks on Soviet recon aircraft before they came anywhere near the force.

It prompted a US Navy officer to refer to the Soviets as "they're basically naked up there".

The exercise had a number of purposes

1) Warn the Soviets about taking military action against Poland.
2) Determine how much Soviet spies in the U.S. Navy knew about naval operations and were passing it on to the Soviets. This later turned out to be the Walker spy ring.

3) Naturally, test Soviet defenses.
 
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