Responding to the OP
Nah- the leverage is not the same to "chew" on Czechoslovakian territories when Germany only has the "mandible" of Silesia, Saxony and Bavaria, but lacks the "jawbone" of Austria. Plus, there's no sensible historical claim to the broader German public without inheriting Austria's claim.
I agree with Athelstane that Memel would be the easiest pickup, and, if they hold off on Austria in 1938, they could maybe do an adventure against Memel that year or in 1939 and get away with it because of Lithuanian weakness. An ideal situation, but one the Poles would probably be too intelligent to fall for, would be to partition Lithuania with the Poles. If the Poles are seen in partnership with the Nazis it will reduce sympathy for them. For that reason, Hitler might be prepared to support a Polish claim to almost all of Lithuania except Memel in the short term, with the idea of coming back around to make demands against Poland in later years.
While the Poles wanted to unify with the Lithuanians, and certainly wanted to solidy their claim to Vilnius/Wilno, I don't think they'd want to be seen doing any of this in tandem with German aggression or bullying.
Eupen-Malmedy - it could be done if the Belgians were willing to sell and the Germans willing to buy, but Germany was not flush with cash and would not want to expend resources that could support later conquests to raise hard currency to purchase territory.
North Schleswig - no. The "juice would not be worth the squeeze" considering the Germans never bothered moving the border even after they totally occupied Denmark in 1940. Hitler just did not put alot of value in adjusting the German-Danish border, and seems to have suffered no domestic ill consequence because of his inaction on the issue.
Danzig - no, because it's not predictable that Germany could win decisive control in a crisis without war anyway, and because they might as well use it as a pretext for making wider demands on Poland.
So, in summary, if Hitler needs to do something instead of Austria in the first half of 1938 to show territorial revisionist success, Memel is his only/best option.
If Austria is still not lined up to be the victim in late 1938 or in 1939, Poland could be set up as the alternate victim of a "splendid little war". Hitler is not likely to be ready diplomatically or militarily to commit to war on Poland during 1938. However, between his build-up, and diplomatic outreach to the Soviet Union, he might convince himself that he could launch a splendid little war to partition Poland with the Soviet Union, and the Wehrmacht would think it is a grand idea.
Theoretically, if the Germans and Soviets take down Poland on OTL's schedule, and the west and Italy do nothing, the Germans may be able to frighten all the Danubian and Balkan states into puppet-hood.
But this requires Germany to have several diplomatic lucky breaks in a row. Any of the following could disrupt the plan:
1) The Soviets refuse to cooperate despite the temptation to gain desired lands from Poland.
2) Regardless of what the Soviets do, when the westerners see this is a war to destroy the Polish state, they might declare war.
3) Outraged at destruction of Poland, a Nazi deal with the Soviets, or both, London, Paris and Rome may coalesce around the view that the Nazis need to be contained, so Austrian and Czechoslovakian territory and independence must be guaranteed.
The portions of Sudetenland that were contiguous with Germany perhaps?
Nah- the leverage is not the same to "chew" on Czechoslovakian territories when Germany only has the "mandible" of Silesia, Saxony and Bavaria, but lacks the "jawbone" of Austria. Plus, there's no sensible historical claim to the broader German public without inheriting Austria's claim.
Maybe marginal things like Memel, Danzig, Eupen-Melmedy, and North Schleswig?
I agree with Athelstane that Memel would be the easiest pickup, and, if they hold off on Austria in 1938, they could maybe do an adventure against Memel that year or in 1939 and get away with it because of Lithuanian weakness. An ideal situation, but one the Poles would probably be too intelligent to fall for, would be to partition Lithuania with the Poles. If the Poles are seen in partnership with the Nazis it will reduce sympathy for them. For that reason, Hitler might be prepared to support a Polish claim to almost all of Lithuania except Memel in the short term, with the idea of coming back around to make demands against Poland in later years.
While the Poles wanted to unify with the Lithuanians, and certainly wanted to solidy their claim to Vilnius/Wilno, I don't think they'd want to be seen doing any of this in tandem with German aggression or bullying.
Eupen-Malmedy - it could be done if the Belgians were willing to sell and the Germans willing to buy, but Germany was not flush with cash and would not want to expend resources that could support later conquests to raise hard currency to purchase territory.
North Schleswig - no. The "juice would not be worth the squeeze" considering the Germans never bothered moving the border even after they totally occupied Denmark in 1940. Hitler just did not put alot of value in adjusting the German-Danish border, and seems to have suffered no domestic ill consequence because of his inaction on the issue.
Danzig - no, because it's not predictable that Germany could win decisive control in a crisis without war anyway, and because they might as well use it as a pretext for making wider demands on Poland.
So, in summary, if Hitler needs to do something instead of Austria in the first half of 1938 to show territorial revisionist success, Memel is his only/best option.
Perhaps demands are made of Poland. An extraterritorial railroad and highway would be the hypothetical minimum. Stepping it up, West Prussia and Kashubia. Going beyond that, the 1914 boundary. Then there's the furthest point...
If Austria is still not lined up to be the victim in late 1938 or in 1939, Poland could be set up as the alternate victim of a "splendid little war". Hitler is not likely to be ready diplomatically or militarily to commit to war on Poland during 1938. However, between his build-up, and diplomatic outreach to the Soviet Union, he might convince himself that he could launch a splendid little war to partition Poland with the Soviet Union, and the Wehrmacht would think it is a grand idea.
Theoretically, if the Germans and Soviets take down Poland on OTL's schedule, and the west and Italy do nothing, the Germans may be able to frighten all the Danubian and Balkan states into puppet-hood.
But this requires Germany to have several diplomatic lucky breaks in a row. Any of the following could disrupt the plan:
1) The Soviets refuse to cooperate despite the temptation to gain desired lands from Poland.
2) Regardless of what the Soviets do, when the westerners see this is a war to destroy the Polish state, they might declare war.
3) Outraged at destruction of Poland, a Nazi deal with the Soviets, or both, London, Paris and Rome may coalesce around the view that the Nazis need to be contained, so Austrian and Czechoslovakian territory and independence must be guaranteed.
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