If Japan had his better weapons a year earlier

Well, like in other topics concerning Japan, some peoples are going to great lengths to argue that alternate history is not possible...on alternatehistory.com.

Anyway, just to quickly adress few things:
No it won't. Under those circumstances Nimitz will not fight a battle at Midway. He'll hold back for when the USN can match or surpass the IJN.
Simply not true, a myth that keeps being perpetuated despite accurate information being available. Nimitz commited TF16 (this is why they left port on the 28th) before he knew for certin Yorktown could be used, when he knew Saratoga would be nowhere near Midway before the second week of June (due to leave the continent on 4th iirc, but left in a hurry on 1st, and was way too late for anything), and when he was certain Zuikaku would participate. So he was commiting 2 vs 5.
At Coral sea he commited 2 vs 4 (or even 5 again), as the japanese were believe to have in addition to Shokaku and Zuikaku the mythical "Ryukaku", and possibly Kaga, plus the Kasuga maru.
To reply to Tomo's well informed arguments:
Whoops, I've forgoten the radar :)
Radar might've helped the IJN actually win the Battle of the Coral Sea, leaving them, say, with one fully operative carrier vs. USN loosing one as per OTL, plus have other sustaining major damage, thus preventing it to take part at Midway. Thus Midway sees 5 IJN carriers vs. 2 USN, and after Midway battle both Japanese and USA sustaining a single CV lost each, plus one damaged for each side. Op Watchtower (Guadalcanal) never happens?
Well, at Coral sea what radar would have helped with is stacking the CAP and perhaps maybe helping Shokaku to try to hide under a squall or something thus avoiding the SBDs, but it seem unlikely, however perhaps better stacked CAP would prevents Aults third hit (there were only couple of SBDs attacking), so at least it's less damaged. Radar can't really save Shoho except in the unlikley event it somehow alters course when detecting the american strike and is not seen.
But really, a better result at Coral sea means either the scout who mistaken an oiler for a carrier opens his bloody eyes, in which case a full 78 plane strike is sent against Fletcher before noon on the 7th once the accurate floatplane reports are in (Furutaka's i think?), probably resulting in both US carriers crippled if not outright sunk (with Cardiv 5 undetected and intact, with serious but bearable plane losses, i expect about 25-30 in all), or Hara does not send the disastruous evening strike, so he has more planes on the 8th, which might result in Yorktown being crippled as well, and of course more japanese planes surviving.
So at Midway, it may well be 2 vs 5, so baring and even more outlandish miracle, the two US CVs are summarily clubbered by Nagumo even if one or two japanese CVs are hit.
As to Guadalcanal, unlikely to happen now indeed, but if the americans still have 3 carriers (Saratoga, repaired Yorktown and Wasp) and believe they caused more damage to the japanese than they really did (like thinking they sunk "two" big carriers at Coral sea and "two" at Midway), they might still commit (in OTL initial plan called for just 2 CVs to support the invasion), but they would be in even more trouble than in OTL facing 4 or 5 IJN fleet CVs plus the smaller ones, it is probably the americans who would call Guadalcanal "the island of hunger" and will be forced to evacuate it after losing most of their surface fleet.

This bringing me top something i wondered, if the japanese win the battle of Guadalcanal relatively early, what happens in New Guinea afterwards, the japanese being able to commit their full effort there then, both manpower as well aircraft and shipping?
 
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The only way I see an Empire of Japan doing well in WWII is if the USSR joins the Axis in September 1940 and the Japanese are seen as a necessary ally. It might result in tech transfer and some neat Japanese equipment if the situation were desperate or if a fatal crash occurred on Japanese soil.
 
if the japanese win the battle of Guadalcanal relatively early, what happens in New Guinea afterwards, the japanese being able to commit their full effort there then, both manpower as well aircraft and shipping?
In the long run, IMO, it's bad for Japan. She's over-extending her SLOCs, & deliveries of a/c & spares even to Rabaul was an issue. Guadalcanal is easier for subs from both Oz & Hawaii to reach (they'd probably come from Christie's command, given the dividing lines & risk of fratricide). Plus, the fuel expended on deliveries & on defending when the U.S. does attack... In any case, heavier traffic will attract USN subs.

This might shift emphasis in DC, tho. It might lead to a view that MacArthur, not Nimitz, should get the lion's share of support.:eek::eek: Especially if Fifth Air Force is doing the bulk of the attacking in the Solomons & New Guinea.
 

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If Japan actually invades FIC in 1939 it will cost them more than they gain by moving it up. OTL they "occupied" it, basically a bloodless affair. An invasion will cost men and equipment. It will also put a scare in to the British and the Dutch, some more equipment may be sent as well as troops. This will mean more effort for the Japanese when they finally go for these areas. In any case the biggest gain in FIC was rice, some other stuff yes, but the real needs of Japan for oil and other materials in DEI/SEA were in British and Dutch colonies.

I know their is the issue of the alliance with Germany, but why not have a DEI/Nippon trade deal. Japan gets oil for the war in China and the Dutch keep the islands?
 
I know their is the issue of the alliance with Germany, but why not have a DEI/Nippon trade deal. Japan gets oil for the war in China and the Dutch keep the islands?
The Japanese tried that; the terms were so onerous, the (conquered) Dutch (or maybe it was the locals...) told them to go screw.:cool::p
 
Part of the problem was that in 1939 Japan had very limited hard currency reserves and was pretty much curt out of the international credit system in dollars or sterling. Even had Japan been allowed to purchase all of the petroleum and raw materials it wanted it would have been cash on the barrelhead - no credit, no taking yen etc. It would not have been long before they ran out of cash to pay for the rice, metals, petroleum they seized 1940-42.

Germany was in no position to help Japan financially, even had they been inclined to, as their situation for hard currency and international credit in 1939 prior to the outbreak of war was marginal. I am not aware of how much pressure Germany put on Holland after it was occupied to cough up resources from the DEI - in any case due to the RN anything from the DEI was not going to go to Europe, so any pressure would only benefit Japan. Remember that in 1939 Japan did not go to war alongside Germany (the alliance was a defensive one and Germany started the war), it did not go to war in spring, 1941 when Germany invaded the USSR.
 
If Japan invades FIC in Sep. 1939 instead of 1940 it would be interesting to see how France reacts, as they have just declared war on Germany.

However, move the Japanese invasion of FIC to earlier in 1939, say to spring 1939, then we may see France send a significant naval force.
And if this naval force is at Saigon in Sept. 1939 either fighting or deterring Japanese aggression, does it abandon FIC and race home? If it's still in FIC in June 1940, does the RN force them to surrender or sink them?
 
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Well, like in other topics concerning Japan, some peoples are going to great lengths to argue that alternate history is not possible...on alternatehistory.com.

Because Japan's impossibility in winning the Pacific War is well recorded and established. Japan was overheating their economy historically. (And, even doing so, the only great power it exceeded in war production was Italy) Moving up the production of carriers mean the sacrifice of other weapons.

Japan, quite literally, can only build so much tonnage, so what does Japan sacrifice in order to build more fleet carriers early on? this is a zero sum game. Same as the point made earlier. Better fighters are necessarily more complicated fighters, and the Japanese will end up building fewer of those.

I've yet to see an explanation of how Japan gets these designs a year early, save a few minor examples of designs being either fixed months earlier or for designs to be immediately cancelled. And, in that case, there needs to be a justification for the Navy that was fixated on the "Decisive Battle" suddenly scrapping all of their battleship production.

This will, of course, cause knock on effects elsewhere, as a sudden rapid change in strategic thinking would cause changes

And, regardless if the United States loses every single carrier at Midway, it still would be an economic nonevent for the war. The war will drag out a year or two longer.

Also, if the Japanese don't cancel the battleships until late 1941 to build more carriers (again, doing a complete reversal from the established Japanese doctrine), there is no way the extra vessels can be ready for service in mid 1942. Unryuu was launched 13 months after being laid down, and wasn't even put into service until 24 months after being laid down. Assuming a fresh build starting in December (there has to be time to clear the slips, change out the steel, and other formalities between making the order and laying down the ship, then the earliest the ship could be commissioned would be Dec 1943.

To explain the discrepancy, look at aircraft carriers built/available:

US CV/CVL (ignoring CVE for argument) in Pacific (assuming total loss at Midway) would be, by the end of 1943:

7 CV 7 CVL 850 Aircraft

IJN CV/CVL (ignoring CVE and similar) in Pacific (assuming no ships lost at Midway) would be, by the end of 1944:

9 CV 4 CVL 811 Aircraft

So, assuming that the Japanese manage to scrounge up the resources to rush a year's worth of shipyard production for their CVs, and accomplish the complete destruction of the US at Midway while taking not a single loss, the USstill has caught up by the end of 1943.

(Interesting note: by mid 1944, the US has more carriers and aircraft than the Japanese could produce through mid 1946)

So the US has already returned to parity with the Japanese by the end of 1943. The campaigns in the Solomons will be delayed necessarily, but the Japanese can't invade either Australia or Hawai'i so the Allies can't be driven out of the Pacific. US airmen will have higher casualties, but the Japanese haven't addressed the issues which caused the OTL pilot shortages.

The loss of so many carriers in 1942 will likely prompt the conversions of more Independence light carriers and also the conversion of the Alaska class cruisers to carriers.
 
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