The Confederate men had no shoes, were practically starving, were completely exhausted, and much sicker. Obviously this affects them as a fighting force, especially on a large scale like at Gettysburg. I doubt they'd be too scared or gentlemanly to take anything and everything.
That hasn't anything with them being "gentlemanly". CSA troops (particularly cavalry) robbed CSA civilians blind not talking Union ones. What it has to do is that you have to breaking apart your army to some extent. You can't do it as a whole, you have to send out foraging parties. Sherman could get away with that as Hood was hunting snipe in TN. The Union Army is too big for that. Break out too many foraging parties and you are inviting getting beaten in detail.
Lee split his army so many times throughout the war, with virtually no defeats in that regard. Couple that with the much faster marches and the still (slightly) superior Confederate cavalry at the time and I see no reason that Uncle Bob couldn't keep his army loose after hitting the Union hard in a few successive battles to drive them south.
He wouldn't need to split more than 5-10% of his army off in for the sake of foraging, considering the Confederates were pretty much used to less supplies than the Union soldiers, and that their army was even smaller than Sherman's in the March to the Sea. Also, the reigon is much richer. Sacking cities like Harrisonburg would also provide the army with massive amounts of supply.
He can't get to Harrisburg let alone sack it. If by some miracle he got in he can't get go home if he did take it. Unlike Grant he doesn't have the big army needed to take cities nor time enough to siege them.
If you had said that about Philadelphia I might give you some credit, but I'm certain that you are VASTLY overestimating the size of Harrisonburg. An army of 60,000 would have no trouble immediately storming the city.
That was behind a big river with bridges wired to be blown. Also cities are much tougher to take in RL than in a map exercise.
The bridges certainly weren't wired, and the local militia could have done nothing to repel them.
They could've easily forded with the tiny resistance they'd have had.
ALL of which are completely under the control of the General commanding. Its called logistics. Great Generals remember it.
Lee lost more men than Grant did across all theaters. Grant took gambles, most of them worked. Lee took fewer, most of those failed, and failed against opposing Generals who have gone down in history as clunkers. He lost to McClellan at Sharpsburg (Antietam), a loss that allowed Lincoln to publish the Emancipation Proclamation, a move that ended the Confederacy's already meager hopes for Foreign recognition. He lost at Gettysburg, to an opposing commander who had only been in overall command for THREE DAYS, while Lee managed to utterly destroy the flower of his Army in two days of foolhardy attacks against strong defensive positions.
Grant is called a butcher because he fought a series of battles with heavy losses including some needless ones (the final attempt at Cold Harbor being a perfect example). People forget that after each of those battles it was Lee who retreated being pushed every closer to Richmond and losing the ability to maneuver in any significant way.
Overall Lees built a killer rep against the Union because he faced a series of buffons. As soon as the Union found a competent, if overly cautious, commander in Meade, Lee never did a thing. Had Grant or, God help Lee if it had happened, Sherman been in command at Gettyburg, Lee would never have gotten back across the Potomac and the War would have ended in August of 1863. When he ran into a competent and aggressive commander in Grant, Lee was chased from pillar to post and back again until he was trapped with his back against the Confederate Capital with his flanks beaten in.
tl;dr: Grant flat kicked Lee's ass.
An excellent TL based on that POD. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/grant-at-gettysburg.112193/
as a Virginian, I find Jackson overblown as a commander. He was ballsy, has guts, but no great strategist was he.
More likely he gets himself shot in some other battle.
More likely he gets himself shot in some other battle.
Of everything, I am more curious why and how he would even get that far.
Anaxagoras
Banned
If we set up a "butterfly net" and assume that everything is the same as it was IOTL except that Stonewall Jackson is alive and in command of the Second Corps (I'll assume for the sake of argument that Ewell is a division commander, with Early and Rodes being the other two). Ewell actually did pretty well on July 1, marching to the sound of the guns and pitching in to the Union right flank, which crumbled under the weight of his attack. Jackson probably would have done the same thing. I think his poor performance in the Seven Days was due to sheer physical exhaustion resulting from his exertions in the Shenandoah Campaign, which would not have been a factor here.
So, the question is whether or not Jackson would have done what Ewell failed to do: take the vital hills that would later form the northern portion of the Union line on the second and third day of the battle. For reasons that have never been clear to me, this question has always been fixated on Cemetery Hill, when Culp's Hill was far more likely to fall. Cemetery Hill was defended by fresh Union infantry and considerable artillery, while Culp's Hill was defenseless. And if the Confederates controlled Culp's Hill, the Union position on Cemetery Hill would be fatally compromised. I can certainly see Jackson driving on to either launch an attack in sufficient force to take Cemetery Hill (which might have been successful but would certainly have cost heavy casualties) or realize that Culp's Hill was unoccupied and sent troops to take it.
But, as you point out, what then? IOTL, realizing that the Union position was relatively secure, Meade decided to make a stand at Gettysburg and directed the five uncommitted corps of the Army of the Potomac to converge there. ITTL, with the I Corps and XI Corps battered even beyond what happened IOTL, it seems like that Meade would have gone with his original plan and ordered a defensive position along Pipe Creek, to shield Washington and Baltimore. Only two of the seven corps in the Army of the Potomac had been in action up to that point; the remaining five were still intact and ready to fight. What would Lee do in such a situation? This is the big question for any serious AH scenario of Gettysburg. If Lee had moved forward and attacked the Army of the Potomac at Pipe Creek, it might well have proved a Fredericksburg in reverse - Pickett's Charge tenfold.
But then again, Lee might not have followed the Army of the Potomac towards Pipe Creek. He will have already achieved his chief objective: inflicting a clear battlefield defeat on the enemy army on enemy soil. His attention might have then shifted to his secondary objective: foraging for supplies at the expense of Pennsylvania farmers (a goal which he actually achieved IOTL: the Army of Northern Virginia subsisted for months on the forage it gathered in the Gettysburg Campaign). The Union army, beaten but not that badly battered, would have ventured forth to engage him sooner or later. Lee could not have afforded to move too far to the north, because it would then have been easy for the Army of the Potomac to swing to the west towards the area around Harper's Ferry and cut Lee off from Virginia. Lee would then have had to try to fight his way out, which would mean that the Army of the Potomac would get the opportunity to fight a defensive battle on ground of its own choosing.
If Jackson had been alive and brought about a more complete Confederate victory on July 1, I think that Meade would have pulled back to Pipe Creek and Lee would have spent a few weeks gathering supplies and sending his cavalry to burn bridges and tear up railroads, until the Army of the Potomac began to advance, whereupon Lee would have either tried to find a chance to fight another battle at advantage or would have ducked back into Virginia while he had the chance.
In any case, even a very successful Gettysburg Campaign, from the standpoint of the Confederates, would not have been immediately decisive. But it might have so utterly dislocated the Union war effort that Lincoln would have easily been defeated in the 1864 election and a Peace Democrat elected, which would have changed everything.
I am curious, but by the time that Jackson would have made an attack on the Hill, would Hancock have been in the vicinity, he would already have taken command on the field by this time, right....having him on the field may possibly bolster the Union defenses, at least somewhat. He would have been stern enough to even realize those hills and quite possibly have a lot men defending that position, so to speak.
And keep in mind I am using the word "possibly"
And keep in mind I am using the word "possibly"