Lee was desperate to puncture the Union position, and very nearly succeeded. It's like Operation Barbarosa; it failed, so we view it as stupid, but if it had worked, it would've been genius.So, sort of like what happened at Pickett's Charge?
Lee was desperate to puncture the Union position, and very nearly succeeded. It's like Operation Barbarosa; it failed, so we view it as stupid, but if it had worked, it would've been genius.So, sort of like what happened at Pickett's Charge?
Lee was desperate to puncture the Union position, and very nearly succeeded. It's like Operation Barbarosa; it failed, so we view it as stupid, but if it had worked, it would've been genius.
Because Hood didn't plan at all and just threw men at the much larger (2x the size) army 12 times. Lee knew the best spot for a charge to get through, and that he needed to win the battle badly enough to throw the dice.Why does that apply to Lee, but not Hood, who at least was defending a major Confederate City, instead of seizing the vital shoe depots of Gettysburg?
Pickett's charge could work.. assuming II corps suddenly turns tail and run.. Frankly even if Pickett makes the breakthrough (impossible in my opinion) no troops are fresh enough to exploit it. Meade still has VI corps in reserve to smash any breakthrough.Lee was desperate to puncture the Union position, and very nearly succeeded. It's like Operation Barbarosa; it failed, so we view it as stupid, but if it had worked, it would've been genius.
Considering they actually almost did that, and that Meade would've still had to plug those reinforcements up a hill the was already taken, I'd say that Pickett nearly won the battle.Pickett's charge could work.. assuming II corps suddenly turns tail and run.. Frankly even if Pickett makes the breakthrough (impossible in my opinion) no troops are fresh enough to exploit it. Meade still has VI corps in reserve to smash any breakthrough.
IF Pickett somehow broke through, he would be so bloodied that Meade can simply push him off with VI corps. VI corps was unbloodied and consisted of about 13000 men. I'm quite certain that Pickett could possible hold against that number and Bobby Lee had no reserves to exploit the breakthrough.Considering they actually almost did that, and that Meade would've still had to plug those reinforcements up a hill the was already taken, I'd say that Pickett nearly won the battle.
Uncle Lee always has reserves somewhere. He'd probably just pull away some men from other areas of the battlefield. If he could then repel the VI corps, which I doubt, but would certainly be possible, he could roll the entire Union flank and slaughter them.IF Pickett somehow broke through, he would be so bloodied that Meade can simply push him off with VI corps. VI corps was unbloodied and consisted of about 13000 men. I'm quite certain that Pickett could possible hold against that number and Bobby Lee had no reserves to exploit the breakthrough.
Once again WHAT reserves? Hood, R.H Anderson and McLaw's divisions were worn out from the Second Day of Gettysburg. Pettigrew and Trimble's divisions were part of Pickett's charge but they failed badly. Ewell's 2nd Corps were below Culp's Hill and were of no assistance. There were no Confederate reserves ready to enter the fray.Uncle Lee always has reserves somewhere. He'd probably just pull away some men from other areas of the battlefield. If he could then repel the VI corps, which I doubt, but would certainly be possible, he could roll the entire Union flank and slaughter them.
But he would've just forced A.P. Hill to advance the Light Divison to the top of the hill with his gentlemanship and southern charm, then killed every single member of the AotP via genius, and then sacked DC 173 consecutive times before paving a road of bones and dead yankees all the way to New York, Boston, Chicago, California, and Washington state.Once again WHAT reserves? Hood, R.H Anderson and McLaw's divisions were worn out from the Second Day of Gettysburg. Pettigrew and Trimble's divisions were part of Pickett's charge but they failed badly. Ewell's 2nd Corps were below Culp's Hill and were of no assistance. There were no Confederate reserves ready to enter the fray.
No, Grant really was a butcher. And that's not just Lost Cause...his contemporaries on both sides identified him as such, some of them meaning it as a criticism, others as a compliment (and I think both have validity). I actually think Lee's overrated, but saying his soldiers were more likely to die is a non-point considering that he lost and that a huge chunk of casualties happen after one side breaks.
In my own personal opinion, Sherman was the best Northern general by a fair amount, and maybe the best overall. But if you're Lincoln you want a general who plays like the house, and that's what Grant gave him.
That's more due to having better camps, supplies, and food. Less people died in camp or on marches because of that.Lee had the highest casualty percentage of any Army Commander North or South. It isn't Grant having slightly smaller percentage casualties than Lee but a lot.
Hood was desperate and reckless. Sherman didn't even have to do anything as Hood smashed his army into Sherman's 12 times with no success whatsoever.
Don't see how that's really relevant. I'm just saying what happened when Hood attacked Sherman.If you post here realize "Lost Causers" tend to get pounded on. It started out basically as an apoligism for slavery.
Lee was desperate to puncture the Union position, and very nearly succeeded. It's like Operation Barbarosa; it failed, so we view it as stupid, but if it had worked, it would've been genius.
That's more due to having better camps, supplies, and food. Less people died in camp or on marches because of that.
Don't see how that's really relevant. I'm just saying what happened when Hood attacked Sherman.
Once again WHAT reserves? Hood, R.H Anderson and McLaw's divisions were worn out from the Second Day of Gettysburg. Pettigrew and Trimble's divisions were part of Pickett's charge but they failed badly. Ewell's 2nd Corps were below Culp's Hill and were of no assistance. There were no Confederate reserves ready to enter the fray.