If I were Lee and me, simultaneously

If I were Lee and me, in between the second and third days of Gettysburg, with his desires and my knowledge of the next couple of years IOTL I would not try anything like Pickett's charge. I would want to threaten Washington, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. I think the USA forces would have to abandon their strong points and follow me, maybe even try to get in front of me. I would have Stuart and his forces staying close to them, to give me the word if they get on hard to defend ground, or become sufficiently disorganized.
If the right time ever came, I would pounce.

How much worse could things be:confused:
 
If I were Lee and me, in between the second and third days of Gettysburg, with his desires and my knowledge of the next couple of years IOTL I would not try anything like Pickett's charge. I would want to threaten Washington, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. I think the USA forces would have to abandon their strong points and follow me, maybe even try to get in front of me. I would have Stuart and his forces staying close to them, to give me the word if they get on hard to defend ground, or become sufficiently disorganized.
If the right time ever came, I would pounce.

How much worse could things be:confused:

Except that if you disengage and attempt this, you're doing so with a badly depleted army against an enemy whose logistical tail and will to fight is only the more emboldened by this amounting to conceding a full-scale defeat.
 
Except that if you disengage and attempt this, you're doing so with a badly depleted army against an enemy whose logistical tail and will to fight is only the more emboldened by this amounting to conceding a full-scale defeat.

Doing with the army in the condition with was in on day 2 might make sense, subject to probably wanting to wait for Stuart.
 
At this point there aren't any good alternatives; the ANV has already taken 19,000 casualties, leaving it with roughly 51,000 effectives, as opposed to the Army of the Potomac's 20,000 casualties and 65,000 effectives. (All figures are approximations for the sake of this discussion). Furthermore our ammunition supply is severely depleted.

Further attacks, even if successful, will only bring a temporary advantage at best, and they will inflict further casualties on our already depleted numbers and exhaust our remaining ammunition, leaving us vulnerable to counterattack.

Maneuver while burdened with thousands of wounded and lacking ammunition for further engagements will not bring any real benefits either; the AotP will simply follow us, and other Union forces will arrive in the area, while we cannot expect any aid to arrive. Any subsequent engagements will probably lead to our defeat. If we are defeated and cannot subsequently retreat we will be annihilated; we cannot risk this.

Given this situation I would retreat back into Virginia. That will not be a popular choice, and it might lead to my removal from command, but I believe it to be correct and I would do it. Better that than risk the army's destruction. As long as the ANV exists the issue will be in doubt; it is my duty to preserve it and I will do so.
 
At this point there aren't any good alternatives; the ANV has already taken 19,000 casualties, leaving it with roughly 51,000 effectives, as opposed to the Army of the Potomac's 20,000 casualties and 65,000 effectives. (All figures are approximations for the sake of this discussion). Furthermore our ammunition supply is severely depleted.

Further attacks, even if successful, will only bring a temporary advantage at best, and they will inflict further casualties on our already depleted numbers and exhaust our remaining ammunition, leaving us vulnerable to counterattack.

Maneuver while burdened with thousands of wounded and lacking ammunition for further engagements will not bring any real benefits either; the AotP will simply follow us, and other Union forces will arrive in the area, while we cannot expect any aid to arrive. Any subsequent engagements will probably lead to our defeat. If we are defeated and cannot subsequently retreat we will be annihilated; we cannot risk this.

Given this situation I would retreat back into Virginia. That will not be a popular choice, and it might lead to my removal from command, but I believe it to be correct and I would do it. Better that than risk the army's destruction. As long as the ANV exists the issue will be in doubt; it is my duty to preserve it and I will do so.

Ammunition-wise, the ANV's only problem isn't bad even in regards to long range ammunition until after the pre-Pickett's Charge artillery bombardment.

Just to fill in something worth noting.
 
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