If Germany delayed Barbarossa until April 1942 they would have defeated Russia

The wallies are going to declare war to Germany because the Red Scare is invading western europe?

Maybe the UK, certainly not France or the US.

The period before a Soviet invasion sounds like the best possible time for some Wehrmacht officers to blow up Hitler and the OKH and then ask the UK for terms. Otherwise Hitler is going to be seen as the bigger devil than Stalin.
 
So basically you don’t have an actual answer to these problems which make the operation insoluble. If you can’t resolve the means, which logistics represent, then you have no business making conclusions on the ends. If the German (I assume you writing “Russians” is an mistake) can’t supply their forces at Rostov, as I’ve shown they couldn’t, then they can’t hold onto Rostov even against the OTL attack, much less a much more massive. That means taking the more distant Voronezh, much less holding it, is even more of a pipe dream. It’s as simple as that.

As already stated, I think Rostov could have been held at a minimum, your logistic arguments notwithstanding. In general terms I think that if AGC stays near Smolensk - as is the general concensus here - then it will retain the capacity to undertake limited depth offensive operations during the winter.

Vyazma-Bryansk with more sharply limited penetrations by the panzers (So no galiventing all the way to Orel by Guderian), then pull back the main forces to Smolensk.

So in your plan 2nd Panzer army completes the encirclement in Bryansk in October and then sits there looking east at Kharkov for the next 6 months while AGS struggles in isolation?
 

Anchises

Banned
A quick note that skilled workers reintegrating into their industry in significant numbers means the Germans have massively demobilized, which in turn means the Germans lack both the manpower and material to stop the Soviets before it seizes a whole lot of land. And unlike the Soviets, the Germans don't have much strategic depth to give up. And the main constraint on German production was a mix of lack of resources and poor organization caused by structural deficiencies in German manufacturing sectors.

In practice, it's unlikely the Germans would demobilize to such an extent given the constraints I mentioned earlier in the thread.

That is not necessarily true and really depends on the strategic situation and on the extent of demobilization. Assuming that Germany has 1 1/2 years until the start, a phased and methodical replacement of skilled workers with new recruits (recently grown ups, Volksdeutsche etc.).

This certainly wouldn't guarantee that all skilled workers are reintegrated but would really help to alleviate the labor shortages of OTL.



There is no basis for these claims. The Soviet economic system was supporting the growth of the secondary industries required to support logistical investment. Railway lines in the recently acquired territories in 1941 were undergoing conversion and expansion to Soviet standards. The finishing of construction on a number of industrial facilities ranging from aluminum smelters to refineries for the production of high-grade aviation fuel that were historically cancelled would be completed. As a specific example of this: Soviet truck production prior to the war was progressing at a rate which, had it continued un interrupted, would have delivered to the USSR more trucks by the end of 1943 (350,000) then lend-lease did during the entire war (312,600), as well as retain some 250,000 trucks that they lost in those years. Similarly, before the war the Soviets were producing locomotives at a rate of nearly 1,000 per year. Two years of continued uninterrupted production (which the German invasion caused to cease completely in 1942) would have given them as many additional locomotives as they received through lend-lease. Imports of technology the Germans promised as payment (which the Germans would have had to pony up in lieu of Barbarossa) would have enhanced all this.

I really would like to see some sources here.
 
As already stated, I think Rostov could have been held at a minimum, your logistic arguments notwithstanding.

Do you think pure strength of will is an adequate substitute for inadequate stocks of fuel and ammunition? Well, you certainly have the attitude for OKH, I'll say that much.

In general terms I think that if AGC stays near Smolensk - as is the general concensus here - then it will retain the capacity to undertake limited depth offensive operations during the winter.

Autumn. During the winter it'd have to be purely defensive, although the same sort of defensive as seen at 2nd Kharkov.

So in your plan 2nd Panzer army completes the encirclement in Bryansk in October and then sits there looking east at Kharkov for the next 6 months while AGS struggles in isolation?

Ideally AGS also stops at the Mius, which was the limit of it's resupply with it's historical forces. Increasing the number of forces will spread it's already inadequate supplies thinner therefore decreasing the depth while drastically weakening (this ignoring the fact that the exchange was usually a organizational clusterfuck for the logistics trail) the transferred-in forces which it can support so that's a bad idea. 2nd Panzer Army holding after the Bryansk encirclement, or better yet falling back to it's supply source near Gomel while 2nd Army takes up a screening position, is a far superior alternative to pushing on in any eastward direction, which would be ruinous for it's strength. It would also allow for a tighter pockets, preventing many of the historical Soviet escapees who would rejoin the defense, and subsequent counter-offense.

That is not necessarily true and really depends on the strategic situation and on the extent of demobilization. Assuming that Germany has 1 1/2 years until the start, a phased and methodical replacement of skilled workers with new recruits (recently grown ups, Volksdeutsche etc.).

Yes, it is necessarily true. Given the level of mobilization Germany achieved according to Tooze by 1941 since 1937, equally extensive demobilization would be required to return Germany to sustainable economy. Furthermore, as already noted, the best strategic situation for Germany in 1943 post-1941-British-peace would be one of a double Cold War arms race between Germany and the Soviet Union on the one hand as well as Germany and the Anglo-American alliance on the other, with the conquests and client states of 1940-41 still requiring significant force commitments of themselves to prevent revolts or rethinking of allegiances. So politically, extensive demobilization just isn't happening.

This certainly wouldn't guarantee that all skilled workers are reintegrated but would really help to alleviate the labor shortages of OTL.

I really would like to see some sources here.

You probably should do some research on the status of the Soviet economy in the immediate pre-war era before you try to make definitive statements about it, because otherwise you would be aware of these figures. Walter Dunn's The Soviet Economy and the Red Army and Mark Harrison's Soviet Planning in Peace and War are good starting points.
 
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Anchises

Banned
Yes, it is necessarily true. Given the level of mobilization Germany achieved according to Tooze by 1941 since 1937, equally extensive demobilization would be required to return Germany to sustainable economy. Furthermore, as already noted, the best strategic situation for Germany in 1943 post-1941-British-peace would be one of a double Cold War arms race between Germany and the Soviet Union on the one hand as well as Germany and the Anglo-American alliance on the other, with the conquests and client states of 1940-41 still requiring significant force commitments of themselves to prevent revolts or rethinking of allegiances. So politically, extensive demobilization just isn't happening.

You probably should do some research on the status of the Soviet economy in the immediate pre-war era before you try to make definitive statements about it, because otherwise you would be aware of these figures. Walter Dunn's
The Soviet Economy and the Red Army and Mark Harrison's Soviet Planning in Peace and War are good starting points.

1) I never talked about extensive demobilization. Germany certainly isn't going to end their "loot and exploit" slave economy.

But we are talking about a scenario where the shooting stops for a year and a half. With a lot of fresh 18 year olds and with pool of Volksdeutsche eligible to be drafted into the Wehrmacht or SS, we would certainly see a certain ammount of demobilization of crucial skilled workers and scientists.

phased replacement of some mobilized skilled workers and scientists != demobilization

The Germans certainly wouldn't sit on their hands during a ceasefire. They would take measures to alleviate their (skilled) labour shortages. Straw maning me into saying that the Germans would "demobilize " isn't changing that.

2) "I really doubt" hardly seems like a defintive statement...

Talking about trucks:

You postulate that the Soviets would be able to produce 350k additional trucks if production would have continued unimpeded. There might have been some factors that would have slowed down production, so it seems feasible to assume that this number might have been undershot.

Then you postulate that the Soviets recieved 312k trucks during Lend and Lease.

Lets assume that the Soviets manage to produce around 300k additional trucks, given the problems in a planned economy run by a crazed paranoid sociopath this seems like a healthy pessimistic estimate.

Your numbers of course ignore that the American trucks were far superior to anything the Soviets could have produced. Especially the 200k delievered Studebaker trucks. So the actual growth in logistical capabilties isn't really reflected by the numbers you post.

Taking into account the hypothetical growth of the Soviet army between 41 and 43 it seems to me that there certainly would be more trucks and mobility but not to the degree that a simple comparison of (partly hypothetical) truck numbers would indicate.

Now lets take the changed strategic situation into account:

Instead of having the cream of the crop of the Wehrmacht freezing to death or being encircled/smashed along a ridiculously overextended front, the Soviets have to face them in Poland.

The Luftwaffe would not sustain the losses it did IOTL due to bad weather and constant rebasing. Instead it would defend a comparatively small area that by this point probably would be litered with ground based aa.

Then there is the rail conversion issue and assorted problems.

And technological issues where the Soviet industry struggled in certain high tech areas. Let me just say that the promised German technology imports imho are unlikely to happen. The Greater German Reich never really planned to fullfill its commercial agreements.

Taking all of this into account it seems to me that saying the Soviets would be ready to invade the Reich in 1943 is the same hybris that made the Germans think they were ready for Barbarossa in 1941.
 
I never talked about extensive demobilization. Germany certainly isn't going to end their "loot and exploit" slave economy.

But we are talking about a scenario where the shooting stops for a year and a half. With a lot of fresh 18 year olds and with pool of Volksdeutsche eligible to be drafted into the Wehrmacht or SS, we would certainly see a certain ammount of demobilization of crucial skilled workers and scientists.

phased replacement of some mobilized skilled workers and scientists != demobilization

The Germans certainly wouldn't sit on their hands during a ceasefire. They would take measures to alleviate their (skilled) labour shortages. Straw maning me into saying that the Germans would "demobilize " isn't changing that.

Eh, given that their "skilled" labour supply still practiced in a industrial environment inferior to mass production compared to those of American and Soviet and had developed their skills as part of that environment... it isn't really much of a use, now is it? As I said before, the German problem wasn't the skill of their labour, it was both much more physical (resource shortages), structural (more old fashioned forms of factory production), and organizational (Nazis party institutional chaos).

You postulate that the Soviets would be able to produce 350k additional trucks if production would have continued unimpeded. There might have been some factors that would have slowed down production, so it seems feasible to assume that this number might have been undershot.

In a few other area's I can see there being some undershooting, sure. However, I don't see anything that would slow down truck production in 1941 compared to 1941 absent a German invasion.

Lets assume that the Soviets manage to produce around 300k additional trucks, given the problems in a planned economy run by a crazed paranoid sociopath this seems like a healthy pessimistic estimate.

Then add the 270K trucks* the Soviets had in 1941 that they don't lose to the Germans in 1941-43 this time around and the additional 220K which the Soviets planned (and did) mobilize from the civilian economy in the event of war.

*Technically, the Soviets lost nearly 23,000 more then that in 1941-43, but seeing as they had only 270,000 to start with that'd overlap with their vastly shrunken domestic production, losses among the lend-lease, and the 220K mobilized I mentioned above.

Your numbers of course ignore that the American trucks were far superior to anything the Soviets could have produced. Especially the 200k delievered Studebaker trucks. So the actual growth in logistical capabilties isn't really reflected by the numbers you post.

Kinda? While American trucks were superior to the Soviets in stuff like reliability and handling and off-road performance, to say they were far superior is a willful exaggeration. Soviet trucks still proved up to the job of hauling artillery and supplies around, making up a bare majority (some 59%,if my memory holds correctly) of the Red Army's truck park even at the end of the war. The difference is not liable to be noticeable on the macro level. This is ignoring, of course, that truck vehicles which were cancelled or delayed IOTL by the invasion, like the Zil-15 and Gaz-51, would be able to go into production in significant quantities.

Taking into account the hypothetical growth of the Soviet army between 41 and 43 it seems to me that there certainly would be more trucks and mobility but not to the degree that a simple comparison of (partly hypothetical) truck numbers would indicate.

The 6.5 million man Red Army of OTL which had vanquished Germany in 1945 was supported on the back of 664,455 motor vehicles according to the GATVU (Main Automobile Directorate), of which some 481,000 were general purpose cargo transports of some description and of those were . IATL, they have 790,000 trucks mobilized (570,000 trucks unmobilized). While the trucks are inferior on some factors to some degree, that's a tactical issue and not an operational one.It's worth noting that even in 1945 the GAVTU reported that their vehicle park made up only 80% of what their TO&Es required (although, the fact that many of their rifle divisions were heavily undermanned probably made that moot). That puts Soviet TO&Es as requiring some 600,000 trucks. In other words, without an invasion but with mobilization for an offensive war, the Soviets will have 190,000 trucks in excess of their OTL 1945 requirements. Even without mobilization, they would have some ~95% of requirements. This is grossly superior to the situation in June 1941, when the standing truck park of 270,000 constituted only 45% of their calculated requirements.

Now lets take the changed strategic situation into account:

Instead of having the cream of the crop of the Wehrmacht freezing to death or being encircled/smashed along a ridiculously overextended front, the Soviets have to face them in Poland.

I certainly don't expect the Soviets to achieve a rapid breakthrough or anything like that. It's gonna be a attritional grind along the frontier, but that still favors the Soviets in the end given their larger (and, on average, younger) manpower pool, better access to resources, better organized (and IATL, undamaged and expanded) industry, etc. etc.

The Luftwaffe would not sustain the losses it did IOTL due to bad weather and constant rebasing. Instead it would defend a comparatively small area that by this point probably would be litered with ground based aa.

Sure, but by the same token 1943 the VVS would also have well-established bases and air defense by the border, along with modern aircraft comparable to it's 1944-45 gear. The Yak-3, for example, can go into production by 1942 without the initial program getting canned by the invasion like it was in late-'41 only to be revived two years later. Just as importantly, Soviet high quality aviation gas production will have expanded by hundreds of thousands of tons and it's aircraft industries would be boosted by the retention of 50% of it's aluminum production that was historically lost until 1945 and then an additional 70,000 tons on top of that from the completion of the facility in the northern Urals whose construction was delayed so badly that the first production didn't take place until April 1944. The only real uncertain thing there is how Soviet pilot training would evolve over the next two years.

Then there is the rail conversion issue and assorted problems.

The Soviets proved a lot better at this then the Germans even before lend-lease started showing up, I don't see what "problem" it would be.

And technological issues where the Soviet industry struggled in certain high tech areas.

Struggled so much they managed to compete with not only the Germans, but also the Americans and British for the next 30 odd years.

I mean sure, there probably are going to be areas where the Soviets may improve but not as much as they would have with lend-lease. Radios for example. On the whole, without a devastating invasion but also without lend-lease, Soviet industry is liable to be just better off period in some areas, better off quantitatively (but not qualitatively) in others, and held back in yet others yet still better off then they were in 1941. I really doubt they won't have anything that won't manage to do the job though, which is all they need.

Let me just say that the promised German technology imports imho are unlikely to happen. The Greater German Reich never really planned to fullfill its commercial agreements.

Because OTL it was going to invade in 1941. If it isn't going to invade it's going to have to pony up, less Stalin turn off the tap as his confidence in the Red Army starts to revive.

Taking all of this into account it seems to me that saying the Soviets would be ready to invade the Reich in 1943 is the same hybris that made the Germans think they were ready for Barbarossa in 1941.

Too anybody who hasn't bothered to research the Soviet industrial, armament, and reformation efforts that were underway in 1941 before the Germans invaded, sure. There was all sorts of stuff that was in development in 1941 that would have borne fruit later in the year or in 1942 but had to be ditched because the Germans invaded. Some of the stuff did anyways, but in much more limited forms then might have been. One example of this is actually the quality of the personnel: the majority of the draftees born in 1924-1927 would have finished the 7 or even 9 years schools by 1942. The effect was felt even OTL and with a training regime uninterrupted by German invasion, the improvement would be even more massive. The annual intake without the German invasion and occupation of the country would also be larger in 1942-43: 3 million yearly instead of the 2 million it was reduced too IOTL.
 
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... without any of the loses suffered on the Eastern Front, which not only increases the aircraft numbers but opens up huge amounts/increases the survival rate of instructors the feed the training pipeline? Add that to ground-based defensive infastructure and the Wallies are in for an uphill battle. You can't just assume eliminating the biggest theature of the war isen't going to have MAJOR affects across all of Europe.

Anglo-American aircraft production in 1944 was about 125,000. Axis production was about 70,000. German production was around 38,000, and without the strategic air campaign it might have been 60,000. US aircraft production, AFAIK, was not at capacity in 1944. That is to say, the resources should have been available to crank Anglo-American production to 150,000 or 200,000 in 1946 if necessary. Eastern Front or not, Germany can't compete with that!
 
So basically you don’t have an actual answer to these problems which make the operation insoluble. If you can’t resolve the means, which logistics represent, then you have no business making conclusions on the ends. If the German (I assume you writing “Russians” is an mistake) can’t supply their forces at Rostov, as I’ve shown they couldn’t, then they can’t hold onto Rostov even against the OTL attack, much less a much more massive. That means taking the more distant Voronezh, much less holding it, is even more of a pipe dream. It’s as simple as that.

You've expressed a bunch of opinions about outcomes, but have demonstrated nothing concrete about what could and couldn't be done on the AGS front with respect to capturing Rostov or even Stalingrad.

As I said, the strategy after the Kiev pocket closed should have switched to AGS as the main effort. We agree that AGC digs in and winters nears Smolensk. It may conduct limited winter offensive operations, but generally speaking, by November it is converting to winter gear, building up supplies, and digging in. The Red Army had already committed significant reserves to the Moscow front before Typhoon commenced, meaning that failure of AGC to advance in depth would have avoided a trap. AGS becomes the focal point, receiving at least 2nd Panzer army as reinforcements, plus enough infantry divisions to take and hold the Crimea in the fall and dominate the Sea of Azov. Use the Luftwaffe to destroy the Black Sea fleet and invade across Kerch towards Krasnodar. Establish rail heads to Kharkov and Rostov, and sea communications to the Azov ports and Crimea from Rumania via the Danube. With the pieces in place and no emergency gutting AGC, the AGS offensive could continue all winter.


Vyazma-Bryansk with more sharply limited penetrations by the panzers (So no galiventing all the way to Orel by Guderian), then pull back the main forces to Smolensk.

Under your plan, do you have any particular reason why 2nd Panzer can't close the Bryansk pocket, then move to assist AGS at Kharkov in November, instead of advancing on Tula?
 
Ideally AGS also stops at the Mius, which was the limit of it's resupply with it's historical forces. Increasing the number of forces will spread it's already inadequate supplies thinner therefore decreasing the depth while drastically weakening (this ignoring the fact that the exchange was usually a organizational clusterfuck for the logistics trail) the transferred-in forces which it can support so that's a bad idea. 2nd Panzer Army holding after the Bryansk encirclement, or better yet falling back to it's supply source near Gomel while 2nd Army takes up a screening position, is a far superior alternative to pushing on in any eastward direction, which would be ruinous for it's strength. It would also allow for a tighter pockets, preventing many of the historical Soviet escapees who would rejoin the defense, and subsequent counter-offense.

So under your plan 2nd Panzer sits there doing nothing in October while AGS struggles to take Kharkov 200km away? You're kidding, right?
 
You've expressed a bunch of opinions about outcomes, but have demonstrated nothing concrete about what could and couldn't be done on the AGS front with respect to capturing Rostov or even Stalingrad.

Flatly wrong. Unlike you I've backed up my "opinion" by pointing too the historical supply situation AGS with actual numbers and data, which do demonstrate concrete details about what could and couldn't be done on the AGS front. This is something you've singularly failed to do.

The Red Army had already committed significant reserves to the Moscow front before Typhoon commenced,

Which AGC destroyed. It was the reserves committed after the start of Typhoon which stopped and then threw it back. IATL, without Typhoon, those reserves get sent against AGS. Seriously, your showing a abject lack of knowledge about the chronology of Eastern Front operations and Soviet reserve commitments with this statement.

meaning that failure of AGC to advance in depth would have avoided a trap. AGS becomes the focal point, receiving at least 2nd Panzer army as reinforcements, plus enough infantry divisions to take and hold the Crimea in the fall and dominate the Sea of Azov. Use the Luftwaffe to destroy the Black Sea fleet and invade across Kerch towards Krasnodar. Establish rail heads to Kharkov and Rostov, and sea communications to the Azov ports and Crimea from Rumania via the Danube. With the pieces in place and no emergency gutting AGC, the AGS offensive could continue all winter.

Like all the historical German Eastern Front plans, this is filled with lofty objectives discussing what the Germans are supposed to do with zero consideration for how they are going to do it. How are the Germans going to establish railheads all the way out to Kharkov and Rostov when they couldn't even get any across the D'niepr during '41? The Luftwaffe couldn't destroy the Black Sea Fleet IOTL over the course of three years despite making maximum efforts to do so, how is it suddenly able to do so in a few months IATL? How are the Germans going to get supplies to the Azov ports when those ports are not operational and the shipping doesn't exist? How is Sevastopol going to fall faster then OTL when the Germans did commit large numbers of infantry backed up by specialist assault troops and siege artillery yet still took until mid-'42 to capture the fortress? How is AGS going to continue the offensive all winter with more forces on it's axis when it lacked the supply throughput even continue the offensive during the fall with less forces OTL? How is AGS going to handle the additional 1 million men and 2,000 tanks and aircraft the Soviets will be able to send against them?

Under your plan, do you have any particular reason why 2nd Panzer can't close the Bryansk pocket, then move to assist AGS at Kharkov in November, instead of advancing on Tula?
Same reason it shouldn't advance on Tula: it's too far. Even further then Tula, actually.
@ObssesedNuker ,your last post is pretty mangled with several duplicated paragraphs. you might want to clean it up,its somewhat confusing.

That was weird. Thanks for the heads up.

So under your plan 2nd Panzer sits there doing nothing in October while AGS struggles to take Kharkov 200km away? You're kidding, right?
So under your plan, 2nd Panzer blows it's strength even worse then the advance on Tula, not helping AGS any more in it's struggle to take Kharkov, and AGS collapses even worse then OTL trying to take objectives even further away with just-as-inadequate supply routes while the Soviets are able to send an additional million men and 2,000 tanks and aircraft against AGS? You're kidding right?
 
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Flatly wrong. Unlike you I've backed up my "opinion" by pointing too the historical supply situation AGS with actual numbers and data, which do demonstrate concrete details about what could and couldn't be done on the AGS front. This is something you've singularly failed to do.

As before, you have 2nd Panzer sitting 200km from Kharkov in late October twiddling its thumbs doing nothing while AGS struggles to take the city. You're kidding right?

So under your plan, 2nd Panzer blows it's strength even worse then the advance on Tula

2nd Panzer blows its strength advancing to help AGS pocket Russian forces around Kharkov, does it? You're kidding, right?

How are the Germans going to establish railheads all the way out to Kharkov and Rostov when they couldn't even get any across the D'niepr during '41?

As already stated, make AGS the focal point for the main offensive after Kiev and committing all the logistic resources on that front while AGC consolidates on its rail head at Smolensk. The German army did not have the resources to advance on two AG fronts in the fall of 1941. It had the resources to advance on one. So yes, build the rail heads to Kharkov and Rostov, take the Crimea with the forces to hold it, and establish SLOC from Rumania.

The Luftwaffe couldn't destroy the Black Sea Fleet IOTL over the course of three years despite making maximum efforts to do so

The Luftwaffe made a maximum effort in the Black Sea, did it?
 
As before, you have 2nd Panzer sitting 200km from Kharkov in late October twiddling its thumbs doing nothing while AGS struggles to take the city. You're kidding right?

You really don't have any clue about the actual distances involved on the Eastern Front, do you? Distance from 2nd Panzer Army's positions near Bryansk to Kharkov is ~380 kilometers, not 200. By comparison, the advance to Tula was ~230 kilometers. And this is not taking into the fact that there is no direct transport link connecting Bryansk to Kharkov, which requires 2nd Panzer Army detour through Orel and add another ~70 kilometers to it's (and it's inadequate supply support's) journey.

Perhaps you should contemplate why, despite having only 100 kilometers to go post-Kiev and a 3:1 numerical superiority over the remaining Soviet forces after the transfer of forces up to AGC had taken place, Army Group South still took until October 20th to make it to Kharkov and what that says about AGS's logistical situation.

2nd Panzer blows its strength advancing to help AGS pocket Russian forces around Kharkov, does it? You're kidding, right?

Yes. I mean, advancing around about the 100 kilometers shorter distance to Tula did the same so I don't see why that would suddenly change.

As already stated, make AGS the focal point for the main offensive after Kiev and committing all the logistic resources on that front while AGC consolidates on its rail head at Smolensk.

Which results in AGS collapsing much as AGC did but the Soviets now have more resources for their winter counter-offensive and are able to concentrate them against AGS.

The German army did not have the resources to advance on two AG fronts in the fall of 1941. It had the resources to advance on one.

Given that Army Group Center's advance collapsed catastrophically, that demonstrates the German army didn't have the resources to even advance on one front. As Martin Van Crewald pointed out, the dispersion of resources was necessitated by the infrastructure. Concentrating more effort over the existing road and rail nets was simply not feasible.

So yes, build the rail heads to Kharkov and Rostov, take the Crimea with the forces to hold it, and establish SLOC from Rumania.

The effect of German resources are conditional upon other issues. The inability to get railheads over the D'niepr came not from any lack of rail repair crews, but from the fact that the Soviets had so thoroughly demolished the rail bridges over the D'niepr so thoroughly that that is how long it would take for them to be rebuilt. So there is no way AGS can get railheads to Kharkov and Rostov unless you are positing the Nazis develop magic. Similarly, the October lack of supply throughput stemmed not from a lack of locomotives and rolling stock, but from the fact the rail network itself was so inadequate and German organization so poorly conceived that the entire thing became logjammed back in Poland, which is something no throwing additional resources at can really solve and indeed is more likely to increase the logjam. Inability to establish SLOC from Romania stemmed from the fact that no ports were operational east of Odessa and repairs took well into 1942 to sort out. And even the historical advances were conditional on the fact that the Soviets October and the vast bulk of their November reserves had to be committed to Moscow in order to respond to Operation Typhoon, which is not the case IATL.

Before blithely making assumptions that the issue is a mere commitment of resources, I recommend you actually do research into the logistical matters to see if that is really the case.

The Luftwaffe made a maximum effort in the Black Sea, did it?

Several, in 1941, '42, and even '43. The preponderance of the Luftwaffe's ground attack aircraft and bombers remainedon the Eastern Front throughout the war and the greatest concentration of those in 1942-43 were in the south. The Germans found they couldn't even fully secure the Black Sea despite the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet being laid up in the Caucasus ports in late-1942 with many of their crews conscripted into Naval Rifle Brigades and sent to the nearby fronts.
 
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More T-34's and KV-1's would have been quite a nasty surprise for the Germans. It was already quite a nasty surprise in OTL, since they had not much at hand which could destroy those tanks.

Well, this is a valid statement but the actual tank-related problems for the Red Army circa 1941 were not the number of tanks but:

(a) Inadequate repair and maintenance resources available for the mechanized units: they were well below the officially defined levels. The main reason was concentration of the limited production capacities upon the "final product". Production of the spare parts for the tanks, tractors (used by the military) and trucks had been minimal. The same goes for the specialists. By the early 1941 the mechanized units had a high percentage of personnel with 4 - 5 classes of education and a noticeable percentage of those not even speaking Russian well. A side issue was a questionable quality of the 1st T-34's: the model had a lot of design issues and very short period of time between the serious repairs (among other things, carburetor had something like 50 hours life span). Then there was a problem with the shells production: by the start of the war the tanks were seriously under-equipped with the armor-piercing shells. An extra year could (but not necessarily would) result in some improvement in all these areas and at least the non-com personnel (who, unlike the conscripts, served for a long time) could learn the new equipment.

(b) Serious flaws of the organization. The Red Army had a number of the huge mechanized corps units but they, unlike the German ones, did not have adequate composition of the tanks, self-propelled (or at least moved by the trucks/tractors) artillery and infantry units. They were mostly tanks, which made them extremely vulnerable to the combined arms and pretty much useless as far as reconnaissance and holding the ground was involved. The proper structure of the mechanized/tank corps was created only by the end of 1942.

(c) As everybody knows, the Red Army tactics circa 1941 was terrible both due to the wrong idea of the "tank war" (understood as "purely tanks") and due to the lack of experience (by the start of the war most of the tank crews in the border units had very limited experience). BTW, supposedly "invulnerable" T-34 and KV had been destroyed in the big numbers during the 1st weeks of the war. The story about "invulnerability" was based upon an assumption that the enemy would be shooting at the front armor but the Germans had been widely practicing attacks on the flanks and even their tank artillery (except for the light models) was adequate for breaking a side armor of T-34 (and even KV), breaking the treads, etc.: there are numerous photos demonstrating that fact. Statement that "they had not much at hand which could destroy those tanks" is based on a popular legend. In a reality, most of the Soviet armor, including numerous T-34s and KV had been destroyed in the battles near the border (and most of it was NOT destroyed by the German aviation: they simply did not have enough planes to do what the legend says they did :teary:). BTW, the German armor-piercing shells had been quite effective even against the front armor of T-34.
 
Perhaps you should contemplate why, despite having only 100 kilometers to go post-Kiev and a 3:1 numerical superiority over the remaining Soviet forces after the transfer of forces up to AGC had taken place, Army Group South still took until October 20th to make it to Kharkov and what that says about AGS's logistical situation.

The German army had the logistical capacity for one army group to attempt a deep operation after September 1941. In 1941 it attempted it on two fronts - Army Group Center and Army Group South. If AGC were to hold in place around Smolensk, the logistic resources could be diverted south to allow an advance with AGS into the winter of 1941-1942. If so, Rostov can be taken and held at a minimum and Stalingrad is not out of the question if the Germans were to get lucky.

The effect of German resources are conditional upon other issues. The inability to get railheads over the D'niepr came not from any lack of rail repair crews, but from the fact that the Soviets had so thoroughly demolished the rail bridges over the D'niepr so thoroughly that that is how long it would take for them to be rebuilt. So there is no way AGS can get railheads to Kharkov and Rostov...

Trans-shiping loads via barge across the river would certainly reduce the daily capacity of a rail head further east, but not eliminate all together. A similar problem to the point at the border where the European and Russian rail gauges met and all the train loads had to be offloaded and then reloaded.

Several, in 1941, '42, and even '43. The preponderance of the Luftwaffe's ground attack aircraft and bombers remainedon the Eastern Front throughout the war and the greatest concentration of those in 1942-43 were in the south. The Germans found they couldn't even fully secure the Black Sea despite the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet being laid up in the Caucasus ports in late-1942 with many of their crews conscripted into Naval Rifle Brigades and sent to the nearby fronts.

IMO, the proper move after the Kiev pocket was closed was to allow AGC a limited offensive followed by winter quarters around Smolensk, and to divert the mobile resources to AGS for an offensive to capture all of the Ukraine and possibly even Stalingrad during the winter of 1941/1942. As part of the process whereby AGS becomes the primary effort, the resources necessary to take and hold the Crimean peninsula in the fall of 1941 would be allocated, and then, with Axis domination of the Sea of Azov via airpower, SLOC would be established from Rumania via Crimea to the Sea of Azov ports, perhaps using Sealion assets not employed for Sealion. Between these three logistic solutions - concentration of mechanized resources of all fronts onto one army front, improved rail repair efforts, better employment of sea communications - the logistics problem could be overcome.

Nothing of the opinions that you've provided in response to this proposal alters this conclusion.
 
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The German army had the logistical capacity for one army group to attempt a deep operation after September 1941. In 1941 it attempted it on two fronts - Army Group Center and Army Group South. If AGC were to hold in place around Smolensk, the logistic resources could be diverted south to allow an advance with AGS into the winter of 1941-1942. If so, Rostov can be taken and held at a minimum and Stalingrad is not out of the question if the Germans were to get lucky.

This is wrong on both counts. AGS wasn't attempting to breakthrough enemy front in a deep operation... they were simply occupying land that the retreating Soviets were abandoning. Only in the center did the Germans launch a serious deep operation... and it failed catastrophically, with AGC overextended and subsequently smashed. So what the autumn of 1941 actually shows is that Germany did not have the logistical capacity for any army group to attempt a deep operation.

Trans-shiping loads via barge across the river would certainly reduce the daily capacity of a rail head further east, but not eliminate all together. A similar problem to the point at the border where the European and Russian rail gauges met and all the train loads had to be offloaded and then reloaded.

That was precisely what they tried. Problem was, firstly, they didn't have much in the way of trains capable of running on Soviet rails (only 2,000 locomotives were overrun, with the gross majority of those being already irreparably broken either from attack, sabotage, or just disrepair). The second problem was that it was a inefficient to start with and the poor German rail organization made it even worse. Then there's the problems on the western side of the D'niepr involving the lack of supporting infrastructure (the Germans ignored rebuilding the destroyed repair and supply depots for trains in favor of maximizing the mileage of track repaired) and the weakened railbeds (the Soviets tore up the rail beds as they retreated, ruining line capacity).

IMO, the proper move after the Kiev pocket was closed was to allow AGC a limited offensive followed by winter quarters around Smolensk, and to divert the mobile resources to AGS for an offensive to capture all of the Ukraine and possibly even Stalingrad during the winter of 1941/1942. As part of the process whereby AGS becomes the primary effort, the resources necessary to take and hold the Crimean peninsula in the fall of 1941 would be allocated, and then, with Axis domination of the Sea of Azov via airpower, SLOC would be established from Rumania via Crimea to the Sea of Azov ports, perhaps using Sealion assets not employed for Sealion. Between these three logistic solutions - concentration of mechanized resources of all fronts onto one army front, improved rail repair efforts, better employment of sea communications - the logistics problem could be overcome.

Again, nothing which addresses how the issues involved are solve. You can't simply say "German air power sinks the Black Sea Fleet, improve rail repair efforts, better employment of sea communications" and just assume it's possible... you have to describe how this is done, given the historical inability of German organization and resources to do a number of these tasks not only in 1941, but in '42 and '43 as well. Hell, even in 1944 the Germans were showing a inability to effectively organize and plan their logistics.

The root of these problems have little to do with resources and more to do with the cultural-organizational flaws in the German military command which denigrated logistical functions and handed thus largely handed the task over to less capable personnel that date all the way back to it's very foundation.

Nothing of the opinions that you've provided in response to this proposal alters this conclusion.

"Logistics are just opinion and don't matter" is a pretty OKH attitude, yeah. How did that turn out for them again?
 
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Also at what point do we agree that "the nazis do basically the opposite of everything they did and go against their originial nature, plans, and promises" isnt really a pod its more ASB

No just what happens if they follow the original possibilities - as out lined in the pre Hitler "TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ".


"Logistics are just opinion and don't matter" is a pretty OKH attitude, yeah. How did that turn out for them again?

My old man told me a joke that was going around his division in 1943.

"Who will win the war?"

"Germany will win with its superior will power"

" Russia with its superior numbers."

" America with its superior money"

Each side had its strengths and weaknesses , and ignoring these are your downfall.
 
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There are lots of old discussions on this subject in the post 1900 old threads. Look for the ones around 2010 with Wiking and Snake getting progressively madder at each other for maximum learning/entertainment ratio.
The arguments between Blair Witch and Snake Featherston were also classic. The arguments between Wiking and ObsessedNuker make me feel almost nostalgic.
 
This just makes me think of the last big sealion thread where the pro-lion folk just ignore reality and every point brought up against it to reiterate their singular talking point again and again... and lo and behold here is at least one of our favorite sealion players.
 
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