If Germany and the Soviet Union go to war first..what does France/Britain do?

Well aside from breath a collective sigh of relief...what would Britain/France do if the Nazis and Soviets got into a full blown war in the period 1937-39? This scenario also entails there being no D.O.W by France/Britain prior to war breaking between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Do Britain/France sit out the conflict and simply step up defence and war prep production?
What would the reaction be if the Axis or the Soviets start making large gains?
How does Japan/Italy/Poland react?
Who would have an edge-Axis or Soviets at this point?
What effect would it have on the ongoing civil war in Spain?

In terms of PODs its pretty tough but perhaps some dispute over Romania. Perhaps a more paranoid Stalin and an earlier Soviet attempt to annex Bessarabia with the Romanians actually resisting. It escalates into a full blown Soviet invasion which draws in Germany and things go from there...
 
Poor Poland its right between the two Great powers involved in a war, that never ends well. As for the UK's and France's response sit back and fully rearm sounds about right
 
The basic problem is that Germany and the USSR in 1937-9 do not have a common border. (If they get one through partition of Poland, well, that's OTL.) The OP suggests the war could come about as a result of a Soviet invasion of Romania--but Germany didn't have a border with Romania, either. OK, we assume the Hungarians let the Germans in (willingly or not) but it is hard to see this happening before 1939, and by then Stalin can and does get Bessarabia not by risking a war with Hitler but by agreement with him...
 
As David T noted - how are the beligerent sides supposed to fight one another without the shared border, even if we suppose that Germany is allied with Romania?
 
Poor Poland its right between the two Great powers involved in a war, that never ends well
I dunno, that depends. When Hitler carved up Czechoslovakia, he needed only to dangle a little Tešin to ensure Warsaw's full cooperation - just like promise of Southern Slovakia was enough to bring Hungarians onboard.
Assuming Hitler is willing to promise sizable gains in the East, it all might end quite well for Poland.
 
As David T noted - how are the beligerent sides supposed to fight one another without the shared border, even if we suppose that Germany is allied with Romania?

Germany has to step in to safeguard its oil source in Romania if the Soviets have escalated to full blown invasion. Without that oil all Hitler's future plans largely go up in smoke.
Is it not possible to coax the Hungarians into alliance with territorial adjustments regarding the Czechs or Romanian borders? Poland too could be influenced in such a manner I suppose. I mean in this scenario the Soviets are already being more aggressive than OTL so which will be seen as the bigger threat--Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union at that juncture?
 
As David T noted - how are the beligerent sides supposed to fight one another without the shared border, even if we suppose that Germany is allied with Romania?

If Germany and the Soviet Union focus on Poland first and invade at the same time what are the Entente supposed to do? Assuming tensions arise and Hitler wishes to smash the eastern beast first then we quite easily have our war between the two giants first.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
In terms of PODs its pretty tough but perhaps some dispute over Romania. Perhaps a more paranoid Stalin and an earlier Soviet attempt to annex Bessarabia with the Romanians actually resisting. It escalates into a full blown Soviet invasion which draws in Germany and things go from there...

How about a POD because of a conflict in the Baltic states? East Prussia had a common border with Lithuania, which - along with Latvia and Estonia - were obvious targets for both Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Germany.

If one side intervenes, and the other mounts a counter interventon, you have a shooting war in the Baltics in 1937-38 and the British and French can sit back and sell to whoever has hard currency. The Finns and Poles, obviously, are going to be under strong pressure to join one side or the other. Depending on when in 1937-38 this starts, the Austrians and Czechs may be able to play one side against the other, or they may already be under German occupation (full or partial). The ripples across Central and Eastern Europe are obvious.
 
If Germany and the Soviet Union focus on Poland first and invade at the same time what are the Entente supposed to do? Assuming tensions arise and Hitler wishes to smash the eastern beast first then we quite easily have our war between the two giants first.

Well, Germany and the USSR invaded Poland at about the same time in OTL (granted, the Soviets slightly later). A secret protocol to the Polish-British Common Defence Pact of August 25, 1939 had clearly distinguished between German and non-German aggression against Poland:

"In a secret protocol of the pact, the United Kingdom offered assistance in the case of an attack on Poland specifically by Germany,[3] while in the case of attack by other countries the parties were required to 'consult together on measures to be taken in common.'"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Polish_military_alliance

If Germany and the USSR both invade simulltaneously, the UK and France still go to war with Germany, not the USSR. In the unlikely event Germany and the USSR start fighting each other immediately after the double invasion, the UK and France continue the war with Germany--and with so many German troops having to be deployed in the East may actually launch an offensive against it. With a much better situation in the west than in OTL's June 22, 1941, they do not need to agree to an alliance with the USSR but they are not going to fight it, either (at least not immediately).
 
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How about Germany is rebuffed at the Munich Treaty - but Hitler retains power etc.

The Germans then look to Poland and invade in early 39 - This predates the escalation that predates the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol and so Russia is less reluctant about invading (with a potential war with Japan in the offing) and joins the Invasion on the same day as the Germans

This results in a reluctant Britain and France in declaring war on both Germany and Russia and so they impose sanctions on both and continue to rearm.

From this POD a situation arises where by accident or design they end up in a shooting war.

Britain and France look at each other....shrug and continue to rearm.
 

Marc

Donor
War over the Baltic Republics and/or Finland. Interesting tactical/strategic challenge for the Wehrmacht.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
War over the Baltic Republics and/or Finland. Interesting tactical/strategic challenge for the Wehrmacht.

The Germans do have East Prussia, which was fairly well developed in terms of ports, etc., which provides a supply line, albeit one open to interdiction - the German and Soviet navies and air forces facing off in the Baltic as they were in 1938 is an interesting comparison.

Depending on how the conflict came about, an alliance of convenience between Nazi Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on one side and the USSR and (presumably) "people's revolutionary" forces on the ground in one or more of the Baltic states would be possible, presumably. How the other Central and southeastern European states react, along with the Swedes, is an interesting question, before we even get to the French and British.
 
For what little its worth; played this out on the game board a few times. The assumption was no clear treaty between the USSR & Germany, or division of eastern Europe. Germany invades Poland on schedule with the assumption the USSR will be attacked in 1940. The Soviet leadership understanding this acts preemptively advancing west to 'support' the Poles. So the nazi/Bolshivik war starts in early to mid September 1939.

While the Red Army is much smaller in 1939 the German player had to to be very careful in the initial months. Not only is the German Army significantly smaller it lacks the experience of two campaigns and two extended 'workups' before the Eastern campaign of OTL. Trying to "blitzkrieg" across Poland & into the USSR in autumn weather can be catastrophic. The German player is best off going onto the strategic defense for the winter, with limited local counter attacks. A additional 50-60 divisions of reservists can be mobilized and trained, a logistics base for offensive operations established & the air force strength increased substantially.

Technically the Red Army has a larger starting number for force strength that the Germans, howeverassumptions about the previous purges a & doctrine reduce quality on the game board. Following the quality of training of the Red Army OTL expanding the 100+ divisions of October 1939 of OTL into 300, or even 200 is neither practical nor desirable. The Red player had a choice of trying to keep up a better quality ground force with parity in numbers, or expanding faster & diluting average unit combat power. In each iteration of the game the Red player chose to try expanding the ground forces from a bit over 100 divisions to 200. OTL Germany expanded from approx 80 to 150. Since the scenario did not exclude France from entering the war at its convenience a substantial force had to remain in the west on guard.

Lacking the considerable automotive transport noted from France & Netherlands the German player should be constrained in expansion of the Panzerwaffe & depth of operations. But, the game system did not reflect that, tho it did reflect a general lack of resources looted from the West 1940-41. Success for either side depended on the players skill and tactics. I felt the more logical course for the Red player was to fight a delaying action across Poland, the Baltic states and Ukraine.

Eventually it became stupid to not intervene with the French. The game we used had no mechanism for improving a French army that lasts to 1941. We improvised a bit & were conservative in the improvements. Neither was there a mechanism for perfidious British economic chicanery short of war. That one was debated some, but nothing implemented. Neither was the question of the effects of a unblocked Germany resolved. Even modestly improved French ground and air forces were fatal to a Wehrmacht fighting deep in the USSR. Berlin in 1943.
 
Here is a extract from Merkovs account of the mobilization of the Red Army from 1939. It give a snap shot of what the ground forces looked like & the possible expansion were the emergency of war to occur. I realize presenting a actual source is upsetting to many people here, but hey we can claim is all Stalinist BS right? Still I'm thinking this is better material than the History Channel or most web sites? I'm also pasting the Russian text (Roman alphabet) so folks can translate themselves.


Teper' sleduyet obratit'sya k organizatsionnomu razvitiyu sukhoputnykh voysk Krasnoy Armii, kotoryye k nachalu 1939 g. sostoyali iz 25 upravleniy strelkovykh korpusov, 98 strelkovykh diviziy, 5 strelkovykh brigad, 5 upravleniy kavaleriyskikh korpusov, 26 kavdiviziy, 4 upravleniy tankovykh korpusov, 24 legkikh, 4 tyazhelykh i 3 khimicheskikh tankovykh brigad1029. V pervoy polovine goda byli sformirovany upravleniya 31-go, 56-go i 59-go strelkovykh korpusov, 104-ya gornostrelkovaya diviziya, 1-ya, 4-ya i 5-ya otdel'nyye strelkovyye brigady.

Now we should turn to the organizational development of the ground forces of the Red Army, which by the beginning of 1939 consisted of 25 departments of rifle corps, 98 rifle divisions, 5 infantry brigades, 5 directorates of cavalry corps, 26 cavvises, 4 directorates of tank corps, 24 light, 4 heavy And 3 chemical tank brigades. In the first half of the year, the offices of the 31st, 56th and 59th Rifle Corps, the 104th Mountain Division, the 1st, 4th and 5th separate rifle brigades were formed.

Krome togo, sovetskoye voyennoye rukovodstvo razrabatyvalo novuyu sistemu mobilizatsionnogo razvertyvaniya voysk. 5 maya 1939 g. nachal'nik General'nogo shtaba komandarm 1 ranga B.M. Shaposhnikov predstavil narkomu oborony SSSR marshalu Sovetskogo Soyuza K.Ye. Voroshilovu doklad, v kotorom daval otsenku organizatsionnomu razvitiyu strelkovykh voysk v sootvetstvii s resheniyem Komiteta Oborony pri SNK SSSR ot 29 noyabrya 1937 g. Reorganizatsiya 1938 g. imela tsel'yu likvidirovat' sushchestvovavshuyu raznotipnost' strelkovykh diviziy, usilit' mobilizatsionnuyu gotovnost' kadrovykh prigranichnykh diviziy, obespechit' ravnomernyy pod"yem voyennoobyazannykh zapasa pri mobilizatsii mezhdu okrugami i sokratit' sroki mobilizatsionnogo razvertyvaniya voysk. Dlya etogo bylo sozdano chetyre tipa strelkovykh diviziy: 14 strelkovykh diviziy Dal'nego Vostoka (shtat 14 tys. chelovek), 37 kadrovykh strelkovykh diviziy (shtat 6 950 chelovek, v tom chisle 36-ya sd - 9 000), 10 kadrovykh gornostrelkovykh diviziy (shtat 4 000 chelovek) i 37 strelkovykh diviziy troynogo razvertyvaniya (shtat 5 220 chelovek), kazhdaya iz kotorykh po mobilizatsii razvertyvalas' v tri novyye strelkovyye divizii (vsego 111 diviziy). Krome togo, v kontse 1938 g. byli sformirovany Kamchatskaya i Sakhalinskaya strelkovyye divizii po tipu kadrovykh diviziy. Na voyennoye vremya bylo predusmotreno razvertyvaniye 172 strelkovykh diviziy.

In addition, the Soviet military leadership was developing a new system of mobilization deployment of troops. On May 5, 1939, the chief of the General Staff, commander of the 1st rank, B.M. Shaposhnikov presented the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov report, which assessed the organizational development of the rifle forces in accordance with the decision of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on November 29, 1937. The reorganization of 1938 was aimed at eliminating the existing diversity of infantry divisions, strengthening the mobilization readiness of personnel frontier divisions, ensuring an even rise in the military liable reserves When mobilizing between districts and to shorten the period of mobilization deployment of troops. For this purpose, four types of rifle divisions were created: 14 rifle divisions of the Far East (14,000 personnel), 37 cadre rifle divisions (6,950 personnel, including the 36th Sd-9,000), 10 cadre mountain divisions 4,000 people) and 37 rifle divisions of the triple deployment (5,220 personnel), each of which was deployed in mobilization to three new infantry divisions (a total of 111 divisions). In addition, at the end of 1938, the Kamchatka and Sakhalin rifle divisions were formed as personnel divisions. In the wartime, the deployment of 172 rifle divisions was envisaged.


At this point I don't have a map showing the distribution of these ground units. Bottom line is there were At least 14 full strength infantry divisions in the Far East & some 82 partial strength infantry divisions distributed across the USSR in the summer of 1939.

Odnako, podcherkivalos' v doklade, izmeneniye politicheskoy obstanovki v mire trebuyet usileniya boyevoy i mobilizatsionnoy gotovnosti nashikh strelkovykh voysk, uvelicheniya ikh kadrovogo sostava. Dlya etogo predlagalos' 14 strelkovykh diviziy Dal'nego Vostoka i 36-yu strelkovuyu diviziyu 57-go OSK ostavit' bez izmeneniy. 27 strelkovykh diviziy (s uchetom Kamchatskoy i Sakhalinskoy) perevesti na shtaty po 8 554 cheloveka, 9 strelkovykh diviziy ukreplennykh rayonov perevesti so shtata v 7 300 chelovek na shtat 8 878 chelovek. V doklade vyskazyvalos' pozhelaniye razvernut' vse 37 strelkovykh diviziy troynogo razvertyvaniya v ordinarnyye divizii po shtatu 4 tys. chelovek, chto trebovalo formirovaniya yeshche 74 strelkovykh diviziy. Odnako eto meropriyatiye trebovalo rasshireniya bazy i poka bylo nevozmozhno. V kachestve promezhutochnogo varianta predlagalos' uvelichit' shtat etikh diviziy s 5 220 do 7 854 chelovek, chto trebovalo 154 968 chelovek, iz kotorykh 132 tys. pokryvalos' putem rasformirovaniya stroitel'nykh batal'onov, soderzhavshikhsya za schet drugikh vedomstv{1030}. [332]

Izmeneniye sushchestvuyushchey sistemy mobilizatsionnogo razvertyvaniya strelkovykh voysk v sluchaye voyny obsuzhdalos' 16 iyulya 1939 g. na soveshchanii u narkoma oborony. Bylo predlozheno otkazat'sya ot soderzhaniya diviziy troynogo razvertyvaniya i razvernut' 106 strelkovykh diviziy, iz kotorykh 94 v mirnoye vremya soderzhalis' by po shtatu v 4 tys. chelovek, a 12 - po shtatu v 3 tys. chelovek. Chast' kadrovykh diviziy, v tom chisle i na Dal'nem Vostoke, sledovalo perevesti na 14-tysyachnyy shtat. Pomimo imevshikhsya 37 diviziy sledovalo sformirovat' i ustroit' mesta dislokatsii 69 diviziyam. Krome sushchestvovavshikh 30 upravleniy strelkovykh korpusov sledovalo sformirovat' yeshche 20 upravleniy. Takim obrazom, vse skrytyye, to yest' prednaznachennyye k razvertyvaniyu v sluchaye mobilizatsii divizii perevodilis' v otkrytyye. Tem samym sozdavalas' postoyannaya armiya, gotovaya k ispol'zovaniyu pri minimal'nom razvertyvanii. Provedeniye vsekh etikh meropriyatiy trebovalo dopolnitel'no 297 tys. chelovek, s uchetom kotorykh chislennost' armii prevysila by 2 mln chelovek{1031}.
The change in the existing system of mobilization deployment of small arms in the event of war was discussed on July 16, 1939 at a meeting with the People's Commissar of Defense. It was proposed to abandon the maintenance of the triple deployment divisions and deploy 106 infantry divisions, of which 94 in peacetime would be staffed by 4,000 men and 12 in the state of 3,000 men. Part of the personnel divisions, including in the Far East, should be transferred to a 14-thousand staff. In addition to the existing 37 divisions, it was necessary to form and arrange the deployment of 69 divisions. In addition to the existing 30 departments of the rifle corps, another 20 directorates were to be formed. Thus, all the hidden, that is, intended for deployment in case of mobilization of the division were transferred to the open. This created a permanent army, ready to use with minimal deployment. The carrying out of all these measures required an additional 297,000 people, taking into account the number of the army exceeding 2 million people

Sozdannaya po resheniyu GVS Komissiya po organizatsionnym meropriyatiyam pri NKO pod predsedatel'stvom zamestitelya narkoma oborony komandarma 1 ranga G.I. Kulika 27 iyulya 1939g. prinyala resheniye sozdat' na baze strelkovykh diviziy troynogo razvertyvaniya ordinarnyye strelkovyye divizii shtata 4 100 chelovek. Komissiya sdelala vyvod, chto vse voyennyye okruga mogut razmestit' novyye divizii, material'nykh zapasov takzhe khvatalo, poetomu k 1 noyabrya 1939 g. sledovalo pereyti na novuyu organizatsiyu strelkovykh voysk i k 1 maya 1940 g. podgotovit' novyye mobilizatsionnyye plany{1032}. Krome togo, obsuzhdalsya vopros o sokhranenii sushchestvovavshikh tankovykh korpusov. B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.I. Kulik i K.Ye. Voroshilov vyskazyvalis' za ikh likvidatsiyu, a S.K. Timoshenko, S.M. Budennyy i M.V.. Zakharov - za sokhraneniye, no s peresmotrom shtatnoy struktury. V itoge bylo prinyato kompromissnoye resheniye o rasformirovanii strelkovo-pulemetnykh brigad, no pri sokhranenii tankovykh korpusov dlya sovmestnykh deystviy s pekhotoy i kavaleriyey{1033}.



Created by the decision of the GVS, the Commission for Organizational Measures under the NCO under the chairmanship of the Deputy Commissar of Defense, Commander of the 1st Rank GI. Kulik July 27, 1939. Decided to create on the basis of rifle divisions a triple deployment of 4,1 100 regular rifle divisions of the state. The commission concluded that all military districts could deploy new divisions, there were enough supplies, and by November 1, 1939, it was necessary to switch over to a new organization of infantry troops and, by May 1, 1940, to prepare new mobilization plans {1032}. In addition, the question of preserving the existing tank corps was discussed. B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.I. Kulik and K.E. Voroshilov spoke out for their liquidation, and S.K. Tymoshenko, S.M. Budyonny and MV .. Zakharov - for preservation, but with a revision of the staff structure. As a result, a compromise decision was made to disband the infantry and machine-gun brigades, but with the preservation of the tank corps for joint operations with infantry and cavalry {1033}.



V sootvetstvii s prinyatym resheniyem 15 avgusta 1939g. narkom oborony otdal direktivy ?? 4/2/48601-4/2/4861 1 L VO, KalVO, MVO, OrVO, KHVO, PriVO, SKVO, UrVO, SibVO, BOVO i KOVO, soglasno kotorym im sledovalo s 25 avgusta po 1 dekabrya 1939g. sformirovat' 18 upravleniy strelkovykh korpusov, perevesti kadrovyye divizii na novyy shtat 8 900 chelovek i razverznut' 36 diviziy troynogo razvertyvaniya v 92 divizii po 6 000 chelovek{1034}. 22 avgusta narkom oborony dokladyval v TSK VKP(b) i SNK SSSR ob obespechennosti vooruzheniyem predlagayemykh organizatsionnykh meropriyatiy. S uchetom nalichiya vooruzheniya v neprikosnovennom zapase provodimyye meropriyatiya byli v tselom obespecheny po vintovkam, pulemetam, 82-mm minometam i 76-mm pushkam. Po samozaryadnym vintovkam, [333] 45-mm protivotankovym pushkam, 122-m.m gaubitsam i 76-mm zenitnym pushkam pokrytiye nekomplekta ozhidalos' v techeniye 1939 g. na osnovanii polucheniya ikh ot promyshlennosti, a potrebnost' po protivotankovym ruzh'yam, 12,7-mm stankovym pulemetam, 50-mm, 107-mm i 120-mm minometam, 152-mm gaubitsam, 37-mm i 45-mm zenitnym pushkam i avtomobilyam udovletvoryalas' postupleniyem ot promyshlennosti v 1939-1940gg. Narkom oborony prosil razreshit' ispol'zovat' neprikosnovennyy zapas, obyazat' promyshlennost' vypolnit' plan voyennykh zakazov na 1939g. i proizvesti dopolnitel'nyy zakaz na avtomobili{1035}.



In accordance with the decision taken August 15, 1939. The People's Commissar of Defense gave the directives ?? 4/2 / 48601-4 / 2/4861 1 LO, KalVO, MVO, OrVO, HVO, Privo, SKVO, UrVO, SibVO, BOVO and KOVO, according to which they should have been from August 25 to December 1, 1939. To form 18 departments of infantry corps, to transfer personnel divisions to a new staff of 8,900 people and to deploy 36 divisions of triple deployment into 92 divisions for 6,000 men {1034}. On August 22 the People's Commissar of Defense reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR about the supply of the proposed organizational arrangements with weapons. Given the availability of weapons in an untouchable stock, the measures taken were generally provided for rifles, machine guns, 82-mm mortars and 76-mm cannons. According to self-loading rifles, [333] 45-mm anti-tank guns, 122-m. Howitzer and 76-mm anti-aircraft guns, coating of the non-complete set was expected during 1939 on the basis of getting them from industry, and the need for anti-tank rifles, 12.7- Mm machine guns, 50-mm, 107-mm and 120-mm mortars, 152-mm howitzers, 37-mm and 45-mm antiaircraft guns and cars were satisfied with the receipt from industry in 1939-1940. The People's Commissar of Defense asked to be allowed to use untapped stock, to oblige the industry to fulfill the plan of military orders for 1939. And make an additional order for cars {1035}.



1 sentyabrya 1939 g. Politbyuro utverdilo predlozheniye Narkomata oborony, soglasno kotoromu v Krasnoy Armii predusmatrivalos' krome 51 ordinarnoy strelkovoy divizii (33 strelkovyye divizii po 8 900 chelovek kazhdaya, 17 strelkovykh diviziy po 14 000 chelovek kazhdaya i 1 strelkovaya diviziya v 12 tys. chelovek) imet' 76 ordinarnykh strelkovykh diviziy po 6 000 chelovek, 13 gornostrelkovykh diviziy i 33 ordinarnyye strelkovyye divizii po 3 000 chelovek{1036}. Sootvetstvenno 2 sentyabrya 1939 g. bylo prinyato postanovleniye SNK ? 1355-279ss, utverdivsheye "Plan reorganizatsii sukhoputnykh sil Krasnoy Armii na 1939-1940 gg." Bylo resheno divizii troynogo razvertyvaniya perevesti v ordinarnyye i imet' v Krasnoy Armii 173 strelkovyye divizii. Predlagalos' uvelichit' udarnuyu silu pekhotnogo yadra v strelkovykh diviziyakh, uvelichit' kolichestvo korpusnoy artillerii i artillerii RGK, perevedya yeye s troynogo na dvoynoye razvertyvaniye. Sledovalo rasformirovat' 4 kavaleriyskiye divizii i 2 otdel'nyye kavaleriyskiye brigady, v tankovykh voyskakh rasformirovyvalis' strelkovo-pulemetnyye brigady v tankovykh korpusakh i strelkovo-pulemetnyye batal'ony v tankovykh brigadakh (sm. Prilozheniya 1-4). Sledovalo sokratit' chislennost' obsluzhivayushchikh i tylovykh chastey i uchrezhdeniy. Shtatnaya chislennost' Krasnoy Armii byla ustanovlena v 2 265 tys. chelovek{1037}.



On September 1, 1939, the Politburo approved the proposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense, according to which the Red Army provided for only 51 infantry divisions (33 infantry divisions of 8,900 each, 17 infantry divisions of 14,000 men each and 1 infantry division of 12,000 men) Have 76 ordinary rifle divisions for 6,000 men, 13 mountain rifle divisions and 33 ordinary rifle divisions for 3,000 men {1036}. Accordingly, September 2, 1939 was adopted by the Council of the Council of People's Commissars? 1355-279ss, which approved the "Plan for the reorganization of the land forces of the Red Army in 1939-1940." It was decided to divide the triple deployment divisions into ordinary ones and have 173 rifle divisions in the Red Army. It was proposed to increase the impact strength of the infantry core in rifle divisions, to increase the number of artillery and artillery of the RGC, moving it from a triple to double deployment. Four cavalry divisions and two separate cavalry brigades were to be disbanded, armored machine-gun brigades in tank corps and rifle and machine-gun battalions in tank brigades disbanded in tank units (see Appendices 1-4). It was necessary to reduce the number of servicing and logistics units and institutions. The regular strength of the Red Army was established at 2,265 thousand people {1037}.



Odnako razvitiye mezhdunarodnoy obstanovki v nachale sentyabrya 1939 g. privelo k tomu, chto v noch' na 7 sentyabrya bylo prinyato resheniye provesti chastichnuyu mobilizatsiyu Krasnoy Armii, i voyska poluchili prikaz nachat' "Bol'shiye uchebnyye sbory" (BUS). Soglasno direktive narkoma oborony ? 2/1/50698 ot 20 maya 1939g. nazvaniye BUS yavlyalos' shifrovannym oboznacheniyem skrytoy mobilizatsii. Provedeniye BUS po literu "A" oznachalo, chto proiskhodilo razvertyvaniye otdel'nykh chastey, imevshikh srok gotovnosti do 10 dney, s tylami po shtatam voyennogo vremeni. Zapasnyye chasti i formirovaniya grazhdanskikh vedomstv po BUS ne podnimalis'. Sama mobilizatsiya prokhodila v usloviyakh maksimal'nogo sokhraneniya etikh meropriyatiy v tayne{1038}.



However, the development of the international situation in early September 1939 led to the decision to conduct a partial mobilization of the Red Army on the night of September 7, and the troops were ordered to launch the "Great Training Fees" (BUC). According to the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense? 2/1/50698 dated May 20, 1939. The name of the BUS was an encrypted designation of hidden mobilization. Carrying out the BUS by letter "A" meant that the deployment of separate units that had a period of readiness of up to 10 days, with rear in wartime states. Spare parts and formations of civilian departments for the WCO were not raised. The very mobilization took place in conditions of maximum preservation of these events in a secret {1038}.



V "Bol'shikh uchebnykh sborakh" prinyali uchastiye v MVO upravleniya 2 strelkovykh korpusa, 12 strelkovykh diviziy, 1 korpus PVO, 3 tankovyye brigady; v BOVO- 6 strelkovykh korpusov, [334] 19 strelkovykh diviziy, 2 kavaleriyskikh korpusa, 6 kavaleriyskikh diviziy, 1 tankovyy korpus, 8 tankovykh brigad, 1 motostrelkovaya brigada, 4 polka PVO, 2 gaubichnykh artilleriyskikh polka RGK; v L VO - 4 strelkovykh korpusa, 16 strelkovykh diviziy, 1 tankovyy korpus, 6 tankovykh brigad, 1 kavdiviziya, 1 vozdushno-desantnaya brigada, 2 artpolka RGK; v KOVO - 5 strelkovykh korpusov, 18 strelkovykh diviziy, 2 kavaleriyskikh korpusa, 5 kavdiviziy, 6 tankovykh i 1 motostrelkovaya brigady, 1 tankovyy korpus; v KalVO - 2 strelkovykh korpusa, 4 strelkovyye divizii, 1 tankovaya brigada; KHVO - 1 strelkovyy korpus, 15 strelkovykh diviziy; OrVO- 1 strelkovyy korpus, 9 strelkovykh diviziy. Vsego - upravleniya 21 strelkovogo, 4 kavaleriyskikh i 3 tankovykh korpusov, 93 strelkovyye i 12 kavaleriyskikh diviziy, 24 tankovyye, 3 pulemetno-strelkovyye i 1 vozdushno-desantnaya brigady{1039}.



In the "Great training camps" took part in the MVO of the management of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle divisions, 1 air defense corps, 3 tank brigades; 6 infantry corps, 6 cavalry divisions, 1 tank corps, 8 tank brigades, 1 motorized rifle brigade, 4 air defense regiments, 2 RGK artillery regiments; In the VO - 4 rifle corps, 16 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 6 tank brigades, 1 cavalry division, 1 airborne brigade, 2 artillery regiments of the RGC; In KOVO - 5 rifle corps, 18 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry corps, 5 Cavalry Division, 6 tank and 1 motorized rifle brigade, 1 tank corps; In KalVO - 2 rifle corps, 4 rifle divisions, 1 tank brigade; HVO - 1 rifle corps, 15 rifle divisions; OrVO-1 rifle corps, 9 rifle divisions. In total, there are 21 rifle, 4 cavalry and 3 tank corps, 93 rifle and 12 cavalry divisions, 24 tank, 3 machine-gun and 1 airborne brigade {1039}.
 
It's not hard to imagine Western Europe being afraid of Communist expansion if the Soviets are the aggressors. Britain in OTL had very real fears of a Soviet Invasion of Iran, threatening their oil supply in the Middle East, which may make them more inclined to get involved than France. I feel both sides would stay neutral stay neutral at first, but if it becomes apparent that Germany could fall to communism they'd likely get involved.
 
But why should France and Britain intervene on the Soviet side in a German-Soviet war? As much as the WAllies dislike Hitler, they are anticommunists to the core, so I don't think they would want to sabotage the destruction of the Soviet Union.
 
... As much as the WAllies dislike Hitler, they are anticommunists to the core, so I don't think they would want to sabotage the destruction of the Soviet Union.

Actually no. Chamberlains government had some hardcore anti Bolsheviks, who undercut the alliance talks in the spring or summer of 1939, but others thought a anti German alliance & got Brit participation in the Soviet/French alliance negotiations. France had its right-wingers in Dalliers & Renauds governments as well. But, the French governments of the 1920s & 1930s had consistently seen Germany as the primary threat to French power & prosperity. A Germany that dominated eastern Europe was a terrifying vision to those who believed it was possible. Thats one reason why the French were willing to talk to the Soviet representatives in 1939, and its the reason why France was willing to go to war against Germany in September 1939. Similarly Churchill understood the nazis were the first threat to European peace and British power. He did not like the Communists either, but understood the difference between their long term and the facist German near therm threat. Beyond that both France and Britain had strong centrist and leftist parties that were not "anticommunists to the core".

If Germany is stalemated or defeated by the Red Army thats a circumstance neither Britain or France might join the war. But, a victorious Germany would be a worse problem than the distant USSR. In broad strategic terms the pair has every incentive to help a losing USSR vs Germany. A second incentive is to take control of Germany themselves & ensure governments they control are installed, vs a continuing nazi government, or the Communist installing their government to the Rhine.
 
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...shame both sides can’t lose...

French strategy as outlined from the late 1920s was to conduct economic warfare, and limited low cost offensives until German economic, morale, and military collapse occurred. They'd have been happy to continue preparing for a killing blow while the Communists and Facists attrition their armies away. The main point would be to strike before the Germans can recover any advantage & gain any strength.

Churchill was not the only Brit advocate or preriphrial strategies. Chamberlain or any other PM is likely to endorse a strategy of consolidating Brit power around the edges until its time to finish off facist Germany. The main danger to the Allies is miscalculating when to strike and when to stand by. OTL the Soviet expectation was they might intervene in 1942 when a German collapse was expected. The French defeat in 1940 was a surprise that bankrupted everyones strategy.
 
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