If Doenitz had his 300 U-Booats after the Fall of France?

I'm jumping in having not re-read the OP properly and not even skimming through any of the replies.

One way this might (and its only might) work is if in the Spring of 1939 the Kriegsmarine can see that marching into Prague and the planned move against Poland has made war with Britain and France inevitable. Therefore they abandon plan Z instead of ordering 6 H class battleships and 3 O class battle cruisers between (IIRC) April and August 1939. Instead go all out for building U-boats. AFAIK all the material ordered was eventually used for U-boat construction anyway. However, this way you might speed the construction of U-boats up by 6 months.
 
OK the paper was published in 1957 by some KM naval engineers who participated in the war; naval construction and planning . They were their- they know what they were talking about.

OK I will give my take on what these figures might mean.

1934
Pzsch D [16 months inc]
Pzsch E [16 months inc]

1935
BC Scharnhorst [16 months hull + 27 months ]
BC Gneisenau [19 months hull + 17 months]
K Hipper [19 months hull + 26 months ]
K Blucher [22 months hull + 26 months ]

1936
T Dithmarschen [12 months hull + 25 months]
T Nordmark [14 months hull + 15 months]
T Uckermark [17 months hull + 21 months]
BB Bismarck [31 months hull + 18 months ]
BB Tirpitz [30 months hull + 22 months ]
CV Graf Zeppelin [24 months hull + 1940-43 inc ]
K Prinz Eugen [28 months hull + 24 months ]
K Seydlitz [25 months hull + inc 95% 1942]

1937-1940
K Lutzow [23 months hull + sold 1940 with all material to complete.]
T Franken [18 months hull + 1943]
T Ermland [2 years hull + 1 year]

1938-1940
CV Peter Strauss [~2 years inc]
Kreuzer M[ 1-2 years inc]
Kreuzer N [ 1-2 years inc]
T Haverland [2 years hull + ? inc]

1939-1941
Battleship H [28 months inc]
Battleship J [26 months inc]

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/index.html

http://navypedia.org/ships/germany/ger_index.htm
 
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You're still avoiding the fact that the facilities (i.e. the slipways and other areas needed to construct submarines) didn't exist. And as another poster has said, one ton of battle cruiser doesn't equal one ton of u-boat or even close.

300 u-boats or even an extra [random number] just wasn't possible.
 

trajen777

Banned
The itialian navy had 117 subs in1939, 82 were ocean going. Let's say be treaty and joint planning the navy folloewed the german policy of attacking on the surface. Thereby the designs would increase surface speed, crash dive speed, and reduce the size of the sub. With these factors (throw in japanese torpedoes) and perhaps german training, or working plans, and you just added a quick increase towards the 300 goal. Now add in the 81 french ocean going subs ( lest say u get 40) by treaty. And then you would get 41 german uboats --- 81 itialian subs -- and after training crews 41 french boats equal 163 boats without any production increases. Now scratch the 7 german cap ships and replace with 45 u boats and ur up to 208


Good article on itialian sub policy .....
The technical and performance limitations of Italian submarines operating in the northern Atlantic waters were becoming quite obvious by the spring of 41. Italian submarines were for the most part larger than their German counterparts, making them easier to detect and or fall under attack by the Allies. Italian doctrine on submarine warfare had generally called for their subs to operate beneath the surface while engaging a vessel. The initial torpedo attack would come while submerged, and then the sub could rise to the surface to finish off the target if applicable. Longer periscopes were essential to fit this type of submerged warfare, thus a larger conning tower was required on Italian submarines in comparison to the German U-Boats. In contrast, German submarines would mostly engage their targets while on the surface, hence their subs were designed to give as little of a silhouette as possible. This accounted for some of the greater profile and larger size Italian subs had when viewed against their Axis partner, but finer overall engineering and design by the Germans must be recognized when directly comparing the two fleets. Italian subs also took longer to complete an emergency dive, which of course being able to conduct a quick escape is a very valuable asset when attempting to avoid a surface attack or engagement. Again, the submarines of the Regia Marina were built to match Italian doctrine of attacking below the waves, not necessarily designed to make a quick retreat after an initial engagement. This led to less emphasis or focuses on that ability in the design and production of Italian submarines by their engineers, and in turn was a key component in the construction of German subs. Also, an additional shortcoming for the Regia Marina was the fact that their submarines could not match the speed, submerged or while on the surface, of the German U Boats.
 
This is saying that starting in 1934 or so, in five years, the German shipbuilding industry will build 375 more (75/year) submarines than they did OTL can hire enough people do this and start from a situation where no submarines have been built for 16 years so the skill base for this is greatly depleted. Prewar building a Gato class submarine in the USA took roughly 13 months from start to commissioning. Let's assume because the type VII was smaller and had less complex auxiliary machinery (like air conditioning) let us assume under peacetime conditions and also restarting submarine building from zero it would take 7 months on the slipway, the rest of the pre-commissioning fitting out is in the water. This means you need roughly 50 slipways to build 75 submarines a year, as well as the space and equipment needed to fit out the submarines.

I will assume that not building those 9 large ships will give you enough steel, copper, and whatever other RAW materials you need to build the 375 submarines. But this gives you hulls. You need the optics for all those periscopes, which means many, many more optics than for the rangefinders aboard those 9 ships. You need one or two radio sets for each submarine, even if you have 10 radios per large ship (you don't) this means 660 more radios. 375 submarines will require more precision gauges than 9 large ships. 375 U-boats mean 375 deck guns, yes smaller than the main guns on the big ships but it is still 375 "extra"guns" The list goes on and on - it is not just a question of steel.

Germany will need, beginning in 1934, to build all those slipways they don't have. This means that in order to build 375 submarines by September 1939 you'll be building at a rate of 100/year at some point because you won't be building 75/year from the get-go. remember this is on top of small coastal and training submarines Germany must build.

Having a stack of steel, copper, cables, and so forth does not a submarine build. Having foundries and plants does not an armaments industry make - you need to retool and build new production lines. Without the large surface ships, Germany certainly could have built many more submarines, although not 375. As I have previously posted, you need to train a large number of sailors and build a shore establishment to manage this - a nontrivial exercise. Others have pointed out how a massive U-boat building campaign would have resulted in a British response. Finally, if the Germans do not have a significant surface fleet (nothing larger than destroyers) the RN basically has complete freedom to use their capital ships where they want to (no fleet in being) and in the run up to the war will be building more destroyers/escorts.

I'm just going to quote this post, which covers why any major u-boat build couldn't take place and then duck out for a bit.
 
The itialian navy had 117 subs in1939, 82 were ocean going. Let's say be treaty and joint planning the navy folloewed the german policy of attacking on the surface. Thereby the designs would increase surface speed, crash dive speed, and reduce the size of the sub. With these factors (throw in japanese torpedoes) and perhaps german training, or working plans, and you just added a quick increase towards the 300 goal. Now add in the 81 french ocean going subs ( lest say u get 40) by treaty. And then you would get 41 german uboats --- 81 itialian subs -- and after training crews 41 french boats equal 163 boats without any production increases. Now scratch the 7 german cap ships and replace with 45 u boats and ur up to 208


Good article on itialian sub policy .....
The technical and performance limitations of Italian submarines operating in the northern Atlantic waters were becoming quite obvious by the spring of 41. Italian submarines were for the most part larger than their German counterparts, making them easier to detect and or fall under attack by the Allies. Italian doctrine on submarine warfare had generally called for their subs to operate beneath the surface while engaging a vessel. The initial torpedo attack would come while submerged, and then the sub could rise to the surface to finish off the target if applicable. Longer periscopes were essential to fit this type of submerged warfare, thus a larger conning tower was required on Italian submarines in comparison to the German U-Boats. In contrast, German submarines would mostly engage their targets while on the surface, hence their subs were designed to give as little of a silhouette as possible. This accounted for some of the greater profile and larger size Italian subs had when viewed against their Axis partner, but finer overall engineering and design by the Germans must be recognized when directly comparing the two fleets. Italian subs also took longer to complete an emergency dive, which of course being able to conduct a quick escape is a very valuable asset when attempting to avoid a surface attack or engagement. Again, the submarines of the Regia Marina were built to match Italian doctrine of attacking below the waves, not necessarily designed to make a quick retreat after an initial engagement. This led to less emphasis or focuses on that ability in the design and production of Italian submarines by their engineers, and in turn was a key component in the construction of German subs. Also, an additional shortcoming for the Regia Marina was the fact that their submarines could not match the speed, submerged or while on the surface, of the German U Boats.

From July 1940 - those 81 Italian and a lot of those 81 French (Vichy) boats were already counted among the enemies of the King!

Italian boats operating in the Med (and at one point equalling the number of U-boats operating from French bases in the Atlantic) and french Subs operating from Vichy French Bases around the world - granted the French vessels were not generally attacking the Allies except when the Brits were attacking them but I'm not sure how useful those French boats would have been what with the source of supplies greatly reduced etc.
 

Redbeard

Banned
OK the paper was published in 1957 by some KM naval engineers who participated in the war; naval construction and planning . They were their- they know what they were talking about.

OK I will give my take on what these figures might mean.

1934
Pzsch D [16 months inc]
Pzsch E [16 months inc]

1935
BC Scharnhorst [16 months hull + 27 months ]
BC Gneisenau [19 months hull + 17 months]
K Hipper [19 months hull + 26 months ]
K Blucher [22 months hull + 26 months ]

1936
T Dithmarschen [12 months hull + 25 months]
T Nordmark [14 months hull + 15 months]
T Uckermark [17 months hull + 21 months]
BB Bismarck [31 months hull + 18 months ]
BB Tirpitz [30 months hull + 22 months ]
CV Graf Zeppelin [24 months hull + 1940-43 inc ]
K Prinz Eugen [28 months hull + 24 months ]
K Seydlitz [25 months hull + inc 95% 1942]

1937-1940
K Lutzow [23 months hull + sold 1940 with all material to complete.]
T Franken [18 months hull + 1943]
T Ermland [2 years hull + 1 year]

1938-1940
CV Peter Strauss [~2 years inc]
Kreuzer M[ 1-2 years inc]
Kreuzer N [ 1-2 years inc]
T Haverland [2 years hull + ? inc]

1939-1941
Battleship H [28 months inc]
Battleship J [26 months inc]

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/index.html

http://navypedia.org/ships/germany/ger_index.htm

This is planning Gamelin style - ie. expecting the enemy to be a constant and not someone actually watching you and acting accordingly.

A U-boat programme just slightly larger than the OTL one (ie. more than the Anglo-German Naval Agreement allowed) will mean "Game Over" for Hitler. Either he will be fed to the French first time he tries to go for a another loot, or if he doesn't go for a loot, be eaten by his own because they think he is just a poor sissy.

Next, building that many U-Boats and having no ship larger than a light cruiser will be absolutely stupid seen from late 1930s Germany. All those u-boats will only be good if and when France has fallen, and seen from before May 1940 such a one-sided navy would be compared to interior decorating your dream palace even before you have had your first paycheck. The Germans will not even be capable of invading Norway and still not in control of the French iron mines (which to a large degree made the access to Swedish iron shipped through Norwegian waters superflous) that makes the plane even more stupid seen from before May 1940.

And finally, as others have well pointed out, it still wouldn't be possible to build, man and operate that many Uboats in that time - no matter that a lot of Germans in the decades following WWII had a lot of more or less creative versions of: "How we could have won the war if that plebian amateur Hitler hadn't fucked it all up!"
 

Redbeard

Banned
But all this of course doesn't necessarily say that building the capital ships was the best plan. But instead of subs I would not even suggest more tanks or guns in the first instance - much too dangerous in the early years. Instead invest heavily in educating engineers and skilled workers, build even more industrial infrastructure - power stations, railways and factories - and stock critical resources. Have plans ready of how to transform "nice to" peace time industry into "need to" war time industry. Announce a "New living room furniture for all families" programme and secretly plan to have all the joiners start gluing together wooden planes when the code: "Der Tisch der Tante muss fliegen" is transmitted in a broadcast... (OK, OK - a bit silly, but it would have been fun :), and it almost happened in UK ).

The resources from a few battleships and heavy cruisers will not necessarily be decisive but if the Germans are practically able to go to war economy earlier that might be decisive. How many extra AT guns would be needed in the Romanian army for it to stand its ground when the Red Army cut off the 6th Army in Stalingrad? I'll guess that just a single turret from Bismarck would pay enough.

Anyway, the most certain consequence might be in the Med and in the Far East. With the RN less pressed in the North Atlantic more can be focused in the Med and in the Far East. That might have the Italians think once again about joining the war in 1940 and if they still do the war in NA might be shorter. Which BTW also means less German resources wasted to bail out the Italians from their misery. More British resources allocated to Malaya in 1941 will make a Japanese succes at Singapore nigh on impossible.
 
According to figures I have the Germans ordered exactly 100 U-boats between 20th June 1934 and 9th June 1938. Then they ordered 18 in January 1939 including 4 Type XI boats that were cancelled and didn't order any more until 7th August 1939 when 14 were ordered. That's a grand total of 130 after the 4 cancelled boats were deleted. 163 additional U-boats were ordered in September and October 1939. That's a grand total of 293 U-boats if the 4 Type XI are deducted, not far off the 300 U-boats.

In the meantime the Germans ordered 2 H class battleships in April 1939, 4 H class battleships in May 1939 and 3 O class battle cruisers in August 1939. Only the battleships H and J had been laid down but according to M.J. Whitley in German Capital Ships of World War II, by the outbreak of World War II:
  • Battleship H: had some 766 tonnes worked into her on the slip way and 28,400 tonnes were ordered, delivered or in work in the slips;
  • Battleship J: had some 40 tonnes worked into her on the slip way and 18,300 tonnes were ordered, delivered or in work in the slips;
  • Battleship K: had some 35,735 tonnes in progress, although she had not been laid down.
While others have pointed out (and after reading this will again without acknowledging my caveats) that one ton of capital ship does not equal one ton of submarine they should not have ordered these ships and instead ordered at least a portion the U-boat orders placed in September and October 1939 instead. This is because I think war with Britain and France became inevitable after the Germans occupied the Czech rump state in March 1939 and sooner rather than later. Therefore there was no chance of completing Plan Z and the Kriegsmarine should have concentrated its resources on completing the big ships that were already under construction and building as U-boats as possible as quickly as possible.

Others will also jump in at this point and declare that the British Admiralty would spontaneously order hundreds of corvettes when they heard about what the Germans were up to. The Admiralty would without question want to do that. However, there was a considerable difference between what the Admiralty would want to do and what the capacity of British industry would allow them to do.

The British had effectively put themselves on a war footing between Munich and the Germans marching into Prague. For example between March and September 1939 the Cabinet had abolished financial controls on the armed forces, introduced conscription and authorised the doubling of the Territorial Army from 12 to 24 infantry divisions, with IIRC the goal of increasing the armies of the British Empire and Commonwealth to the equivalent of 55 divisions by the end of 1941.

It had also put in hand a big expansion of the Royal Navy's trade protection forces. Between April and September 1939 the Admiralty had placed orders for 120 A/S vessels consisting of 16 fleet destroyers (8 M and 8 N class), 20 Hunt class escort destroyers, 4 Black Swan class sloops (including 2 for India), 20 Bangor class fleet minesweepers and 60 Flower class corvettes (including 4 ordered for France). At the outbreak of war they ordered another 16 fleet destroyers (O and P class), 36 Hunt class, 60 Flower class corvettes (including 10 built in Canada) and 16 Bangor class fleet minesweepers, for a grand total of 128 A/S vessels.

The Germans can transfer the resources put into the 9 capital ships ordered in the last 6 months of peace into building more U-boats. It would be harder for the British to bring the orders for AS craft placed in September 1939 forward by the same amount of time.
 
A U-boat programme just slightly larger than the OTL one (ie. more than the Anglo-German Naval Agreement allowed) will mean "Game Over" for Hitler. Either he will be fed to the French first time he tries to go for a another loot,

The French made virtually no attempt to "eat" him in September 1939, even though war had been declared and the vast bulk of the German army was fighting in Poland.

or if he doesn't go for a loot, be eaten by his own because they think he is just a poor sissy.

After their experiences in WWI the German people opposed another war. Even the generals urged restraint e.g. in 1938 due to strong Czech defenses.

Next, building that many U-Boats and having no ship larger than a light cruiser will be absolutely stupid seen from late 1930s Germany. All those u-boats will only be good if and when France has fallen,

U-boats sank quite a bit of tonnage in WWI without Biscay or Norweigian bases.
 
I don't know exactly but I think that 300 submarines would be equal to 2-3 Panzer Divisions (anyone that knows more can say if that is correct?)

So, if he manages to convince Hitler that they need to win the BoB in the water, what would be the effects of such decision? I think that IF they won in Britain the subs can be melted to tanks in 6 months-1 year
I'm interpreting that as Raeder persuading Hitler to build more U-boats somewhere between June and September 1940.

As related in an earlier post 297 U-boats were ordered between 20th July 1934 and 30th October 1939. Another 184 were ordered between 23rd December 1939 and 15th August 1940 bringing the grand total ordered to 481 (including 100 ordered in August 1940) although 6 of these were cancelled. The next cluster of orders was November to January 1941 when 122 were ordered including 70 on 20th January 1941, which brought the total ordered to 603.

If the Germans did bring the 134 U-boats ordered August to October 1939 forward by 6 months instead of the 9 battleships and it was possible to actually build them 6 moths earlier too then the shipyard capacity to bring the subsequent orders forward by 6 months becomes possible too. The British can't automatically do the same because their shipyards were full anyway.

I admit that it's not as simple as that, but I do contend that the Germans could have built more U-boats if they did not have their "Battleship interlude" of about 6 months in 1939. Furthermore I also contend that British industrial resources prevented them from responding to an increase in German U-boat production by building more AS vessels at will. They couldn't build them in the quantities the required in the first half of the war IOTL.
 
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Redbeard

Banned
The French made virtually no attempt to "eat" him in September 1939, even though war had been declared and the vast bulk of the German army was fighting in Poland.



After their experiences in WWI the German people opposed another war. Even the generals urged restraint e.g. in 1938 due to strong Czech defenses.



U-boats sank quite a bit of tonnage in WWI without Biscay or Norweigian bases.

Pls go and read up on the events from the reoccupation of tbe Rhineland to Munich. The French wanted a tough no-tolerance line towards the Germans, but were nit supported by the British - who felt that their interests were not seriously endangered after the Anglo-.German Naval agreement of 1935.

Next go and read on how and why Hitler gained power. The Germans felt hugely humiliated after WWI and eagerly supported a figure like Hitler who offered them satisfaction. Had he not re-occupied the Rhineland, had he not offered some kind of solution to the problem of millions of Germans being surpressed in Czeckoslovakia - he would have been ridiculed and disposed of by his own.

We are used to seing Munich etc. from a point view knowing what happened afterwards - Endlösung etc. - but seen from 1938 there actually was a relatively legitimate German case of liberating millions of Germans from foreign surpression. He had almost 100 % support from the German people in that and widespread support outside. It is true that the French and British declaration of war in September 1939 came as a surprise to many, not at least in leading German circles, but how on earth, if you are at all in contact with the real world, can you overlook how loyally the German people supported Hitler to the end?

Next about U-boats without French or Norwegian bases - do you seriously try to claim that the U-Boats, be they 100, 300 or a trizillion, would be a real threat in the Atlantic if they had to exit through the North Sea or British Channel?

Could we please get some real opposition!
 
Remember in WWI SONAR/ASDIC did not exist. Using hydrophones you could listen for a sub but this was pretty iffy. For much of the wat the limitations on aircraft meant that the risk to a sub even if caught on the surface was limited - radios only so-so, and capacity of patrol aircraft to carry depth charges or damaging munitions was small. So in WWI sending subs through North Sea or Channel choke points was a very acceptable risk. Given the advances in ASW and aviation technology sending U-Boats through those choke points is unacceptable. Later on in the war, even the Bay of Biscay was dangerous enough to make U-boats stay underwater in the daytime.
 
Pls go and read up on the events from the reoccupation of tbe Rhineland to Munich. The French wanted a tough no-tolerance line towards the Germans, but were nit supported by the British - who felt that their interests were not seriously endangered after the Anglo-.German Naval agreement of 1935.

They must have expected the British to do the fighting. :) For a "tough no tolerance" nation, France was remarkably passive in September 1939--even though war was then declared and they had Britain on their side.

Next go and read on how and why Hitler gained power. The Germans felt hugely humiliated after WWI and eagerly supported a figure like Hitler who offered them satisfaction.

The main factor in Hitler's rise to power wasn't Versailles but the depression. It was said that in the relatively good economic times of 1928, years after Versailles, "one seldom heard of Hitler or the nazis, except as the butt of jokes." It was the depression that finally forced the German masses to turn to an alternative to Weimar.


Had he not re-occupied the Rhineland, had he not offered some kind of solution to the problem of millions of Germans being surpressed in Czeckoslovakia - he would have been ridiculed and disposed of by his own.

Undoing Versailles made him popular but the masses still didn't want war.

Next about U-boats without French or Norwegian bases - do you seriously try to claim that the U-Boats, be they 100, 300 or a trizillion, would be a real threat in the Atlantic if they had to exit through the North Sea or British Channel?

In fact every single U-boat ever built first had to go via those routes. After reaching the Atlantic they had enough fuel for a war patrol. U-boats were already active prior to the fall of Norway and France in the spring of 1940. Btw I think it's called the English channel. :)
 
Remember in WWI SONAR/ASDIC did not exist. Using hydrophones you could listen for a sub but this was pretty iffy. For much of the wat the limitations on aircraft meant that the risk to a sub even if caught on the surface was limited - radios only so-so, and capacity of patrol aircraft to carry depth charges or damaging munitions was small. So in WWI sending subs through North Sea or Channel choke points was a very acceptable risk. Given the advances in ASW and aviation technology sending U-Boats through those choke points is unacceptable.

But the Germans never stopped sending U-boats through the North Sea.


Later on in the war, even the Bay of Biscay was dangerous enough to make U-boats stay underwater in the daytime.

Or use the Piening way. :) It would've been a lot less dangerous had boats only maintained radio silence as Werner and Lehman-Willenbrock found out.
 

Redbeard

Banned
They must have expected the British to do the fighting. :) For a "tough no tolerance" nation, France was remarkably passive in September 1939--even though war was then declared and they had Britain on their side.



The main factor in Hitler's rise to power wasn't Versailles but the depression. It was said that in the relatively good economic times of 1928, years after Versailles, "one seldom heard of Hitler or the nazis, except as the butt of jokes." It was the depression that finally forced the German masses to turn to an alternative to Weimar.




Undoing Versailles made him popular but the masses still didn't want war.



In fact every single U-boat ever built first had to go via those routes. After reaching the Atlantic they had enough fuel for a war patrol. U-boats were already active prior to the fall of Norway and France in the spring of 1940. Btw I think it's called the English channel. :)

If you insist on staying in your darkness I will not disturb you further.
 
7&
You're still avoiding the fact that the facilities (i.e. the slipways and other areas needed to construct submarines) didn't exist. And as another poster has said, one ton of battle cruiser doesn't equal one ton of u-boat or even close.

300 u-boats or even an extra [random number] just wasn't possible.



EHHHH actually no one has proven anything , they just keep on making boasts.

Lets examine my estimation that they ALSO laid down 183 small warships in addition to the 23 large warships I have already detailed they ACTUALLY LAIDED DOWN FROM 1934-1939.

Here are the small warships laid down
10 "FBOOT" 1934 & finished 1935-38 [~ 1028t]
1 "Grille" 1934-& finished 1935 [3440t]
1 "Brummer" 1934 & finished 1936 [3354t]
1 "HELA" 1937 & finished 1940 [2520t]
1 "A" minelayers 1939 incomplete
32 "M-Boot 1935" 1936-39 & finished 1938-41 [874t]
12 "Torpedoboot 1935" ; 1936-38 & finished 1939-40 [1068t]
16 "Zerstroer 1934"/1934A" ; 1934/35 & finished 1937-39 [3156t]
6 "Zerstroer 1936" ; 1936/38 & finished 1938-39 [3415t]
1 "Krischan-I" 1934 [250t]
1 "Krischan II" 1934 ; finished 1935 [700t]
1 "Krischan III" 1934 ;finished 1935 [960t]
1 "Greif " 1935 finished 1937 [~ 930t]
1 "Hans Rolshoven"1936 ; finished 1938 [1168]
1 "Karl Meyer" 1939 ; finished 1940 [1351t]
1 "Sperber" 1938 & finished 1938 [1076t]
2 "Luderitz" 1938 & finished 1940 [~ 3600t]"Carl Peters"
1 "Otto Wunsche" 1938 & finished 1943 [~ 5900t]
2 "Wilhelm Bauer" 1937 & finished 1940 [~ 5600t]
38 TYPE-II U-Boat 1935-37 & finished 1935-40 [ 254-291t-314t]
33 TYPE-VII U-Boat 1936-1939 & finished 1936-1941 [626 -753t]
19 TYPE-IX U-Boat 1937-1939 & finished 1938 -1940[1032 - 1053t]
2 TYPE 1 U-Boat 1935 & finished 1936 [862t]
1 UA U-Boat 1937 & finished 1939 [1128t]

185 smaller warships laid down by 1939.

Remember the article reported either 21 PBS OR 375 TYPE-VII U-Boats.
 
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If you insist on staying in your darkness I will not disturb you further.


Lol, fine. But a correction: instead of "every U-boat ever built" (went through the North Sea) it should've read every u-boat that ever fought went that way.
 
93 of those ships are U-boats (although some not finished until 1941 but lets say they are all done by September 1939), so actually 92 "other" ships built by the Kriegsmarine before 1940, in addition to the large warships. So now, assuming the German Navy builds only type VII submarines between 1934 and 1939 where are we? Using the figures just posted we need to add ~280 type VII boats to get to 375 in 1939, or ~210 to get to 300 in 1939 depending on what number you want to pick. Let's assume you have the steel, copper, etc from the cancellation of everything except rowboats available for construction. Let us pass over the question of other gear like optics, radios, specialized stuff that needs to be sourced that not building other ships doesn't free up. Let us, fro the moment, assume the British totally ignore this. To get those submarines built you have to AVERAGE 40-60 MORE submarines per year than OTL. You don't have the slipways, you don't have the workers to do this - you can expand but that takes time, and building more slipways etc takes resources. When you get finished, how do you crew all these boats in 1939/40?

If Skippy the ASB magics away all these real issues, you then end up in 1939 with a navy consisting of 300-375 submarines and rowboats. No destroyers, no minesweepers, no nothing but submarines and those (until June 1940 - actually later to get facilities established) have to get to sea through narrow chokes points. The crews are mostly pretty green including the commanding officers and that won't be good.

No surface fleet means the RN can deploy a lot of heavy units elsewhere - the Med, the far east etc. No need to keep a lot of ships in the Home Fleet. No Norwegian campaign is possible, and Britain has no fear of invasion - without surface units crossing the Channel is suicide (forget all the other issues about Sealion).

Bottom line, even if the Germans care to create a navy of nothing but submarines and rowboats they can't have 300-375 type VIIs ready for sea and adequately staffed by September, 1939. They can certainly have a good deal more submarines, but so what. No minesweepers - that means the RN & RAF can mine exits to the Baltic Sea and Kiel areas and those minefields stay forever. Between mines, sea conditions, and ASW operating in the Channel is suicide for U-boats so losses to east coast convoys from other than air attack is near zero and the need for escorts there much reduced so those ships go elsewhere. No Norwegian campaign means convoys to Russia get a pretty free run, and then there is the iron ore issue. This is not a winning idea.
 
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