If Bismarck had been a nationalist

I was going to add this to the Harsher Prague peace thread. But decided that would be in error, so i decided to make this a new thread.

Bismarck is often described as a key figure in the unification of Germany, but was he actually also a key figure in disuniting Germany.

Bismarck was a Prussian Conservative Monarchist, his loyalty was to the Royal line of the House of Hohenzollern. His concern was to secure
the survival of this Royal line.

Below is a quote, Bismarck in 1849 to one of his fellow Conservatives.

"We are Prussians, and Prussians we shall remain . . .. We do not wish to see the Kingdom of Prussia obliterated in the putrid brew of cosy
south German sentimentality."

Prussia proper, i.e East and West Prussia were populated mainly by people of Slav descent, these lands were never part of the Holy Roman
Empire, and lay outside of the German Confederation. They were never seen as part of the German homeland.

However Austria proper, was ethnographically, culturally and historically part of the German heartland.

At the moment, i see an irony in the Prussian Bismarck excluding Austria from Germany. One key problem of the late 19th century was that
Germany remained divided. Germany hadn't been fully unified in 1871.

A tradegy awaited Germany, Europe and the world, two world wars, one with an insane psychopath, in charge of one of the worlds most
powerful, industrialised, culturally and scientifically advanced nations of the world.

This tradegy stemmed directly from the failure of Germany to be fully united in 1871. The Second World War stemmed directly from the
First. The First World War had many causes. One thing that drew Germany to war in 1914, was being tied to having to protect a ramshackle
empire, that was surrounded by enemies. Germany could not abandon Austria and the Austrian Germans to fight Russia alone. German nationalism couldn't allow it.

And Russia could not allow Austria to crush the south Slavs. However Germany and Russia had no issues of conflict along there shared
border, unlike France and Germany. Germany was forced to choose between Austria and Russia. In doing so Germany tied her destiny to an
outdated power that stood in the path of the historical development of nationalism. War between Austria and Russia was inevitable, and
Germany's need to defend it's half German brother, deprived it of international maneuver.

Austria was like a man standing in the middle of a motorway, with Germany forced to stand there with it.

In being forced to choose Austria over Russia, Germany created the ground for the two front war Bismarck tried to avoid. The Franco Russian
alliance. If Germany was going to back Austrian meddling in the Balkans then Russia was bound to have an alliance with France as its only
alternative. This left Britain. Germanys problems in fighting France and Russia together, whilst being allied to a state that couldn't pull its
own weight, led directly to the violation of Belgian neutrality, and consequently war with Britain. War with Britain, led to war with America.

None of this was unavoidable. Germany could have gone on the defensive in the West and tackled Russia first, hindsight exaggerates the
obviousness of this approach. But its logical from the standpoint of the early 20C, to see why many in power in Germany, felt compelled to
tackle France first. France was and had been for centuries a superb world power. It had nearly conquered the whole of Europe only a 100
years before. The deficiences in any army are only apparent after the event. What if the French advanced in the west, the industrial heartland
of Germany - the Ruhr - was less than 150 miles away from the French frontier. Even a limited French advance could seriously threaten war
production. And what if the French had made some respectful progress with the bulk of the German armies in the east. At the same time
Britain and Japan might sieze Germanys oversees territories, more likely the longer the war dragged on.

And the war was most likely to drag on longer in a scenario where Germany dealt with Russia first. Russia was a difficult power to tackle,
history was littered with examples of Russians defeats, but none of the victors could come up with a means of finishing her off. If Russia
chose to fight on, then what. The French and Swedes had discovered this, the huge space, the lack of modern roads, winter and the
toughness of the population didn't lend itself to a quick knock out blow. Germany bogged down in struggling to fight a decisive battle with
Russia, whilst a huge, well trained, well motivated, well armed French army, serviced by good communications, nibbled at its Western
frontier, dangerously close to the Ruhr, was not an appealing scenario.

Had Germany not had to contend with Russia, or had the Austrians been a material compensation against Russia, then Germany could have
simply sat on the defensive in the west. Austria though was a liabilty and susceptible to the disillusionment of large numbers of it's own
citizens. Austria was incapable of defending itself against Russia, what if Italy attacked Austria ?. What then. And what if as feared, Russia
became stronger as the war dragged on. And might Britain financially bolster France and Russia to prevent one single power dominating the
continent. Might America do the same.

Given all this is it any wonder Germany chose to try to knock France out quickly. It's axiomatic that in conflicts each side tries to take out it's
strongest enemy first. To do anything else is to invite defeat. But Germany had no choice in picking the route, by which it could most quickly
defeat France, before Russia mobilized. Through Belgium and into war with Britain. The problem of defeating Britain and the route of least
opposition, submarine attacks on Britains Atlantic shipping life lines inevitably led to war with America, no world power could stand by
whilst its maritime trading freedom was under threat.

Being obligated to prop up Austria denied Germany peace with Russia, this in turn trapped Germany in a two front war, consequently
pushing Germany into conflict with Britain and America. Germany had it's foot caught in the trap of having to support Austria against
Russia. Bismarck frowned at the failure to continue the reinsurance treaty with Russia. Not being a nationalist meant, he possibly failed to
see that Germany had to defend Austria. In consequence, Germany arguably the most scientifically advanced nation in the world, and one of
the three most industrialised nations in the world, found itself allied to a weak state and fighting the other two most industrially advanced
countries in the world, Britain and America.

A tradegy of mass proportions that Germany found itself trapped in protecting a weak relic of history, and in so doing should find itself at
war with all the major world powers, the two most powerful of whom - Britain and America - were seen by many as logical and natural allies
of Germany.

This tradegy was a direct descendent of Bismarcks division of Germany for the sake of Prussian interests.

What if Bismarck had been a true German nationalist, or if someone who was, had been there in place of him. Might they have demanded
that German Austria have a closer but subordinate relationship with a Prussian dominated German Confederation in 1866. Rather than
excluding Austria, she is forced to concede a closer relationship within a German Confederation. This would then have necessitated the
independence of Hungary. How this occurs is uncertain. Wether in 1866 or 1867, maybe Austrias inclusion in a new Prussian dominated
German Confederation, forces Hungarian nationalist sentiments to bubble up more powerfully, and sooner.

This would have involved jettisoning Galicia, thrown to Russia by Prussia, like a bone to a trusty dog. ( Thats not meant to be offensive to
the magnificent cultural input of Russia to world history. ). Is this fanciful, maybe not, would Russia have been opposed it, i think not. Would
Britain have been able to do anything other than grumble, no. Would France go to war over this, most likely no, but if she did, then she
risked facing Prussia, Russia, and Italy. Prussia has the chance of raising the flag of German peril from an expansionist France, would the
German Austrians not be enflamed at France telling them they could not be part of a German Confederation. This is what French intervention would have amounted to in this situation.

Does this not cement Prussias power, all of Germany rallies behind the Prussian rallying cry - Germans have a right to be German, as the French have a right to be French. Is Britain going to fight the innocence of such a claim. I think not, is France going to be concerned that in a war against the Germanies, rallied behind a flag of National pride like never before, uniting all those German states of Austrian sympathy, behind Prussia, with Austria forced to follow, with Russia by implication of its Galician gains behind them, with Italy - enlarged by it's gains and possibly hungry for some French pickings and a main course of Rome itself - as a potential foe. Is France going to wade into such a conflict, definately not.

However it happens the Franco German war is easily implicated with the right of Austrians to be members of a German Confederation.
Frances defeat is more likely and the real unification of Germany that Bismarck missed or didnt want is assured. Here is a cleverer more skillful approach, a war with France calling for the right of Austria to be a player in Germany, Austrias South German allies are now unavoidably behind Prussia. They may find themselves surprised by this, and baffled at the wiliness of a Prussian policy that bought this about. But they cant reverse it.

Whats left is Hungary, in some ways in the same plight as Austria would have been. But Germany doesn't have to defend Hungary, there is
no Nationalist urge to do so. Agreement can now be reached with Russia, Hungary dependent on Germany will be relatively compliant.

Germany can avoid the two front war, and so war with Belgium, Britain and the the USA.

If Germany had been really united in 1871, theres less need to annexe Alsace Lorraine, if Germany doesn't then so much the better, Germany is free to reach an understanding with Russia in the Balkans.
 
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Sigh. Anyone want to take me up on a bet that Eurofed will support this?

Victoria:
"On the whole, however, the flank powers' likelihood of intervening in the affairs of west-central Europe would depend heavily upon what Germany itself did; there was certainly no need to become involved if it could be assumed that the second German Reich was now a satiated power.

This assurance Bismarck himself was all too willing to give after 1871, since he had no wish to create a gross-deutscher ("Greater German") state which incorporated millions of Austrian Catholics, destroyed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and left Germany isolated between a vengeful France and a suspicious Russia." - Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

The flank powers - Britain and Russia.

Germany would be just as likely to take the areas it took from France OTL in TTL (if it can), if not more - since a replacement to Bismarck will probably support that rather than opposing that as well.

Germany's problems OTL came from a lack of ability to grow without stepping on people, and a lack of skill at handling that post-Bismarck - not having Austria-Hungary as an ally may mean Germany is without allies at all.
 
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And if germany annex austria, what happen to south tyrol ? Germany keep it ? in this case even Italy will turn it's back on germany.
 
Im not envisioning Germany annexing Austria, there is at this point no Germany in that sense of the term. You maybe mean Prussia, well i'm not suggesting Prussia does that either, in fact Prussia has no chance of annexing Austria. Read the post properly.

It's an attempt to look at what happens if, instead of Austria being excluded or expelled from Germany by Prussian influence, that Prussia does the exact opposite, and makes the condition of peace in 1866, that Austria
joins a Prussian led Confederation. Read it, and see it. See the difference.

On the contrary, not having Austria as an ally, removes a wedge between Russia and Germany, and Italy and Germany. Germanys conflict with Russia is a product of Austrias conflict with the South Slavs. Italy cant realistically fight on Germanys side, while Austria holds territories that are seen as naturally part of Italy. Other wise German Russian stress is less explosive. Okay tensions over Turkey, but on the scale of things nothing that cant be worked out. On the other hand Austrias conflict with the South Slavs is fundamental to her very survival. Austria is bound to have to fight them, that is probably the only unavoidable conflict in Europe, as no other state has it's very survival at stake, as Austria does.
 
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The first thing I would point is that Russia totally could let Austria suppress the Serbs. That was precisely what they had intended to do in 1908, and they hadn't been bothered when Serbia was beholden to Austria from the 1880s to 1903.

What Russia really couldn't do was let Germany, the military juggernaught on her border, control her economic jugular at the straits. And that meant she couldn't allow Germany mastery of the Balkans. And that meant sticking up for Serbia in these particular circumstances.

How is mega-Germany going to be less of a menace in that regard than wee Germany? I don't say it's inevitable. It requires different circumstances and priorities for Russia, Germany, or the Ottomans, none of which is too tricky. But getting rid of Austria is no sort of guarantee against German-Russian conflict.

My opinion of WW1 is that it was a fluke. A chance murder, hasty responses, panic, poor communications, mobilisation, and Austria and Germany decided to gamble and lost (just because I think it was a fluke doesn't mean I think nobody started it). there were so many flukes going spare, and the climate was such, that it was perhaps 50/50 that there would have been a fluke; but the actual circumstances were a fluke still. There's nothing mystical about Serbia.
 
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Now, as to the actual question. "What is Bismarck was a convinced big-German?" "Then he wouldn't have become prime-minister of Prussia." Simple, isn't it? :p

A feeling of German nationality was ubiquitous among educated Germans at this time - and does it not follow that, in such a large and disunited nation, there were a lot of kinds of German nationality? We tend to see the 19th century through the lens of later kinds of German identity - to assume that just because the pan-Germans of the next era idolised Bismarck, he must have shared their beliefs - but this is wrong.

German academia spent the 19th century enthusiastically re-fighting the Thirty Years War on the pages of newspapers and journals. At stake were two opposed versions of history, each with an explanation of what had gone wrong with Germany; and hence two opposed solutions.

For the 'northern', 'Protestant', or 'Prussian' school - all these terms are of course generalisations - Germany's tragedy had been the Holy Roman Empire's success, when it should have been swept away by a modernising, centralised, administrative, and almost certainly Protestant monarchy. For the 'southern', 'Catholic' , 'Austrian' school, the tragedy was the Holy Roman Empire's failure: if not for the intervention of foreign powers, it could have set up a secure, federal, ecumenical Germany under the benevolent overlordship of the Hapsburg house.

See where this is going? As we saw in 1848, this wasn't about how who was to have the throne of an otherwise identical Germany but about the whole form of the German constitution. The Germany that came about - under the domination of one state and a strong central government, with an administrative civil service and a mighty military apparatus - was by its nature an exclusion of the Austrian vision of what Germany was all about.

To include Austria in this Germany would make its position less certain domestically: bludgeoning into line the Catholics, who were staunchly German but who believed in the other Germany, was as we know a painful and lengthy process for the 'Prussian' Germany in the first years of its existence. It would, as Elfwine points out, alarm all the other powers. In short, why do it? If you believed in a centralised and mighty German government, you were a little-German because that's what a little-German was. And if you believed in the looser, less militarised federation that would be necessary to sell big Germany - why, then you were a big-German!

And as for Bismarck, he was more than anything a conservative Prussian patriot. He was sufficiently canny to realise that to preserve Prussia he needed to change it, domestically and internationally, and for this reason he was dancing on the edge of being a wee-German. But he never really seems to have bought into it.

Was there a group of people in Germany who believed in setting up a united and centralised German republic, damn the consequences, damn religious divides, damn domestic turmoil and the need to overthrow established elites, damn the threat of war with other powers? Yep! They were known as 'revolutionary socialists'. Hum. Bismarck, Red Junker? It has a certain perverse appeal. :p

(There was of course to arise a increasingly influential group of people who believed that Germany should carve out an empire on a world-wide scale like Britain, America, and Russia, and should start by uniting all the Germans in Europe. But this began only after Germany had been created and the question of its form resolved; as the new, militantly proud Germany and its new, militantly proud but frustrated middle-classes started looking to broader horizons.)

And as for Austria continuing to exist independently but becoming a political and economic satellite of a centralised German state? That's sort of what happened! But I will note that there is no constituency in Austria that is frantically pro-German, in terms of a Prussian Germany, at this time. Such movements - a bizarre cocktail of taking-our-jobs ethnic nationalism, lower-middle-class anxiety, and anti-church anti-regime sentiment which only made it really big when they dropped the last one - came later. For now, German Austria is a country of peasants who don't care, ruled over by a civil service who want to keep their jobs, with a conservative aristocracy. Its cities - and by this we largely mean Vienna - are home to nationalists, true, but this collection of liberals, radicals, and socialists are neither in charge nor the sort of people Bismarck wants anything to do with.

If you want a big Germany in the 19th century, I suggest letting the Austrians win. Here's a sketch: let us say the Italians win more conclusively in the first Italian war, Austria looses Venetia, Italy becomes France's problem and the Austrians decide to fuggedaboutit ("revolutionary flotsam will only destroy itself!": seriously, they thought that) and concentrate on what they can still secure. A war with Prussia is eventually fought mano-a-mano, and Prussia is not destroyed but much reduced at the expense of the middle-states. Federal big Germany.
 
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Im not envisioning Germany annexing Austria, there is at this point no Germany in that sense of the term. You maybe mean Prussia, well i'm not suggesting Prussia does that either, in fact Prussia has no chance of annexing Austria. Read the post properly.

IBC has addressed this whole affair better than I can, but I want to repeat: The only way you're getting both OTL Germany and Austria incorporated into its set up instead of Austria-Hungary being something that doesn't fit into is annexing/absorbing/conquering Austria.

Austria-Hungary simply does not have interests that coexist with the Prussia-dominated Germany-in-the-making and vice-versa. Austria being part of any such thing would require destroying AH and Austria being absorbed, or a very different such thing, or a very different Austria.
 
A "nationalist Bismarck" would be a man who rejects all his ancestry, and takes a route that is almost contrary to everything he was bred and born to: a member of the Prussian junkers. Stranger things have happened: Russian princes have become nihilists and revolutionaries, French aristocrats have embraced the ideals of the revolution, and so on. But this different Bismarck would not have become the chancellor of Prussia.

Neither the Prussia-dominated Germany of OTL nor an ATL where Austria wins the war of 1866 would become the great nation that so many pan-Germanist try to imagine. Everyone has seen what happened IOTL, and an Austrian victory would just prorogate - for a time - the amorphous German Confederation: there would be changes, Prussia's role would be reduced and Prussia itself would be probably marginalised, but Austria does not have the focus on the situation in Germany. Too many different interests vie for the attention of Vienna, and in the end they are damned to fail.

The window of opportunity opened - and swiftly closed - in 1848: the king of Prussia should have reached to pick up the "crown from the gutters" - and ideally would have moved his capitol from Berlin to Frankfurt. Then a different Great Germany might have been born.
 
Ok some problems with this scenario. :p

Is this where an alien space bat arrives. :rolleyes:

Let me phrase it differently. Bismarck or someone sees the dangers of excluding Austria from Germany, and conclude Austria is less dangerous in a German Confederation than out. The situation is reversed, Austrias South German allies line up behind Prussia, as it is know France who seeks to exclude Austria from Germany.

Pretty please, i just thought it was an intersesting idea to see how things might develop if Austria isn't excluded. :D
 
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What is meant by a 'German Confederation'? A German confederation as it was before, with Austria and Prussia both members and neither supreme, would mean Prussia had gone to war for the sake of Hanover, which they hadn't: they were making a bid for a monopoly on power in northern Germany and they didn't intend to give any back.

Do we mean an zollverein of some sort which includes both wee-Germany and Austria? This was what was envisages by the pan-Germans in subsequent decades (also to include Switzerland, the Low Countries, and sometimes Romania because pan-Germans were never exactly modest). Just like the first zollverein in Germany but on a far larger scale, it was to ease a transition from economic domination to political union.

And I don't think the achievement of big Germany in this way is impossible. The pan-Germans were no Bismarcks: being beset by paranoid delusions - but then, as anyone who has read the Mail can tell you,all anxious and frustrated lower-middle-class nationalists are beset by paranoid delusions. :p But whereas you can forget about the Netherlands and Romania (and South Africa...), I don't see why a political and economic pull couldn't eventually bring Austria to Germany.

From a domestic point of view, then even by the end of the empire IOTL then the Catholics, like the liberals, had become respectable - and optimistically the same thing might one day happen to the socialists (EdT portrays this scenario, both in terms of Germany's political development and Austria's eventual fate, in Fight and be Right). And the balance of power changes. After all, Germany-Austria was, as we know, already weaker than a coalition of its enemies in 1914. With the rise of Russia, America, and Japan, big-Germany is less world-shattering. There were even people in France who were open to the idea, especially if it raised the possibility of their getting Lorrain and Alsace (again, touched on by EdT). And of course allowing Germany to become big because you want it as a friend against the new industrial economies is precisely what Britain and France actually ended up doing.

So, dodge WW1 and it could happen. I am of the opinion that WW1 was a fluke. Some guy got shot, hasty reactions, poor communication, railways timetables, and Germany and Austria gambled and lost (just because it was a fluke doesn't mean nobody started it). Given the climate of the time, and the number of possiblle flukes, it was pretty damn likely for something to go off. But the actual Serbia thing was still a fluke, and further changes in the 19th century, even well after 1871, could easily have averted it.
 
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