Even if the Italian divisions are informed and prepared, it will not make that much of a difference. It was a formidable force on paper, 55 divisions, but in reality, it was more of a militia.
The Italians had lost their best men in Libya, Tunisia and at Stalingrad and then again in Sicily. What remained in Italy was mostly coastal divisions, which were more like weak regimental combat teams (4-6 infantry battalions with little heavy weapons, 1-2 light artillery battalions) without operational or strategical mobility, and often even no tactical mobility either. They consisted of men of the older classes, often with little modern training, inexperienced and badly trained officers and suffered from a severa lack of automatic weapons, AT weapons and AA. But their morale was the worst part - they knew Italy had lost, and their bad equipment did nothing to help morale either.
The forces that were not of this type was either small elite units with little ability for large-scale field combat or cadres under training (the Italians were raising armoured and motorised formations again) with little of their on paper equipment yet delivered.