If Badoglio had had an atom of firmness...

[maverick]

...or brain matter.

As you know, Marshall Pietro Badoglio, commander in chief of the Italian Army and Italian dictator following the inner coup against Mussolini in July of 1943, quickly proceeded to sign an armistice with the allies on September of that year, with support from the King and presumably the members of the Fascist government that had acted against Mussolini...

Now, in the great comedy of errors that was the Italian and Roman campaigns of 1943-1944, the news of the armistice were made public before the Italian army was actually informed, adding to a confusion only worsened when Badoglio, the King and several minister escaped to the allied-occupied portions of Italy without as much as issuing one single army to his troops...

This left 55 Italian divisions, IIRC, confused and without orders, easy prey for a German army that had less than a 1,000 men in Rome for police operations...

But...what if Pietro Badoglio had been able to inform his men and the entire Italian army of the armistice? could those 55 Italian divisions prevent the Germans from occupying Rome and reinforcing Italy?

Could Italy have a role in the Italian campaign other than being a stage and supplying victims and partisans?

And of course, could Marshal Badoglio maintain his influence in Italian politics following the war, ala deGaulle? and how would the post-war be with Italy having played a vital role in the war for the allies, having joined them in late 1943?

 

[Michele]

But...what if Pietro Badoglio had been able to inform his men and the entire Italian army of the armistice?

It goes without saying that the great turncoat operation was virtually not planned and shabbily executed.

However, the first answer that comes to mind WRT your question above, is that while the Germans suspected and expected this to happen, anyway, with the whole Italian army duly informed in full detail, the same would hold true for the _German_ army.

Italy and Germany had been close allies for several years of war. The King and Badoglio had ousted Mussolini, who, incredibly, still had his fans among all Italians and, what's important, among officers. Other officers would simply not accept betraying the ally. Note how later the RSI did have volunteers that did not come from internment camps in Germany.

In short, somebody would have informed the Germans of all those details. The wider the orders are circulated, the higher the chances somebody leaks.

The paramount preoccupation of Badoglio and the King was that if it leaked, the Germans would react against them, and they were probably not wrong (see Skorzeny's Horthy operation in the Hungarian case). They would have needed to take some personal risks, in order to decrease the risks to the common soldiers.

Note how Badoglio showed he did have more than an atom of brain matter. One lacking it, would have been hammered in some way, by someone (probably the Germans) but he was not. Firmness, OK, probably not an atom unless it was at the expense of somebody else's skin.

 

[lothaw]

It goes without saying that the great turncoat operation was virtually not planned and shabbily executed.

However, the first answer that comes to mind WRT your question above, is that while the Germans suspected and expected this to happen, anyway, with the whole Italian army duly informed in full detail, the same would hold true for the _German_ army.

Italy and Germany had been close allies for several years of war. The King and Badoglio had ousted Mussolini, who, incredibly, still had his fans among all Italians and, what's important, among officers. Other officers would simply not accept betraying the ally. Note how later the RSI did have volunteers that did not come from internment camps in Germany.

In short, somebody would have informed the Germans of all those details. The wider the orders are circulated, the higher the chances somebody leaks.

The paramount preoccupation of Badoglio and the King was that if it leaked, the Germans would react against them, and they were probably not wrong (see Skorzeny's Horthy operation in the Hungarian case). They would have needed to take some personal risks, in order to decrease the risks to the common soldiers.

Note how Badoglio showed he did have more than an atom of brain matter. One lacking it, would have been hammered in some way, by someone (probably the Germans) but he was not. Firmness, OK, probably not an atom unless it was at the expense of somebody else's skin.

Well, the invasion of Greece showed his organizational and leadership skills. Not too surprising that the man who presided over the humiliation of Italy's superior(comparitively) military at Greek hands, didn't compose himself any better as a politician.

But even if the Italian Army was mobilized for the allies... this is the same group that couldn't conquer Greece and Egypt. How much use are they going to be against the Wermacht, especially when a none too small percentage of those 55 divisions is still giong to be loyal to Mussolini?

Hate to say it but the joke goes during a political meeting before the war Ribbentrop brags that Italy shall be on Germany's side in the even of war. To that Churchill replies, "Seems fair, we got stuck with them last time."

 

[Michele]

Well, the invasion of Greece showed his organizational and leadership skills. Not too surprising that the man who presided over the humiliation of Italy's superior(comparitively) military at Greek hands, didn't compose himself any better as a politician.

Actually, he had seen it coming. He accepted the "political" guarantees provided by Mussolini and Ciano (i.e. that Greece would collapse from within and that Bulgaria was likely to join, both turned out to be false as a three-dollar bill). And he bailed out - after a while.
So as to the Greek campaign, you can still accuse him of being spineless; anybody but a yes-man would have resigned before, not after the beginning. But even there, he's got that excuse of those absurd political assumptions.
But you can't actually make him responsible for the fiasco.

But even if the Italian Army was mobilized for the allies... this is the same group that couldn't conquer Greece and Egypt. How much use are they going to be against the Wermacht,

Quite. I could explain that, but you should first please explain what use could have been the Free French or the Polish Forces in the West against the Wehrmacht. French and Poles had been defeated even more thoroughly. For that matter, you should also explain why the Allies were so happy to have the Romanian army fighting against the Germans in the last year of the war.

especially when a none too small percentage of those 55 divisions is still giong to be loyal to Mussolini?

That is a problem. Yet, it might come as a surprise to you, but the Italians, just like the Romanians and the Finns, did fight against Germans, starting in December 1943.

Hate to say it but the joke goes during a political meeting before the war Ribbentrop brags that Italy shall be on Germany's side in the even of war. To that Churchill replies, "Seems fair, we got stuck with them last time."

No, you don't hate to say it. You really come through as being happy to say it, especially if one considers how happy you are to pass on some slander about the French in your signature.

 

[Slowpoke]

For that matter, you should also explain why the Allies were so happy to have the Romanian army fighting against the Germans in the last year of the war.

They had to. Providing cannon fodder to the Soviets was (one of) the condition(s) for getting Transylvania back.

 

[Michele]

They had to. Providing cannon fodder to the Soviets was (one of) the condition(s) for getting Transylvania back.

This is the answer to the question: "why did the Romanians fight the Germans?"

The question asked, however, was: "Why did the Soviets want the Romanians fighting the Germans, if the Romanians had been defeated by the Soviets?"

Once one answers that, he also has the answer to the question of the other poster: "What good would the Italians be fighting against the Germans?"

I hope it's clear now.

 

[Slowpoke]

The question asked, however, was: "Why did the Soviets want the Romanians fighting the Germans, if the Romanians had been defeated by the Soviets?"

Cheap cannon fodder. And for propaganda purposes. And even a bit out of spite. Stalin was a very spiteful character.

 

[Michele]

Cheap cannon fodder. And for propaganda purposes.

So you have that answer.
If you make a list of the nationalities and ethnic groups involved in the Italian campaign 1943-45, you'll see that the need of cannon fodder was not a prerogative of the USSR only; the Westerners needed them as well.

And even a bit out of spite. Stalin was a very spiteful character.

Maybe he was, but there were other very practical and pragmatic reasons apart from the ones above and beyond any cheap spite, and personally I think he was more pragmatic than spiteful.

 

[maverick]

This is probably a hard question to answer...but how many of those 55 divisions would have really stayed loyal to Mussolini? Given that the government, the King and the possibility of salvation from the Nazis (its not like all soldiers were loyal fascists) lies with the other side?

 

[lothaw]

Romania faught against the Germans for one simple reason, they were going to get crushed by the Soviet forces if they didn't. Iron Guard or not, the country had a sense of self-preservation. Stalin was only too happy to let them be fodder and it let him set up a puppet government after the war. Neither really apply to Italy.

Hardly fair to group Finland with the Fascist powers. Actually Finland's struggle in this war is probably the one I find most appealing. A country that's quite literally caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Hitler sold them out to Stalin during the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, they still faught a heroic struggle during the Winter War. Of course when Hitler launches Barbarossa they're going to be eager to get their own back. When it was clear which way the wind was blowing, of course they turned on Hitler. Actually surprisng Stalin allowed the Finns to drop out like that. I guess Stalin figured if the Finns could cause him that much trouble, they could protect his Northern flank while he's going after the real prize.

It would've been political suicide to deny the Free French at least a token place in the North Africa campaign and the liberation of France. Eisenhower did indeed let de Gaule's forces take point in a few important operations.


But if Bagdilio would've managed to bring the entire Italian military to his flag so to say, a good half of his military would've been crushed by the Germans in the Balkans, if not surrendered outright, before the Allies could relieve them. The Germans just disarmed them OTL since they had no idea what was going on and sent them on their way.

Question is would the allies accept these Italians that have been fighting against them the past four years to hold a part of their line. Especially when Mussolini gets freed by Skorzeny. The "Co-belligerent Italian military" was really just a token force OTL, but it'd be a bit more now assuming the allies didn't disarm them anyways.

It really wouldn't effect the war any though, and Bagdilio is still going to have to give up power since he techniclly is a Fascist dictator.

Oh, and as for my sense of humor, until now no one's had issue with it, the joke was in the same manner as my signiture, somewhat relevent to the consersation and mildly funny.

 

[Michele]

Romania faught against the Germans for one simple reason, they were going to get crushed by the Soviet forces if they didn't. Iron Guard or not, the country had a sense of self-preservation.

No. Wrong. The Romanian troops could have laid their arms down and they would not have been "crushed" (though whether they would survive Soviet POW camps, that's another story). The reason why they chose to fight is another. However, it's irrelevant here. The question is why the Allies thought it useful having them to fight against the Germans.

Stalin was only too happy to let them be fodder and it let him set up a puppet government after the war. Neither really apply to Italy.

The "token force" you talk about below deployed 5 small divisions to fight alongside the Allies against the Germans in Italy, and a sixth was trained but did not find time to be deployed.
It might come as a surprise to you, but the _Western_ Allies were terribly short on manpower by 1944, especially in a secondary theater as Italy. That campaign was fought by: British troops (which includes units from Great Britain but also South African, New Zealand, Indian and Gurkha troops); US troops (including a Japanese-American regiment); French troops (including Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian troops); Poles; Greeks; Hebrews; Brazilians (yes); and Italians, probably I'm forgetting someone.
The need for cannon fodder applied as much in Central Italy as in Transylvania.

Hardly fair to group Finland with the Fascist powers. Actually Finland's struggle in this war is probably the one I find most appealing.

Which is irrelevant, of course. The point was that every turncoat did its best to provide fighting troops to help their new friends against their old friends, and that the new friends never said, "oh no, we defeated you, so surely you cannot be of any help", which seems to have been your point. And in this, Finland can jolly well be grouped with the others.

It would've been political suicide to deny the Free French at least a token place in the North Africa campaign and the liberation of France.

And the Italian campaign. So it was all political, not a need for rifle-bearers? You now only need to explain the drive to recruit Moroccan volunteers. Or the need to have Brazilian troop sin Italy, after all they did not need to liberate their own country.

But if Bagdilio

Badoglio.

would've managed to bring the entire Italian military to his flag so to say, a good half of his military would've been crushed by the Germans in the Balkans, if not surrendered outright, before the Allies could relieve them.

Very probably. Which would have meant, anyway, more troubles for the Germans, more expenditure of reinforcements and supplies there, and more partisan action at the margins of all of that. It's not as if the Allies needed to "retrieve" these troops for them to be useful to the Allied cause. If they managed to suck up German reinforcements, fighting them where they were, that would have already been a plus, even if they were eventually defeated.

The Germans just disarmed them OTL since they had no idea what was going on and sent them on their way.

On their way to the internment camps in Germany.

Question is would the allies accept these Italians that have been fighting against them the past four years to hold a part of their line. Especially when Mussolini gets freed by Skorzeny.

Which, given just a bit of overall effectiveness by the Italian government in this situation, would never happen.

The "Co-belligerent Italian military" was really just a token force OTL, but it'd be a bit more now assuming the allies didn't disarm them anyways.

As mentioned, nobody had any problem with Finnish, Romanian, Slovakian troops fighting their former allies, and while precautions were taken, these forces were not disarmed by the Allies.
And as mentioned, it was not a token force. A token force might be the Belgian brigade (actually a reinforced battalion). But when the Allies need Brazil to send one division; when the British battalions disband their AT companies in order to bring their rifle companies up to strength; when one considers that the French units would be withdrawn for Anvil/Dragoon; when one looks at the losses for Montecassino alone; then one concludes that the Western Allies did need cannon fodder in Italy, just like the Soviets in the East.

It really wouldn't effect the war any though,

That depends. If Badoglio had had spine and had done things right, then operation Giant might have taken place, and might even have succeeded, and this would have had a significant effect on the war in Europe.

and Bagdilio is still going to have to give up power since he techniclly is a Fascist dictator.

Do tell. What makes Badoglio a Fascist dictator, technically?

 

[maverick]

Back on topic...

That depends. If Badoglio had had spine and had done things right, then operation Giant might have taken place, and might even have succeeded, and this would have had a significant effect on the war in Europe.

A. Does anyone have any idea of whether Badoglio would have been able to have enough of the Italian army to change sides without the Pro-Mussolini faction take the upper hand?

B. Would the political chaos and the additional italian troops allow for either Operation Giant or a similar plan and subsequently in an earlier and less bloody liberation of Rome?

Rome was nearly taken without much effort after the Anzio landings in 1944 had Alexander been less cautious...IIRC...

 

[LordKalvan]

Whatever sin may be attributed to Badoglio (and the list is pretty long ), "firmness", "dedication", "brilliance" and "spirit of sacrifice" are not among them. Badoglio was - from the beginning of his career to the bitter end - an ambitious and very touchy military bureaucrat.

His behavior post 25 July 1943 is right for the par: he starts negotiation with the Allies in Lisbon (but typically the delagation includes 3 generals, without a clear chain of command); the negotiations (which are again nothing to write home about, on both sides) linger on for all of August (but noone prepares a sensible plan to follow up the unavoidable conclusion of the negotiations). At the end of August Badoglio is still asking for "an allied landing on Italian mainland" before designing the armistice. The armistice is signed on 2 September but on 3 September Badoglio is still representing to the Italian government that "negotiations are in progress". The infamous message to Italian forces in all war theatres is sent out on 8 September, without any plan in place (except for the shameful running of the king and of Badoglio toward the south).

Btw, Mussolini is rescued from Gran Sasso on 12 September: 4 days later.
It was not a comedy of errors, it was a tragedy; and Badoglio should obviously have been court-martialled after the war, but it did not happen because it would have been an indictment of the monarchy too.

 

[maverick]

Back to topic...

Assuming that Badoglio can be a capable leader ITTL, and that the allies can organize some sort of landing on continental Italy, either at Volturno or at Anzio with the help of several Italian divisions loyal to Badoglio and the King before the Germans have time to reorganize and counter this...could this lead to a fall of Rome in September of 1943 and the liberation of much of Italy south of the Tiber by late 1943? Given the right conditions, of course?

 

[mattep74]

Ok, lets imagine that the italian armies are informed and Badoglio and the royal family then escapes to allied territory. what happens if a great number of the italian army are profascits? It leads to civil war behind the German lines and it helps the allies, but what about the civilian population?

In Yugoslavia the italians made the choise of giving away their weapons to Titos partisans iirc, but what if they joined Tito? Greater headache for the Germans.

Maybe the Germans draw forces from other fronts. The 250,000 men in Norway and Denmark might have to leave their relativly easy job to actually fight

 

[Markus]

However, the first answer that comes to mind WRT your question above, is that while the Germans suspected and expected this to happen, anyway, with the whole Italian army duly informed in full detail, the same would hold true for the _German_ army.

In short, somebody would have informed the Germans of all those details. The wider the orders are circulated, the higher the chances somebody leaks.

Funny thing is the Italian Army did have two contingency plans for this scenario in the drawers. Admittedly not perfect ones, but better than no orders at all.
And even without orders some divisions around Rome gave the Wehrmacht a good fight. One armoured or mechanized Division stationed near Rome needed several days to make contact with the Germans paratroopers already in Rome. And last but not least there is logistics. If much or most of 55+ Italian Divisions decide to defend their Homeland logistics for German troops in southern Italy are going to become interesting and that is just the start. Italy is connected to it´s neighbouring countries by seven major railroad lines. All but two run through mountains. That means lot´s of tunnels and bridges. Blowing them up was SOP to prevent and invasion and thus had build in chamber for explosives. This allows the Italians to severely cripple the German re-supply for a period of time. The Allies on the other hand face no such additional logistical problems.

Ohh, and the Germans “knew” the Italians would defect even without anybody on the Italian side telling them. Arresting Mussolini was enough of a warning.

edit: IMO the butterfly effect will be big enough to allow the Allies to reach the Po Valley in mid-44.

 

[danwild6]

If you're right Markus then this could lead to a different cold war in Europe. If the Italians fight in Yugoslavia and the allies are able to reach the Po by mid 44 then by late 44 early 45 you could see the allies advancing into Austria and Yugoslavia.

Austria may end up a member of NATO, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary may end up neutral.

 

[Lord Insane]

If you're right Markus then this could lead to a different cold war in Europe. If the Italians fight in Yugoslavia and the allies are able to reach the Po by mid 44 then by late 44 early 45 you could see the allies advancing into Austria and Yugoslavia.

Austria may end up a member of NATO, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary may end up neutral.

A minor nitpick would be that Yugoslavia did end up being neutral in OTL- a Communist neutral, but a neutral nonetheless.

 

[danwild6]

oh thanks for the correction don't knowwhat I was thinking

 

[lounge60]

...or brain matter.

than a 1,000 men in Rome for police operations...

But...what if Pietro Badoglio had been able to inform his men and the entire Italian army of the armistice? could those 55 Italian divisions prevent the Germans from occupying Rome and reinforcing Italy?


And of course, could Marshal Badoglio maintain his influence in Italian politics following the war, ala deGaulle? and how would the post-war be with Italy having played a vital role in the war for the allies, having joined them in late 1943?

Badoglio??????
Listen,im Italian and you believe me if i tell you that Pietro Badoglio was a jester,a coward and a loser.