if Argentina becomes independent (or British protectorate) from 1806 or 1807

If an 1806 or 1807 British victory in Buenos Aires were to result in accelerated independence - from Spain - of the Viceroyalty of La Plata, would Argentina's development have unfolded much like OTL (e.g. federalist-unitarist civil wars, Rosas regime, 1865-1930 economic boom, Peronism, Dirty War, Falklands War, hyperinflation, 2001-02 economic collapse)? If so, would at least its earlier development have been much like in another thread?

Would it have been much the same story (especially later on) if La Plata became a British protectorate (assuming it eventually gains independence)?
 
yet another possible outcome of 1807

I've just been thinking - maybe a British victory of Buenos Aires in July 1807 could make Buenos Aires independent (or under a British protectorate), but the Uruguayan coast could be made into a British colony or protectorate (without the same immediate independence as Buenos Aires)?

After all, the British had already gained the Uruguayan coast a few months earlier, and I don't think that the locals in Montevideo were as radically against the British as their Buenos Aires counterparts.
 
at best, Britain can control the port cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. the hinterlands are going to remain opposed. I doubt either BA or M will be willingly occupied, and it's going to be an endless string of opposition parties agitating against any native gov't that plays nice with Britain. Montevideo will be easier and Britain's best hope for a long term presence would be in Montevideo/Uruguay, but I still think the rest of the colonials will make a habit of creating trouble. there was some acquiescence of the locals in Buenos Aires OTL, but I think it's inevitable that the spanish population is going to make trouble for the Brits and anyone who kowtowed to them.

You run into problems with British presence once Spain is invaded by France. While Britain kept whatever it wanted at the Congress of Vienna, they had semi-plausible excuses for doing so. taking over colonial possessions of an ally is nothing but pure greed.

Ultimately, unless the situation is Europe changes, British success in 1806/1807 in BA/M results in more or less the same situation as OTL: spanish colonials breaking free and then bickering amongst themselves for decades.

Personally, I think Britain got lucky by losing. they would have spent a lot of resources on a losing proposition and had a sticky situation trying to keep it for themselves instead of Spain.
 
at best, Britain can control the port cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. the hinterlands are going to remain opposed. I doubt either BA or M will be willingly occupied, and it's going to be an endless string of opposition parties agitating against any native gov't that plays nice with Britain. Montevideo will be easier and Britain's best hope for a long term presence would be in Montevideo/Uruguay, but I still think the rest of the colonials will make a habit of creating trouble. there was some acquiescence of the locals in Buenos Aires OTL, but I think it's inevitable that the spanish population is going to make trouble for the Brits and anyone who kowtowed to them.

You run into problems with British presence once Spain is invaded by France. While Britain kept whatever it wanted at the Congress of Vienna, they had semi-plausible excuses for doing so. taking over colonial possessions of an ally is nothing but pure greed.

Ultimately, unless the situation is Europe changes, British success in 1806/1807 in BA/M results in more or less the same situation as OTL: spanish colonials breaking free and then bickering amongst themselves for decades.

Personally, I think Britain got lucky by losing. they would have spent a lot of resources on a losing proposition and had a sticky situation trying to keep it for themselves instead of Spain.

So what you're saying is that the analogies with the Cape Colony in 1795 and esp. 1806, Mauritius in 1810, Trinidad in 1797, and Quebec in 1759 aren't so apt for Buenos Aires/Montevideo in 1806-07? (Although perhaps Buenos Aires/Montevideo sometime before the formation of the Viceroyalty of La Plata in 1776 might be more apt of an analogy.)

(In Quebec, though, French forces did fight against the British even after the latter's victory in 1759, and the French even scored a victory against the British in 1760.)

What you're saying also is that for the masses of Spanish people over there who'd be ferociously opposed to the British, it's either independence or nothing - not even a protectorate, never mind an outright colony, would cut it for them?

Perhaps at least some Spanish folks there might become in favour of the British once they witness a lot more British soldiers coming to Buenos Aires in July 1807 than a year earlier and promising them freedom and commercial privileges? (Although that may be wishful thinking.) Because from what I understand, it was precisely because there were so few British soldiers relative to the total Buenos Aires population (1,500 vs. 45,000) in 1806, whereas in Cape Town of that same year it was more like 6,000 vs. 15,000-20,000; in 1807 in Buenos Aires, we're talking more like 8,000-10,000 vs. 45,000.
 
Last edited:
British Uruguay but independent Argentina?

I'm now thinking, maybe in the aftermath of a British victory in Buenos Aires in 1807, it could be at the very least Uruguay that could have become a British colony? After all, it was OTL taken over by the Brits for five months and, at least in Montevideo and at other points along the Banda Oriental coast, the Spanish/local opposition to the Brits was not as ferocious as in the city of Buenos Aires.

And at the same time, Buenos Aires and the rest of that side of the Rio de la Plata could become independent under a British protectorate, and proceed to develop more or less like OTL?

I'm sure that in that scenario, Uruguay would have been facing a Falklands-like predicament in terms of being British but being fiercely claimed by Argentina.
 
Look to OTL Portuguese occupation of Uruguay for clues. Like the Brits, Portugal (fairly) quickly occupied the urban center, but it took them several years to pacify the countryside. I don't think Britain ever tried to occupy the countryside. Their goal was to use Montevideo as a launch point to assault Buenos Aires, and once the BA goal was thwarted, they packed up and left, so we don't know how they would have fared. After several years of occupation by Portugal (and later Brazil), Buenos Aires acted as a launch point to stir up trouble in Uruguay, and ended up creating an independent Uruguay.

I do think that if Britain wanted a presence in the area, they should have held on to Uruguay, and probably could have. but it wasn't going to be easy. In an earlier colonial time, it would have made sense, and it probably seemed like a good idea at the time. They had no way of knowing that the situation was going to drastically change (Spain flips from being an enemy to an ally, and a massive independence movement all over south America erupting) within months to a few years.

I'm thinking if you mix OTL with TL, you have:
Britain controlling Montevideo. within months Nap invades Spain. Britain agrees to return Uruguay to Spain at the conclusion of the European conflict, but extorts trade concessions in the La Plata region. Britain gets the trade presence it wants, and is absolved of occupation costs.

With a British interest in the region, Portugal is going to dissuaded from pushing south. Britain is basically running Portugal while the court is in Brazil. That has butterflies for the early years of Brazil, who don't waste precious dollars trying to hold on to Uruguay. I'm sure Pedro I would find another way to spoil his reputation, but maybe without a war sapping his popularity and the country's coffers, he could have smoothed the way to a more stable early Brazil.
 
Look to OTL Portuguese occupation of Uruguay for clues. Like the Brits, Portugal (fairly) quickly occupied the urban center, but it took them several years to pacify the countryside. I don't think Britain ever tried to occupy the countryside. Their goal was to use Montevideo as a launch point to assault Buenos Aires, and once the BA goal was thwarted, they packed up and left, so we don't know how they would have fared. After several years of occupation by Portugal (and later Brazil), Buenos Aires acted as a launch point to stir up trouble in Uruguay, and ended up creating an independent Uruguay.

I do think that if Britain wanted a presence in the area, they should have held on to Uruguay, and probably could have. but it wasn't going to be easy. In an earlier colonial time, it would have made sense, and it probably seemed like a good idea at the time. They had no way of knowing that the situation was going to drastically change (Spain flips from being an enemy to an ally, and a massive independence movement all over south America erupting) within months to a few years.

I'm thinking if you mix OTL with TL, you have:
Britain controlling Montevideo. within months Nap invades Spain. Britain agrees to return Uruguay to Spain at the conclusion of the European conflict, but extorts trade concessions in the La Plata region. Britain gets the trade presence it wants, and is absolved of occupation costs.

With a British interest in the region, Portugal is going to dissuaded from pushing south. Britain is basically running Portugal while the court is in Brazil. That has butterflies for the early years of Brazil, who don't waste precious dollars trying to hold on to Uruguay. I'm sure Pedro I would find another way to spoil his reputation, but maybe without a war sapping his popularity and the country's coffers, he could have smoothed the way to a more stable early Brazil.

A critical question in terms of British control of Montevideo and of Buenos Aires is: Is it easier or harder for the British to control Buenos Aires, after a victory, than Montevideo? My guess is that it would be somewhat harder, given how Buenos Aires people were more radical in their anti-British sentiment than the Montevideans. Of course, it depends on who is the commanding officer for Buenos Aires in 1807 - if it's Whitelocke, who was an incompetent military commander but a talented administrator, I'm sure he wouldn't do a half-bad job. But I dare say that Whitelocke would have a harder time in Buenos Aires than he would have had in Montevideo (and what Auchmuty did have in Montevideo). My hunch would be that when it comes time to 1808 and the invasion of Spain by Joseph Bonaparte (with Spain then becoming a British ally), the British would want to part with what's more difficult to control (Buenos Aires) - either returning it to Spain or granting it independence and either way getting a trading presence without the administrative costs, and retain what's somewhat easier to control (Montevideo) with less administrative costs. Unless once the British gain control of Buenos Aires there's no point in controlling Montevideo if Buenos Aires isn't also controlled?!
 
It's my understanding that, at this time, Montevideo had a bigger population than Buenos Aires. Doesn't that mean that it would be easier to colonise the latter than the former?
 
It's my understanding that, at this time, Montevideo had a bigger population than Buenos Aires. Doesn't that mean that it would be easier to colonise the latter than the former?

That's not my understanding. Just prior to 1806-07, Buenos Aires city had 40,000 to 45,000 people, while OTL Uruguay as a whole had 30,000 people or somewhat more (of whom about 10,000 lived in Montevideo).
 
Last edited:
Buenos Aires vs. Montevideo re: degree of local opposition to the British

A critical question in terms of British control of Montevideo and of Buenos Aires is: Is it easier or harder for the British to control Buenos Aires, after a victory, than Montevideo? My guess is that it would be somewhat harder, given how Buenos Aires people were more radical in their anti-British sentiment than the Montevideans. Of course, it depends on who is the commanding officer for Buenos Aires in 1807 - if it's Whitelocke, who was an incompetent military commander but a talented administrator, I'm sure he wouldn't do a half-bad job. But I dare say that Whitelocke would have a harder time in Buenos Aires than he would have had in Montevideo (and what Auchmuty did have in Montevideo). My hunch would be that when it comes time to 1808 and the invasion of Spain by Joseph Bonaparte (with Spain then becoming a British ally), the British would want to part with what's more difficult to control (Buenos Aires) - either returning it to Spain or granting it independence and either way getting a trading presence without the administrative costs, and retain what's somewhat easier to control (Montevideo) with less administrative costs. Unless once the British gain control of Buenos Aires there's no point in controlling Montevideo if Buenos Aires isn't also controlled?!

Actually, I'm wondering now: If Whitelocke (or some more competent commanding officer) had pulled off a victory in Buenos Aires in early July 1807, would the fierce opposition to the British among the porteños have been somewhat blunted, in much the same way that anti-British opposition in Montevideo among its locals was somewhat blunted earlier in 1807 after the British victory there under Auchmuty? (Whitelocke was a significantly better administrator than commanding officer, and Auchmuty was quite a good officer and administrator.) Or would it have been more difficult to do so in Buenos Aires, given its differences with Montevideo?
 
Top