Idle thought about the Prussian and Meiji Japanese constitutions

Japan's Meiji Constitution, which was drafted in the 1880s and adopted in 1890, was quite deliberately modeled on the Prussian Constitution of 1850. (The main foreign advisor to the constitutional drafters was a Prussian legal academic, Dr. Herman Roesler.)

The Prussian Constitution was very deliberately drafted, in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, to provide a veneer of liberal democracy while dividing real power among the monarchy, wealthy landowners, and the military. It was very much a “keep the peasants down and the liberals out” design. For various reasons this was attractive to the Meiji oligarchs -- they were a mixture of military men and wealthy landowners themselves.

Arguably it wasn’t a bad design for a 19th century monarchy entering a period of very rapid modernization, like Germany after 1850 and Japan after 1890. In both cases, the constitution worked pretty well for a generation or two. But by 1914 in Germany, or the early 1930s in Japan, the internal political structure was visibly cracking under the stresses of modernity. In the case of Japan, the election of a series of more or less liberal governments caused the military to become increasingly radicalized and disloyal, while the deeply conservative judiciary, police and security services winked at radical nationalist groups. By the mid-1930s the system had more or less collapsed; the liberals had been demoralized and muted, and Japan was sliding into ever more aggressive military adventures abroad and de facto military rule at home.

So: it's a common speculation that, if there’d been no Great War, Imperial Germany would have naturally evolved into a social democracy. The Socialist party was within an election or two of taking power, and probably would have been able to form a government. The prewar Socialists had a broad tent, but they were mostly pretty liberal and pacifist, so they’d have led Germany towards the light.

Japan’s experience suggests an alternative: a system hardwired for conservative rule would have thrown up an intense autoimmune reaction, with destabilizing and probably violent results.

Thoughts?


Doug M.
 

yourworstnightmare

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I have always thought that with no WW1, the German Socialists would split in Moderates and Revolutionaries the day they win an election, and the Moderates would be forced to form a coalition with the Centrist Parties.
 
Fascinating idea, Doug. I like. It seems like a plausible scenario, actually.

Arguably it's what happened in OTL WWI when the mobilization schedules quickly broke out of the Kaiser's control.

With the Wehrmacht acting on its own things could turn ugly very quickly, particularly if the political/diplomatic factors that led to WWI OTL are as yet unresolved.


Edit: Japan OTL had a continent full of technologically and economically weaker opponents to fight across the sea and out of sight from Akira Average on the street. How does the fact of Germany's long land borders and equally or near equally powerful neighbors change things?
 

Susano

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Well, at the end of WW1 the German military did run the show, with Ludendorff and Hindenburg. So in a way it indeed did happen in germany as well - though of course WW1 is hardly normal circumstances.

In general, I cant see the German army getting as radical as the Japanese one. Staging a coup? Maybe, Ludendorff seems to have been not averse to it IOTL. But mowing down (German) protestors once a general strike is called, which WILL happen? So, personally while things could get VERY rough in Germany I dont see the military winning it in the end like they did in Japan.
 
Is the Japan analogy truly valid? Germany had nothing on its borders like China and Manchuria to give fanatical officers a chance to train in blowing up trains and assassinating officials.

(I've sometimes wondered if the key to getting a *liberal Japan is to make sure China holds together).
 
The prewar Socialists had a broad tent, but they were mostly pretty liberal and pacifist,

The people who voted the naval bills and then the war credits, pacifist? :confused:

Is the Japan analogy truly valid? Germany had nothing on its borders like China and Manchuria to give fanatical officers a chance to train in blowing up trains and assassinating officials.

(I've sometimes wondered if the key to getting a *liberal Japan is to make sure China holds together).

Damn interesting idea, that second one. The first one, of course, implies that if German officers had Ukraine for a Manchuria then we might be talking. I think the Japan analogy would be more valid in the event of the CP winning late in the war.
 
That was pragmatism (well, the war credits were, in any case). In mindset, they sure were, they did actively campaign against the militarism rampant in the Kaiserreich.

I see patriotism in alliance with the pragmatism on that count. Wanting civilian oversight of the armed forces doesn't mean you're against war.

I have always thought that with no WW1, the German Socialists would split in Moderates and Revolutionaries the day they win an election, and the Moderates would be forced to form a coalition with the Centrist Parties.

They had "won" an election already as of 1914; that is, they'd got the most seats in the Reichstag, although given the almost complete lack of executive responsibility in Imperial Germany this didn't mean hugely much. The split was in my opinion very much a result of the war, its aftermath, and the Russian experience.

In Britain, we managed to keep a big-tent left party that was eventually able to come to power and transform society without being "revolutionary"; and indeed, EdT's depiction of a social democratic Kaiserreich seems to have a bit of the Attlee about it.

My personal opinion is that nothing is predestined but that if Germany carried on without war for another couple of decades and somehow managed to dispense with or neuter Wilhelm II, social democracy is at any rate more likley than a putsch. Germany wasn't Japan, and for all their poisonous attitudes I really can't see any self-respecting Prussian officer involving themself in a *2-26 incident. Germany before WW1 had a much less busy tradition of political murder, as Faeelin points out. Socialists this funny new government might be, but government is government, law and order is law and order.

And the point of my remarks about pacifism is really that mainstream socialism in Germany was both moderate and nationalist. We're not talking about shoulder-boards being torn off here: the army has little to lose from an orderly transfer of power.

But once again, German victory late in WW1, I think, mixes up some Japanese aspects with many of the ills of Weimar.
 
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Susano

Banned
I see patriotism in alliance with the pragmatism on that count. Wanting civilian oversight of the armed forces doesn't mean you're against war.
Its always a matter of context, and hence "pacifist" can be quite a relative term. In a modern context the ideas on defense of the moderate part of the SPD would be seen even as somewhat aggressive, but at that time they were moderatly pacifist. And the SPD leftwing, and not even only those who then formed the USPD, were really very pacifist even by modern standards.

Maybe Im engaging in party patriotism here :D , but it is amazing what the SPD got right way ahead of its time, also such things as rights for women and Jews...
 
Its always a matter of context, and hence "pacifist" can be quite a relative term. In a modern context the ideas on defense of the moderate part of the SPD would be seen even as somewhat aggressive, but at that time they were moderatly pacifist. And the SPD leftwing, and not even only those who then formed the USPD, were really very pacifist even by modern standards.

Maybe Im engaging in party patriotism here :D , but it is amazing what the SPD got right way ahead of its time, also such things as rights for women and Jews...

Difference of terminology again. ;) I don't intend "pacifism" to be a good thing; in fact, I put it to the credit of the SDP (who are one of my favourite historical parties, actually) that they weren't "pacifist". Influenced by Orwell (of course), I regard "pacifism" as being a yes-or-no matter: a pacifist is basically someone who, out of vague moral conviction that they haven't though through much, self-deceit, or complete apathy, doesn't think the world contains anything worth fighting for. The admirable suspicion of war and militaries that you're calling "moderately pacifist", I'd call "anti-militarist", "doveish", or suchlike.

I consider myself against war morally and against aggression in all circumstances, but I think true pacifism is cowardly, and basically a denial that we live in and depend on a society of rights and duties (nobody would ever charge a trench on his own account), so I put it in much the same category as tax evasion and Thatcherism. :D

I'm surely conditioned by my own country's history on that point, of course. Germany has a historical problem of militarism in recent times; Britain doesn't, but in Britain the "pacifists" were the spineless seed-cake nibbling species of left-winger who would repeat wooly slogans about how we should sit back and accept fascist world domination because Britain was just as bad, really throughout the 30s. Attlee - no militarist - sorted them out nice and proper! ;)
 
(I've sometimes wondered if the key to getting a *liberal Japan is to make sure China holds together).

But see: Japanese expansionist war against China in 1895, annexing Korea in 1910, and trying to annex Shandong in 1915.

And on the other hand: Shidehara Diplomacy in the decade after WWI. For the whole half century from 1895 to 1945, there was only one extended period when Japan wasn't pushing against China: the 1920s. Oddly enough, this was the period when warlordism in China peaked, rendering the central government a pathetic joke and China a de facto collection of rival bandit states.

IOW, I think the best conditions for a liberal Japan would be either a China strong enough to deter casual aggression (but not so strong as to present a clear strategic threat), /or/ a China so weak and divided as to present no threat and be easily manipulated without significant military intervention.

Incidentally, the rise of Chiang in the late 1920s was a major trigger for radicalizing Japan's right wing and military. Chiang wasn't a serious threat, but he was perceived as one -- a rough analogy might be to the way American conservatives view the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Doug M.
 
...I think the best conditions for a liberal Japan would be either a China strong enough to deter casual aggression (but not so strong as to present a clear strategic threat), /or/ a China so weak and divided as to present no threat and be easily manipulated without significant military intervention.

Incidentally, the rise of Chiang in the late 1920s was a major trigger for radicalizing Japan's right wing and military. Chiang wasn't a serious threat, but he was perceived as one

Personally, I think a good case can be made for a weak China leading to less Japanese expansionism, as others have said. In my opinion, the external pressure wasn't the big factor leading to the Japanese ending the Siberian Intervention, it was public anger at the cost (both in gold and human lives) that was being spent when the Japanese public didn't see the USSR as a threat. As early as the late 1920's, during the era of the Nine Powers Treaty and the Northern Expedition, various Japanese leaders were already losing credit with the public for being seen as "weak" in protecting Japanese interests in China. Public pressure was the one thing strong enough to prevent Japanese militarists from starting wars of opportunity.

Many people in Japan during this time period were afraid that a KMT-lead China would be strong enough to deny Japan (and the other imperial powers) their special rights in China. Without a united China, I wonder if you would have enough public support for the use of force to preserve Japanese interests in China. If China remains divided amongst warlords, I think the civilian government of Japan will remain content to simply play one warlord against another. It is easy enough to find some warlord willing to covertly support Japanese business rights in return for Japanese money and arms. If Manchuria and Shantung remain within the Japanese sphere of influence, I think most civilian and business leaders would be content to leave them under nominal Chinese control. Remember, during late Taisho and early Showa, Japan did agree to give up all rights in China other than purely economic rights, and withdrew it's troops from Shantung.

I'm sure you will still have military leaders advocating expansion of the Japanese Empire. Especially after the Showa Financial Crisis and the start of the Great Depression, you will still have many military leaders calling for direct annexation and control of Manchuria and other resource-rich areas. However, I think many business leaders will not support direct military control of resources that Japan can still buy on the open market. During this period, too, you have great weakness in Japanese banks and problems with Japan's foreign currency reserves. By this time, Japanese leaders already know that military action against China will bring boycotts, both in China and in Overseas Chinese communities. Why risk desperately needed export markets to seize raw materials that don't seem to be at risk (of being nationalized/controlled by a strong Chinese government)?

I think many people outside of Japan, now and then, saw Japan's expansion as naked aggression and conquest for money. Rightly or wrongly, though, many people in Japan saw moves like this as necessary to protect Japan against strong and unfriendly neighbors (namely, China, the British Empire, USSR, and the US). If there is little perceived need to use force to maintain Japan's favorable position in China, the military won't have the support it got historically from a slice of the public. Nishihara-Loan-style diplomacy will stay the preferred means of control for the Japanese government, and a frustrated military will have to content itself with constant build-ups to prepare for future wars against the US or USSR. You still face the problem of don't-miss-the-bus-ism dragging Japan into a war if/when war again breaks out in Europe, but at least without so much aggression in the 1930's, Japan should have most of its international reputation intact. This Japan would probably be in a much stronger position financially, too.

To sum up, I think a good case can be made for a weaker China, one that is not widely perceived as able to defend its own interests, actually preventing Japanese expansion, simply by making such military action seem unnecessary. Without Japanese aggression, Japanese trade benefits, and without huge military spending, the civilian economy is spared the historic huge disruptions. A Japan with a stronger economy is also less prone to pressure from radicalized pro-military jobless youths, especially if the agricultural sector does better than historically. The potential exists for a virtuous cycle. With any luck, the military remains but one power block among many, powerful but lacking overwhelming public backing, and unable to seize full control of the government.
 
But see: Japanese expansionist war against China in 1895, annexing Korea in 1910, and trying to annex Shandong in 1915.

I don't see what this is indicative of. Do you think America was not a liberal democracy, because it conquered the Philippines?

Let's not forget that liberal Britain and France tore up the Ottoman Empire to establish a series of colonies designed to provide critical raw materials for their homeland, and, in the case of Britain, pioneered the use of bombing to subdue rebellions.

China may well be a strategic threat if it's stronger, but by the same token a military that is willing to rush off and create its own foreign policy is a disaster if China is united.
 
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