Idealistic Cold War

I don't think it'll ever be as great as people like you want it - Picard sets a high standard to live up to

Too true.

It would, however, require some very idealistic people to be consistently in power, and that's harder to do than it should be.

That's not entirely the case. I won't deny that individuals can sometimes massively alter the course of events - I do deny historicism. But democracies usually tend to operate in paradigms, sustained by uncodified doctrines and settlements, by broad consensus - and individuals are limited by that tendency. Once a policy is established it pertains to a greater or lesser degree as long as it is seen as successful: One victory can frame the debate for decades, making some positions acceptable and others completely bonkers (until a major failure causes a paradigm shift, breaking the previous consensus and allowing "the impossible to become inevitable" as Thatcher put it).

With a very few exceptions, individual leaders are limited by circumstances - the limits of the debate affect the platform they are elected on, that platform limits what they can reasonably do in office, the general trend of policy affects the composition of the legislature which in turns checks the executive's freedom of action (in parliamentary democracies, leaders who depart from a consensus run the risk of being removed by their own side; in presidential ones, they suffer gridlock). The Churchill who won in 1951 was an exceptionally different politician from the one who lost in 1945; the Nixon who won in 1968 very different from the one who lost in 1960.

So for instance, a successful Wallace Presidency with his re-election in 1948 might lead to Stevenson or Kefauver or William O. Douglas as President in the 50s; or possibly it makes Taft a more plausible candidate. But I think it's more likely to affect how Eisenhower runs and wins, to force adaptions in the Republican platform (and compare the hawkish GOP platform of 1952 with earlier isolationism and you can see how circumstances affect policy). An Eisenhower Presidency that followed a successful Wallace Presidency would be very different from the Eisenhower Presidency that followed the successful Truman Presidency in OTL. Of course, there are only a few points where these paradigm shifts can take place - although, in AH terms, smaller shifts can go on to create ones that weren't there in OTL.
 
That's not entirely the case. I won't deny that individuals can sometimes massively alter the course of events - I do deny historicism. But democracies usually tend to operate in paradigms, sustained by uncodified doctrines and settlements, by broad consensus - and individuals are limited by that tendency. Once a policy is established it pertains to a greater or lesser degree as long as it is seen as successful: One victory can frame the debate for decades, making some positions acceptable and others completely bonkers (until a major failure causes a paradigm shift, breaking the previous consensus and allowing "the impossible to become inevitable" as Thatcher put it).

With a very few exceptions, individual leaders are limited by circumstances - the limits of the debate affect the platform they are elected on, that platform limits what they can reasonably do in office, the general trend of policy affects the composition of the legislature which in turns checks the executive's freedom of action (in parliamentary democracies, leaders who depart from a consensus run the risk of being removed by their own side; in presidential ones, they suffer gridlock). The Churchill who won in 1951 was an exceptionally different politician from the one who lost in 1945; the Nixon who won in 1968 very different from the one who lost in 1960.

So for instance, a successful Wallace Presidency with his re-election in 1948 might lead to Stevenson or Kefauver or William O. Douglas as President in the 50s; or possibly it makes Taft a more plausible candidate. But I think it's more likely to affect how Eisenhower runs and wins, to force adaptions in the Republican platform (and compare the hawkish GOP platform of 1952 with earlier isolationism and you can see how circumstances affect policy). An Eisenhower Presidency that followed a successful Wallace Presidency would be very different from the Eisenhower Presidency that followed the successful Truman Presidency in OTL. Of course, there are only a few points where these paradigm shifts can take place - although, in AH terms, smaller shifts can go on to create ones that weren't there in OTL.


While I agree with all of this to a greater or lesser extent, it's easier to deflect something from purely altruistic things than slip down to more, in a word, mundane levels.
 
As for the Sandinistas, they did indeed have elections that were declared free and fair by most of the world.

The Reagan administration were the only people claiming they were "soviet style sham elections," for obvious reasons.
 
As for the Sandinistas, they did indeed have elections that were declared free and fair by most of the world.

The Reagan administration were the only people claiming they were "soviet style sham elections," for obvious reasons.

Indeed. They also completely undermined the confidence in International Law with their refusal to acknowledge the outcome in 'Nicaragua v United States.'

Don't get me wrong I'm not anti-american and believe they have been overwhelmingly a force for good. However it is thoroughly disappointing they have sometimes strove to be the 'less bad' player on the world stage.
 
The Soviet had withdrawn from Iranian Aserbaijan by the end of 1946, and without any threats to bomb them. I can imagine that America made threats to stop them going back in when the Shah started attacking the area in 1947, but I've never seen any references to that so America kept it very quiet.

Of course, it wasn't incredibly overt, and the crisis wasn't as publicized as Cuba, but Washington made it clear that Soviet meddling would be met with force. Which is why the Majlis dared to reject the coerced proposal to give Soviets a 51% stake of the oil industry that was being voted on. The whole crisis was Stalin probing to see how far he could go. If the U.S. isn't going to aid Iran because it's an authoritarian monarchy with only a fledgling parliamentary system, then it's all in for the Soviets.


The ease with which the Tudeh were rounded-up and dispatched in 1953 suggests he very much was. The Soviets had no influence in the rest of Iran, so the absolute worst that is going to happen if America doesn't back the Shah's re-conquest, is that a section of northern Iran merges with Azerbaijan and another section becomes an independent Kurdish state.

The events in 1953 are complex and different than 1947, but you're underestimating the strength of the Tudeh. It was very strong in the urban areas, Tehran had close to 50 communist newspapers around the time period. The Tudeh also penetrated the military officers corps well enough to know of the coup attempts in 1953. If the Soviets are able to move openly, then they could easily become the Soviets' lackeys like the East German and Polish Communist parties. You don't need a majority to orchestrate a coup d'etat. I think the Soviets would run into problems with the occupation, but the geo-strategic importance of Iran means dissidents will meet the same end as the Hungarians in 1956.
 
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Of course, it wasn't incredibly overt, and the crisis wasn't as publicized as Cuba, but Washington made it clear that Soviet meddling would be met with force. Which is why the Majlis dared to reject the coerced proposal to give Soviets a 51% stake of the oil industry that was being voted on. The whole crisis was Stalin probing to see how far he could go. If the U.S. isn't going to aid Iran because it's an authoritarian monarchy with only a fledgling parliamentary system, then it's all in for the Soviets.




The events in 1953 are complex and different than 1947, but you're underestimating the strength of the Tudeh. It was very strong in the urban areas, Tehran had close to 50 communist newspapers around the time period. The Tudeh also penetrated the military officers corps well enough to know of the coup attempts in 1953. If the Soviets are able to move openly, then they could easily become the Soviets' lackeys like the East German and Polish Communist parties. You don't need a majority to orchestrate a coup d'etat. I think the Soviets would run into problems with the occupation, but the geo-strategic importance of Iran means dissidents will meet the same end as the Hungarians in 1956.


And a Soviet occupied Iran would have been a huge shift in the balance of power. Maybe not immediately, but as ME oil became increasingly important.


What other places would the OP have led to an increase in Soviet power?
 
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