Ideal OoB and Equipment for WWI Combatants

[Scott Washburn]

It sometimes takes looking in the oddest places to see the history of a thing. The professionals knew. Oh, they knew, some of them, because they were warned. They were not that stupid.

Some of them may have suspected or worried, but as far as my research found none of them were saying it openly. Not surprising since it would have been career suicide. "Oh, by the way, sir, all of the work and training we've been doing for the last fifty years is totally worthless. We need to come up with something new." Oh yeah, that would have gone over well.

 

[Hammerbolt]

Gassing the deafened motion sick strap hanging troops in a spiky hot metal sauna with carbon monoxide did somewhat reduce their effectiveness when debussed.
What it would be most useful for in 1919 would be to bring supplies forward to support the troops once the line had been broken, to maintain the tempo of the beak through. Also to bring casualties back together with situation reports.

So, maybe an open topped Mark IV "Heavy Cargo"...

 

[Paternas]

How about introducing a communications/forward observer tank with radio? A big problem was the lack of fast communications between attacking troops and the supporting artillery and other units. You modified holt tractor with armor plates should be able to carry a radio and be introduced quite quickly. It wouldn't need armament.

 

[Hammerbolt]

How about introducing a communications/forward observer tank with radio? A big problem was the lack of fast communications between attacking troops and the supporting artillery and other units. You modified holt tractor with armor plates should be able to carry a radio and be introduced quite quickly. It wouldn't need armament.

The french had the FT TSF, a version of the FT17 carrying a radio. Afaik, about 100 were produced in 1918, and at least some served in the war:

 

[McPherson]

Some of them may have suspected or worried, but as far as my research found none of them were saying it openly. Not surprising since it would have been career suicide. "Oh, by the way, sir, all of the work and training we've been doing for the last fifty years is totally worthless. We need to come up with something new." Oh yeah, that would have gone over well.

Let me see.

Emory Upton (storm tactics), William Tecumseh Sherman (siege of Atlanta), Theodore Roosevelt (Kettle Hill), Leonard Wood (machine guns), Nelson Miles (enemy riflemen using superior rifles from entrenched positions), come to mind. Even a jerk named, Arthur MacArthur, was worried about the defense over offense problem (Filipino American War, famous for the North Luzon pacification after General Otis got into "trouble". ).

Ideally, I'd hire a mercenary to shoot Woodrow Wilson, put Kaiser Wilhelm in a coma, and drug Franz Ferdinand for like 2 weeks starting the week before his trip to Sarajevo. But failing that, all Great Powers would be a lot better off with the following:

1. Something vaguely resembling camo for field uniforms. Napoleonic snazziness is all well and good for the parade ground, but in the field you want dull browns and greens. Also, nobody has time to do up a fancy outfit anymore.
2. Until someone develops a walkie-talkie, every platoon should have a pair of designated radiomen to carry the comms gear. Better comms = better tactics. Reducing radios to easily man-portable size is a top priority.
3. Recon airplanes. Get them up immediately. By which I mean, get a fucking Wright Flyer if you have to and start using it for recon. Start working on synching machine-guns to the propeller ASAP.
4. Every army should reorganize their officer training doctrine to emphasize initiative among low to mid-level officers. Until decent radios are available, this is the best way to counter for the comms problem.

Most of these have already been covered in some capacity by other people, though.

Specifics for each country:

• America: Wilson hits his head and is left unfit for office.
• Italy: Shoot Luigi Cadorna, stake him in the heart with green wood, cut his head off with a silver sword, then shoot him again, just to be sure.
• AH: Oh boy. Send von Hötzendorf to train cadets or something, or just shoot him. And make sure the lieutenants all have adequate winter gear BEFORE launching an offensive in the Carpathians in fucking JANUARY. Better yet, follow up getting rid of Conrad by not launching a winter offensive in the Carpathians.
• Germany: Hit anybody who even suggests unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic over the head and have them cashiered and locked up. On the spot. Including the Kaiser if need be. And send Ludendorff on vacation in late '17 and have somebody who isn't cracking under the stress try to unfuck Kaiserschlacht.
• Russia: Fire the entire General Staff. You can't possibly get any worse.
• Turkey: Shoot Enver Pasha. Fucking megalomaniacal mass-murderer.
• France: Where to start? Um. Have a functioning government that isn't basically a provisional government that got entrenched? Don't try to use attrition tactics against the neighboring major power with a significantly greater population?
• UK: Strip Haig naked, beat the crap out of him, and force him to live like a conscript in a trench for a month. Maybe that'll help.
• Belgium: Beg, plead, and suck up to France for help, up to and including letting them in to defend Belgium once the diplomatic crisis starts. Also, have the entire military built to hold off the Germans at the border. France isn't the threat at this point.

Murder of Sam Hughes.

comments like this, it's what makes this site so much fun.

1. Shooting Woodrow Wilson is disproportionate. The man was evil, but he could be remediated by simply finding him incompetent and impeaching him.
2. Kaiser Bill should have been politically abdicated. Franz Ferdinand's security detail failed him. Even so, it would have been prudent to adopt a "everyone is expendable and can be replaced for reasons" policy as far as German or AH politics is concerned. See (1.)
3. Great powers wish list.
- re-elect Teddy.
-Someone in Italy should have understood by 3rd Isonzo that Cadorna was insane. If you have a Sampson, Ghormley or Pye on your hands (US Navy admirals who went insane.) , you send that person to hospital.
-Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf? Relieve him for incompetence in July 1914. Do not wait for him to screw up in war.
-After Kaiser Bill is packed off to Holland, arrest the entire German diplomatic corps and jail them for incompetence. Ludendorff is obviously insane. Hospital. Unrestricted U-boat warfare is going to be a coin flip if the Russians still start the trains flowing west and Germany winds up in a shooting war. A lot depends on AH/Serbia.
-Czar Nicky should be abdicated and SHOT for treason after the Russo-Japanese War. Ditto Rasputin and anyone else at court who influences Russian politics between 1900 and 1914. The Russian general staff should be included. This is the first practical situation where death is merited for crimes against the people.
-The Three Pashas should be shot early and often. Again the justification is treason and the crimes against the people.
-France could have tried a better version of Verdun by making the Germans do the attacking harder.
-Haig needed imagination and a general staff, who had a clue. Sorry, that is not going to happen. Maybe next time?
-Belgium is the goat staked between two predators. Kind of like Poland. Nothing will fix her, except Europe studies war no more.

Finally, unless a war crime or a justifiable charge of treason (political malfeasance so grave to endanger the existence of the nation, or giving aid and comfort to the enemy, are two modern acceptable definitions.), is committed as a willfull act, I would be hesitant to endorse or cheer on even fictional unjustified homicides.

 

[Worffan101]

Finally, unless a war crime or a justifiable charge of treason (political malfeasance so grave to endanger the existence of the nation, or giving aid and comfort to the enemy, are two modern acceptable definitions.), is committed as a willfull act, I would be hesitant to endorse or cheer on even fictional unjustified homicides.

Fair, that's why I'm only advising for the extremely detailed murder of Cadorna (TWELVE motherfucking battles of the Isonzo?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!) and Enver "Genocide" Pasha.

I mean, I'd even let Nicky II live, and he was the poster child for monarchy being the worst government system. Even Kaiser Bill had his moments (when his ADHD and massive chip on his shoulder weren't in charge), Nicky II somehow managed to fuck up literally every single thing he touched.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Austria-Hungary couldn't invest heavily into anything. Franz Josef kept the purse strings too tight for even Conrad's most modest budget proposals.

If a large enough budget was approved:

First thing on the list would be replacing all the bronze barrelled guns with steel barrelled ones with modern recoil mitigation devices (some of the guns in AH service didn't even have spades!).

Second on the list would be expanding the officer corps, AH had a pretty good cadre of multilingual pre-war officers, but then they were all culled in the Winter Carpathian Offensives*. Developing a redundancy of officers would greatly improve AH's ability to sustain casualties.

After that increasing the number of machine guns per battalion is a must. IIRC Conrad wanted to at least match the Russians.

In terms of fancy new technologies, the Austro-Daimler Panzerautomobil seemed like a really decent armoured car, and Mannlicher's pistol calibre carbines would have been useful in infantry assaults.

*some better winterized uniforms would also be a good idea.

I'll add a doctrinal bit to mine. DO NOT ALLOW FORCES TO BE ENCIRCLED EVEN IF THEY ARE IN A FORTRESS! As a strong point along a contiguous frontline fortresses are fine, but once the wings start being pushed back its time to blow the mags and withdraw with the rest of the line. Przemyśl, as valiant and tenacious as its defenders were, only ended up being

a) impetus for the Carpathian Offensives (Vienna put a lot of pressure on Conrad to relieve the siege)

b) a capitulation worse than Singapore (20k dead and over a 110k captured!)

c) a big knock to moral (the progress of the siege had become a focal point for the national and international press)

The traditional use of fortresses just isn't viable anymore. Especially if the theoretical relief force would have to break through the lines of a strongly entrenched enemy in unfavourable terrain, march dozens of kilometres in the middle of winter, and then defeat the besieging force...

Also, try really hard to figure out what your allies have planned. Conrad knew nothing of the Schlieffen plan and was caught completely flat-footed by the fact that Germany would have one field army for its entire eastern flank.

And do a better job sniffing out rats.

 

[Driftless]

How well prepared were any of the national armies for what percentage of their force was available day 1, day 30, day 90, day 365 of any declared war?
(For comparative examples, the Germans appear to have been more structured to have larger forces ready sooner than the Russians and French. The British regulars were, by and large, more ready, but a comparatively small force. The US had to go from a largely colonial/constabulary force in 1916, heavily dependent on very uneven National Guard forces for numbers; to a "million man" expeditionary force in a year. How ready they were has been extensively debated.)

 

[McPherson]

The traditional use of fortresses just isn't viable anymore. Especially if the theoretical relief force would have to break through the lines of a strongly entrenched enemy in unfavourable terrain, march dozens of kilometres in the middle of winter, and then defeat the besieging force...

Vercingetorix. Apparently the Austrian general staff was NTB.

 

[Bougnas]

One could certainly argue that conservatism led France to be less-well prepared for WW1 in terms of equipment than other belligerents. That said there were quite a few opportunities to improve the situation.

Rifle(s):
The desire to exploit the benefits of smokeless powder and to one-up the Germans who introduced a new rifle in 1884 meant that the 1886 Lebel was the best rifle in the world for a short time but by the time of the war was totally outclassed.

The Lebel effectively used a Kropatscheck mechanism/magazine design which was completely obsolete by the 1890s and heavily limited rate of fire. Moreover the cartridge was based on that of the Gras ammunition, which prevented the French from going down in caliber to 7.5 or 7mm and using the Swiss Rubin-style rimless cartridge(tested at the time). A lower caliber round would have offered increased accuracy and/or reduced recoil and weight of the rifle while being more compatable with autoloading devices.

Had the French waited a few years longer to introduce a new rifle, they would have ended up with a weapon using the much more modern Mannlicher or Puteaux mechanism (latter tested in the 1880s but not mature enough to go into the Lebel) and with a better round.
The French also still wanted short barrel carbines (0.8m) for special troops and very long rifles (around 1.30m) for the infantry but some countries like the UK with the SMLE and the US with the M1903 Springfield ended up adopting an intermediate length rifle (around 1m) for general use.

Alternatively, a plausible way to get an even better result would have been to replace the Lebel in the early 1900s with the intermediate length version (1.125m) of the Berthier (with the new cartridge if still developped) that was used by colonial forces in Indochina.

Either option would have resulted in France having as good if not better of a service rifle as the other countries involved in WW1, in line with say a SMLE. It would have a good rate of fire, would be lighter, easier to handle in the trenches, less complex and more suited to mass production in the 1900s. Indeed going for the Berthier option might see the French still having production capability for a rifle by 1914, reducing the effort needed to replace Lebel losses during the war.

Bonus impacts would be having an easier time designing automatic weapons during or after the war (looking at you Chauchat), and having a much more modern bolt action rifle and cartridge before WW2 (something a bit worse than a MAS 36 but no worse than other rifles of the era). It might indeed be easier to then develop the MAS 40 rifle and FM24/29 LMG with a cartridge closer to the OTL 7.5mm Mle 1929 (basically like transitionning from 30.06 to 7.62x51).

MG:
See above for a potential better round for the OTL MGs. Adopting the Hotchkiss MG earlier than 1914 (I think it was sold in 1908 already) would give France a more reliable and easier to produce MG before the war, instead of getting a few of the MGs developped by state companies.

Uniform:
Without necessarily going to the Reseda 1911 uniform, the French had plenty of options from the 1890s to 1910s to get a uniform more suited to WW1. Even the low-visibility versions of the blue shirt and red trousers (without shiny buttons and other cosmetic stuff) would have been better, and a color similar to the post-1915 horizon blue was also tested. Beyond having less visible uniforms the French could also have got vastly superior pouches suited for firing prone, load-bearing equipment and lighter backpacks (all tested before WW1).

Moreover while not as capable as the Adrian design the French had several helmet designs before WW1 that could have offered some protection against shrapnel, even if it could only be issued to arty gun crews and cavaliers.

Mobile kitchen:
Yes, the French did not have one.

 

[Driftless]

Mobile kitchen:
Yes, the French did not have one.

Ironic.... There has to be a joke lurking in there somewhere....

Kidding aside, how were French troops fed when they were in the field?

 

[Scott Washburn]

Let me see.

Emory Upton (storm tactics), William Tecumseh Sherman (siege of Atlanta), Theodore Roosevelt (Kettle Hill), Leonard Wood (machine guns), Nelson Miles (enemy riflemen using superior rifles from entrenched positions), come to mind. Even a jerk named, Arthur MacArthur, was worried about the defense over offense problem (Filipino American War, famous for the North Luzon pacification after General Otis got into "trouble". ).

Oh yes, there were people worrying about this over the years. The biggest worries, though, came from the Franco-Prussian War. With both sides armed with breechloading rifles for the first time it became very apparent that the old close order tactics didn't work any more. And for the next 30-odd years there was a huge debate in the world's militaries over what to do about it. System after system was proposed, tried, modified, rejected and tried again. Reading the hundreds of articles in the Journal of the Military Service Institute and the Army and Navy Journal from that period is fascinating. But the interesting thing was that by around 1900, the debate fades away. They've stopped talking about tactics and instead are wondering about how bicycles can be used in the military or arguing about whether the battalion colors ought to be kept in the rear or still carried on the front lines. The military theorists thought that they'd solved the tactical problems and they went into the Great War War convinced they their systems could overcome the power of the defense. Obviously they were wrong, but for any significant changes to come about BEFORE the war starts it would have taken a lot of people in positions of power recognizing their system was NOT going to work. Those people were not there.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The Haldane reforms include some form of Conscription with the table of equipment to support in addition to the 6 Regular Infantry, 1 Cavalry divisions plus 14 TA Infantry Division + 14 Brigade Yeomanry force pretty much within a month or 2 of a European declaration allowing a much faster build up of a much larger BEF capable of deploying to the UK continent (or for TA units to replace overseas regular units faster).

 

[McPherson]

Oh yes, there were people worrying about this over the years. The biggest worries, though, came from the Franco-Prussian War. With both sides armed with breechloading rifles for the first time it became very apparent that the old close order tactics didn't work any more. And for the next 30-odd years there was a huge debate in the world's militaries over what to do about it. System after system was proposed, tried, modified, rejected and tried again. Reading the hundreds of articles in the Journal of the Military Service Institute and the Army and Navy Journal from that period is fascinating. But the interesting thing was that by around 1900, the debate fades away. They've stopped talking about tactics and instead are wondering about how bicycles can be used in the military or arguing about whether the battalion colors ought to be kept in the rear or still carried on the front lines. The military theorists thought that they'd solved the tactical problems and they went into the Great War War convinced they their systems could overcome the power of the defense. Obviously they were wrong, but for any significant changes to come about BEFORE the war starts it would have taken a lot of people in positions of power recognizing their system was NOT going to work. Those people were not there.

If that were the case, then WHY did the Americans persist with skirmishers forward when they went over the top in WW1? That is something straight out of the Petersburg playbook that Grant used to break Lee.

And since Upton got there first before the Franco Prussian War, that should be an indicer that somebody was not paying attention. Also, it turns out, (WWII island fighting) that nobody had "solved" the machine gun in an infantry brawl until about 1942.

 

[edgeworthy]

For something that should be possible, if a bit of a change in doctrine, would be for the British Army to switch the ratio of Howitzers to Field Guns, going into 1914 with three times as many 4.5" Howitzers as 18 pdrs.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

For something that should be possible, if a bit of a change in doctrine, would be for the British Army to switch the ratio of Howitzers to Field Guns, going into 1914 with three times as many 4.5" Howitzers as 18 pdrs.

Until it wasn't, the British army was expecting to, and largely did for the first months of the war, fight a war of manoeuvre - as did everyone else involved.

Until then the 18 pounder was a superior weapon system for that kind of warfare with much higher rate of fire and slight increase in range.

A split trail 18 pounder capable of firing to a higher elevation allowing to act as a semi-howitzer as well as increasing range for its primary day job as a field gun that can spam out loads of Shrapnel rounds in a short time period would have been a good compromise.

There would have to have been an overwhelming and totally unambiguous understanding that a HE lobber would be more useful than the field gun and I just do not see that happening.

 

[Zman]

Didn't the UK try to maybe an APC version of the Mark IV tank? maybe get that going asap?

They did, the Mark IX
https://en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Ma...
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Mark IX tank - Wikipedia