Ideal OoB and Equipment for WWI Combatants

On radios

The problem discovered very quickly by the RN in IIRC 1901 when they first started using them was 3 fold

Triangulation - The enemy now knows where you are
Operational security - even if using proper code etc a sudden flurry of comms lets the opposition know that something is up
Jamming - the RN found very quickly that radio comms could be jammed

The issues would be the same for land use.

Now that's not to say that Radio is not useful - far from it in fact - its just that it can not at this time reliably replace runners/dispatch riders or LOS comms (aldis lamp / flags etc)
 
The plausible:
All participants: Stock up on more shells beforehand. Use was way over estimates on all froonts and all of them faced a shell crisis limiting options in 1914/1915.
More mortars, more MGs per comapny. Invest in one ship less and use the funds to improve your ToE.

Tactics: train and imlement smaller maneuver units, down to the platoon and Auftragstaktik. Use short but heavy barages... day long preparational barages only tell your oponent where to focus his reserves.

German:
Implement use of Haber-Bosch process earlier.
Have lorry transported radios to coordinate the advance at regiment level (at the elast) and get faster locational awareness of youir troops on the map for better spotting of developments.
If the war of maneuver fails, cheaper and quicker to produce MGs (best would be stamped metal like the MG 42 (if metalurgically possible?). Also... roller blowback possible at teh time?).
Build more planes and train more pilots.
 

Driftless

Donor
The French considered the "Reseda Green" uniforms in 1911-1912, but didn't make the shift. (image borrowed from jeandebueil's excellent "Unwanted Clairvoyant")
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Driftless

Donor
Use short but heavy barages... day long preparational barages only tell your oponent where to focus his reserves.

Those extended barrages also churned up the ground to the point where they became gooey morasses. Very difficult for man, beast, machine to cross with any element of speed, which compounded the carnage.
 
For Canada:

First of all, higher a mercenary to kill Sam Hughes.

Might want to have him cashiered or jailed, instead. Incompetence is a political/military offense for dismissal. Corruption in office is a prison term.

Second on the list is to run the Ross Rifle through some extensive tests, and actually act on the feed back this time. So many of the problems Canada had with the guns could have been found and solved pre-war (in fact, quite a few of the problems were discovered in training prior to being shipped overseas) and by just improving quality control standards at the factory. Here's a pretty good video on the numerous screw ups involved in the Ross' production.


Ross is the one who needed a lead tranquilizer.

While unruining the Ross, some enterprising factory worker starts experimenting with converting it into an automatic rifle. OTL Mr. Huot was able to successfully manage that in two years, working alone, without pay. So actually give this guy a salary, and a staff to speed up the process and hopefully the CEF can go over with some decent auto rifles.

That might be possible, but it might be better to adopt a light machine gun. (cough, Lewis gun, cough.)


The APC prototype looks good on paper. I'm not sure what other candidate that could do its essential unintended mission which is deliver an infantry section with its machine gun (German Breakthrough 1918, the armoured autocar did act as intended in the mission role as I see it.).

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Source: Here.

Using radios for all communication is one option, and this works well in a fight against enemies with less radio use. Against an army that uses radios everywhere, there is another option which works very well and renders the first option useless. This consists of making radios, but training troops to maintain EMCON and minimize their use wherever possible. At the same time, set up a large organization of radio intelligence units in the army with listening and direction-finding equipment. All recorded communications would pass to decryption, and locations from direction-finding would pass to artillery units (which units would probably be located with, as passing data to them by radio would be dangerous and passing data by messenger would be slow). Artillery would immediately fire on any major radio source in enemy territory. Frequency-hopping can defeat interception and jamming, but not direction-finding. War against a radio-dependent enemy could be summed up with this:

Most likely the enemy army would lose all of its radio operators and most of its command staff within 1-2 weeks, and would be completely neutralized without an alternative to radio.

The ideal method to use depends on how much the enemy force uses radios, and most importantly if they can function without using them.

I would point out.

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Marconi pack radio.

Not light, not robust, and very hard to use. RN begins radio experiments in July 1899, USN jumps on it in August 1899. Both fleets are fully radioed up by 1903. This includes experiments with RDF, jamming and weather effects. Land warfare showed its ugly side (Russo-Japanese War.). Not until WWII will "mobile" radio be practical in land warfare. Unusually, the Royal Flying Corps start putting heavy Marconi radios with telephone sets into SE type scout planes that flew as early primitive Airborne Early Warning type combat air patrol planes to spot German intruders crossing over the battlefield, about 600 sets worth.
 

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That might be possible, but it might be better to adopt a light machine gun. (cough, Lewis gun, cough.)
from the wiki:
To further this aim, Blair, A.A. Janson, and Huot sailed for Britain, arriving at Sandling, Hythe on 10 January 1918, for an extensive British trial at the arms testing establishment at RSAF Enfield. This took place between 19–21 March 1918, and the Huot competed against the Lewis, Hotchkiss, and Farquhar-Hill. The results appeared favorable. "The Huot did better in some tests than the Lewis. It was superior in snapshooting from a trench, in quickness of getting into action..."[4] Even muddy, after firing four or five clearing rounds,[4] it would function again, without the need for stripping and cleaning;[6] Blair noted it was the only weapon on the trial able to suffer immersion and do so.

In firing 10,000 rounds through the Huot, Enfield uncovered fouling of the gas cylinder at 4,000 rounds, and the barrel worn out at 10,000.[4] Since this example had already had some 11,000 rounds fired through it before coming into Enfield's hands, this is understandable. Using all varieties of Mark VII ammunition it would be likely to encounter (including K, KN, J, and US), they found the Huot had no major problems, though there were unexplained stoppages, and it did not require the specially chosen ammunition the Lewis did.[4] Furthermore, the Huot proved able to fire 4,000 rounds without oiling or cleaning; which the Lewis was unable to do.[7]

In a 22 October 1917 letter to the British Minister of Munitions, Blair said tooling existed in Canada and the Dominion Factory was ready to begin manufacturing the Huot, using parts from Rosses scheduled for scrapping.[4] After exposure to it in France, Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, commanding the Canadian Corps, reported every soldier to come in contact with the Huot liked it, and on 1 October 1918 wrote requesting 5,000 be purchased, arguing casualties required increased firepower for each remaining man,[6] as well as to allow his men to answer the growing number of German light machine guns.[6] It was ugly, but at C$50, considerably cheaper than the original C$1,000 cost of the Lewis.[8]
Doesn't sound like the Lewis was the better gun.

The APC prototype looks good on paper. I'm not sure what other candidate that could do its essential unintended mission which is deliver an infantry section with its machine gun (German Breakthrough 1918, the armoured autocar did act as intended in the mission role as I see it.).
Yeah its performance on the defensive was outstanding. However, as the paper I linked notes its performance on the offensive during the Hundred Days was much worse.
 
This could be ASB, but the production cost of a WW2 Sten Gun was pretty low. It had something like only 47 parts and used a 9x19mm round. I think its comceivable the British see a use for trench clearing SMGs and come up with something similarly cheap.
 

Deleted member 1487

Why?

I know the British did but then it was probably the best price at the time!
Why what? That they could only source it from Germany? The Germans dominated the chemical industry pre-WW1. And after WW1. After WW2 is when it changed due to industrial dismantling and well the accumulated problems of having lost millions of their young men in two world wars and the US, UK, France, and USSR taking all the remaining best minds in Germany as well as the US industry expanding during WW2.

The three major firms BASF, Bayer and Hoechst produced several hundred different dyes, and by 1913, the German industry produced almost 90 percent of the world supply of dyestuffs and sold about 80 percent of their production abroad.[6]
 
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Why what? That they could only source it from Germany? The Germans dominated the chemical industry pre-WW1. And after WW1. After WW2 is when it changed due to industrial dismantling and well the accumulated problems of having lost millions of their young men in two world wars and the US, UK, France, and USSR taking all the remaining best minds in Germany as well as the US industry expanding during WW2.


Your not wrong - but as soon as Britain could not source dyes from Germany because of all that unpleasantness they setup/consolidated their own industry - such as the creation of British Dyes LTD in 1915 to ensure enough supply of Dyes and other chemicals etc particulalrly those vital for explosives.

This in addition to buying dyes and already dyed uniforms/clothing from other nations i.e. the USA.

But until it could not get dyes from Germany - it didn't have to worry about it.

My question being why would the French not also purchase dyes from Germany had they chosen a more sensible colour for their field uniforms and then when they could no longer buy from Germany (if that was indeed the case), do as the British did and stand up/consolidate their own industry (which is what I suspect they ended up having to do anyway as they were still dying stuff) ?
 

Deleted member 1487

Your not wrong - but as soon as Britain could not source dyes from Germany because of all that unpleasantness they setup/consolidated their own industry - such as the creation of British Dyes LTD in 1915 to ensure enough supply of Dyes and other chemicals etc particulalrly those vital for explosives.

This in addition to buying dyes and already dyed uniforms/clothing from other nations i.e. the USA.

But until it could not get dyes from Germany - it didn't have to worry about it.

My question being why would the French not also purchase dyes from Germany had they chosen a more sensible colour for their field uniforms and then when they could no longer buy from Germany (if that was indeed the case), do as the British did and stand up/consolidate their own industry (which is what I suspect they ended up having to do anyway as they were still dying stuff) ?
It wasn't an issue of whether Britain could or couldn't, but of France. The French economy was pretty messed up pre-WW1 and was stagnating compared to other economies, because they, like Britain, were overly focused on capital markets and small manufacturing (they made Germany look like paragons of US style mass manufacturing) and had focused nearly all their investments into the Russian economy, which limited capital available to start up a competing chemical industry against Germany...not that they'd really be able to compete given Germany's lead. It would have been too expensive to build an industry to supply the army like that without any other buyers, especially when army money was much more needed to invest in modern heavy artillery.

In war time when flush with cash it is possible to put fiscal responsibility over the side of the ship, but pre-war that isn't a viable option. The US chemical industry largely turned into what it was as a result of WW1 and meeting European needs. As it was the US was in a serious recession in 1913-14 and WW1 took us out of it and dramatically expanded US industry.

Without WW1 the US industry would never have developed into what became after WW2 because of European capital injections to meet the needs their own industries couldn't.

As to your question about why the French wouldn't buy from Germany pre-war...national pride. Germany was their core rival, so trading with them for military stuff was a political non-starter, especially when issues like access during a war were brought up. See above for the issue with financing it. During the war it wasn't an issue, but it took several hundred thousand dead in 1914 to figure that out.
 
The problem with this sort of exercise is that no one foresaw the stalemate of the trenches so there is no reason for anyone to develop weapons or equipment help break that stalemate.
 
The problem with this sort of exercise is that no one foresaw the stalemate of the trenches so there is no reason for anyone to develop weapons or equipment help break that stalemate.

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Russo-Japanese War. Japanese soldiers pot-shotting their Russian opposites.

San-Juan-Hill-Blockhouse.jpg


US 16th Infantry; final assault Spanish blockhouse; San Juan Hill. Notice barbed wire and stakes? Also notice messenger trench used for cover?
 
Russo-Japanese War. Japanese soldiers pot-shotting their Russian opposites.

US 16th Infantry; final assault Spanish blockhouse; San Juan Hill. Notice barbed wire and stakes? Also notice messenger trench used for cover?
Those were preparatjions for assaults on fortresses. Can't compared with an entire front line of a war...
 
Using radios for all communication is one option, and this works well in a fight against enemies with less radio use. Against an army that uses radios everywhere, there is another option which works very well and renders the first option useless. This consists of making radios, but training troops to maintain EMCON and minimize their use wherever possible. At the same time, set up a large organization of radio intelligence units in the army with listening and direction-finding equipment. All recorded communications would pass to decryption, and locations from direction-finding would pass to artillery units (which units would probably be located with, as passing data to them by radio would be dangerous and passing data by messenger would be slow). Artillery would immediately fire on any major radio source in enemy territory. Frequency-hopping can defeat interception and jamming, but not direction-finding. War against a radio-dependent enemy could be summed up with this:

Most likely the enemy army would lose all of its radio operators and most of its command staff within 1-2 weeks, and would be completely neutralized without an alternative to radio.
That's a neat trick - but did anyone ever actually pull it off in practice? And is direction-finding equipment good enough to use for artillery targeting practical with WW1 technology? (Remember, this was WW1, when you could shell a observed and well-located enemy strongpoint for a week, and it would be back in action ten minutes after you ceased fire.)

I wasn't proposing using radio for all communications - everything on your side of the lines can go be landline - but if you want to avoid your artillery being reduced to pre-programmed fire by map reference, and your infantry getting mown down because they were 20 minutes late getting to the jump-off point and the barrage had already lifted, you need some faster method of communication than runners, motorcyclists or carrier pigeons.
 
Those were preparatjions for assaults on fortresses. Can't compared with an entire front line of a war...

You are kidding? How was Mukden not a trench warfare nightmare or Santiago de Cuba a miniature continuous front as the Americans closed in on San Juan heights?
 
The biggest foresight that could have been made is the French improving the quality of the Chauchat's magazine. If they didn't make a half ass magazine for that gun it wouldn't have jammed, had feeding problems, and failed in the trenches as often as it did to where it was viewed as a worthless joke of a weapon. And while we are on the French, another thing they could have done differently was not be stupid enough to outfit their soldiers with powder blue and red uniforms that were based in the Napoleonic era and adopted proper military camouflage. For the Brits, and this is more later end of WW1 going into the interwar/early WW2 a bit, a big foresight they should have had was the importance of machine pistols and sub-machine guns so they weren't dumping endless amounts of hard currency on Thompson guns which were expensive to get in those times.
 
Minimum plausible POD what about giving ASAP a automatic pistol to each private? Trenchs and closae cuartel brawls and a fast firing 1911 or any of the available models would be better than a rifle. Later some enterprising blokes would surely play about transforming them to full automatic fire. From that to a smg...
While I agree this idea has some merit, I suspect issuing every private a quality automatic (most likely actually a semi automatic) pistol would have been viewed as cost prohibitive in the early 20th century. I suspect it cost at least several times as much to produce a 1911 as say an 03 Springfield (I have seen various figures for historical pricing..) I think a basic blow back operated SMG sized weapon (perhaps with a limited supply of magazines that were more or less hand fitted to a particular firearm and serially numbered along with the firearm) might be a better way to provide some troops with more short range fire power. I suppose it could be a semi auto only weapon if there were concerns about ammo expenditure if full auto weapons were widely issued (semi auto also make sense if magazines were scarce and or hard to replace if they were lost in action..)

Maybe with suitable analysis one could conclude that issuing every private a high quality semi auto pistol such as a 1911 (along with a bolt action rifle) was worth the cost but it seems unlikely to me that early 20th century decision makers would have approved this.

Maybe small professional armies might have been more inclined to do something along these lines. (The BEF widely equipped with both rifles and 1911 style handguns and the same amount of emphasis put into pre war hand gun training that they historically put into pre war rifle training is an interesting thought although I doubt it would ever have actually occurred.)

Expecting pre WW1 conscripts to become tactically proficient with handguns along with learning everything else they need to learn during their training seems unlikely to me, but maybe a small professional force with long service times could expect to train at least some of their infantry to be able to use a handgun well enough to justify issuing them on a large scale. The ammo costs for training and the likely need to replace expensive worn out semi automatic hand guns during training might have also been seen as prohibitive.

In my view, basic SMG style weapons seem likely to be more viable for wide scale issue vis a vis the context of this fictional thread.
 
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