I will not send American boys to do the work

What if LBJ had decided against the Vietnam War draft? What influence would that have had on US public's view of the Vietnam War?
 
What if LBJ had decided against the Vietnam War draft? What influence would that have had on US public's view of the Vietnam War?

The draft was already on at the time, but the rate of draftees being inducted was increased because of the Vietnam conflict.
 
What if LBJ had decided against the Vietnam War draft? What influence would that have had on US public's view of the Vietnam War?

This would presumably mean calling up the reserves which is a POD I have seen mentioned by several US Army officers in their accounts of the war. Vietnam is stated to be the first war where the US did not use its reserve officers. The argument is that reserve officers can afford to speak out about problems whereas career men will have said career destroyed by doing so. The effects of the "Positive Reporting Policy" - don't report bad news - is an example often mentioned, also that Westmoreland was, arguably, letting tactics drive strategy rather than the other way around.

It would also make the war relevant to the slightly older men in the reserves who had a vote, unlike the teenage draftee's. That the war was not really a threat to anyone who did not have teenage sons is sometimes mentioned as one reason protesting it was mainly a teenage thing.

As mentioned there would still be draftee's, but a slightly older USARV on average, as well as the officers who were more likely to keep talking about problems even after it was made clear they would not have a military career afterwards. Supposedly the project to create the first tank was kept alive in British Army headquarters for a year by an officer who was a London Merchant Banker in civilian life for example.
 
What if LBJ had decided against the Vietnam War draft? What influence would that have had on US public's view of the Vietnam War?

What do you mean? Only sending voluntary enlistees to Vietnam? Draftees were intermingled throughout the Army, so that's not practical, unless some special commands were established.

Only sending men to Vietnam who volunteer or consent to go? That's even trickier.

Both policies reduce the strain and loss to the U.S. They also mean, IMHO, a higher quality of men in Vietnam, and much less problems with bad acts by U.S. troops there - which surely changes the popular view of the war.

If the second policy - it will be extremely difficult for the U.S. to deploy any large number of ground troops in Vietnam. There will be no question of U.S. forces winning the battles against the NVA/VC; instead it will be necessary to train up ARVN forces. Green Berets doing COIN will be more important as well.

If North Vietnam pushes with so many NVA that they threaten to win; more U.S. airpower, and more airpower against North Vietnam. Also, there may be opportunities for the U.S. to deploy ground troops in places like Khe Sanh and the Highlands and other places to provide secure bases and strongpoints, but not COIN.

The U.S. did train up ARVN to be much more effective in about two years. The problem was that MAC-V didn't really start on that until 1968, when it was already too late for U.S. morale.

The crunch would be in 1964-1967, with the NVA trying to hit hard, few U.S. troops to meet them, and ARVN not ready. A Tet-level offensive could come close to winning.
 
The crunch would be in 1964-1967, with the NVA trying to hit hard, few U.S. troops to meet them, and ARVN not ready. A Tet-level offensive could come close to winning.

Instead of being utterly crushed militarily, as it was IOTL.

Really, with the structure and doctrine of the U.S. military at that period of history, we had no choice but to use draftees.
 
IMO that is reshuffling deck chairs on the Lusitania.

I see y'all's point that militarily, relying on reservists who could speak out re: the nonsensical BS Westy imposed upon MACV might have had a salutary effect on the tactical situation and overall morale.


LSS, for the most impact on conducting the war, change the politics prompting an escalation and you neither need draftees nor get terribly creative militarily.

You'd need LBJ NOT to feel so cornered by his own sense of inferiority into escalating the war with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964.
Without that escalation, Nam was a backwater and not really that much of a drain on US resources.

JFK got to look like a studly Cold Warrior with the Cuban Missile Crisis before his assassination.
LBJ OTOH was on the back foot re: foreign policy b/c he didn't trust JFK's leftovers in the Cabinet nor was he in the loop on foreign affairs until he swore in.
Even when he was briefed, remember the whiz kids he dealt with were totally flummoxed by guerrilla warfare and had zero idea what Vietnam's cultures and history motivated their politics and didn't care, figuring America could overwhelm them with firepower and goodies.

Despite some spectacular strategic blunders, the US didn't lose the battles b/c it didn't commit enough resources, more they committed way too much.
 
My father a USAF officer & WWII vet was more than a bit puzzled when it was clear reservists would not be called up in significant numbers. In retrospect that looks like the first step leading to his opposition to that war. At the time, circa 1966, he made it clear he thought it a serious mistake not to activate reservists sufficient to expand the Army for a decisive intervention.

... The effects of the "Positive Reporting Policy" - don't report bad news - is an example often mentioned, also that Westmoreland was, arguably, letting tactics drive strategy rather than the other way around.

Dont get me started. Wading through Westmorlands auto biography made it clear where one of the major problems in US leadership was.

As mentioned there would still be draftee's, but a slightly older USARV on average, as well as the officers who were more likely to keep talking about problems even after it was made clear they would not have a military career afterwards. Supposedly the project to create the first tank was kept alive in British Army headquarters for a year by an officer who was a London Merchant Banker in civilian life for example.

A example of what reservists can do would be Dolittle. It is little known he originally held a reserve comission, left the US Army Air Corps circa 1929 and was a reserve officer for the next decade. Despite that he went from LtCol in 1942 to General in 1943 and commanded sucessively two of the USAAFs most high profiled bomber commands. His autobiography is illuminating.

Aside from the afore mentioned benefit of reservists calling out the BS the over promotion/thinning of the NCO & company grade officer ranks would be avoided. With the influx of draftees the NCO ranks were spread too thin, and the junior officers were either drawn upwards to fill out battalion & brigade staff or spread as thinly as the NCOs in the companies. The NCO situation became worse as overworked and demoralized career men left at ten, twelve years rather than the minimum twenty, and those who did reach twenty left enmass rather than stay on as Master Sgts or Sgt Majors.
 
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