I gave my Life to save the Peace in Our Time

Munich 30 September 1938.
All the documents have been signed, Chamberlain and Daladier think that an agreement has been reached, Hitler try hard not to laugh, Mussolini claims to be the brilliant diplomat who managed to engineer a solution saving the Peace in Our Times.
(Benes is swearing seven kinds of hell, but who cares? he's in Prague).

The four (C,D,H and M) are shaking hands and posing for official photos.

Mussolini has an heart attack.

He realizes he's dying and, being the peacock he is, want to be remembered and respected as a great political man.
With his last dying breath he admonishes all to respect the pact that "he" was able to arrange, while fixing Hitler's eyes.
(he was a good actor and a good orator when he wanted to).
Then he dies.

Hitler is moved, since at the time he respected M very much and felt in debt with him for the anschluss affair.
Not that he has any intention of respecting Munich, but his plans have to be at least postponed, since:
1) all the affair went in front of a lot of newspapermen and the news will be the main article for the next month: there is simply no political space to go around it for a while.
2) next month he will be forced to attend to M funeral in Rome (and C and D will be as well), and he will have to praise his efforts for peace
3) if he want to have simpathies in right-wing groups (hungarians, etc), he cannot go at once in the opposite direction of the path suggested by "holy leader of fascism" :)D) with his last words.

Not that he has any intention to keep his word, but operations must be delayed a bit.
let's say spring 1940

(too late? too early? comment)

What the consequence of no-war-for-two-years?
(that means: germany get sudetenland, but does not occupies Czecho-Slovakia nor Poland: only diplomatical actions until spring 1940).

Would H be able to occupy prague in may 1940?
Would be wiser to move toward danzig?
How would the western/eastern powers react?

I believe the senario you lay out would actually help Germany.

1) If Hitler cannot go right for the rump state of Czechoslovakia, then his eye must turn to Danzig. He wants an alliance with the Polish miliary dictatorship against the USSR (Communism being his ultimate enemy and the Western Democracies just a side show). H is not going to war with Poland while the Czechs are still in his rear. So it would be a strong diplomatic push not military. H might get the corridor he wants; the argument about German population and traditional German territoy is strong. And if he does get the corridor, then an eventual German-Polish Anti-Communist allaince becomes a near certain.

2) Even if one accepts that the entire German economy is based on nothing more that gearing up for war, this is nothing to indicate that the war has to come by 1939. Most of the military agreed on a war start from 1944-1948. Any delay that allows the German miliarty more time to build up is good for them.

3) After Munich the Slovaks will begin thinking about independence even if H does not occupy the rest of the Czech nation. The Germans were decent enough at eastern Eruopean diplomacy; I think they could covertly stir up a strong Slovak independence movement.

4) After Munich, the Czech nation lies open to attack, the Sudeten defenses are gone. The Czechs ahve seen thier allies desert them. Who knows, depending on how things shake out, they may willingly fall into the Axis sphere.

Yes, I do think this would leave Germany in a much better position that OTL.
 

Dangerous waters there, jewish population in 1933 Germany was 500 000 while German one was +60 000 000.

Having written my M.A.-thesis on "Die Auswanderungsberatungsstelle Münster 1929-38" (Emigration Consulting Agency - yes, such things exist) I am quite aware of these numbers.

In how far dangerous waters? The "Reichsfluchtsteuer" (Refugee Tax), introduced in 1931 to prevent capital drain brought a revenue of ca. 1 million RM p.a. prior to 1933.

The NS-government systematically used it to make (predominantly Jewish) emigrees leave behind most of their wealth. In 1938, the revenue peaked at 342 million RM, altogether this tax brought almost a billion during the 3rd Reich.

Additionally, the Jewish population in Germany had to pay about 1.12 billion RM in 1938/39 after the progrome of November 9th as so called "Judenvermögensabgabe" (Jewish Wealth Fee) of 20% of one's overall wealth above 5000 RM.

The complete tax income of the Reich in 1938 had been about 17-18 billion RM.

So....as to me the numbers say that less than 1% of the German population paid, within two years 1938/39 an extra sum (additional to ordinary taxation) which amounts to almost 10% of the 1938 budget.

That doesn't finance the complete re-armament, but it is quite a feat, still.

----

The Gold Reserves of the Austrian National Bank amounted to three times the German Gold Reserves at the time of the Anschluss. Sure, Germany's reserves were depleted at the time, but Germany had 10 times the population of Austria...
 
I believe the senario you lay out would actually help Germany.

Well thought out, I would like to make a few additions though.

1) If Hitler cannot go right for the rump state of Czechoslovakia, then his eye must turn to Danzig. He wants an alliance with the Polish miliary dictatorship against the USSR (Communism being his ultimate enemy and the Western Democracies just a side show).

The ultimate goal though is Lebensraum, the empire in the East. And Poland is as much in the way of it as it can be. I simply cannot see it work in the long run. I cannot even see Barbarossa as an aggressive plan to destroy the Sovjet Union with an independant Poland as Germany's ally. Maybe if they subjugate themselves which I can't see happening.

If Poland gives Danzig and the corridor to Hitler in September 1939, they will simply be attacked in March 1940.

H is not going to war with Poland while the Czechs are still in his rear.

In a way yes, but consider what you wrote in #3&4. Also, how good is the Czech potential for an offensive?

2) Even if one accepts that the entire German economy is based on nothing more that gearing up for war, this is nothing to indicate that the war has to come by 1939. Most of the military agreed on a war start from 1944-1948. Any delay that allows the German miliarty more time to build up is good for them.

Yes and no. It depends a lot about when appeasement dies. Also, time plays in favour of the Sovjet Union which has to recover from the purges.

3) After Munich the Slovaks will begin thinking about independence even if H does not occupy the rest of the Czech nation. The Germans were decent enough at eastern Eruopean diplomacy; I think they could covertly stir up a strong Slovak independence movement.

4) After Munich, the Czech nation lies open to attack, the Sudeten defenses are gone. The Czechs ahve seen thier allies desert them. Who knows, depending on how things shake out, they may willingly fall into the Axis sphere.

Absolutely right. By March 1939, the 2nd Republic wase very much on the way to accomodate itself into the German sphere of influence. Both, the Czech as well as the Slovak part gradually, but quickly turned more and more authoritarian.
 
Also, time plays in favour of the Sovjet Union which has to recover from the purges

Which also gives more time for Germany, and in particular Hitler, to realise just how big the Red Army is. In 1941, they thought Russia had 200-240 divisions. By the end of 1941, they had already fought 300. Hitler often said that if he'd known how much manpower the Soviets could put in the field, he wouldn't have invaded (although whether he meant this is debateable; he was warned about the size of their military).

I also agree with your other point, that Poland is basically stuffed.
 
Well thought out, I would like to make a few additions though.

The ultimate goal though is Lebensraum, the empire in the East. And Poland is as much in the way of it as it can be. I simply cannot see it work in the long run. I cannot even see Barbarossa as an aggressive plan to destroy the Sovjet Union with an independant Poland as Germany's ally. Maybe if they subjugate themselves which I can't see happening.

If Poland gives Danzig and the corridor to Hitler in September 1939, they will simply be attacked in March 1940.

I should have been more specific: the Poland I was envisioning in the Axis was a Polish version of Romania under the iron Guard or Hungary under the ArrowCross.

As for barbarosa, any campaign truly based on "Lebensraum" is doomed to failure. If Poland is not completely wiped off the map, rather turned into a Pro-Axis dictatorship based on the polish ethnic group, then Barbarosa can become a crusade against Communism and all the old lands of the USSR could get the same treatment.
 
I should have been more specific: the Poland I was envisioning in the Axis was a Polish version of Romania under the iron Guard or Hungary under the ArrowCross.

As for barbarosa, any campaign truly based on "Lebensraum" is doomed to failure. If Poland is not completely wiped off the map, rather turned into a Pro-Axis dictatorship based on the polish ethnic group, then Barbarosa can become a crusade against Communism and all the old lands of the USSR could get the same treatment.

Part of the problem with Poland is that many of the Prussians who make up so much of the German High Command had their family estates on territory that in 1939 is within the Polish borders. For instance, in Guderian's memoirs, he mentions his joy at 'liberating' his old family lands.

Although a Polish version of Hungary is an interesting idea. But wasn't Poland a military dictatorship anyway (or am I confusing them with somewhere else?)

Barbarossa only succeeds if the Russians surrender. Not the Communists, the Russian people. Barbarossa might have caused Communism to collapse but whether the Russians then stop fighting is highly unlikely, probably in partisan groups. Personally, I think that the only way the Germans win in Russia is if they get all the way to the Bering Strait!

The Soviets had a Scorched Earth policy. As they retreated, they burnt all the crops, leading to HUGE famines in the occupied areas. There was just about enough left to feed the German Army. Any ethnic or anti-Communist states the Germans create would collapse, as the Germans would be unable to feed the poplulation.
 
Part of the problem with Poland is that many of the Prussians who make up so much of the German High Command had their family estates on territory that in 1939 is within the Polish borders. For instance, in Guderian's memoirs, he mentions his joy at 'liberating' his old family lands.

Although a Polish version of Hungary is an interesting idea. But wasn't Poland a military dictatorship anyway (or am I confusing them with somewhere else?)

Barbarossa only succeeds if the Russians surrender. Not the Communists, the Russian people. Barbarossa might have caused Communism to collapse but whether the Russians then stop fighting is highly unlikely, probably in partisan groups. Personally, I think that the only way the Germans win in Russia is if they get all the way to the Bering Strait!

The Soviets had a Scorched Earth policy. As they retreated, they burnt all the crops, leading to HUGE famines in the occupied areas. There was just about enough left to feed the German Army. Any ethnic or anti-Communist states the Germans create would collapse, as the Germans would be unable to feed the poplulation.

The strategy I am referring to is one of offering liberation to the ethnic/nationalists that made up the USSR. Win the people over, do not drive them away. Enter the USSR a liberators (do what you will later maybe).
 
The strategy I am referring to is one of offering liberation to the ethnic/nationalists that made up the USSR. Win the people over, do not drive them away. Enter the USSR a liberators (do what you will later maybe).

Yes, I see your argument. But there was not enough food so policy kind of becomes irrelevant. Although pretending to liberate them from Communism and then turning on them when the situation is secure is a viable option. As long as the situation becomes secure relatively quickly (ie if the Soviets are beaten quickly). Which is unlikely as there are simply too many of them.

The Germans don't have the logistical ability to defeat Russia: the more troops they put in the field, the fewer there are available to run the transport and supply network necessary to keep them in the field. German troops didnt freeze in the winter because there was no winter clothing; they froze because the winter clothing couldn't be delivered to the front lines without something else being held back: ammunition, food, fuel etc.

The problem is, the guys in charge were Nazis. Viable options weren't really their forte. But if they weren't Nazis, there's no Barbarossa in the first place.
 
In how far dangerous waters?

That the jews where richer, owned Germany, of course. Who made the most studies on how much money they had?

I think that the only way the Germans win in Russia is if they get all the way to the Bering Strait!

Incorrect, only in the 1950s did the Siberian wastes become economically exploitable, had axis forces reached the AA line then industrial activity would have been crippled.
That scenario hovewer, is itself difficult unless the axis came up with 1950s technologies.

H is not going to war with Poland while the Czechs are still in his rear.

4) After Munich, the Czech nation lies open to attack, the Sudeten defenses are gone.

Ah.
 
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Incorrect, only in the 1950s did the Siberian wastes become economically exploitable, had axis forces reached the AA line then industrial activity would have been crippled.
That scenario hovewer, is itself difficult unless the axis came up with 1950s technologies.

Sorry, wrong.

There is a fairly substantial gap between the AA line and the Siberian wastes. The Soviets dismantled much of their heavy industry (more than 2,500 factories) and rebuilt it beyond the Urals in 1941-42, as well as moving and supplying 25 million people to staff, supply and guard them. In many ways, that was THE outstanding achievement of the war, greater even than winning it. In one factory, 8000 women had to live in holes dug in the ground. These are people who are not just going to give up as soon as things start to go wrong.
 
Sorry, wrong.

There is a fairly substantial gap between the AA line and the Siberian wastes. The Soviets dismantled much of their heavy industry (more than 2,500 factories) and rebuilt it beyond the Urals in 1941-42, as well as moving and supplying 25 million people to staff, supply and guard them. In many ways, that was THE outstanding achievement of the war, greater even than winning it. In one factory, 8000 women had to live in holes dug in the ground. These are people who are not just going to give up as soon as things start to go wrong.

You're right regarding the industrial factor, but it is debatable if with moscow fallen the Stalin enturage would have resisted.

Even not considering Moscow's importance as a communication hub, the psicological impact would be devastating, and the soviet regime did NOT have centuries of tradition to legitimate its rule as the Zar in 1812.
A new government would most probably made some sort of peace (at least to affirm his existance with a decision, even if a Brest-Litovsk-like one).

Obviously this does not cover the problem if the germans were actually able to reach the AA line
 
You're right regarding the industrial factor, but it is debatable if with moscow fallen the Stalin enturage would have resisted.

Even not considering Moscow's importance as a communication hub, the psicological impact would be devastating, and the soviet regime did NOT have centuries of tradition to legitimate its rule as the Zar in 1812.
A new government would most probably made some sort of peace (at least to affirm his existance with a decision, even if a Brest-Litovsk-like one).

Obviously this does not cover the problem if the germans were actually able to reach the AA line

The problem with Barbarossa is that it was based on the idea that when Communism collapses (after 3 to 5 months!), the Russians stop fighting.

I don't see this happening. If the Soviet regime does collapse, the army just takes over. Hitler confused the Communist political system with the actual Russian nation. Russians are not only extremely tough fighters, but also rather patriotic. There were also a lot of them.

The other point is, the AA line. Do the Russians recognise it? It's just a line on a map drawn by Hitler, I'm not aware of it having any real value. I also don't see the Germans holding it against any counter-attacks given that all their supplies, and most of their artillery, would be hundreds of miles behind the front line, being pulled by horses, and avoiding several million cut-off Russian soldiers.
 
Yes, I see your argument. But there was not enough food so policy kind of becomes irrelevant. Although pretending to liberate them from Communism and then turning on them when the situation is secure is a viable option. As long as the situation becomes secure relatively quickly (ie if the Soviets are beaten quickly). Which is unlikely as there are simply too many of them.

The Germans don't have the logistical ability to defeat Russia: the more troops they put in the field, the fewer there are available to run the transport and supply network necessary to keep them in the field. German troops didnt freeze in the winter because there was no winter clothing; they froze because the winter clothing couldn't be delivered to the front lines without something else being held back: ammunition, food, fuel etc.

The problem is, the guys in charge were Nazis. Viable options weren't really their forte. But if they weren't Nazis, there's no Barbarossa in the first place.

No it isnt! Only people living in the areas the Soviets annexed in 1940 welcomed the Germans and even then that was mostly confined to the Baltic States as people in Westren Ukraine were hostile to the Germans as well as the Soviets.

The idea that the Nazi's could set up pro-Axis puppet states or even gain a large Measure of willing support (rather than drafting starving Soviet POWs etc who’d be dead otherwise) is an ABS fantasy, born of Cold War agi-prop.

The people living the U.S.S.R were not witless,they knew what the Germans were about right from the start. Even if the Axs forces are less brutal it wont change much
 
No it isnt! Only people living in the areas the Soviets annexed in 1940 welcomed the Germans and even then that was mostly confined to the Baltic States as people in Westren Ukraine were hostile to the Germans as well as the Soviets.

The idea that the Nazi's could set up pro-Axis puppet states or even gain a large Measure of willing support (rather than drafting starving Soviet POWs etc who’d be dead otherwise) is an ABS fantasy, born of Cold War agi-prop.

The people living the U.S.S.R were not witless,they knew what the Germans were about right from the start. Even if the Axs forces are less brutal it wont change much

I am afraid you are wrong on that.
Germans were initially welcomed both in parts of ukraine an od in caucasus.
As an example (which has tragical consequances even today), cecenia was de-populated by Stalin because of the support the separatist gave to germans (Cucasus=>Siberia) and only after de-stalinization people was allowed to return (Siberia=>Caucarus)
(the fact was, thruth to tell, amplified by Stalin paranoia)
Basically, almost every non-russo nationality saw in the german invasion the opportutity to establish a national independent government.
Of course, most of them saw how big of a misunderstanding that was
 
I am afraid you are wrong on that.
Germans were initially welcomed both in parts of ukraine an od in caucasus.
As an example (which has tragical consequances even today), cecenia was de-populated by Stalin because of the support the separatist gave to germans (Cucasus=>Siberia) and only after de-stalinization people was allowed to return (Siberia=>Caucarus)
(the fact was, thruth to tell, amplified by Stalin paranoia)
Basically, almost every non-russo nationality saw in the german invasion the opportutity to establish a national independent government.
Of course, most of them saw how big of a misunderstanding that was

Uh, the uprising in Checenya long pre-dated the German invasion and the Germans didnt give them much help, also more to the point Chechnya has less than a million people in 1942. Even then many Chencens fougth in the Red Army.

Your flat out wrong the non-Russian nationalities in the pre-1940 borders were overwhelmingly loyal to the U.S.S.R only small numbers of quislings would help the Germans because you find sleazy collaborators everywhere truth be told. In the newly annex areas of the U.S.S.R the Ukrainian nationalists were hostile to the Germans too, the Baltic states give the Germans a degree of support and westrn Belarus was a hotbed of partisan actively.

Whatever else the Germans do they wont get widespread support from the locals, whatever they do. Even allowing to get up their own little puppets states with pretty flags etc wont do the trick. As most peoples in the U.S.S.R were *gasp* fairly happy to remain in the Union, even if they throught Stalin himself was a monster.
 
Uh, the uprising in Checenya long pre-dated the German invasion and the Germans didnt give them much help, also more to the point Chechnya has less than a million people in 1942. Even then many Chencens fougth in the Red Army.

Your flat out wrong the non-Russian nationalities in the pre-1940 borders were overwhelmingly loyal to the U.S.S.R only small numbers of quislings would help the Germans because you find sleazy collaborators everywhere truth be told. In the newly annex areas of the U.S.S.R the Ukrainian nationalists were hostile to the Germans too, the Baltic states give the Germans a degree of support and westrn Belarus was a hotbed of partisan actively.

Whatever else the Germans do they wont get widespread support from the locals, whatever they do. Even allowing to get up their own little puppets states with pretty flags etc wont do the trick. As most peoples in the U.S.S.R were *gasp* fairly happy to remain in the Union, even if they throught Stalin himself was a monster.

Of course the Russo-Checenya tension pre-dated 1941: this was precisely one of the reasons for the beginning of deportations before the german arrived in the area. (by the way, that did not exactly put them in a loyalist frame of mind).
I do not pretend you to trust my words: there are a lot of documents about non-russo nationalists giving support to the germans; several even followed them duting their retreat into central europe and were used by the germans as occupation troops.
In eastern italy (which the germans occupied after the armistice in 1943) people remember the german-allied kazhaks and south-ukranian occupation troops even in the present days.
Of course, everywhere there is an invasion, you will find also a collaborationist, but there was indeed much insoddisfaction in the 1941 CCCP border fringes, both for economical (collectivization), and for etnical (russian vs. caucasus and/or ukraine) motivations
 
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