Man Halleck is useless even in TTL
The Confederacy's greatest asset?
Sure seems like that sometimes.
Man Halleck is useless even in TTL
The Confederacy's greatest asset?
Sure seems like that sometimes.
He was a first rate clerk. Not good for much else.If he spent more time on logistics and less time fighting better generals in his own ranks he would’ve been much better off
Hooker may have to try pushing his way south the hard way.What are the current troop strengths and dispositions in the East? Does Hooker have something up his sleeve, like perhaps a slide to the East or is he going to try to bull doze ahead? How about another peminslar campaign? Or how about a corps advance up the James and another Corps to advance from NC north. Does the Union have the men for this and a strong front south of the Rappahanic?
Bruce Catton said it best:The idea of pushing against the James with a corps from the James is good and all, but doing it with a corps or two of the Army of the Potomac would cause Halleck to reject the idea immediately. Halleck was a student of Jomini, and was obsessed with the concept of ‘force concentration’. To detach a corps or two from the AotP and plant it a rather great distance would be a violation of the concept according to Halleck. Halleck would be shouting about how Hooker would be defeated in detail since Lee has the lines of the interior. It would be impossible to convince Halleck to do so.
Hooker, I think, would have enough political savvy to realize that. How Hooker plans future operations will be interesting to see.Although the Peninsula route is the best route to attack Richmond, reviving the idea of the Peninsula Campaign will infuriate the Republicans as McClellan’s failure tainted the route in the eyes of the Republicans. There were several McClellanites like Sedgwick and officers like John Gibbon who were convinced that the Peninsula was the right route to capture Rochmond, but politics prevented them from executing another Peninsula Campaign.
Have you forgotten what was going on the Western Theater at the time of Chancellorsville? Sherman is still a Corps commander in Grant’s Army of the Tennessee, which is in the middle of Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign. By the time anyone considers calling up forces from Grant’s army, the Army of the Tennessee will be besieging Vicksburg and need more corps to complete the siege.Grab a corps from the western armies if you have to. Or heck, grab 3 (Not like we need Sherman to do work if Richmond falls). Then use one on the James and add the others to the main body.
Neither side of the ACW ever launched mass cavalry charges (a la Waterloo), cavalry action tended to be more of dismounted action. The only time I can remember a cavalry charge on infantry outside of 1864-65 was Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth’s charge on Day 3 of Gettysburg that ended in disaster.make good use of his cavalry, and perhaps overrun some union batteries in pitched battles
Have you forgotten what was going on the Western Theater at the time of Chancellorsville? Sherman is still a Corps commander in Grant’s Army of the Tennessee, which is in the middle of Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign. By the time anyone considers calling up forces from Grant’s army, the Army of the Tennessee will be besieging Vicksburg and need more corps to complete the siege.
Meanwhile, Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland is still getting ready for the Tullahoma Campaign and Burnside’s Department of the Ohio (IIRC) is preparing to invade East Tennessee (although Grant’s siege of Vicksburg will require IX Corps from Burnside).
Neither side of the ACW ever launched mass cavalry charges (a la Waterloo), cavalry action tended to be more of dismounted action. The only time I can remember a cavalry charge on infantry outside of 1864-65 was Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth’s charge on Day 3 of Gettysburg that ended in disaster.
My point was that there were no corps in the Western Theater that were available to be sent off to the Eastern Theater.I knew Sherman was a crops commander, but I meant the units that would have eventually OTL Sherman would have led
Some lessons Hooker should learn from Chancellorsville:Quick little update jumping ahead on the situation in the West, not much difference from OTL. I'll try to answer some of your questions on Hooker's plans in the next update. Feel free to post any ideas or thoughts, I'd love to hear them. Thanks.![]()
Farragut was also pushing repeatedly for an attack on Mobile also. If Hooker cannot cancel the RR Campaign, maybe work out a deal where Mobile is attacked by Grant and Farragut, then send forces to Louisiana for the Red River.Grant constantly advocated for an expedition against Mobile from Lake Pontchartrain throughout August-September to Halleck. Although Halleck was for the option, he had to reject it on grounds that Lincoln’s desire to regain Texas, presumably to protect it from the machinations of Napoleon III of France. Given that Grant couldn’t convince Lincoln of aborting the Red River Campaign in 1864, I doubt Hooker could convince Lincoln to cancel it.
Considering Jackson's corps would have been badly mauled by the Union stand and counterattack, Longstreet's Corps has to be the core of the rebuilt ANV. Lee simply cannot spare this Corps.With the casualties of Chancellorsville being higher than OTL, I think Longstreet’s Corps will not be available for Bragg’s use at Chickamauga. It is unknown if Bragg was even aware of the fact that Longstreet’s Corps was reinforcing him until September 12, the earliest surviving dispatch to Bragg that Longstreet’s Corps was being forwarded to him. Given that Bragg had launched thrown some offensive movements against Rosecrans before September 12, Bragg might still decide to fight it out with Rosecrans.
I see no "may" about it; securing the Valley would secure Hooker's right flank and make it harder for Lee to turn him.With the Union setback in the Valley, Hooker may be interested in securing the Valley. To do so, 30,000 (the size of 2-3 Corps) is the maximum size of the invasion force due to the nature of logistics in the Valley. Hooker would probably use his main force to demonstrate against Lee’s position at North Anna and possibly attack Lee if he decides to detach some soldiers to save the Valley.
With Hooker on the North Anna, Lee's priority IMHO will be to try to push Hooker back north away from Richmond to give himself some breathing room. Davis will have no problem with something like this.On the other hand, Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia would be less overconfident than they were at Gettysburg. Lee, the aggressive general that he is, may find a need to regain the initiative from Hooker. Lee’s favorite form of attack was the ‘turning movement’, although trying to execute a turning movement against Hooker’s camps would take him north to Pennsylvania (I’m assuming that Hooker will position himself nearby Fredericksburg). Lee had always been interested in the idea of a vigorous counterattack, even before the Chancellorsville campaign. However, with his defeat at Chancellorsville, Davis (probably) will not approve of such a campaign.
Ewell will be facing Sedgwick in the Valley; Sedgwick was adored by his troops and respected by his peers; however, I'd argue his actual performance as corps commander was mediocre. Ewell was an excellent division commander, the unsung hero of Jackson’s Valley Campaign; however, Ewell proved to be a mediocre Corps commander, while he proved to be a good operationalist, his tactical performance were all mediocre (though the criticism of Ewell at Gettysburg tends to be undeserved). So the Valley Campaign will be fought by two rather mediocre commanders, though Sedgwick has the advantage of numerical superiority and Ewell knows the ground very well. An interesting fight to see.
I have to agree with you on both points. Having visited several history forums before, I am rather surprised by the very positive opinion of Sedgwick’s abilities held by many people. I mean, Sedgwick had only been engaged in two major battles as a corps commander:At Second Fredericksburg (and Salem Church), he handled his men competently but with timidity, he was unengaged at Gettysburg but he spearheaded the pursuit of Lee's army, and fought well in some minor engagements, but failed to bring them to bay. His next real battle was the Wilderness, where Sedgwick's right flank got surprised and routed by John Brown Gordon. Following that, he was killed at Spotsylvania.Yeah Sedgwick doesn't seem to have been very effective his tardiness cost Hooker in OTL. Ewell, I read through Pfanz's bio on him a while ago. Ewell did well enough at the Wilderness and Chaffin's Farm but Spotsylvania was not a good day. I would take him over A.P. Hill but Longstreet and Jackson seem far superior.
With his army now rested, Hooker looked to again take the offensive. He would formulate his plans while the campaign in the Shenandoah wrapped up. Hooker wanted to make sure everything was in order before attempting to take the Confederate capital. The Shenandoah must be cleared before any operations could begin. He did not want a repeat of the 62 campaign where Jackson from the Valley was able to threaten Washington and prevent much needed manpower from reaching McClellan. Sedgwick was making progress but it would still be sometime before the fighting concluded.
I have to agree; TTL's 1863 Valley Campaign should be very interesting. I would imagine Ewell will want to emulate Jackson using superior mobility and knowledge of the Valley to wrongfoot Sedgwick. Sedgwick will likely use superior numbers to press Ewell. This campaign would warrant a chapter.I see Hooker has opted to wait for Sedgwick to finish off Ewell in the Valley before making a move to the Chickahominy. Unless Hooker is throwing feints against the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee may detach a few brigades to Ewell to aid him in his fight with Sedgwick.
Ewell will be facing Sedgwick in the Valley; Sedgwick was adored by his troops and respected by his peers; however, I'd argue his actual performance as corps commander was mediocre. Ewell was an excellent division commander, the unsung hero of Jackson’s Valley Campaign; however, Ewell proved to be a mediocre Corps commander, while he proved to be a good operationalist, his tactical performance were all mediocre (though the criticism of Ewell at Gettysburg tends to be undeserved). So the Valley Campaign will be fought by two rather mediocre commanders, though Sedgwick has the advantage of numerical superiority and Ewell knows the ground very well. An interesting fight to see.
Considering the disdain many in Lincoln's cabinet hold for McClellan, I'm not surprised. I would imagine Hooker will want to use strategy similar to his previous battle to catch Lee off guard; however, Lee will be looking out for such a feint.The ultimate question Hooker now faced was how to go about attacking Richmond. The debate between the overland march and the amphibious landing again came to the forefront. Many of the pro McClellan old guard favored a landing on the style of the Peninsula campaign. After Fredericksburg, General Franklin had made this argument to the President and many officers seemed to agree with him. The plan had many merits it would bypass the main Confederate defensive line and give quicker access to the city.
Lincoln however was adamant about the overland route and the need to provide maximum protection for Washington. Hooker for the most part agreed with the President. He recalled how vulnerable the army was in 62, outbreaks of disease, threats to its supply lines and its near destruction. He did not want a repeat of that demoralizing experience. It was decided the attack would be made overland. The army, now some 105,000 men, would thrust to the Chickahominy and with superior firepower, in particulate its heavy guns, grind the roughly 65,000 Confederate defenders down.
Despite dismissing the idea of sending the AoP to the Peninsula, Hooker still had other plans for this route. To distract from his main effort, Hooker hope to effectively coordinate with General John Dix's Department of Virginia. It was hoped that he could make a lunge at West Point and maybe even threaten Richmond itself. However even if it looked promising Hooker did not put too much hope in this plan portion of the plan. General Dix was an older officer who hadn't shown much in the way of aggression thus far in the war, his approach would surely be a cautious one.
I wonder if Hooker will try to get a younger officer to command an Army of the James built around those two corps.....considering Dix's age and lack of field experience, Hooker may want a younger and more vigorous Commander to command such a campaign.The plan for Gen. Dix to throw feints against Richmond is the same as the one in Gettysburg. For the most part, I expect Lee to detach a brigade or two to appease Davis and Richmond. A minor nitpick here, Dix did not have 32,000 men in the Peninsula, but rather 32,000 men split between the Peninsula (IIRC IV Corps) and the area around Suffolk and Norfolk (VII Corps).
If Hooker successfully reaches the Chickahominy, then he can link up the IV Corps and sort of count them in for his campaign against Richmond.